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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 ―THE DARKEST AND BLOODIEST OF ALL THE DARK AND BLOODY FEUD 
COUNTIES OF THIS STATE‖: VIOLENCE AND PLACE                                              
IN BREATHITT COUNTY, KENTUCKY 
 
―The means used to achieve political goals are more often than not                                                                       
of greater relevance to the future world than the intended goals.‖1 
-Hannah Arendt 
On Violence 
 
 
―Kentucky Lawyer Shot‖ read one headline on the first page of the New York 
Times‘s May 5, 1903 edition.  James B. Marcum, attorney, U.S. Commissioner and 
Republican power broker was the victim of assassination by a then unidentified assailant 
in front of the courthouse in Jackson, the county seat of Breathitt County, Kentucky.  
Marcum was a Breathitt County native and, in his forty five years, he had risen through 
the requisite political ranks and standards of social achievement.  His career epitomized 
the more optimistic estimations of the upper South and, more particularly, those of the 
Kentucky mountains at the turn of the century.  In his capacity as corporate attorney, he 
represented a modest sized railroad, one that was working harder than any other at the 
time to connect the craggy Cumberland Plateau to the commercial centers beyond the 
mountains, hauling out the region‘s coal and hardwood while delivering opportunities for 
education, culture and technology.  As a Republican native of a traditionally Democratic 
county, he personified the vigorous two-party competition enjoyed in Kentucky but 
                                                 
1
Hannah Arendt.  On Violence.  (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970): p. 4.  
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dwindling in most of the other southern states.  Many Kentuckians probably considered 
his death not only a ghastly crime but an affront to progress itself.          
 Outside of Kentucky, Marcum‘s murder might have just been another quotidian 
newspaper item had it not been for the notoriety of the locale in which it happened.  
Times readers who were familiar with the name ‗Breathitt County‘ before reading this 
article were probably less than shocked in learning of Marcum‘s assassination.  Isolated 
and poor, Jackson, Kentucky had been the site of well-publicized violence since the 
tumult of Reconstruction in the 1870s.  In the following decade, prolonged periods of 
white intraracial violence in other Kentucky counties established the state as an 
abnormally brutal area, a reputation that fed the state‘s notoriety but was ultimately 
limited to its highlands.  Once its unruliness was imitated by surrounding counties, 
Breathitt County was no longer one peculiar locality that seemed oddly married to 
violence; it was part of a larger trend among mountain Kentuckians and, by extension, 
white southern mountaineers en masse.  The idea of the ―mountain feud‖ was given birth, 
and, even though it was overshadowed in popular memory by other tales of mountain 
violence (especially the idiomatic ―Hatfield-McCoy feud‖), Breathitt County was 
remembered as ―the darkest and bloodiest of all the dark and bloody feud counties‖ in 
Kentucky.
2
     
By the time of Marcum‘s death his home territory had already been indelibly 
associated with what appeared to be an institutionalized (or perhaps ―natural‖) form of 
reciprocal violence acted out among a population increasingly distinguishable from other 
                                                 
2
James Patrick Kirby.  Selected Articles on Criminal Justice.  (New York and London: H.W. 
Wilson, 1926): p. 101. 
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white southerners and categorized as ―mountain whites.‖3  ―Bloody Breathitt‖ epitomized 
feud, a term for conflict that originated far from the Kentucky uplands but, through a 
combination of fact and fiction, took on a historical and geographical specificity that 
permanently associated the word with the southern highlands and contributed to the idea 
of ―Appalachia‖ as a region distinctive from the rest of the South.  The widely-perceived 
proliferation of a form of blood feud in the region also helped to establish the 
impoverished mountain white as not only a target of reform but also a bizarre 
anthropological rarity.
4
  The white intraracial violence seen there was attributed to the 
region‘s isolated insularity, and it became popular among both mountaineers nearby, and 
their critics from elsewhere, to contrast Kentucky‘s ―feud belt‖ with the ―outside world.‖5   
But, aside from its redefinition of mountain whites, feud redefined violence as 
well.  The term conveyed a place ―at the bottom of the cultural heap,‖ trapped in a distant 
past in which violence had motives based upon revenge, kinship-based honor and 
ritualized reciprocation, a society existing in the present but lower on the ―temporal 
                                                 
3White southerners from the section‘s steepest uplands were first identified as a culturally 
―peculiar‖ population at least as early as 1873.  But various pieces of literature had begun to recognize a 
discernible distinction between communities in the upland and lowland South decades earlier.  See Charles 
Fenno Hoffman.  A Winter in the West: By a New Yorker, in Two Volumes (Vol. II).  (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1835); John Alexander Williams.  Appalachia: a History.  (Chapel Hill and London: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2002): pp. 197-198; Alan Batteau.  The Invention of Appalachia.  (Tucson: The 
University of Arizona Press, 1990):  pp. 29-37; Henry Shapiro.  Appalachia on Our Mind: the Southern 
Mountains and Mountaineers in the American Consciousness, 1870-1920.  (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1978): p. 275. 
 
4
John A. Williams.  Appalachia: A History.  (Chapel Hill and London: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2002): p. 199; Altina Waller.  Feud: Hatfields, McCoys, and Social Change in Appalachia, 
1860-1900.  (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988): pp. 166-168.     
 
5Contrasts between Breathitt County and the ―outside world‖ were drawn by a multitude of writers 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  The earliest one that I have been able to find, a published account 
of rail lines under construction in eastern Kentucky, dates from 1887; Young Ewing Allison.  The City of 
Louisville and a Glimpse of Kentucky.  (Louisville: Committee on industrial and commercial improvement 
of the Louisville board of trade, 1887): p. 44.     
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hierarchy.‖6  It was, as in political scientist John Keane‘s Aristotolean analogy, a product 
of ―pre-political realm of the oikos [the family] and the extra-political ‗barbarian‘ world 
beyond the polis [the state].‖7  The word suggested a sense of order and decorum that 
users of post-Civil War violence rarely employed.  Feuds were an ordered condition of 
violence, though one that was troublingly archaic, that prevents the escalation of killing 
beyond commonly accepted limitations.
8
  Perhaps most importantly, the use of feud to 
describe violent relationships dictated that they would be deemed strictly horizontal, 
                                                 
6For the ―hierarchies of place‖ that place certain locales ―at the bottom of the cultural heap,‖ see 
Barbara Ching and Gerald W. Creed, ―Recognizing Rusticity: Identity and the Power of Place,‖ in Ching 
and Creed (eds.), Knowing Your Place: Rural Identity and Cultural Hierarchy.  (New York: Routledge, 
1997): p. 14.  For ―temporal hierarchies,‖ Johannes Fabian.  Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes 
its Object.  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983): pp. 11-21, 75-79, 81-82.  I am grateful to 
Helmut Smith for introducing me to this important book.  
 
7
John Keane.  Violence and Democracy.  (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1994): pp. 38-39.   
Since one of my main precepts in this project is the subjectivity with which feud is used to 
describe violence, I do not offer an a priori definition of the word.  However, objectively existent feuds, as 
they are portrayed by historians and anthropologists, are defined by their strictly horizontal realm of 
conflict (i.e., between ―equals‖) and by their origination from ―small differences‖ that have little to no 
bearing on transcendent issues of ideology or state power.  Historians and anthropologists habitually use 
the word ―feud‖ exclusively for conflicts between individuals or groups of equal standing.  This is 
demonstrated most pointedly in studies of societies in which factional violence became, or has become, 
institutionalized and accepted as a normal course of action on a strictly horizontal basis.  Furthermore, it 
seems that scholars are more comfortable with speaking of feuds in a setting defined by spatial, cultural or 
(perhaps most importantly) temporal distance.  See Michael S. Drake.  Problematics of Military Power: 
Government, Discipline and the Subject of Violence.  (New York: Routledge, 2002): pp. 81-84; William Ian 
Miller.  Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland.  (University of Chicago 
Press, 1990): pp. 179-220; Harry J. Lamley, ―Lineage Feuding in Southern Fujian and Eastern Guangdong 
under Qing Rule,‖ in Jonathan Neaman Lipman and Steven Harrell (eds.), Violence in China: Essays in 
Culture and Counterculture.  (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990): pp. 27-64.     
 
8
Aside from being acted out between equal parties, blood feuds are also defined by their 
limitations of violence.  In contrast to warfare, feud violence supposedly takes the form of a ―game,‖ with 
mutually agreed-to rules of behavior.  This arrangement came with expectations that the honor of all parties 
would be maintained or healed and required that whatever violence that was employed had to follow rules 
that demonstrated respect for the opponent; Jenny Wormald, ―Bloodfeud, Kindred and Government in 
Early Modern Scotland,‖ Past and Present, Vol. 87 (1980): pp. 54-97.  While this form of directed violence 
is reminiscent of the antebellum code duello, it has no relationship to the use of violence in most of the 
post-Civil War Kentucky ―feuds,‖ in which violence was carried out with nothing more than an intention to 
cause the greatest harm to opponents.    
5 
 
acted out between individuals or groups of equal standing and with equal access to the 
use of violence.
9
   
The political motives behind James Marcum‘s death were eventually revealed and, 
as will be shown in a later chapter, their shocking implications had a statewide impact on 
Kentucky‘s electoral future.  But James Marcum‘s murder was portrayed as one act in an 
alleged reciprocal, age-old family feud, and this portrayal dictated that it would be 
remembered as something far different.  Feud, and all it entailed, was a device of 
depoliticization, obscuring or removing the political implications of political violence.
10
  
Violence is depoliticized when its political motivations and implications threaten to 
question the validity of individuals or groups who manage to survive violent challenges 
to their authority.  The feuds of ―Bloody Breathitt‖ went down in history as 
―manifestations of irrationality generated by lack of information, randomness and 
                                                 
9
Esther Heidbuchel.  The West Papua Conflict in Indonesia.  (Wettenberg: Johannes Herrmann 
J&J-Verlag, 2007): pp. 142-152, 161-188; 400-401; Stathis Kalyvas.  The Logic of Violence in Civil War.  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): pp. 330-370. 
 
10
Many of the most important approaches to the depoliticization of violence have dealt with the 
developing world in the post-Cold War era.  See, Elaine Thomas, ―Muting Inter-Ethnic Conflict in Post-
Imperial Britain: The Success and Limits of a Liberal Political Approach,‖ in Beverly Crawford and 
Ronnie D. Lipschutz (eds.), The Myth of "Ethnic Conflict": Politics, Economics, and "Cultural" Violence.  
(Berkeley, CA: International and Area Studies, University of California Press, 1998): pp. 436-439; Richard 
Beardsworth.  Derrida and the Political.  (New York: Routledge, 1996): p. 95; Stanley Cohen, ―Crime and 
Politics: Spot the Difference,‖ in Richard Rawlings (ed.), Law, Society, and Economy.  (Oxford and 
London: Oxford University Press, 1997): pp. 242-246; Allen Feldman.  Formations of Violence: The 
Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland.  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991): p. 259; Klaus Schlichte, ―State Formation and the Economy of Intra-state Wars,‖ in Dietrich Jung 
(ed.) Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars: A Political Economy of Intra-state War.  
(New York: Routledge, 2003): pp. 27-44; Wim Savenije and Chris Van der Borgh, ―Youth Gangs, Social 
Exclusion and the Transformation of Violence in El Salvador,‖ in Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (eds.) 
Armed Actors: Organised Violence and State Failure in Latin America ; Laura F. Edwards, ―The People‘s 
Sovereignty and the Law: Defining Gender, Race, and Class Differences in the Antebellum South,‖ in 
Stephanie Cole, Alison Marie Parker, Laura F. Edwards (eds.) Beyond Black & White: Race, Ethnicity, and 
Gender in the U.S. South and Southwest.  (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2004): pp. 11, 28n; 
Wendy Brown.  Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire.  (West Orange and 
London: Princeton University Press, 2006): pp.13-24.  
6 
 
unpredictability‖ rather than conflicts over real power.11  But an examination of the 
people who used violence there, their victims and their respective relationships to the 
political trends outside of the county‘s boundaries show that Breathitt County was only a 
pronounced example of larger forces at work.  As the reputation of Kentucky and the 
southern mountains was sullied by this reputation, the political elites who benefitted from 
acts of violence were protected.  Feud, not as an event or type of social relation but as an 
imprecise, misleading descriptor of violence, distorted the larger meaning of violence in 
Breathitt County.   
During the worst days of violence in Breathitt County, the rest of the South was 
not without its own rash of violence, and violence of a decidedly non-horizontal nature.  
In the larger South the more notable reports were of interracial violence against 
freedpeople and, considering the region‘s recent history at the time, its political import 
was difficult to deny.  Violence, when described as a feud, could not be political, at least 
in the sense that Americans of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries thought of politics 
or even of political violence.
12
  Even during the most brutal days of Reconstruction, 
killings all over the South could be written off as apolitical ―‗long time feuds‘ involving 
‗bad blood‘ between families and community factions‖ as long as they were strictly white 
affairs.
13
    The racial significance of postbellum political violence in the lowland South, 
in contrast to the supposedly unadulterated whiteness of the mountain South, was part of 
                                                 
11
Mehrad Vahabi.  The Political Economy of Destructive Power.  (Northhampton and Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2004): p. xi.  
 
12
Kalyvas, pp. 71, 99, 367; James C. Scott, ―Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change,‖ 
The American Political Science Review (hereafter APSR), Vol. 63, No. 4 (December, 1969), pp. 1146n.    
 
13
Apparently, using feud to depoliticize reconstruction era violence was popular among both 
conservative southerners and Unionist northerners witnessing internecine violence during military 
occupation; Dan T. Carter.  When the War was Over: The Failure of Self-Reconstruction in the South, 
1865-1867.  (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1985): p. 40.  
7 
 
the reason that this history of violence was not roundly remembered as political.  
Nineteenth-century Americans were forced to think of violence as a means of achieving 
political aims.  The Civil War and the ensuing Indian wars of the West ensured that these 
aims retain an abiding association with racial difference.  Those who defended ―white-
on-black‖ interracial violence at the turn of the century acknowledged it as a means of 
maintaining white supremacy and an attendant ―herrenvolk democracy‖ that, ideally, 
superseded all considerations of difference within the white race.
14
  When conservative 
white southerners harassed, maimed and killed freedpeople in the 1870s and afterward 
there was little ambiguity of purpose.  It was to maintain a political status quo based upon 
racial difference, and it was defended as such in southern newspapers and decried as such 
by those of the North.  With the internal differences created by the Civil War, a memory 
becoming ever more distant, race and the enforcement of racial boundaries dominated the 
use of violence carried out in the name of power.
15
  But for white southerners to kill each 
other at rates that surpassed the anecdotal and approached the phenomenal had to be 
explained as something far different, something that would not challenge the way in 
which white Americans perceived themselves and their society.  Southern mountaineers 
were considered among the most egalitarian people in the nineteenth century United 
States because they had supposedly not been exposed to inferior races, and consequently 
had never felt the need to bring hierarchies of any kind into their social structure.  If the 
feuds of eastern Kentucky had political import, it was deemed best forgotten or 
                                                 
14
George M. Fredrickson.  The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American 
Character and Destiny, 1817-1914. (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1987): pp. 43-70, 256-
282.  See also John Hope Franklin.  The Militant South, 1800-1861 (second edition).  (Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 2002) (originally published in 1956): pp. 33-62, 214-226. 
 
15
David Blight.  The Road to Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory.  (Cambridge and 
London: Harvard University Press, 2001): pp. 108-111.  
8 
 
minimized.  As a result, the role of African Americans in Breathitt County‘s 
Reconstruction era struggles, a presence that signified involvement in a much larger 
movement, was curtailed or completely omitted in the press.
16
   
James Marcum, a politician killed by other politicians, was very much part of 
Kentucky‘s ―polis.‖  His death was the elimination of a challenge to the local political 
status quo established and maintained by entrenched Democratic elites who sought to 
demonstrate the futility of Republican dissent through the use of violence, a common 
enough series of events in many parts of the South at the time.
17
  In fact, every other 
highly-publicized act of individual or mass violence recorded in Breathitt County since 
the Civil War was also motivated by struggles for control over the local state, 
corresponded to the two-party system and reflected larger trends in the South or the 
United States.  From its beginning, Breathitt County‘s very existence suffered from a 
                                                 
16I use the phrase ―Reconstruction era‖ when describing Kentucky in the 1860s and 1870s because 
Kentucky was never subject to the federal imposition of Reconstruction and, unlike most border states, did 
not emerge from the war with a pro-federal Republican-controlled state government.    
 
17
Jonathan Markovitz.  Legacies of Lynching: Racial Violence and Memory.  (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2004): Kenneth Barnes.  Who Killed John Clayton?: Political Violence and 
the Emergence of the New South, 1861-1893.  (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998).  Barnes 
differentiates ―political‖ violence from ―racial‖ violence in a manner that I do not imitate here since my 
thesis is that both interracial violence and white intraracial violence were fundamentally political in nature.  
This book also defines ―political violence‖ only in its counterrevolutionary capacity despite the wealth of 
scholarship on revolutionary anti-state violence.  See also, W. Fitzhugh Brundage.  Lynching in the New 
South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880-1930.  (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993). 
Many histories of the South as a region have tended to exclude Kentucky, primarily because most 
historical conceptions of the postbellum South are based upon the states of the Old Confederacy.  However, 
as demonstrated most prominently by the state‘s inclusion in C. Vann Woodward‘s Origins of the New 
South, much of Kentucky‘s history was determined by its similarities to, and (albeit complicated) 
relationship with, the South as a whole before and after the Civil War, especially in terms of politics and 
economic traits.  The legacy of slavery, inherited from the beginnings of its statehood, is principal among 
many reasons Kentucky should be considered a southern state.  For Kentucky state histories that make the 
state‘s southern identity evident, see Harold D. Tallant.  Evil Necessity: Slavery and Political Culture in 
Antebellum Kentucky.  (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2003): pp. 103-104; Lowell Hayes 
Harrison and James C. Klotter.  A New History of Kentucky.  (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 
1997): pp. 181-182; Penny M. Miller. Kentucky Politics & Government: Do We Stand United?  (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1994): pp. 54-56.      
9 
 
crisis of legitimacy, a crisis that was only complicated by what happened afterward.
18
  A 
healthy, operational state, as famously put by sociologist Max Weber, monopolizes the 
use of ―legitimate violence‖ but, as one American historian observed in describing the 
late-nineteenth century United States, ―legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder.‖19  To 
quash disputes over legitimacy, states can employ violence against its loudest detractors, 
simultaneously eliminating dissension and warning potential dissidents (while, according 
to Hannah Arendt, also inadvertently making plain its true lack of actual power).
20
  In 
opposition, to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the state, non-state actors employ 
different violent acts depending upon the desired level and target of destruction and the 
desired performance.  ―Bloody Breathitt‖ was a place and time defined by both 
insurrectionary violence against the state or majority party, and (in the case of Marcum‘s 
homicide) counter-insurrectionary against those who challenged their authority.
21
              
                                                 
18Legitimacy ―reflects the vitality of the underlying consensus which endows the state and its 
officers with whatever authority and power they actually possess, not by virtue of legality, but by the reality 
of the respect which the citizens pay to the institutions and behavior norms.  Legitimacy is earned by the 
ability of those who conduct the power of the state to represent and reflect a broad consensus.‖; H.L. 
Nieburg.  Political Violence: The Behavioral Process.  (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1969):p. 54.  See 
also Robert Alan Dahl.  Political Oppositions in Western Democracies.  (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1969): pp. 348-402.    
 
19
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20
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In all cases, violence was acted out within arbitrarily-drawn county lines between 
residents of the county and were always motivated by conflicts over the control of county 
government.  That fact, by itself, should suggest that violent acts had more to do with the 
allocation of power within said boundaries than it did with of isolated mountaineers‘ 
alleged pathological tendencies.  Even though outside observers did acknowledge the fact 
that deadly shootings in the county were often associated with elections, they generally 
minimized the importance of politics as a mere excuse for inborn ferocity.  New South 
boosters in the latter days of Reconstruction found it more advantageous to portray 
Breathitt County‘s population as a strangely disorderly Other than to acknowledge the 
similarities between its murderous riots and the analogous incidents that were 
simultaneously taking place in the lowland South.  Progressive-era America‘s middle 
class nabobs would not believe that the banal mechanics of county government were 
worth the shedding of white blood.  If county government was not banal, it was, even 
worse, antiquated and corrupt in contrast to the contemporary civic reform and 
centralized planning ongoing on local and national levels.  ―County government is the 
most backward of all our political units,‖ the National Municipal League proclaimed in 
the early 1920s, ―…the most neglected by the public, the most boss-ridden, the least 
efficiently organized and most corrupt and incompetent, and, by reason of constitutional 
complications, the most difficult to reform.
22
  In the Progressive mind, fighting over 
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control of a county government did not refute explanations of violence that used terms 
like ‗isolation‘ and ‗ignorance,‘ but instead confirmed them.  Like the city wards that 
planners and political scientists of the time (most of whom were far more familiar with 
the New England township model of local government) abhorred, rural counties were a 
vestige of the past best absorbed and transformed by social engineering.  The county was, 
at best, quaint and, at worst, detrimental.  But, for many Americans, especially 
southerners within or without the Kentucky mountains, the county constituted the State, 
or its most immediate and dominant proximity, in the nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century.  What stood in the way of governmental progress in the ivy-covered 
walls was a central institution in the hinterlands, especially in the sparsely populated 
mountains of the Cumberland Plateau.  The county mattered in a way that the early 
twentieth century‘s arbiters of political economy did not understand.  At the same time, it 
mattered in a way that proponents of the New South understood fully but, seeing 
attendant problems, chose to suppress.   
             
Methodology and Historiography  
This dissertation uses the history of Breathitt County, Kentucky from the mid-
nineteenth century to the early twentieth century as a synecdoche for white intraracial 
violence in the United States.  ―Bloody Breathitt‖ described a geographical space that 
seemed to contain an unusually large number of violent incidents over the course of five 
decades, fought in an unremitting struggle for control over local government.  But, while 
acknowledging that this place was well-deserving of its nickname for a number of years, 
this dissertation suggests that Breathitt County embodied a larger historical experience 
12 
 
even while it had the appearance of an ahistorical anomaly.  ―Bloody Breathitt‖ described 
a place and time that was inherently violent, but influenced by the contingency of larger 
trends, trends that determined when violence was used and what form it took.
23
       
This dissertation‘s purposes are to expose the circumstances that led to violence in 
Breathitt County and to describe the specific types of violence, types that corresponded to 
different political and historical contexts.  The kinds of violence were not invented in a 
remote mountain environment but were instead ―model-based‖ cases of individual or 
(more often) collective violence, identical to those in other places in contemporaneous 
history and specific to familiar, identifiable political situations.
24
  The county was the 
locus for guerilla warfare between formerly peaceably-inclined neighbors during the 
Civil War just as was the case in many other parts of Kentucky and the South at the exact 
same time.  During the 1860s and 1870s, when communities in the southern states were 
rent apart over the war‘s results, it experienced types of mass violence almost identical to 
episodes in the former Confederacy.  Although small in number, Breathitt‘s African 
American population asserted their newfound rights, just as black southerners did 
                                                 
 
23Although the two are ―almost always intertwined and hard to disentangle,‖ inherency and 
contingency describe two ―antithetical‖ causal environments for the occurrence of violence.  The former 
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to a great measure of subjectivity based upon the perceptions of observing ―authorities.‖  Harry Eckstein, 
―Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Political Violence‖ in Ted Robert Gurr (ed.) Handbook 
of Political Conflict: Theory and Research.  (New York: The Free Press, 1980): p. 138-142 (p. 139q).  In 
recent years, political scientists and anthropologists who study places torn by mass violence have begun to 
look upon explanations that favor inherency with a more skeptical eye.  The perceived problem is that 
violence that takes place because of contingencies such as war, famine or political oppression can be 
written off as the offspring of a society that is inexplicably inherently violent without need for further 
explanation.  See Malcolm Deas, ―Violent Exchanges: Reflections on Political Violence in Colombia,‖ in 
David Apter (ed.) The Legitimization of Violence.  (Chipenham and Wiltshire: Antony Rowe, Ltd., 1997).   
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Press, 1986): pp. 20-27.     
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elsewhere in the South.  Election-related rioting and attempted insurrection were 
reproduced in a state that had never left the Union but still suffered from the continuation 
of violence seen further south.  Lynching, a form of violence reproduced almost 
uniformly throughout the South beginning in the 1880s, was recorded there in turn, and in 
a manner that reflected the larger tendency while also reflecting the peculiarities of the 
local political friction.
25
  Finally, when political assassination threatened to reach 
international epidemic proportions at the turn of the twentieth century, it was employed in 
the streets of Jackson as well.  Violent death and the destruction of property were 
constancies in the county for generations but not always in the same form.  Just as feud 
obscured the political incentives behind ―Bloody Breathitt,‖ it also hid the similarities 
between violence in the ―feud belt‖ and the ―outside world.‖   
With that in mind, each chapter begins with a description of political and social 
circumstances in Kentucky, followed by concurrent accounts of the same in eastern 
Kentucky and then Breathitt County, demonstrating statewide correlations throughout.  
Kentucky is a state on the fringes of the ―Solid South,‖ and, for that very reason, integral 
to the diversity of southern history.  After it was divided from Virginia in 1792, Kentucky 
began as ―the first western state to enter the union,‖ but owing to the persistence of 
slavery and other political and cultural affinities, the state was rooted in the South 
thereafter.
26
  By the 1850s, Kentucky society was guided, if not dominated, by 
slaveholders while somehow nurturing a small community of abolitionists, making it 
virtually the only slave state to tolerate anti-slavery dissent at such a late date.  When it 
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failed to join its southern sisters in secession in 1861, Kentucky took on a regional and 
sectional identity crisis. It was not subject to Reconstruction in the 1860s and 1870s but, 
during this same time, its economy became rooted more and more in extractive industries, 
sending it on another historical trajectory away from the agrarian South.  ―Never fitting 
comfortably into either the North or the South, the Bluegrass State has historically 
exhibited characteristics of both regions while avoiding the most extreme polemics of its 
northern and southern neighbors,‖ one state history explains.  ―The state‘s ambiguous 
regional personality carries over into its internal identity, where geographic diversity 
dictates cultural diversity.‖27 But perhaps no other state is able to encapsulate the most 
troublingly divergent of southern images, the patrician agrarianism of the Bluegrass 
matched by the mountains‘ industrial degradation, with its largest cities (Louisville and 
Lexington) fitting into neither.  Kentuckians have long been eager to differentiate the 
state‘s mountainous eastern third from its more cosmopolitan and wealthier Bluegrass 
section (which section has had a greater role in forming the national image of the state is 
a matter of debate), giving birth to the enduring idea of the ―two Kentuckys.‖28  However, 
the supposed division between the two was scarcely based upon fact.  Most of eastern 
Kentucky‘s history was determined by political and economic interaction with the 
Bluegrass, since the latter dominated virtually all access to capital and housed the state 
capital.  Like feud, the idea of the ―two Kentuckys‖ was created and popularized, as shall 
be demonstrated in following chapters, for political expediency.  Although this 
dissertation‘s principal subject is one of Kentucky‘s counties, and the violent history 
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therein, this one county exhibits the entire state‘s uneasy position in the Civil War, 
Reconstruction and the New South.   
Also, this dissertation considers the ways that Breathitt County‘s violence was 
initially interpreted, reframed, misunderstood and, ultimately, depoliticized.  Having 
witnessed the distortion of the developing world‘s political violence in recent decades 
anthropologists and political scientists have devised a number of terminologies for 
depoliticization that apply also to ―Bloody Breathitt.‖29  Eastern Kentucky‘s white 
intraracial violence was attributed to any number of apolitical factors, including 
biological and racial inclinations, isolation, lack of education, obsession with revenge and 
the overpowering importance of kinship, forces that can be understood collectively as 
what Beverly Crawford calls violence‘s ―primordial explanations.‖30  Primordial 
explanations are more widely referred to as reports of communal violence, acts of 
                                                 
29
It is admittedly unusual to use twentieth century political and social theory on a nineteenth 
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destruction that represent an ―outside threat‘‖ originating ―outside the social frame.‖31  
Communal violence is action that takes place without the authority, or beyond the 
supervision, of the modern state and, consequently, beyond its responsibility as well.  It is 
believed to be ―the product of ‗deep-seated hatreds‘ or ‗ancient animosities‘‖ that ―[take] 
on the appearance of a natural phenomenon which outsiders have no right to condemn 
and no hope to prevent‖ or is portrayed as such so that ―presiding governments‖ (i.e., 
Kentucky‘s state government) can distance themselves from blame.32  Emotional 
descriptors like ―hatred‖ and temporal descriptors like ―ancient‖ suggest that violence 
taking place in the present has very little to do with the ―real‖ present as it is seen by 
outside observers.  Communal violence originates over issues that have nothing to do 
with the modern state and therefore do not offer a viable censure of its ability to rule and 
for that reason, cannot be deemed political by the state‘s standards or those of 
metropolitan observers.  External sources of violence, factors common to an entire region 
or nation-state, were occasionally used to explain violence in Breathitt County 
(particularly during Reconstruction).  But internal causes, causes that only had bearing 
within the insularity of the county‘s boundaries, became far more popular in explaining 
                                                 
31
The concept of communal violence comes from the field of Subaltern Studies and has, since the 
1990s, been used to describe incidents of religious and ethnic violence in the Indian subcontinent.  V.V. 
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both lawlessness and feuding and the ―‗irrational attachments‘ to blood kin‖ that 
supposedly brought it about.
33
  Owing to this sense of insularity, descriptions of Breathitt 
County written there and elsewhere often wrote of it in contrast to the ―outside world.‖      
Descriptions of white intraracial violence in Breathitt County and nineteenth 
century eastern Kentucky as a whole (as will be shown in the final chapter) was often 
described as having pre-political origins before the Civil War and originating from 
personal or familial animosities.  These descriptions typically overlooked the fact that 
death and destruction in the county was directed by men who had become mobilized 
during the Civil War, a decidedly political event, and a statewide crisis of legitimacy that 
was felt in both of the two Kentuckys.  Beforehand, Breathitt County was no more or less 
peaceful than any other part of Kentucky.  As will be accounted in the next chapter, the 
earliest story of gunshots fired in anger in the county‘s history involved sheriff‘s deputies 
trying to dispatch an abolitionist minister in the 1850s, an anecdote that could have 
originated from any number of places.  And, just as this violent antebellum incident 
reflected larger forces at work in the US South, so did incidents that followed.  After the 
war Breathitt County‘s syncopation with the ―outside world‖ was often recognized and 
often suppressed.  As it was reported by governmental leaders and other political elites in 
the Bluegrass, ―feuding‖ in Breathitt County was typically portrayed as ―beyond the 
social frame‖ as the social frame was understood in the postwar Bluegrass.  When these 
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observers gain or suffer from the way in which the provincial violence is portrayed, it 
becomes that much more vital for it to be considered communal rather than political, 
inherent rather than contingent, and motivated by internal-rather than external-causes.     
   Political violence, ―acts of disruption, destruction, or injury whose purpose, 
choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and/or 
effects…tend to modify the behavior of others in a bargaining situation that consequences 
for the social system‖ is evident in United States history, although the political and social 
status quo never seems to be affected.
34
  But the political element of violence is often 
difficult to identify, especially in a democracy where deviations from civil behavior are 
more likely to be written off as having apolitical origins.
35
  Violence ―that arises in a 
modern context but will not fit the story of progress‖ is written off as ―senseless‖ and a 
product of an apolitical ―pre-modern culture.‖36  Explanations of violence that employ the 
pre-modern and the senseless are, like communal explanations, attempts to depoliticize 
political violence by placing it in the ―world beyond the polis.‖37  Such was the feud and 
its semantic role in describing ―Bloody Breathitt,‖ violence that has continued to be a 
―difficult subject, diffuse and hard to cope with‖ even after historians ostensibly resolved 
to take violence in America seriously.   
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Violence as a general subject, not just that performed by a lowly, rural population, 
has posed a challenge to historians in recent decades.  Whether to portray violence as 
communal or political, caused internally or caused externally, has been, in Richard 
Hofstadter‘s words, ―a difficult subject, diffuse and hard [for historians] to cope with.‖38  
In the 1950s, he and his influential generation of American historians created a master 
―consensus‖ narrative of (as a later historian summarized their interpretation) ―a nation 
placidly evolving without serious disagreements" where violence was an irrational 
aberration rather than a sign of conflict or an individually or collectively reasoned force 
for change.  By the end of the 1960s, the Consensus interpretation of American history 
was at a loss to explain assassinations and mass riots and could no longer deny violence‘s 
place within the national social order.  Hofstadter‘s co-editing of American Violence: A 
Documentary History
 represented the Consensus school‘s late admission that the United 
States‘ history of violence was to be taken seriously and inspired a new historiographical 
emphasis on violence in the 1970s and 1980s- particularly among historians of the 
South.
39
  The negotiation between inherency and contingency has been at the center of 
most of these historical approaches.  Some of the most lauded examinations of white 
southerners‘ uses and interpretations of violence limited their respective examinations to 
the years previous to the Civil War (i.e., the ―Old South‖).40  These studies also limited 
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themselves to white southerners, albeit with the understanding that antebellum modes of 
violence contributed to a racial status quo based upon white supremacy and black slavery.  
Therefore, while cultural qualities dictated inherent (usually white male) southern 
attitudes toward violence beforehand, the contingencies of war and emancipation, it is 
implied, brought an abrupt end to the society that sustained these violent qualities.  The 
Old South was, and remains, a temporally distant place, and discussions of its violent 
tendencies did not dare readers to suspect that there might be disturbing lineages between 
past and present. 
Other southern historians have attached the issue of violence to the political 
discord that followed it, most notably involving white resistance to black emancipation 
and citizenship, and focus primarily on ―white-on-black‖ interracial violence.41  Postwar 
―white-on-white‖ intraracial violence, a subject that has gotten less scholarly attention, is 
said to have differed from Old South to New.  C. Vann Woodward identified the New 
South‘s ―gunplay, knifing, manslaughter, and murder‖ as the successor to the Old South‘s 
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more ordered ―traditional expression of violence,‖ the ―code duello.‖42  W.J. Cash‘s The 
Mind of the South (1941), the work that is otherwise credited with placing the greatest 
emphasis on the continuity of traits in southern history, recognized a change in the 
frequency of southern violence and the types of violence used after the Civil War.  To 
Cash, what had once been an expression of frontier individualism became a means of 
enforcing conformity to a ―savage ideal‖ among white southerners and reactionary fear of 
black increases in power (adamant in keeping up the portrayal of trait-continuity into his 
own lifetime, Cash dismissed this difference as a ―contradiction [that] is not so great as it 
sounds at the first hearing‖).43  If inherency suggests the continuity of traits irrespective 
of political change brought about by war and statecraft, it would seem that neither it, nor 
the interpretation based upon contingency, has become absolutely dominant in southern 
historiography.                      
 Thanks to journalism, popular fiction and theatrical adaptations, ―feud‖ violence 
in an American or southern context remained a familiar subject for most of the twentieth 
century, particularly in relation to the narrative represented by the idiomatic ―Hatfields 
and McCoys,‖ a phrase encapsulating historical events that underwent a ―transformation 
from history to folklore.‖44  Feud remained relatively understudied among southern 
historians despite its associations with the Old South until after the rise of Appalachian 
                                                 
42
C. Vann Woodward.  Origins of the New South, 1877-1913.  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1951): p. 158.  
 
43
W.J. Cash.  The Mind of the South.  (New York: Vintage Books, 1969): pp. 114-123, 138-141 
(quotes pp. 115, 138).   
 
44―[The] transformation from history to folklore, in fact, was so complete that, even though the 
feud is usually not mentioned in history textbooks, almost every American today is aware of the Hatfield-
McCoy legend.‖; Altina Waller, Feud…, p. 249.     
22 
 
Studies in the 1960s and 1970s.
45
  These ―revisionist‖ historians of Appalachia were 
chiefly concerned with debunking the assumptions and stereotypes that had established 
the mountain whites as a group fundamentally distinct from other white southerners, and 
Anglo-Americans in general, in the late-nineteenth century.
46
  Appalachian revisionists 
were motivated by a need to demonstrate that violence in eastern Kentucky (often a 
stand-in for the Appalachian mountain population en masse) was not the product of 
isolation and degeneracy that observers had believed it to be for most of the twentieth 
century. Unswervingly, they have attached feud violence to themes of economic 
exploitation and regional underdevelopment brought on by the degradations of economic 
dependency created by industrialization financed by a ―dominant culture‖ that intimated 
itself into Appalachia in subtle ways even before the arrival of railroad track and steam 
shovel.
47
  Appalachian differentness, they argued, was simply a veneer for disguising the 
unequal capital-labor relationships in the mountains and a false reinterpretation of the 
violent results.    Accordingly, this series of monographs represents a consistent effort to 
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uphold violent contingency over inherency in explaining ―feud‖ violence.48  The only 
major problem with this analysis is that its impact has not been felt firmly enough among 
the lay public or even among many historians.  The stereotypes of Appalachia that 
revisionists have fought for decades remain.
49
  My contention that feud is a discursive 
device handy for depoliticizing violence is an argument very much concurrent with these 
historians‘ arguments- minus the conscious preoccupation with dispelling stereotypes.  
                                                 
 
48
A thorough effort at revisionist treatments of the history of the Appalachian region and its image 
had its beginnings with Henry Shapiro‘s Appalachia on Our Mind: the Southern Mountains and 
Mountaineers in the American Consciousness, 1870-1920.  (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1978).  The major works that have since followed suit, and done so by examining the subject of feud 
violence, are: Gordon McKinney, ―Industrialization and Violence in Appalachia in the 1890‘s‖ in Joel W. 
Williamson (ed.) An Appalachian Symposium.  (Boone, NC: Appalachian Consortium Press, 1977): pp. 
131-144; James C. Klotter, ―Feuds in Appalachia: an Overview,‖ Filson Club Historical Quarterly 
(hereafter FCHQ), Vol. 56 (1982): pp. 290-317; Altina Waller.  Feud: Hatfields, McCoys, and Social 
Change in Appalachia, 1860-1900.  (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); ―Feuding in 
Appalachia: Evolution of a Cultural Stereotype,‖ in Mary Beth Pudup, Dwight Billings and Waller (eds.) 
Appalachia in the Making: The Mountain South in the Nineteenth Century.  (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1995): pp. 347-376; Dwight Billings and Kathleen Blee.  The Road to Poverty: The 
Making of Wealth and Hardship in Appalachia.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); ―Where 
‗Bloodshed is a Pastime‘: Mountain Feuds and Appalachian Stereotyping,‖ in Billings, Gurney Norman 
and Katherine Ledford (eds.).  Confronting Appalachian Stereotypes: Backtalk from an American Region.  
(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1999): pp. 119-137.    
The ―classical‖ model of revisionist Appalachian history tends to, at the risk of exaggeration, treat 
case study localities as relatively inert bodies that were and are acted upon, exploited and changed from 
outside, typically by the late-nineteenth century arrival of railroads and large-scale extractive industries.  In 
these works, conflicts that took the form of anything from feuds to labor-related violence were attributed 
solely to these types of familiar ―imperialist‖ events.  Recently, a small number of monographs have delved 
into the economic and political activities of Appalachian communities before the period of incorporation 
and discovered a series of societies given to vigorous internal activity and hardly isolated from the ―outside 
world.‖ In these post-revisionist studies, communities in what came to be known as Appalachia generated 
their own origins of conflict, often from early in their respective histories of white settlement.
 
 See Robert 
Wiese.  Grasping at Independence: Debt, Male Authority, and Mineral Rights in Appalachian Kentucky, 
1850-1915.  (University of Tennessee Press, 2001); Rebecca J. Bailey.  Matewan Before the Massacre: 
Politics and Coal, the Roots of Conflict in Mingo County, 1793-1920.  (Charleston: West Virginia Press, 
2008).           
 
49
Even a recent history of Kentucky attributed feud violence to a ―hard-to-define abstraction, ‗the 
Kentucky character,‘‖ that entailed inherent features such as ―blood relations, the weakness of the courts, 
isolationism, and a fighting spirit,‖ imprecise suggestions that encourage age-old problematic assumptions 
about violence; Hambleton Tapp and James C. Klotter. Kentucky: Decades of Discord, 1865-1900.  
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001): pp. 400, 409.  Another account of white intraracial 
―feuds‖ in Louisiana attributes the violence to the ―anarchy and degeneration‖ of a population with a 
―distorted perception of individual rights,‖ a similarly imprecise abstract explanation for violence that 
employs no substantive evidence; Samuel C. Hyde, Jr..  Pistols and Politics: The Dilemma of Democracy 
in Louisiana‟s Florida Parishes, 1810-1899.  (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 
1996): p. 261.    
24 
 
The settings of the two book-length revisionist treatments of feud, Altina Waller‘s 
Feud: Hatfields, McCoys, and Social Change in Appalachia, 1860-1900 (1988) and 
Dwight Billings‘s and Kathleen  Blee‘s The Road to Poverty: The Making of Wealth and 
Hardship in Appalachia (2000) are geographically close to each other (and to Breathitt 
County) but examine two very different scenarios.  Waller‘s book shows that the quarrel 
between the Hatfield and McCoy families began as an interpersonal dispute enclosed 
within a discrete mountain community but then became complicated by the arrival of 
industrial interests from beyond the mountains.  It was to these outside interests‘ benefit 
that the conflict was attributed to isolation, drunkenness and attendant stereotypes.  The 
Road to Poverty portrays a far less-known story, the ―Clay County War‖ in which two 
powerful families vied for control over their native county from the 1840s until the early 
twentieth century.  Even though the two families were not the late arrivals that Waller 
uses as indirect antagonists, their bringing of industrialization (in the form of their 
competing salt-making businesses- a much older industrial pursuit than the better-known 
timber and coal extraction) to their part of the mountains is a sort of invasion analogous 
to the one portrayed by Waller.   
The difference in the findings of these two books should, if nothing else, show the 
insouciance with which feud was used to describe any violent acts in the Kentucky 
mountains and the firm association between the word and the place.  However, they share 
a common benchmark: the arrival of industrialization brought social chaos to previously 
peaceful (to use historian Robert Wiebe‘s often-repeated phrase) ―island communities‖ 
and violence ensued.
50
  Both books show that the primordial explanations for violence 
used for their respective subjects were chimerae disguising the connections between 
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violence and modernization.  But, while these books successfully defeat the stereotypes 
that their respective authors despise, they do not necessarily disqualify their two stories 
from being about ―feuds.‖  In all actuality, the Hatfield-McCoy feud and the Clay County 
War were feuds proper (if such a thing exists historically) albeit ones whose causes were 
misconstrued.  Both were essentially horizontal affairs, prolonged fights between two 
groups who were very similar to each other and had roughly the same capabilities when it 
came to getting the upper hand- a battle of equals.  Furthermore each of these ―feud‖ 
scenarios had a definite narrative form, with a beginning, an end and the same families (if 
not the same individuals) being involved throughout.   
This is where ―Bloody Breathitt‖ differs; there, feud did not describe an event, but 
a series of events that, over the course of years, amounted to a geopolitical ontology, a 
state of being that defined the county‘s existence and helped to redefine that of the 
Kentucky mountains surrounding it.  Breathitt County was a fundamentally violent place 
for a number of years.
51
  In accounts of its troubles that did not employ feud, ―lawlessness‖ 
was used instead, suggesting that the county contained a Hobbesian condition of social 
entropy beyond the control of state authorities.
52
  Testimonials from natives of the county 
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affirmed its native violence and often attributed it to the same ills as observers from 
elsewhere.  Lack of education, isolation and a racial/cultural tendency toward violence 
cannot be blamed, since many other counties in the United States that were as unschooled, 
secluded and peopled by Anglo-whites did not have the same condition of endemic 
violence.  Furthermore, industrialization cannot be blamed fully, since the first recorded 
episodes of mass violence pre-dated the events that most historians would equate with it 
(corporate influence over local politics, access to railroads, the arrival of large-scale 
extractive interests), at least in Breathitt County.  Even though the causes of the 
seemingly phenomenal rash of factional violence in eastern Kentucky in the final decades 
of the nineteenth century were given to misattribution by the media and the public, such 
violence did happen and cannot be completely dismissed as nothing more than the 
product of stereotypical exaggeration, even if ―often erroneous, exaggerated, and self-
serving‖ accounts dominated its retelling.53   
It was the Civil War, an event that Billings, Blee and Waller do not consider a 
causal factor, that introduced mass violence to Breathitt County and mobilized segments 
of its white and black male population against each other as ―feudists.‖54  Fighting in 
Breathitt County was very much political, and political in the most prosaic sense of the 
word: involving the same party system used by the rest of the United States.  For a time, 
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the war militarized the two-party system in Kentucky since membership in the 
Democratic Party very often meant support for the Confederacy, while Unionists were 
responsible for bringing the Republican Party to the state.  The effect of the war was felt 
harshly in Breathitt since it was a Democratic, mostly pro-Confederate county surrounded 
by the largely Unionist Kentucky mountains.  Moreover, its native Unionist minority was 
unwilling to tolerate Confederate dissent within an officially Union state, and their 
respective wartime depredations established longstanding postwar animosities.  Most 
importantly, it was the war that made the county‘s Democratic leanings controversial for 
the first time, establishing the argument over legitimacy that outlasted the war generation.  
If prolonged violence happens within a generation after something so devastating as a 
civil war, or, in the case of ―Bloody Breathitt,‖ begins almost immediately afterward, the 
past war should be considered.  The ―feudists‖ of Breathitt County began fighting of their 
own accord, and their resultant troubles cannot be blamed on the interference of a 
―dominant culture,‖ unless the Union and the Confederacy could be spoken of as such.                 
Finally, unlike the two revisionist monographs on feud violence in eastern 
Kentucky that mainly interrogate the motives for violence, I pay close attention to the 
aforementioned ―model-based‖ variety of violence witnessed in Breathitt County.55  
Guerilla warfare, various forms of rioting, lynching and public assassination are all very 
different kinds of deadly violence, are used within very different social and political 
situations and, contextually, each have very different associations.  All of these models of 
violence were used for political ends in one sparsely populated county over the course of 
only five decades, suggesting that Breathitt County may well have been an inherently 
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violence place for a time, but it was also affected by contingencies that made its history 
of violence diverse.  Feud, at least in the case of Breathitt County (I make no similar 
claims about the Hatfield-McCoy feud or the Clay County War), was primarily a 
discursive tool for hiding this very telling diversity.     
 
Why Does Bloody Breathitt Matter? 
This dissertation has multiple purposes, one of which is to reintroduce a part of 
―Appalachia‖ into the larger narrative of southern history.  Breathitt County, Kentucky 
never resembled the South at large according to traditionally accepted criteria.  The South 
is most often thought of as the former Confederacy, excluding Kentucky and other states 
that felt the sharp brunt of secession and war even though they were not de jure rebels.  
But politically, Kentucky and its notorious county were very much part of the South.  The 
entirety of southern Appalachia, and more specifically the area of southeastern Kentucky 
studied here, was contained within colonies, and later states, whose governmental 
arrangements and institutions were determined by the existence of chattel slavery, its 
controversy and its legacy.  The proliferation of extractive industries in the final decades 
of the nineteenth century set the region apart from the traditionally agrarian South in 
many Americans‘ minds (even though mineral and timber extraction have had 
tremendous impacts on many parts of the South not typically thought of as 
―Appalachian‖) as did the early industrial discourse that set central Appalachia apart 
regionally as a space populated by a ―a strange and peculiar people.‖  Once much of the 
region was dominated by captains of the coal and timber industries, rather than yeomen 
and planters, it seemed quite far removed from a South defined by either ―Moonlight and 
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Magnolias‖ or ―the Sahara of the Bozart.‖  However, the region had been peopled by 
black and white southerners for generations before what one revisionist has called ―the 
fiction known as ‗Appalachia.‘‖56           
This dissertation also attempts to expose, or re-expose, the irrevocable connection 
between violence and politics in American history.  The employment of feud was only 
one method of depoliticizing violence in American history.  The school shooting 
phenomenon, especially at Columbine High School in 1999 and Virginia Tech in 2007 
(the latter of which took place during the writing of this dissertation), reawakened debates 
over how internal violence in the United States should be interpreted.  While neither 
tragedy had perceivable political motives, they renewed preexistent political discussions.  
But they also awakened a resistance to the very possibility of exploring the events‘ 
political ramifications.  Both added new fuel to arguments for greater regulation of 
firearms sales, while opponents of such regulations countered with claims that ―senseless‖ 
violence cannot by stymied by preventing gun sales.  In other words, the possible 
complexities of acts that appeared outwardly ―senseless,‖ and, therefore, beyond social 
context, should not be discussed.  In effect, lending weight to the supposed 
―senselessness‖ of killing depoliticizes violence and, worse, confounds attempts to get to 
its real meaning (much like relegating feud violence to ―legend‖ status).57  The cultural 
critic Jean Baudrillard predicted that such a denial could constitute an entire nation‘s loss 
                                                 
 
56Mary K. Anglin, ―A Question of Loyalty: National and Regional Identity in Narratives of 
Appalachia,‖ Anthropological Quarterly, Negotiating Identity in Southeastern U.S. Uplands, 65 (1992): p. 
106.    
 
57Anton Blok writes: ―To define violence as senseless or irrational is to abandon research where it 
should start: exploring meaning, interpreting symbolic action and mapping the historical and social context 
of activities defined as violent.‖; Anton Blok.  Honour and Violence.  (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001): pp. 
112-113.    
30 
 
of intellectual freedom.  ―[If] [v]iolence is whitewashed, history is whitewashed, all as 
part of a vast enterprise of cosmetic surgery at whose completion nothing will be left but 
a society for which, and individuals for whom, all violence, all negativity, are strictly 
forbidden.‖58  The historical denial or trivialization of violence is dangerous for reasons 
both political and aesthetic.  This denial and trivialization are the roles that feud has 
played and, with its being ―the darkest and bloodiest of all the dark and bloody feud 
counties,‖ roles that the construction of ―Bloody Breathitt‖ contributed to as well.   
But I also want to address issues of everyday politics, ones that have implications 
that have bearing far beyond the boundaries of one rural county or the misunderstood 
region of Appalachia as a whole: the manner in which violence is not so much 
whitewashed as it is relegated to a stratum of American society that many might consider 
politically invalid.  While echoing the findings of the revisionist school of Appalachian 
history (but with the concern that I do not remain bogged in regional specificity), it also 
has bearing on the aforementioned formation of ―hierarchies of place,‖ hierarchies that do 
not so much disfranchise and invalidate geographical spaces as they do the people who 
live in them.  The ―two Kentuckys‖ construct was not only about creating hierarchies 
within Kentucky or the white South, but also about establishing the nationwide existence 
of a subaltern white citizenry perpetually carrying on the threat of primordial violence as 
their defining attribute.   
Feud, as antiquated as it is as either an antiquated social relationship or a 
descriptor of violence, still has some currency in signifying persistent white American 
traits that travel under the cultural mainstream‘s radar.  References to a feud, historical or 
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fictional, convey an inability to conform to modern norms of behavior (i.e., ―they‘re still 
feuding‖) and, therefore, a diminished right to exist in the modern world and an 
irredeemable role as an outsider (and, curiously, always a white outsider).  In 2008, a 
cellular phone commercial portrayed a nuclear Hatfield family oddly housed in an 
expensive-looking cul de sac neighborhood calling an end to their feud with the McCoys 
because of being able to finally reach them by cellular phone (inadvertently calling to 
mind the late-nineteenth century hope that communication and technology would end 
feud violence).  The song ―Shenandoah‖ plays lightly and what appear to be 
daguerreotypes hang on the wall in the background, subtly evoking a past century.  But 
the product advertised in the commercial, and the teen-aged son and his parents, are 
undeniably products of the twenty-first century, dressed in the costume of the suburban 
upper-middle class (a follow-up commercial depicted the Montagues and Capulets 
reconciling for similar reasons but, in contrast, still in their Elizabethan garb, unlike 
American feudists trapped forever in a literary past- but armed with cellular phones).  
The punch line: ―Who will we feud with now?‖  Even amid the trappings of twenty first 
century consumerism, the pathological urge endures.  In the same year, a character in the 
sitcom ―30 Rock,‖ an unsophisticated naïf typically portrayed as a religious escapee from 
southern poverty (and called a ―hillbilly‖ by other characters), non sequitured that before 
his move to the big city he had ―promised [his] mother that if I ran into any Mackenzies I 
would kill them.‖  The quip suggests that this feud is ongoing and permanent and 
potentially executable outside of its place of origin.  It and the commercial both suggest 
that the feud and all that it represents are American constancies, not trapped within a 
particular provincial space but rather carried by an insidious breed of white humanity, 
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dangerous but comically so as well, and diffused throughout the national populace.  
When journalist Hunter S. Thompson described the Hell‘s Angels motorcycle club as 
descendants of the ―inbred Anglo-Saxon tribes of Appalachia,‖ he was expressing his 
own belief in a real national hierarchy of place but, more generally, conveying an image 
of a never-ending strain of the white American existence defined by primordial 
violence.
59
  Feud, as it is employed in the American media, serves as an eternal contrast 
to advanced white society.     
 This employment of feud is not limited to popular culture, but has also been used, 
purposefully or inadvertently, in academic literature.  A historian of southern violence 
wrote in the 1980s that ―isolated mountain people,‖ in the years after the Civil War, ―had 
no notion of cultural pluralism or moral relativism- only right and wrong,‖ suggesting 
that spatial removal from metropolitan areas resulted in a lack of nuanced attitudes 
toward relationships of power (one wonders how great other nineteenth century 
Americans‘ perceptions of such decidedly twentieth century concepts were in 
comparison).
60
  In a mid-1990s political science monograph, nineteenth century white 
intraracial violence in Kentucky (no longer divided into the ―two Kentuckys‖ but now 
characterized instead as a single essentialized statewide political space) provided a 
primordial explanation for a very current, and actually very national, political trend:   
Because of Kentucky‘s history of dueling and feuds, its penchant for self-reliance, and its isolation, 
one would not be surprised to find that 95 percent of rural Kentucky households are armed; about 
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half of the males in those areas, it is estimated, carry guns either on their person or in their 
vehicles.  Given such powerful attitudes, it is also not surprising that the Kentucky General 
Assembly, strenuously lobbied by the National Rifle Association (NRA), in 1984 prohibited 
Kentucky localities from regulating the distribution of firearms.
61
   
 
By placing the origins of their supposed ―powerful attitudes‖ about gun ownership into a 
past beyond the polis as suggested by dueling and feuds, opposition to gun control was 
invalidated as acceptable political behavior (for that matter, the NRA‘s lobbying power in 
the legislature was conflated with a popular affinity for guns as a causal factor, thus 
rendering the argument inconsistent and confused) casting the debate over gun control in 
the United States as a hierarchical relationship between a knowledgeable, benevolent 
urban elite and a rural populace with ―regressive political tendencies‖ defined by an 
unfortunate past of white intraracial violence.
62
  Although Breathitt County was not 
individually mentioned, its since-depoliticized history of violence was integral in 
delegitimizing the ideology of late-twentieth century Kentuckians.        
 In another scholarly engagement with the rural working class, an anthropologist 
studying gender and labor relations in the mountains of western North Carolina used feud 
in a more nuanced fashion in a published moment of self-critical confession after one of 
her subjects exhibited what she considered repugnant behavior.    
I have been loathe to offer this vignette because it presents mountain whites as ignorant, hate-
mongering, and racist-a partial truth which invokes the Hatfields and McCoys [my italics].‖  
Failing to note instances such as these, however, I unwittingly construct Appalachia as egalitarian, 
bucolic, and white [Anglin‘s italics], echoes again of the local schema.  It is equally important to 
note that this moment of virulent racism did not go unchallenged, but was refracted and relocated 
in the debate between Hazel and her father [Anglin‘s subjects].63   
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The scene described a family quarrel over a matter of racial and regional identity politics 
(and involved the use of a racial epithet) that ended with one subject reminding another 
that their living in ―the South‖ ultimately stifled the debate.  The vignette reflected what 
is probably an issue very common to researchers who harbor sympathy for their subjects 
yet disagree with them on fundamental subjects.  But the language she uses to reveal this 
is more telling than was intended.  ―Hatfields and McCoys,‖ the phrase that Americans 
use interchangeably with feud, was offhandedly linked with the ―ignorant, hate-
mongering, and racist‖ even though the incident in question had nothing to do with the 
carrying out of a familial vendetta or, for that matter, any act of violence.  The 
anthropologist divorced the familiar surnames from their actual historical context and 
used them as surrogates for some perpetually bigoted mudsill of white American 
existence that could only be spoken of in the fictive form of mythologized historical 
figures and, unlike her subjects whom she had previously idealized, undeserving of her 
sympathy or ―help.‖  It would seem that  feud, or its synonyms, does not only suggest a 
format for ―primordial‖ violence but a racial and cultural presence that challenges the 
limits of scholars‘ own beliefs in multiculturalism and ―cultural pluralism or moral 
relativism.‖  The forces supposedly let loose by ―Bloody Breathitt‖ and all it entails are 
extremely difficult for the liberal imagination to confront without using an awkward 
coded language.  In the following chapters, and especially in the final one, I make a small 
attempt at deciphering the code.       
 More than anything else, feud represents an act of segregation, a segregation of 
violence from the national narrative and a virtual denial of its existence.  The success of 
violent acts is itself an indictment of the society that they are acted out against.  In such 
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cases it is easy business for those who benefit most from the maintenance of the status 
quo to point directly, and exclusively, to the unarticulatable senselessness of violence, 
thereby robbing it of its historical and spatial meaning.  Those listening are ready to 
believe them, since an indictment upon their society is an indictment upon them as well, 
and it is therefore more suitable for acts of ―lawlessness‖ to be written off to irrationality, 
thus making violence as far beyond the confines of human agency as a hurricane.  This is 
far easier when violence is acted out among America‘s most marginalized populations 
and in its most marginalized places, both urban and rural.  But if we do two things-first, 
examine the actual acts as they transpired, and, second, consider the possibility that they 
might have been carried out for reasons as rational as the most cherished American 
narratives of patriotic bravery (the ones that just happened to involve killing), we see a 
very different picture.  In the thick of the United States‘ worst period of mass urban 
disorder, Martin Luther King, Jr. insisted that "a riot is the language of the unheard."
64
  A 
riot is only one manifestation of violence.  Perhaps the same could be said for others as 
well.   
 
Chapter Overview 
           The arrangement of chapters is both thematic and chronological.  To demonstrate 
exogenous effects upon Breathitt County over the course of the nineteenth century, most 
of the chapters begin with political conflicts in the ―outside world‖ (i.e., Kentucky) and 
end with  accounts of their being endogenously reproduced in the county.  Most of the 
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chapters deal with types of violence that were specific to their respective eras and 
political conditions.    
            The county is a political unit common to most of the United States, but its 
importance was intensified in the southern states.  Nineteenth-century county government 
was paradoxical, embodying elements of both popular sovereignty and elitism.  While 
looking forward to a yeoman republic defined by local rule, local rule that might have 
been best embodied in the county, Thomas Jefferson nevertheless had to acknowledge the 
prevalence of courthouse patricians who dominated county courthouses.
65
  In chapter two, 
I describe how Breathitt County‘s history of violence came from both internal and 
external sources, sources that can be traced back to the formation and arrangement of 
county government.  From its beginning as a state in 1792, the ―free‖ land of Kentucky 
was contested by settlers and land speculators who had seized many of the land grants 
issued to veterans of the Revolutionary War.  This conflict continued in pockets of the 
state after it was resolved in the agriculturally attractive (and, therefore, first-settled) 
Bluegrass.  Even though its county seat was named for a president who publicly despised 
the rash of land speculation (yet was a land speculator himself) during his administration, 
the county was formed as part of one such enterprise.
66
  A white male minority of old 
families and commercially interested recent arrivals formed the county in hopes of 
harnessing its untapped mineral and timber resources once more viable means of 
transportation attached it to the ―outside world‖ (in this case, Kentucky‘s own ―polis,‖ the 
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Bluegrass).  This chapter describes how this political paradox planted the seeds for 
Breathitt County‘s history of violence.       
Chapter three illustrates Breathitt County‘s experience in the Civil War.  As 
mentioned before, revisionist histories of ―feud‖ violence have either firmly dissociated 
postbellum factional conflicts from the war or disavowed the war‘s importance by 
omission.
67
  But in Breathitt County, the American Civil War had a tremendous, long-
lasting impact on the relationships between its citizenry.  Breathitt County was home to a 
close-quartered war between neighbors like many other parts of the South.  Somehow, 
however, the politically legitimate violence involved in the fighting of the Civil War was 
absorbed by the illegitimacy embodied by feud.         
Chapter four shows a time period in which Breathitt County‘s legitimacy was 
tested to an even greater degree than it was during the war.  The years of presidential and 
congressional/ military Reconstruction were devastating in the formerly rebellious states, 
but they were felt in the unseceded border states as well, with Kentucky being the most 
pronounced and divided case.  Conflicts over the politics of race and statehood were 
fought out in the streets of Jackson in a manner not dissimilar from those in other parts of 
Kentucky in the 1870s.  In the 1870s, the Kentucky state militia was dispatched to 
Jackson twice to quell local disputes, one of which resulted in the shooting death of a 
county judge, earning the county the nickname ―Bloody Breathitt.‖68  It was during this 
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time that violence in eastern Kentucky was portrayed in the media as something far 
different than the conflicts of Reconstruction.         
―‗Keeping up the old trouble‘: Parochialism, the Past and the Death of a Feudal 
Chieftain‖ is a coda to its preceding chapter, demonstrating how the development of 
eastern Kentucky‘s ―feud belt‖ gave credence to the pre-established primordial depiction 
of political violence in Breathitt County.  In turn, the strength of the Republican Party in 
the mountains, in contrast to the state‘s Democratic majority, helped to establish the ―two 
Kentuckys.‖  As the idea of Appalachian otherness gained popularity for reasons both 
cultural and political, Breathitt County became more and more connected to the ―outside 
world,‖ as land was sold and plans were made for future advancement.  These changes 
set the stage for the violent death of the county‘s most famous ―feudist‖ and the last 
remnants of the Civil War‘s challenge to Democratic dominance in the county.   
The fifth chapter details the most famous acts of political violence in Breathitt 
County‘s history.  The campaign and subsequent assassination of William Goebel 
radicalized Kentucky‘s two-party system and brought new attention upon the Kentucky 
mountains and Breathitt County.  After Goebel‘s death Democratic efforts to enforce 
their control over the county‘s ballot box resulted in three assassinations carried out in a 
manner similar to that of Goebel‘s short years earlier.  What was, at the turn of the 
century, an internationally popular form of political violence was interpreted as a feud, 
thereby confusing its political import. 
To many Americans, ―Bloody Breathitt‖ represented traits in their country‘s 
character that were best forgotten.  But to others, ―lawlessness‖ and feud were important 
elements in a useable history, useable for economic gain, and useful for strengthening 
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political arguments.  The sixth and final chapter, ―‗The feudal wars of Eastern Kentucky 
will no doubt be utilized in coming years by writers of fiction.‘: Reading and Writing 
Bloody Breathitt,‖ details the history of feud in the American and southern American 
lexicon as a descriptor of violence.  It also describes how people in Breathitt County, its 
Kentucky surroundings and the ―outside world‖ employed the county‘s violent history to 
their own ends soon after the most famous incidents had ended.  This chapter makes a 
modest claim that is certainly not novel but essential to my general argument: that culture 
and cultural interpretations of human events can and has been used to disguise political 
motives, especially when these motives require inequality and disfranchisement. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
―TO THEM, IT WAS NO-MAN‘S LAND.‖:  BEFORE BREATHITT WAS BLOODY 
 
 
In his memoir of a life‘s religious revelations and ponderings, George Washington 
Noble recalled watching a ―pitched battle‖ when he was a child in Breathitt County, 
Kentucky.  The fight was a strictly hand-to-hand fray, a common exhibition in the 
southern backcountry, and employed seconds in order to prevent foul play by both 
pugilists and give a measure of duel-like ritualized order to what might otherwise have 
been nothing more than base mutual brutality.
69
  In the county seat of Jackson this 
directed display of violence became institutionalized as a popular spectacle and contest 
between communities.  On Court Days (always a boisterous event in the antebellum 
South), ―Tessy Boys,‖ the leading bullies of various communities, fought each other for 
cash prizes and local prestige.
70
 The Tessy Boy fights established a space in which even a 
child like George Noble could be a participant in an otherwise adult male event, 
expanding Court Days‘ social significance beyond their official functions and broadening 
their magnitude.  The fights instilled a political and legal event with an element of 
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entertainment while also providing an informal interaction of some of the county‘s male 
citizens alongside the more formal proceedings, gathering ―high and low into deeply 
charged, face-to-face, ritualized encounters.‖71  A rough, unruly activity in tandem with a 
public event that insured civic order, the Tessy Boys‘ fights also serve as an allegory for 
Breathitt County, Kentucky‘s social and political way of life in the two decades previous 
to the Civil War. The incorporation of acts of violence into a state-ordained ritual like 
Court Day, and the constraints provided by seconds and public oversight, mirrored the 
local state‘s marginally successful attempt to bring stability to a chaotic environment.   
Untamed as it was, the place that became Breathitt County was never completely 
isolated from the ―outside world‖ as it would later be portrayed.  The county came into 
being in 1839 at the behest of Jeremiah South, a Bluegrass speculator who, anticipating 
potential improvements, lobbied for the county‘s formation around the thousands of acres 
of timberland he had recently procured.  As was the case with most antebellum petitions 
for new Kentucky counties, South‘s was easily granted, giving him and his allies a 
remarkable amount of local power.  Along with other recent arrivals and the wealthier 
elements of the preexistent population, South exerted both political and economic 
domination over his new county.  The most dramatic outcome of the new county‘s 
creation, and the establishment of a town that would shortly be named in honor of 
Andrew Jackson, was the creation of an unprecedented pocket of Democratic defiance 
within a section that adhered to the Whig Party.  Breathitt County was a testament to the 
amount of political control a minority could exert within a small political unit, creating a 
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collusion of Jacksonian America‘s two most all-encompassing impulses: the expansion of 
free enterprise and the demand for local sovereignty, impulses that worked in conjunction  
to spell the end of ―disinterested‖ government.72   Combining commodification of the 
land, the creation of a new governmental unit, and successful manipulation of the 
electorate‘s party loyalties (and, by extension, the political character of the county), the 
creation of Breathitt County can best be termed an act of cartographic and political 
discipline, a discipline carried out for decidedly undemocratic purposes.
73
         
During this period the territory that was to become Breathitt County was not 
exclusively peopled by like-minded white settlers with amicable aims for the area‘s 
development.  It was instead the construction of an arena for the conflict that Frederick 
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Jackson Turner dubbed ―the contest between the capitalist and the democratic pioneer.‖74  
Before what would become the state of Kentucky in 1792 was occupied by more than a 
small population of white pioneers, most of the land had already been doled out into land 
grants by the state of Virginia, initially as a latter variety of the colonial headright, and 
later awarded to veterans of the Revolutionary War.  Most of these grants remained 
unclaimed for decades, but were still contested between settlers and speculators.
75
  In the 
meantime, people either ignorant or uncaring of these previous arrangements populated 
the area.  For some, especially the relatively small number who had occupied the Three 
Forks region for decades previous, the forests and pastures of the Kentucky River‘s lower 
breaks were a place to raise crops, livestock and families without having to go into debt 
for the prospect of eventually owning land.  To speculators, however, it was an 
investment for an unseen future, a future based upon extraction rather than agriculture 
and hunting.  Below the heavily timbered exterior lay a wealth of coal, and the combined 
value of these two resources eventually transformed the landscape and economy of 
eastern Kentucky. While the area‘s early pioneers had begun capitalizing on these 
resources to supplant their agricultural pursuits since the early 1800s (an enterprise 
assisted by the Kentucky River‘s sometimes-navigable forks) there remained an 
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abundance of natural resources that could only be fully harnessed at some future time in 
which railroads could supplant the rivers as a more dependable means of transportation.   
 
Figure 1: Breathitt County in Modern-Day Kentucky 
 
When this new community was being formed, Tessy Boy fights notwithstanding, 
it was probably among the most peaceful in the United States.  But the county‘s very 
creation, the attempt to impose a new economic and political discipline upon an 
otherwise undisciplined space, was a catalyst for future conflict.  The county‘s formation 
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presented an opportunity for conflict between landowners and untitled settlers, a conflict 
that created a mutual dearth of legitimacy that impacted both public and private sectors.   
Befitting their relative poverty, the latter group held a shortage of control over the formal 
institutions that would sustain their command over the land they called home, and 
became legally transformed from settlers to squatters.  At the same time, landowners and 
speculators were not able to fully triumph either, for reasons political, economic and, 
perhaps most important, geographic.  This chapter traces these factors during Breathitt 
County‘s first two decades of existence as an embryonic source of violence.     
 
“…the very roughest class of men…” 
In the 1930s, Breathitt County native and historian E.L. Noble (George Noble‘s 
younger cousin) recollected a local fable from what he fancifully called ―the medieval 
history of Eastern Kentucky‖ about a man who, sometime before the county‘s 
partitioning, traded ―an entire creek of land, some two to three thousand acres‖ for a rifle.  
The moral of the story, Noble explained, was that while ―the man buying the gun today 
(the 1930s when his series was written and published) is looked on as an imbecile…in 
fact [at that time in history] he made the best bargain.‖ While the deed to the land brought 
with it the potential for wealth, this was wealth that involved the application of arduous 
labor; the plowing of rough ground and fencing of crops, the tending of livestock, the 
hiring of possibly undependable help, not to mention the burden of paying property taxes.  
In contrast, ownership of the rifle, compounded with unfettered access to all the territory 
one was willing to traverse, made one ―heir to all the game that roamed the woods in a 
thousand valleys, or on a thousand hills.‖  Noble added that, along with the rifle, ―A fish 
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hook in those days was more valuable than a common farm.‖76  The terrain almost 
demanded that one live the existence of what Noble called a ―wood denizen‖ rather than 
that of a legitimate yeoman.
77
  And, even in his own time, Noble believed that something 
like the wood denizen existence persisted just shortly beyond the isolated poverty he saw 
around him.         
There once lived, a now invisible people, in these forest primeval worlds, rich in primeval glory 
and wealth of worlds unknown to man.  The greed of man has robbed this ancient folk of their 
wealth and left them in poverty amid man‘s ingratitude.  They still reside here among the people 
of today; but silent, uncomplaining: too proud to weep aloud; too good(?) to shed a tear; to royal 
to mourn for waste; to majestic to live with their own; to pure and lovely to ever fade or vanish 
from the part of man that has journeyed from afar and knows poverty in its extreme; a poverty 
stricken people that would not exchange themselves for all that now stands as civilization.
78
       
 
Influenced by a probable combination of early twentieth century sociology and 
local color writing, as well as an elderly mountaineer‘s sense of nostalgia, E.L. Noble‘s 
descriptions of Breathitt County‘s early years are pastoral, edenic and, on the whole, 
apocryphal.  Official land ownership was as desirable to the nineteenth century Kentucky 
mountaineer as it was to other agriculturally-minded and investment-minded Americans 
of the time.  However, the story of the rifle/land trade and the ―now invisible people‖ 
serve as economic parables, illustrating the importance of open land to many early 
settlers in the Three Forks region; while contractual ownership of tracts of land was 
recognized as legitimate and sought after, it was secondary in importance to the settlers‘ 
ability to exploit the land‘s wealth.  The Cumberland Plateau‘s rugged terrain made 
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agricultural techniques transplanted from elsewhere difficult.
79
  The clearing of land for 
planting staple crops required an almost prohibitive investment of time and labor.  Corn 
and flax and small patches of cotton were grown, mainly for home consumption, but, for 
the most part, large expanses of the county‘s 700 square miles remained unimproved for 
decades (see Figure 2).
80
  For these reasons, unlimited access to open lands was 
imperative for many mountaineers who found that hunting and foraging could not be 
fully replaced by agriculture and husbandry.  A generation before E.L. Noble‘s 1872 birth, 
mountain farmers who supplemented their livelihood with game meat and grazed their 
livestock on other people‘s land might have laughed at the prospect of trading land for a 
gun, but probably out of the story‘s rueful reality rather than its absurdity.          
The fight that George Noble witnessed, probably in the early 1850s, happened at a 
time when a substantial population in the northern reaches of the Kentucky River‘s three 
forks was barely a generation old.  Although most of Kentucky had been densely settled 
since the late eighteenth century, especially the verdant Bluegrass, the eastern area of the 
state that was part of the Cumberland Plateau had not been widely occupied by Euro-
Americans for nearly as long.  ―The [non-Indian] population of Kentucky until the 
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separation from Virginia,‖ wrote one early twentieth century historian, ―was practically 
confined to the Bluegrass.‖81  Kentucky‘s first generation of white settlers considered 
 
Figure 2: Farming on Improved and Unimproved Land in Breathitt and Surrounding Counties, 1850-1860 
County # 
Families 
# 
Farms 
 
 
Acres 
improved 
Value of improved 
land (including 
implements) 
 
Acres 
Unimproved 
Percentage of 
improved land 
Average 
improved acres 
per family 
% Families 
with Farms 
1850         
Breathitt 625 433 13,517 $279,674 274,043 04.7% 0.04 69.28% 
Clay 782 511 19,186 320102 137,006 12.28% 0.04 65.34% 
Estill 934 604 26,839 493554 84,619 24% 0.03 64.66% 
Owsley 
(1843) 
588 484 14,887 369148 226,241 06.1% 0.03 82.31% 
Perry 500 396 14,145 233263 279,673 04.8% 0.03 79.2% 
1860         
Breathitt 824 471 18093 458,647 226518 7.9% .04 57.16% 
Clay 1005 596 27590 518417 227306 12.1% .03 59.3% 
Estill 2133 558 40828 992961 106868 38.2% .05 26.16% 
Owsley 897 578 26277 774862 231160 11.3% .03 64.43% 
Perry 990 595 18754 430969 301564 6% .05 60.1% 
 
 
 
 ―Caintucke‘s‖ section of the plateau little more than an impediment to reaching the more 
desirable Bluegrass, a bountiful cultivator‘s paradise where a facsimile of the Virginia 
plantation economy could be most easily re-created.  With its being ―least accessible and 
last settled,‖ one Appalachian historian labeled the plateau ―New Appalachia‖ due to its 
having no permanent white occupation until roughly the last decade of the eighteenth 
century, and relatively little for some time after that.
82
   
The opportunity to mine and refine salt, an ever-valuable commodity, prompted  
Bluegrass residents to establish satellite hermitages in the mountains.  At its smallest 
headwaters surrounding what is now the town of Manchester in modern day Clay County, 
the Three Forks region (the area of eastern Kentucky draining into the north, middle and  
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Figure 3: Kentucky‘s Three Forks Region  
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south forks of the Kentucky River) gave birth to a burgeoning salt-making industry in the 
late eighteenth century, starting a thriving market economy supported by river navigation 
improvements and slave labor.
83
  Shortly thereafter, white settlements, fed by Virginia to 
the east and the Bluegrass to the west, formed on the shores of the Big Sandy River soon 
after and eventually coalesced into Floyd County, the first Kentucky county formed 
exclusively in the mountains.
84
  But most of the land in between these watersheds was 
steeper, rougher territory not well-suited to cultivation, slightly poorer in mineral wealth 
and of little initial use other than hunting and grazing.  As Kentucky‘s population grew, 
rising land prices in flatter sections of the state drew attention to these lands that earlier 
pioneers had bypassed.  As the population of the mountains slowly grew new arrivals 
made agreements with more established residents that their collective needs were better 
met by the formation of new counties. Clay and Floyd Counties (which had shared 
between them the entirety of eastern Kentucky after their respective formations) were 
then carved into smaller units where courts and markets could be reached more easily.  
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As late as the Civil War, still recognizing that theirs was a relatively new community, 
eastern Kentucky‘s residents referred to the Bluegrass core as the ―old settlements.‖85   
To an outside observer, Three Forks residents in the early nineteenth century 
appeared impoverished and considerably different than the white southerners who had 
turned the Bluegrass into a thriving agricultural metropole.  Confounded by a lack of 
provisions while following the Kentucky‘s north fork southward, a travel writer recorded 
in 1835 that ―These primitive people live altogether in log-huts, and you may form some 
idea of their extreme poverty, from our being utterly unable in our last day‘s ride to 
procure grain of any sort for our horses, or even a mouthful of food for ourselves.‖86  
This condition of relative destitution was exacerbated by a constant trickle of new 
arrivals.  As settlement in eastern Kentucky grew slowly during the early decades of the 
nineteenth century, the availability of useful land declined.  And, as this condition 
progressed, the perceived differences between the Bluegrass and eastern Kentucky 
became starker.  In 1889 a journalist described Kentucky as divided into three distinct 
regions ―like Gaul,‖ an oft-repeated reference to the Gallic wars.87  But the contrast 
between the highlands and the Bluegrass popularized another geographical commentary 
made three years earlier, one that asserted ―two Kentuckys,‖ one defined by agrarian 
wealth and the other by primitive deprivation.
88
  This geographic metaphor came to 
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influence Kentuckians‘ self-image as well as their state‘s portrayal outside of its borders.  
Different as they seemed, however, the two Kentuckys were never far removed from each 
other.          
From early on, legal ownership of arable land was concentrated into relatively 
few hands.
89
  For some landless arrivals, especially those who aspired to eventual 
ownership, tenancy was the most likely option.  While it had never existed as a stable 
system given to habits of deference and permanency, tenancy in some form or another 
had been practiced since the early days of white settlement in Kentucky.
90
  Many 
Kentucky tenant farmers deemed it a temporary condition, one that could be left behind 
after a short time when open land came available elsewhere.  Frontier tenancy‘s inherent 
instability, an instability determined by the relative availability of cheap or free land, 
prevented Kentucky from ever developing a clearly defined class division between 
landlord and tenant.
91
  The transient habits of un-landed settlers was a source of constant 
irritation to landlords not only because dependable labor lasted only as long as tenants 
felt inclined to provide it, but also because rampant landlessness could prove threatening 
to the Virginia-style ―agrarian republic predicated upon monied wealth‖ that Kentucky‘s 
first generation of landowners wanted to reproduce.
92
  Even if it did not become a static 
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economic arrangement, the inequality of landownership upon which the practice 
depended was a source of constant friction from the early days of Kentucky‘s white 
settlement.   
 Landowners sometimes used unusual methods in attempting to control their 
renters.  In the winter of 1844 a widowed landlady living near Floyd‘s county seat of 
Prestonsburg wanted to dispossess a tenant family from a cabin on her property but was 
contractually obligated to allow them to remain housed there until the following March.  
Being aware that the tenant‘s daughter ―had acquired an unsavory reputation‖ by 
becoming involved with a married lawyer, the landlady enlisted a young relative to scare 
the family off of her property.  Employing a homemade noisemaker made from rope and 
wood, the boy sneaked into their vicinity under cover of night and tricked the tenants and 
their neighbors into believing that ―a haunt [had been] sent into the neighborhood on 
account of the conduct of this young woman and the lawyer…‖  The tenant family‘s 
neighbors succumbed to superstition and soon forcibly removed them from the county.
93
  
The landlady was then free to once again use the now-vacant property as she pleased.         
When possible, the courts could be used as well, but not always to landowners‘ perfect 
advantage.  In the winter of 1845, during a Baptist camp meeting near Prestonsburg, ―the 
very roughest class of men in and around the town‖ staged a mock camp meeting, 
drunkenly shouting bogus sermons and prayers with the constant threat of forcibly 
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disrupting the actual meeting.  After ―three of the best citizens in the place‖ had the group 
indicted by a justice of the peace for their blasphemies, their ringleader confronted one of 
them in front of his house and launched a fuselage of rocks through his windows.
94
  After 
firing off a shot and injuring one rioter the homeowner managed to escape with his 
family by disguising himself as a woman
 
but was later himself counter-indicted for his 
reckless use of a firearm.  After he was acquitted the rioters were tried for their own 
actions, ―settl[ing] the social and moral atmosphere in and around Prestonsburg for 
several years.‖  The two trials aroused conflict in the community to such a degree that the 
state militia was summoned to keep peace.
95
 
These incidents suggest that Jacksonian Appalachia, presumably a time and place 
of remarkable egalitarianism, was rife with the same tension between the landed and the 
landless that had permeated the Bluegrass‘ settlement decades earlier.  Either through 
force, jurisprudence or control exerted through manipulation of folk belief in the 
supernatural, eastern Kentucky landowners had some means of controlling tenants, but 
squatters were another matter.  To early Kentucky landowners, the alleged avoidance of 
labor to amass land was perhaps more repugnant to their sense of republican virtue than a 
tenant farmer‘s daughter‘s adulterous affair.96  But their moral superiority was limited.  
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Since much of what became the state had already been deeded out in grants by the state 
of Virginia, the unwarranted occupation of deeded land was rampant virtually from the 
beginning of white settlement and influenced political debate, while also fattening 
lawyers‘ pocket books, for decades.97  ―Almost every inch of Kentucky land was disputed‖ 
and the distinction between squatter and legitimate landowner was often quite 
indistinct.
98
  Yeomen who found unauthorized settlers on their property could sometimes 
force them into tenancy.
99
  But farmers with large expanses of land or absentee owners 
found the practice much harder to prevent.  Ignorant of, or perhaps unconcerned about, 
these estates‘ official tenure, Kentucky squatters made use of these expanses of land 
throughout the nineteenth century.  As E.L. Noble described his forbears‘ arrival in the 
Three Forks region (much of which was already owned ―on paper‖), ―To them, it was no-
man‘s land.‖100                
Kentucky squatters wielded significant political power during the early years of 
white settlement.  Public Good, Thomas Paine‘s leaflet that disputed Virginia‘s rights to 
what would become Kentucky in the following decade, was widely circulated west of the 
mountains within two years of the Revolutionary War‘s end, arguing in favor of settlers‘ 
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rights to land contained within the Virginia grants in opposition to those of speculators.
101
  
These hopes were eventually revealed to be somewhat valid once these landless farmers 
formed into an effective voting bloc.  From the turn of the century until well into the 
1800s Kentucky squatters took advantage of the state‘s lack of property requirements for 
voting and elected legislators who advocated their interests over those of speculators.
102
  
In the 1820s and 1830s, state legislation favored occupiers‘ rights to the disadvantage of 
Virginia grant claimants.
103
  While squatting violated property relations, it did so without 
publically challenging ―the de jure distribution of property rights.‖104  Kentucky‘s 
legislature had little reason to look any more favorably on speculators than squatters 
since speculators often failed to pay their debts to the state while the latter may not have 
been abundant sources of revenue but did ―attend to their own business.‖  As a result, in 
its early years Kentucky became a state ―on the vanguard in recognizing the rights of the 
squatter.‖105  
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Although given to relative poverty and legal tenuousness, squatting on someone 
else‘s land provided a measure of freedom as well.106  To the landless immigrant, it was 
an effective means of making a living, on par with most landowners without having to 
deal with the coercion inherent to tenancy.  In recent decades historians have maintained 
that habits of landownership in preindustrial Appalachia threatened to sow the seeds of its 
own destruction.
107
  Bearing in mind the challenges presented to farmers attempting to 
make a living off of increasingly smaller tracts of marginally fertile land, the squatter‘s 
presence was, if left otherwise unmolested, arguably more sustainable than land practices 
deemed legally legitimate.  While most probably aspired to become landowners 
themselves, many squatters, especially those who occupied the remotest land, saw little 
need for the legitimacy that came with an undisputed title.  Squatters based their claims to 
property on direct physical control over their living environment rather than the 
recognition of state authorities, yet did so without presenting a serious challenge to laws 
and common practice regarding property rights.
108
  The undisciplined atmosphere that 
gave birth to this culture of ―preemption‖ reflected a radical conception of non-
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contractual ownership that prevailed throughout the Trans-Appalachian West for years.
109
  
For years, the greater Ohio Valley was a ―squatter‘s paradise.‖110   
And since it was settled last, the Three Forks region was the paradise‘s last 
bastion.  As squatters became landowners by invoking preemption, or moved further west, 
their importance as a political coalition declined. Henry Clay, who guided Kentucky 
politics for decades, came to look upon squatting more as trespassing than as inexpensive 
improvement of fallow land.
111
  Federal land policy, which ostensibly granted the right of 
preemption in 1841, favored only settlers who were able to purchase the lands they 
occupied in the near future.
112
  For this reason, coupled with the omnipresent possibility 
of westward movement, the number of squatters in central and western Kentucky 
dwindled significantly in the 1840s.  The success of squatting was inversely proportional 
to legitimate landowners‘ willingness (or ability) to surveillance their land and enforce 
their control over it.  So in parts of the mountains squatters persisted.
113
  Without outside 
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interest in one of the ―newest‖ sections of New Appalachia, squatters in expanses of land 
between Manchester and Prestonsburg were free to drive livestock, fell timber and mine 
coal with impunity for years after most of the rest of the state had become divided among 
landowners.  Squatters who exported timber and coal profited from their neighbors to the 
west without having to adopt a post-frontier dedication to privately owned land.  
Furthermore, Three Forks squatters‘ way of life did not directly impede that of their 
landowning neighbors.  With his dependence upon open land, even the wealthiest farmer 
made a living in a manner very much like the landless, even those who probably 
surreptitiously used his land.  Due to geographical conditions, both depended upon access 
to open land, land that was not subject to commodification by grant or title.            
Squatters eking out livelihoods on land titled to men who were long dead (sometimes 
without heirs) declared preemption because they aspired to become ―legitimate‖ 
landowners themselves.  Like most tenants, such farmers saw official landlessness as a 
temporary condition to be eventually overcome and logically accepted the 
commodification of the land they lived upon.
114
  As Kentucky went from being the 
United States‘ ―first western state‖ with widespread landlessness to a southern state with 
widespread land ownership, preemption eventually lost favor.  The availability of land 
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60 
 
west of the Mississippi River could only threaten the value of southern land.  When the 
last antebellum federal preemption bill was struck down by Congress in 1859, 
southeastern Kentucky‘s U.S. House representative, John Elliott, joined most other 
southern congressmen in opposing it.
115
  But to squatters who invested most of their time 
in hunting and droving, preemption was an unhelpful non-issue, since ―improvement‖ of 
land did little to improve their well-being.
116
  If anything, clearing land was detrimental 
to their interests, since it diminished the habitat of game animals and eliminated the cane 
and mast that free-range cattle and pigs fed upon.  For years the area that was to become 
Breathitt County served as a haven for this way of life, a way of life that did not 
necessarily reject economic participation in the outside world but still depended upon the 
land remaining unfenced, untitled and undisciplined.
117
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                Still, like all Americans, mountaineers with or without land craved participation 
in public institutions.  They realized that a place for mediation, namely the court, was 
necessary to maintain peace and prosperity in even the most sparsely populated places 
and, rather than travel to far away county seats, it was easier to institute seats of 
government that were physically convenient.  The formation of new counties became the 
most viable means of bringing courts to remote populations.           
 
 
 “These people lived here in seclusion for several years…” 
 
 The difficulty involved in clearing land for cultivation and grazing (and the even 
more difficult prospect of generating enough capital to obtain legal ownership of 
sufficient land) necessitated that these farmers combine marginal cultivation, the hunting 
of large and small game and open range grazing of livestock on titled and untitled land.
118
  
Livestock was the locale‘s only marketable agricultural product and required extended 
road travel, either east to Virginia or west to the Bluegrass, the former being the easier 
conveyance.
119
  Three Forks farmers turned to other forms of marketable extraction soon 
after their arrival.  The recorded products that Three Forks mountaineers shipped to the 
Bluegrass in the early nineteenth century, deer skins, furs, honey and ginseng, 
demonstrate the way in which hunting and gathering could be used to contribute to a 
                                                                                                                                                 
the American West as its case study), see Thomas Clay Arnold, ―Rethinking Moral Economy,‖ The 
American Political Science Review (hereafter APSR) , Vol. 95, No. 1 (March, 2001), pp. 85-95; Florencia E. 
Mallon. Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru.  (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995): p. 64.   
 
              
118
Ronald Lewis.  Transforming the Appalachian Countryside: Railroads, Deforestation and 
Social Change in West Virginia, 1880-1920.  (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 
1998): pp. 23-28.  
 
               
119
The importance of eastern Kentucky droving began to decline in the early 1850s after 
improvements on the Ohio River increased its traffic, further minimizing the importance of the old 
Wilderness Road as a commercial route; Verhoeff, The Kentucky Mountains..., p. 100.   
62 
 
market economy.
120
    Coal, salt and timber may have surpassed agriculture as the Three 
Forks‘ primary market commodities by the 1830s, especially in the southern headwaters, 
where salt extraction began in the late eighteenth century (see Figure 4).
121
  Coal and 
timber were easily transportable via the rivers, and residents used self-manufactured  
 
Figure 4: Agricultural and Extractive Production of Breathitt and Surrounding Counties-1840
1 
County Coal 
(bushels) 
Salt 
(bushels) 
Lumber ($) 
  
Other ―products of the 
forest‖ (e.g., skins, 
ginseng)  ($) 
# Sawmills/ 
Grist mills 
# Cattle Corn  
(bushels) 
1840        
Breathitt 21,017 70 $0 $1,617 1/9 3,517 91,185 
Clay 88,950 106,000 $5,230 $2,745 6/29 6,321 153,140 
Estill 98,525 0 $2,457 $1,135 5/27 5,118 296,697 
Perry 0 7,000 $0 $14,889 1/34 6,001 88,070 
 
flatboats for delivery further northwest in Beatyville and Frankfort.
122
  The seasonally 
navigable three forks of the river provided a permanent (but tenuous) conduit of 
transportation between the Three Forks region and the Bluegrass core.  Cannel coal, a 
particularly valuable variety of hard coal, was prevalent in the Three Forks, especially in 
the future Breathitt County.  Cannel is primarily a surface coal, and could be easily 
surface mined without deep shaft digging, making early coal mining a simple winter 
vocation for farmers.
123
  ―Shallow pits‖ and ―farmers‘ diggings‖ were sufficient for most 
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early coal mining enterprises, although slightly larger enterprises employing slave labor 
were in operation at least as early as the 1830s.
124
 Timber was an even greater asset to 
those interested in supplementing their farming.  In 1835, up to 3000 logs from the Three 
Forks drainage area were felled and floated to Bluegrass markets by flatboat crews.
125
  
Although the vast majority of male heads of household in Breathitt County reported 
themselves to the census as farmers, many were simultaneously lumbermen and miners 
as well.   
But the natural wealth of what was to become Breathitt County was only as 
accessible as was allowed by the small means available to exploit it.  Although the 
markets available downstream kept the Three Forks region in  permanent contact with the 
Bluegrass the sparse population could not even begin to fully capitalize on its natural 
resources due to a lack of infrastructure.  State geologists surveyed Breathitt County and 
surrounding environs as early as the 1840s but no major efforts had been made to create 
centralized mining operations in the area.
126
  Remarking on the wealth of coal and timber 
on Simon Cockrell, Sr.‘s land in the 1830s a local memoirist writing in the 1910s wrote 
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that ―The latter was regarded as of but little value at that time, but would be worth an 
immense fortune now.‖127  
Early nineteenth-century arrivals to the Three Forks region created a diverse 
economy that combined hunting, droving and marginal crop cultivation with timber and 
mineral extraction, an economy that notably employed a small measure of slave labor.  
While visitors to the area may have perceived poverty in this undisciplined half of the 
two Kentuckys, later labeled a ―retarded frontier,‖ Jacksonian mountaineers had 
economic advantages equal to most Americans of their time and arguably greater than 
many.
128
   Market ties to Virginia via the old Wilderness Road and the Bluegrass via the 
Kentucky River might be termed by some historians as economic dependencies; however, 
with a wealth of land unfettered by legal boundaries, these were dependencies that white 
Kentucky mountaineers negotiated generally under their own terms.  E.L. Noble 
hyperbolically described his ancestors as existing in ―forest primeval worlds, rich in 
primeval glory and wealth of worlds now unknown to man….These people lived here in 
seclusion for several years; not knowing what country or nation they were citizens.  They 
wanted quiet and seclusion and for a long time found it.‖129  While relative seclusion was 
readily available to Noble‘s forbears, the ability to profit from markets outside of their 
immediate vicinity was far too enticing to allow them to retreat completely to the 
mountain fastness that surrounded them.  Residents of the Three Forks region in the early 
nineteenth century were eager to profit from the land even when they had no legal claim 
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to it.  The two Kentuckys, different as they were in outward appearance, were 
permanently linked by commerce.  This linkage was precisely what brought about the 
creation of Breathitt County.            
 
“The Father of Breathitt County” 
 
Unregulated land-use was not without potential complications.  In 1805, conflict 
arose between cattlemen living between the Kentucky‘s middle and north forks over the 
destruction of crops by steers that had strayed from a cattle drive en route to the Virginia 
line.  John Amis, a north fork resident, took revenge on his careless neighbors by 
somehow drowning a number of their cattle in the river.  In retaliation, members of the 
Strong and Callahan families from the banks of the middle fork killed Amis‘ cattle and 
horses and assaulted his wife.  Amis and his confederates attempted revenge days later by 
firing on the offending party of cattlemen, and shots were returned without immediate 
resolve. In an apparent response to the conflict, or perhaps the request of concerned locals, 
the Kentucky General Assembly formed Clay County from two other counties the 
following year with the intention of indicting the cattle war‘s participants with greater 
ease.  If the state government‘s intentions were the maintenance of law and order in the 
area, it would seem that the effort was only partially successful; Amis was reportedly 
fatally shot while testifying on the witness stand.
130
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 What was remembered as the ―Clay County Cattle War‖ was probably somewhat 
of an anomaly in the Three Forks region.  Long cattle drives and free-range grazing 
continued for years afterward.
131
  The fact that the Cattle War was still frequently spoken 
of nearly a century later attests to how truly unusual this sort of mass violence was before 
the Civil War.
132
  The formation of a new county as a result of this one incident 
demonstrates that nineteenth-century eastern Kentuckians considered the oft-practiced 
formation of new counties a remedy for most, if not all, ills.
133
  Over the thirteen years 
following the Cattle War, eastern Kentuckians continuously petitioned the legislature for 
the delineation of new counties in order to bring courts closer to remote farming 
communities, amounting to a ―frenzy of county-making‖ between 1806 and 1822.134 
Between 1822 and 1860 the number of counties in the state increased from 71 to 110, 
bringing county courts closer to a greater number of voters while simultaneously 
increasing the state‘s intensely parochial social and governmental character (see 
Figures ).
135
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Throughout the nineteenth century the partitioning of new county boundaries at the 
request of locally circulated petitions, as well as the settling of border disputes between 
preexistent counties, became the Kentucky General Assembly‘s primary activities.136  
With much of the population still somewhat transient in the early century there was no 
sanctioned requirement for petitioners to be natives of the area in which they wished to 
form new counties. While local primacy usually superseded other matters, occupants of 
one section of the state who could conceivably benefit from there being a new county in 
another section were at liberty to seek out their creation as well.  With county and circuit 
courts more readily available to citizens in these increasingly smaller counties, the 
importance of county government increased.  County courts in Kentucky had broad 
reaching powers comprising not only the judicial but the legislative and executive 
branches as well, with few checks and balances between the three.  County courts were 
controlled by a board of justices of the peace, a position that was a lifetime appointment.  
Justices were required to make multiple magistrate nominations to the governor but firm 
recommendations could be made, recommendations that governors had little reason to 
ignore.  The powers of county government in relation to the state were virtually ―semi-
federal‖ analogues to the state‘s balance of power with the federal government.137  As 
was the case in the rest of the antebellum South, the white male Kentuckian ―naturally  
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Figure 5: Kentucky in 1800 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Kentucky in 1820 
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Figure 7: Kentucky in 1840 
 
Figure 8: Kentucky in 1860 
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came to regard the county as having much and perhaps paramount importance among the 
governments to which he was subject.‖138 
 The proliferation of new counties came with unforeseen problems, especially the 
continuous decrease of individual county tax bases.  As preexistent county governments 
struggled to keep valuable taxable territories, counties could easily lose a considerable 
amount of revenue with a single act of the legislature, an act that often went through with 
little attendant debate.
139
  As a result, they ran the risk of becoming more and more 
impoverished over the course of years, decreasing the ability of county courts to sponsor 
public works and making paid public positions less and less attractive to local candidates.  
In many counties, particularly in their infant years, no immediate funds were available for 
the building of county courthouses, necessitating the holding of court in private homes. 
Clay, Perry, Breathitt and perhaps most other counties in southeastern Kentucky held 
court in homes, usually those of the ―first families,‖ during the earliest years.140  Holding 
court in privately owned homes was a seemingly innocuous arrangement brought about 
by economic and geographical necessity, an arrangement that most mountaineers did not 
complain about.  The first families‘ local primacy of settlement and wealth of land 
suggested a measure of disinterestedness.  However, the convening of court in homes 
created conflations of public and private spaces that elite hosts could conceivably use to 
their personal advantage, to say nothing of the fact that these were often the same local 
elites who initially petitioned the state to carve new counties.
141
  As a result, the degree to 
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which these new county courts reflected the will of the population depended chiefly upon 
elite intentions.
142
  While making possible the local sovereignty craved by nineteenth 
century Kentuckians, the predominance of county government impeded the development 
of white male democracy.     
Most of eastern Kentucky‘s counties formed before 1850 were able to finance the 
construction of courthouses within a few years of their respective origins, and the 
importance of the initial court procedures being held in wealthy farmers‘ parlors might be 
written off as merely symbolic.  However, new county formation created other 
opportunities for the fusion of elite private interests and public policy.  New formations 
worked to the advantage of first families who leveraged the prestige that primacy brought 
with the control of new county courts to form multigenerational oligarchies.  Between 
1799‘s ratification of Kentucky‘s second constitution and the writing of a new state 
constitution in 1849, most county offices were appointed by justices of the peace rather 
than elected, and justice positions themselves were usually passed down to candidates 
selected exclusively by the board of justices.  Elite families and their clients were able to 
supervise election results, control local patronage and use county funds for personal 
gain.
143
  Since a daunting number of state legislators simultaneously served as justices of 
the peace in their respective counties (a trend rampant not just in eastern Kentucky but 
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across the state) the oligarchic influence was felt in the General Assembly as well.
144
  As 
one of the only twentieth century historians to thoroughly examine the subject has 
asserted, even though there was ―a sense of noblesse oblige‖ to insure fair governance, 
southern counties in the antebellum period were essentially ―undemocratic‖ 
institutions.
145
    
Although its government did eventually suffer from the same oligarchic 
tendencies as other counties in the South, Breathitt County was not dominated by its first 
families.  Many early families maintained their wealth and privilege for ages, but the 
county‘s founders, and the guides to its political destiny, were wealthy Kentuckians from 
outside of the Three Forks region whose chief aims were creating greater access to the 
Bluegrass and maximizing the resulting profits.  In 1833 Thomas Sewell, one of eastern 
Kentucky‘s leading merchants from the Big Sandy River Valley, financed the clearing of 
a new road connecting Perry County‘s War Creek community with Hazel Green, 
Kentucky.
146
  Beginning in 1835 the state financed navigational improvements on the 
north fork in order to facilitate canalization of the larger river further downstream.
147
  
During the 1830s the small settlements in the Kentucky River‘s lower breaks were slowly 
experiencing more visitation from outside of the watershed.  The area‘s new 
interconnectedness with the other half of the two Kentuckys was demonstrated in a 
sometimes flamboyant manner; three years later a traveling circus featuring an elephant 
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arrived from the Bluegrass, treating locals to the bizarre sight of Asian megafauna 
tromping through the mountain hardwoods.
148
     
As the 1830s progressed, the Three Forks region was being ―discovered‖ by both 
settlers and a revived speculative frenzy unmatched in Kentucky since the 1790s.
149
  With 
business in other parts of the state ―prostrated‖ by the Panic of 1837, settlement 
accelerated as farmers from the Bluegrass, as well as previously settled areas of eastern 
Kentucky, were attracted to the watershed.
150
  After building a second home on the north 
fork of the Kentucky River, Simon Cockrell‘s son-in-law, Madison County native 
Jeremiah Weldon South (in partnership with a prominent Bluegrass co-investor), 
procured one of the delinquent land grants originally issued in the 1780s, a grant that 
amounted to more than 108,000 acres of mostly forested land.
151
  Although the area‘s 
timber was what originally attracted South to the Three Forks, it was a difficult resource 
to exploit in the near future, while the creation of a new county would have attracted land 
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buyers and potential tenants.
152
  With Cockrell‘s support, South canvassed the area with a 
petition for the formation of a new county, resulting in the removal of portions of Clay, 
Estill and Perry Counties to form a new county in the winter of 1839.
153
  Although he 
campaigned for the new county ―without remuneration of any kind,‖ South stood to gain 
much from forming Breathitt County around his enormous unimproved estate.
154
  As 
other land speculators realized, the formation of a new county seat increased the value of 
property with the application of a minimal amount of labor.  The new county, named for  
Figure: 9 
 
Jeremiah Weldon South, circa 1878 
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the state‘s first Democratic governor, was the first to be formed in eastern Kentucky since 
1822.  After Sewell began erecting dwellings along the north fork, a small town, initially 
named Breathitt in 1839 but changed to Jackson in 1841, developed into a county seat.  
Owing to Breathitt County‘s planned, commercially-interested origins, it became a 
municipal rarity: an American county formed without a preexistent central settlement.
155
 
South brought with him a formidable Kentucky pedigree.  After helping Daniel 
Boone construct Boonesborough in 1779, his grandfather John South fought in the 
Revolution and served in the Kentucky General Assembly‘s first sessions.  His father 
Samuel followed a general‘s commission in the War of 1812 with stints as legislator 
(losing Kentucky‘s speaker of the house post to Henry Clay by a single vote) and later 
state treasurer.
156
  Although he came from the other of the two Kentuckys, a distinction 
not quite codified in the 1830s, most of the county‘s locals were relative newcomers 
themselves and had little reason to think of South as an interloper.  As one visiting New 
Yorker was surprised to find, Jacksonian highlanders would ―sing the praises of ‗old 
Kaintuck‘ with as much fervor as the yeoman who rides over his thousand fat acres in the 
finest regions of Kentucky [i.e., the Bluegrass].‖157  Any white Kentuckian with deep 
roots in the state was a fellow, not a foreigner.   
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With his new county established, South began building a widely-supported local 
power base.  As the primary petitioner for the county‘s founding, South was able to name 
the county‘s first justices of the peace, including himself, insuring a consensus of 
interests among the new county‘s leading landowners.158  After being joined by his 
brothers John and Richard, Jeremiah had the latter appointed as Breathitt County‘s first 
sheriff, a position that rivaled county judge in official power (John, a lawyer who made a 
legal career representing heirs to the old Virginia grants, might have received his own 
appointment had he not died in 1838).
159
  John Hargis and Simeon Bohannon, recent 
arrivals from Woodford County (the heart of the Bluegrass where the Virginia-style 
planter economy had taken its most successful roots) served as the county‘s first circuit 
court clerk and county clerk respectively.
160
 Jeremiah South himself served as the 
county‘s first state representative in 1840 and was elected to the state senate three years 
later.
161
  Even aside from his ownership of most of the county‘s land, the ―father of 
Breathitt County,‖ ―Jere‖ South and his Bluegrass fellows exhibited considerable control 
over their new political unit.
162
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After assuming the legislator mantle, Jeremiah South came to be known as eastern 
Kentucky‘s greatest advocate in the statehouse, sometimes ―favor[ing] that section even 
to the detriment of the state‖ and resultantly ―idolized by the mountain people.‖163  After 
his service in the state house for most of the 1840s South was elected to organize 
Breathitt County‘s troop contribution to the Mexican War but failed to receive the 
commission he sought due to having not recruited a large enough body of men.
164
  This 
small setback did not diminish his popularity, locally or statewide, and he was soon after 
reelected to the General Assembly and was remembered at the time of his death as 
―perhaps, the most popular and influential man in all of Eastern Kentucky from his early 
manhood to 1880‖165  He was a lifelong supporter of Jackson‘s party and, as Kentucky 
Democrats‘ fortunes increased during the 1850s, his influence increased as well, 
garnering him the powerful position of state penitentiary superintendent and lessee in 
1859.
166
  This position came with considerable influence since it brought with it control 
over all convict labor, a commodity upon which most of Kentucky‘s internal 
improvements (at least that which did not employ slavery) depended.
167
  While he ran the 
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penitentiary South maintained the social capital he had established as a legislator, 
supplying his political allies with ―cheap boarding, cheap washing and free drinks‖ when 
the legislature was in session and giving out ―curiously wrought walking sticks and cedar 
chests‖ as gifts, swaying the General Assembly away from the prison reforms he 
opposed.
168
  Even fellow Democrats criticized his undue influence over the legislature, 
having allegedly up to a third of the body under his sway ―as absolutely as were the 
convicts.‖169  A former Negro inmate remembered his being only slightly more merciful 
to his charges than his cruel predecessor, owing more to slightly ―more humanity in the 
man [and] less executiveness‖ than to his own personal kindness.170  By his death in 1880 
he had been ―one of the controlling voices in the Democratic party in Kentucky‖ for 
some time, not to mention a controlling voice in the county he had helped to found.
171
    
South and his Bluegrass contingent‘s most permanent legacy in the Three Forks 
region was the establishment of a unfailingly Democratic constituency, a modest feat had 
it not been formed from within solidly Whig (and later Republican) territory in a state 
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known for its local political constancies and at a time when the state‘s Democracy was at 
a low ebb.
172
  In the 1840s, Kentuckians of many societal strata supported the Whigs and,  
as was the case in most southern communities, they created relatively homogenous party 
loyalties in their respective communities (loyalties that usually extended to the county 
level).
173
 Those who gained their wealth from new roads and easy credit favored Clay‘s 
American System, while poorer elements supported the party in areas of the state where 
Democratic slaveholders dominated elections.
174
  Even after the party‘s national decline 
                                                 
 
              
172
In terms of party loyalty, southeastern Kentucky counties exhibit consistencies that (if Whig, 
American, Opposition and Republican tickets can be uneasily lumped together) span centuries.  Breathitt 
County‘s Democratic deviation from its Whig neighbors is especially significant considering the tendency 
of county electorates in the Three Forks region to follow the political lead of the counties out of which they 
were partitioned.  Floyd and Morgan Counties, older counties situated to Breathitt County‘s north and east 
nineteenth century boundaries, exhibit the same staunch loyalty to the Democratic Party throughout the 
nineteenth century and, like Breathitt, held pro-Confederate leanings during the Civil War.  Intuitively, this 
might indicate that Breathitt County‘s  political socialization came from economic and social ties between 
these counties.  However, the similarities may be misleading.  Aside from the waterways that drained into 
the three forks of the Kentucky River, Breathitt County‘s only other major transportation conduits across 
county boundaries was a state road connected the county with Clay, Perry (counties that lost territory to the 
former‘s formation) and Owsley (a newer county to which portions of Breathitt County were lost) Counties, 
which were all traditionally Whig.  Before 1850, there were no mapped roads between Breathitt and its 
similarly Democratic neighbors, suggesting that such physical ties of socialization might have been 
relatively minimal and giving further credence to Jeremiah South‘s personal influence on the electorate; 
Harold Tallant.  Evil Necessity: Slavery and Political Culture in Antebellum Kentucky.  (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 2003): pp. 136-137; Eugene A. Conti, Jr., ―Mountain Metamorphoses: 
Culture and Development in East Kentucky,‖ (unpublished dissertation, Duke University, 1978): p. 186.  
Ernest Collins, ―Political Behavior in Breathitt, Knott, Perry and Leslie Counties,‖ (unpublished master‘s 
thesis, University of Kentucky, 1940): p. 41; Moore, p. 224; James E. Copeland, ―Where Were the 
Kentucky Unionists and Secessionists?‖ RKHS, Volume 71, No. 4 (1973): pp. 350-351; Frank F. Mathias 
and Jasper B. Shannon, ―Gubernatorial Politics in Kentucky,‖ RKHS, Volume 88, No. 3 (1990): pp. 263, 
265, 267, 269; James Klotter and Hamilton Tapp.  Kentucky: Decades of Discord, 1865-1900.  (Frankfort, 
KY: The Kentucky Historical Society, 1977): p. 7; Harry August Volz, ―Party, State and Nation: Kentucky 
and the Coming of the American Civil War,‖ (unpublished dissertation, University of Virginia, 1982): pp. 
69-70.  Wallace B. Turner, ―Kentucky Politics in the 1850‘s,‖ RKHS, Vol. 56, No. 2 (April, 1958): pp. 123-
124.  
 
              
173
Harry Watson.  Jacksonian Politics and Community Conflict: The Emergence of the Second 
Party System in Cumberland County, North Carolina.  (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1981): pp. 220, 304.  
 
              
174
Ronald Lewis, pp. 65-68.  Historians of the 19
th
 century American South who consider political 
parties to be tools of the elite, as well as historians who deem them true vehicles of mass opinion, all 
recognize the Whig Party‘s special formidability in the upland South, particularly in eastern Kentucky; 
Billings and Blee, The Road to Poverty, p. 109; Michael Holt.  The Rise and Fall of the American Whig 
Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War.  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999): pp. 
80 
 
in the early 1850s, one area of the state never allowed Democratic footholds.  Breathitt 
County was carved from the three counties that composed the eastern end of this ―Whig 
Gibraltar,‖ the south-central section of Kentucky where loyalty to Clay‘s party was most 
dependable.
175
  For the first few years Breathitt County continued with its Whiggish 
origins, casting strong majorities for William Henry Harrison and gubernatorial candidate 
Robert Letcher in 1840. But within four years Breathitt County had begun an ongoing 
Democratic attachment, one that was to remain unchallenged for decades (see 
Figures ).
176
  Hargis and the Souths had numerous structural devices at their disposal for 
creating this area of Democratic support.  Sheriffs and county court clerks, offices 
subordinate only to the county judge, held tremendous control over elections.
177
 As part 
of their official duties, Hargis and Bohannon, the first clerks of the county court and 
circuit court respectively, were in charge of orchestrating ―divides‖ (the vocal casting of 
votes on election days) and could not only monitor party loyalty but could also 
manipulate outcomes.  With his brother Richard as sheriff (and fellow petitioners serving 
as the second and third), South was fully capable of using the carrot of patronage and the  
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Figures 10-12: Presidential, Gubernatorial and Congressional (U.S. House) Elections in Breathitt County 
and its ―Birth‖ Counties, 1828-1859 
 
 ―Democrat‖/ 
National Republican 
Democrat/ 
National 
Republican 
Democrat/ 
Whig 
Democrat/ 
Whig 
Democrat/ 
Whig 
Democrat/ 
Whig 
Democrat/ 
Whig 
Democrat/ 
Whig 
Democrat/ 
Whig 
County 1828 
Pres. 
1832 
Pres. 
1836 
Pres. 
1836 
Gub. 
1840 
Pres. 
1840 
Gub. 
1843  
Cong. 
1844 
Pres. 
1844 
Gub. 
Breathitt ----- ----- ----- ----- 45-159W 
 
135-217W 219-138D 231-120D 
 
250-151D 
Clay 58-348NR 100-299NR 153-202W 
 
136-356W 91-438W 
 
141-447W 102-443W 92-335W 
 
232-383W 
Estill 239-215‖D‖ 
 
227-311NR No returns 337-455W 155-459W 
 
314-473W 43-597W 216-392W 328-441W 
Perry 59-100NR 81-146NR 172-83D 
 
165-134D 45-185W 
 
159-266W 144-154W 84-113W 
 
148-245W 
Owsley ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 129-165W 
 
216-151W 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Democrat/ 
Whig 
Democrat/ 
Whig 
Democrat/ 
Whig 
Democrat/ 
Whig 
Democrat/ 
Whig 
Democrat/ 
Whig 
Democrat/ 
Whig 
Democrat/ 
Whig 
Democrat/ 
American 
Democrat/ 
Opposition 
County 1845 
Cong. 
1847  
Cong. 
1848  
Pres. 
1848 
Gub. 
1849 
Cong. 
1851 
Cong. 
1852  
Pres. 
1853 
Cong. 
1856  
Pres. 
1859 
Gub. 
Breathitt 288-138D 382-158D 151/143D 278/120D 401-126D 369-0D 234-96D 373-223D 502-112D 394-299D 
Clay 321-195D No Dem. 
candidate 
125/377W 229-
416W 
321-
351W 
348-
330D* 
185-
278W 
398-271D 369-421A 511-418O 
Estill 205-
337W 
No Dem. 
candidate 
238/485W 381-
490W 
391-
377W 
325-466W 322-
358W 
565-410D 543-474D 493-556O 
Perry 67-206W No Dem. 
candidate 
No 
returns 
177-
192W 
291-
392W 
220-149D 77-130W 257-121D 295-173D 270-265D 
Owsley 121-
212W 
No Dem. 
Candidate 
248/330W 270-268D 256-
294W 
315-241D 326-294D 476-178D 401-335D 314-456O 
 
 
 
 
County # Democratic Majorities/ Recorded 
Elections 
# Nat. Rep., Whig, American or 
Opposition Majorities/ Recorded 
Elections 
Breathitt  13/15    (86.6%) 2/15 
Clay 3/19 16/19    (84.2%) 
Estill 3/18 15/18    (83.3%) 
Perry 6/18 12/18    (66.6% 
Owsley (formed from part of Breathitt 
Co., 1843) 
5/12 7/12      (58.3%) 
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stick of inconvenient summonses to swell the Democratic vote.
178
  Breathitt County‘s 
political machines came and went long after South‘s death, but they were invariably 
Democratic.
179
      
Long after his death South‘s personal influence was credited for the county‘s 
political transformation, but it also involved a measure of subterfuge.  In 1846, South, 
John Hargis and other fellow Democrats orchestrated a petit coup in the county court by 
holding a meeting of the justices of the peace with only one of the body‘s two Whig votes 
members present (Thomas Sewell being the absent Whig).  Two vacancies were filled by 
Democrats, placing the county court completely under Democratic control.  Although a 
Whig himself, Governor William Owsley ignored Sewell‘s warnings of the Democrats‘ 
attempt to ―get in power‖ illicitly.180 Sewell‘s suspicions were worthy; with Democrats in 
exclusive control over county patronage and public works, the party‘s majority increased 
significantly for years afterward.        
Whether South et al employed these undemocratic methods or depended upon 
South‘s purported charisma (or a combination of both), it is clear that he wielded a 
tremendous amount of political authority in the new county, a level of authority achieved 
partly through marrying into one of the area‘s first families (like his brother, Richard 
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South married women from the Cockrell family- a definitive ―first family‖).  But South 
benefited also from the Three Forks region‘s prior lack of what historical geographer 
Mary Beth Pudup has called an ―indigenous vanguard class,‖ a preexistent elite that 
retained control over local society sufficient to dominate the local economy and political 
institutions.
181
  John Hargis‘ arrival, giving the county its first internal law practice, 
further expanded the new county‘s economic potential.  In the early 1850s he, South and 
five of the county‘s other large-scale landholders became charter stockholders in the 
Lexington and Kentucky River Railroad Company, a corporation that anticipated 
someday connecting the Three Forks region to Lexington by rail (a goal that did not 
actually come to fruition until after Hargis‘ and South‘s deaths).182  Just as forming 
Breathitt County conceivably benefited South, it did so for his neighbors as well.  As a 
landowner with ambitions of economically enhancing the Three Forks region (with a 
brother who represented potential outside landowners), South was imposing a measure of 
economic and political discipline that only the arrival of a middle class could provide, a 
discipline that most local landowners had little reason to disapprove of.  The Three Forks 
region was populated by farmers who shared an interest in expanding their own 
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commercial abilities.  As its founder and wealthiest landowner, South was the most 
―prominent‖ man in Breathitt County within short years of his arrival.183  
 
“I want my tenant to go and drop in his ballot without my knowledge of the man for 
whom it is given.”       
   
But in a place given to absentee ownership and speculation, being prominent did 
not necessarily involve being present.  For some of the county‘s ―founding fathers,‖ 
living in Breathitt County was a temporary arrangement.  In order to exert his growing 
statewide authority South was obliged to spend most of his time in the Bluegrass by the 
late 1840s, leaving his son Andrew Jackson South in Breathitt County to manage local 
business (in total, South fathered 13 children, some of whom remained in or around 
Jackson until well after the Civil War).
184
  After serving as the first county clerk, Simeon 
Bohannon also returned to the Bluegrass, spending most of his time back in Woodford 
County and using his Breathitt County property as a summer home for his wife and 
daughters.
185
   
John Hargis, however, established a more permanent presence in the county he 
helped to create.  A Virginia native (he was born in Washington County, Virginia and did 
not come to Woodford County until young adulthood), Hargis did not have the same 
roots in Bluegrass society as did his compatriots, and did not feel compelled to return.  
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After, starting his law practice, Hargis represented the county in the state senate, a tenure 
defined by his efforts to recreate the Bluegrass‘ commercial success in the Three Forks.  
Realizing the importance of strengthening ties with the Bluegrass, he advocated the 
construction of roads and river improvement in his section.
186
  He unsuccessfully 
protested the continuing formation of new counties that removed territory from Breathitt 
County, and attempted to increase state funding for county common schools.
187
  Although 
Democratic influence in the county court had come about through less than legitimate 
means, John Hargis did much to encourage white male Breathitt Countians to support his 
party.            
As one of the only mountain Democrat delegates in Kentucky‘s 1849 
constitutional convention, Hargis contributed Jacksonian appeals for individualism, local 
sovereignty, rural supremacy and slavery.  Citing the ―great danger to be apprehended 
from the influence [cities like Louisville] might exercise from the arising from the 
consolidation of wealth and numbers,‖ he attempted to prevent the state‘s cities from 
increasing their representation in the General Assembly.
188
  Speaking for a locality that 
produced few professionals, Hargis opposed limiting county judge candidacy to 
lawyers.
189
  Most remarkably, Hargis spoke out against Kentucky‘s most cherished of 
political institutions, vive voce or voice voting.  Although vive voce eased the 
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participation of the illiterate, it was widely criticized for allowing local elites to monitor 
voting habits and potentially manipulate the electorate.
190
  Hargis was most concerned 
with landowners‘ exploitation of renters‘ votes, and demanded that economic authority 
not translate unduly into electoral influence.  ―I want my tenant to go and drop in his 
ballot without my knowledge of the man for whom it is given.  If they vote by ballot what 
landlord will know anything about the vote of his tenant[?]‖  But since most of the men at 
the convention owed their political successes to knowing the inclinations of their tenants 
and neighbors, his plea for a secret ballot was ignored.
191
   
Opposition to vive voce did not indicate firm opposition to the elite machinations 
that had created Breathitt County ten years earlier, nor to the efforts to create a one-party 
regime during the intervening years.  Hargis wanted there to be as few electable offices 
on the local level as possible and opposed making county attorney, coroner, jailer and 
―other little petty officers‖ electable, preferring that they remained positions appointed by 
the justices of the peace.  Absent due to illness for much of the proceedings, Hargis‘ 
contribution to the expanded herrenvolk democratization that Kentucky‘s 1849 
constitution was hoped to provide was ambiguous.
192
  But Hargis‘s support was clear in 
                                                 
 
            
190
Richard Franklin Bensel.  The American Ballot Box in the Mid-Nineteenth Century.  (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004): pp. 56-57; Ireland, Aristocrats All…, p. 368.  The secret ballot was instituted for 
the state in the original 1792 constitution but its 1799 replacement established vive voce as standard in 
Kentucky for a century.  For the role of vive voce as a method of social control and an advantage to eastern 
Kentucky elites see The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. XXV, No. 1 
(January, 1905): p. 125; Waller, Feud…, p. 26; Billings and Blee, The Road to Poverty, pp. 106, 374.   
 
              
191
Knowing that he was in the minority, Hargis apparently did not push the issue and submitted his 
own draft of a proposed constitution that allowed for vive voce.  Kentucky did not eliminate it until the 
1880s; RDPCRCSK, 1849, (Frankfort, KY: A.G. Hodges & Company, 1849): pp. 43, 336.  
 
             
192
RDPCRCSK, 1849, p. 362.  While the 1849 constitution was supposedly an improvement over 
its 1799 predecessor (in terms of expanding democracy) many historians agree that its most lasting legacy 
was a killing blow to the Kentucky Whig Party (a result that Hargis no doubt approved of) and, as a result, 
the weakening of vigorous two-party competition experienced throughout the South in the 1850s.  For a 
87 
 
the constitution‘s revitalized declaration of support for slavery. Asserting that slavery was 
―sanctioned by the Bible,‖ he proposed its permanent protection in the new constitution 
and, aware that Kentucky‘s Protestant clergy had traditionally been the institution‘s most 
vocal critics for decades, proposed a constitutional exclusion of ―clergymen, priest or 
teacher of any religious persuasion, society, or sect…‖ from serving in the General 
Assembly.  Exhibiting the common white anxiety of an unmanageable free black 
population, he also proposed that all emancipated slaves be required to leave the state 
under the penalty of re-enslavement.
193
 Hargis‘ fear of free blacks reflected his Woodford 
County past more than it did his new home in the mountains.
194
  According to local 
memory, slavery had existed in the area that was to become Breathitt County since about 
1800.
195
  But, from its creation until the Civil War, slaves made up less than five percent 
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of Breathitt County‘s population.196  Since whites in Breathitt County and surrounding 
areas outnumbered slaves by a considerable margin, they probably did not share most 
white Kentuckians‘ fear of insurrection.  Even with Nat Turner‘s Virginia revolt a 
relatively recent memory, slaves in the mountains were allowed to go armed for hunting.  
During an extended dispute between two Clay County salt manufacturers, one of the two 
even armed a number of his slaves and directed them to harass his adversary and the 
latter‘s adherents during a court trial.197  Slaveowners willing to use their bondsmen as 
armed combatants had little fear of armed insurrection.      
But this contribution to the convention had greater political significance than it 
did practical significance.  Hargis‘ firm support for slavery as a representative of a county 
with very few slaves, paired with his support for his constituents‘ sense of localism, 
amounted to a paradoxical intersection of sectional and class-based politics. Even though 
the number of slaves in the county grew over the two decades after it was established 
(while, in contrast, already small slave populations in neighboring counties declined over 
the same period) few Breathitt County citizens owned slaves.  However, those who did, 
like South and Hargis and all of the county‘s original justices of the peace, were among 
the county‘s political economic and political elite.198  But while these men were a 
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minority within their own locality, they were not within the broader context of the entire 
state.  Slave ownership was widely dispersed in Kentucky, and most slaveowners owned 
less than ten slaves at any given time, a rate that was scarcely different than that of 
Breathitt County.
199
  Although the number of slaves and slaveowners in the county was 
far below the statewide average, the typical Kentucky slaveowner owned less than ten 
slaves as well, a trait shared with masters in all of the slave states.
200
  Hargis and the 
Souths had little reason to see themselves differently than other slaveholders in Kentucky 
and the South and perhaps found this similarity more compelling than the interests of 
their yeoman and squatter constituents.
201
  Their support for slavery, matched with their 
representation of a county with few slaves and only a few slaveowners, made the 
institution‘s political importance to the county‘s elites was disproportional to its 
negligible economic importance.  As much as John Hargis wished for Breathitt County‘s 
white population to be unfettered by centralized government and bureaucracy, his 
economic values reflected those of Bluegrass rather than the half of the two Kentuckys in 
which he now resided and represented.     
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 This disproportionality of interests may have resulted in a small but telling yelp of 
dissent shortly after the constitution‘s ratification.  In 1851 Kentucky‘s flamboyant 
emancipationist Cassius M. Clay attempted a gubernatorial bid, garnering slightly over 
three percent of the popular vote and carrying no county majorities.  In Breathitt County 
he carried only 5.9 percent of the vote, a percentage that amounted to fewer than fifty 
votes.
202
  While such a small number of votes is ostensibly insignificant, when looked at 
within the context of counties that gave Clay more than a five percent vote, Breathitt 
County appears to be a striking aberration, an aberration that may have been an indicator 
of internal tension.  All of the other counties that cast a more than negligible vote for 
Clay were primarily in more developed areas of Kentucky where slavery was either an 
important part of the economy, a matter of recorded popular controversy resulting in 
formal dissent or both.  Perhaps what makes Breathitt County most peculiar in this 
election was the fact that all other counties that cast more than a five percent vote for the 
emancipationist ticket were, owing to Clay‘s past association with the party, consistent 
Whig counties (see Figure ).
203
  The small number of men in Breathitt County who cast 
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economy generated by iron and salt mining slavery was not universally accepted, perhaps due to its 
monopoly by an elite minority.  Also, twelve of these counties (including all of the counties in the Three 
Forks region except for Breathitt) had hosted emancipationist or abolitionist gatherings shortly before 1851, 
revealing at least a small ferment of native anti-slavery sentiment and resultant impetus for an 
emancipationist voting base.   In contrast, the counties in which Clay had his poorest showings were ones 
in which slavery was either a large part of the economy (the northern Bluegrass and the plantation-heavy 
―Jackson Purchase‖ area to the far West) or ones where slavery was ―out of sight, out of mind‖ (such as the 
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votes for Cassius Clay did so not out of fear of the tiny local black population, nor for the 
effect slavery had upon labor arrangements and probably not out of moral disgust for the 
idea of human enslavement.  These votes were cast less out of reaction to slavery‘s 
economic and social prospects than out of the reality of having a slaveowning minority 
control and represent a population whose interests they did not consistently share.  The 
commercial enterprise that was Breathitt County did not depend upon slavery, but the 
institution nevertheless represented the irregularity of its creation.  Moreover, it showed 
that, while one of their descendants claimed that they were ignorant and uncaring of 
―what country or nation they were citizens‖ eight decades later, the county‘s adult white 
males were quite concerned with subjects originating in the ―outside world,‖ namely 
slavery and the two-party electoral system. 
 
 
Figure 13: Counties Returning Greater than 5% for Cassius M. Clay for Governor, 1851 
County 1851 Clay vote (%) % of Pop. Black in 
1860 
Whig Majority in 
1851 Gub. Election 
Known Public 
Antislavery Activity 
<1851  
Breathitt  5.9 4.3 No No 
Butler 7.2 10.0 No No 
Clay 26.5 9.2 Yes Yes 
Edmondson  5.0 6.1 No No 
Estill 18.1 7.6 Yes Yes 
Fayette 5.1 47.3 Yes Yes 
Garrard 15.4 34.9 Yes Yes 
Jessamine 5.1 40.1 Yes No 
Knox 9.9 8.7 Yes Yes 
Laurel 7.3 3.4 Yes Yes 
Lincoln 6.9 33.7 Yes Yes 
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Madison 35.2 35.9 Yes Yes 
Monroe 13.9 11.0 No Yes 
Ohio 8.7 10.8 No No 
Owsley 8.5 2.4 No Yes 
Perry 12.2 2.2 No Yes 
Pulaski 12.7 8.0 No Yes 
Rockcastle 19.4 7.4 Yes No 
Todd 6.8 42.3 Yes No 
Washington 7.1 24.8 No No 
Wayne 7.0 9.9 Yes Yes 
Whitely 13.2 2.9 Yes No 
 
 
The tensions revealed in 1851 were tested six years later when William Ellaby 
Lincoln, an English abolitionist preacher, visited the county.  On leave from Ohio‘s 
Oberlin College, Lincoln came south in the spring of 1857 to preach against slavery and 
to visit John G. Fee, Kentucky‘s second most prominent critic of slavery and the founder 
of co-racial Berea College on the eastern edge of the Bluegrass.  Fee urged Lincoln to 
travel to Breathitt County and he agreed, travelling southeast soon after on foot and later 
horseback.  Along the way, Lincoln encountered resistance to his abolitionist message 
until he arrived in Breathitt, where he was taken in by a reticent opponent of slavery.  
Lincoln‘s host was ―careful not to expose himself too much‖ as an abolitionist since local 
slaveholders were willing to defend their institution ―even by mob violence.‖  They were 
part of a multiracial congregation to hear a ―colored preacher…whose sermon was a 
careful steer between the master & slave.‖  When Lincoln rose to the pulpit later in the 
day, sheriff‘s deputies arrived and warned the slaves away at gunpoint.  During his 
antislavery exegesis of the prophet Jeremiah, Lincoln realized that the same deputies had 
pointed their pistols in his direction from their pews.  He was able to convince them to 
lower their guns during worship, but afterward some ―young slaveholders‖ who were also 
in attendance warned Lincoln that he would be shot if he did not leave quickly.  On his 
93 
 
way back to the home of the quiet abolitionist (who had bowed out of going to Lincoln‘s 
service so as not to attract unwanted attention), the deputies feigned friendliness but then 
began shooting.  Lincoln claimed later to have barely escaped with his life after his horse 
threw him from his saddle as he was being fired upon.
204
  Lincoln‘s visit provided an 
opportunity for the county‘s white consensus on slavery to be challenged publicly for the 
first time.  It also showed that, as in other southern communities in the 1850s, protests 
against the slaveholding order was punished with violence, in this case meted out by 
officers of the county court.      
1851‘s ballot deviation and the small show of sympathy for abolitionism (as well 
as the state-mandated effort to suppress it) short years later reveal a lack of perfect 
consensus within antebellum Breathitt County‘s Democratic cabal, but hardly a serious 
challenge to the party‘s (and by extension Jeremiah South‘s), local influence.  As far as 
its official institutions and formal political character went, Breathitt County remained in 
the image of its ―father.‖  But South‘s mastery over court did not translate into mastery 
over country.  For the entirety of his life, and for years after it, much of South‘s vast 
landholdings were occupied by squatters, many of whom probably occupied the land 
before South procured the delinquent title or were descended from those who did.
205
  By 
1846, approximately half of Breathitt County‘s heads of household reported having no 
land.
206
  While some of these families were tenants, they and their squatting neighbors 
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were alike in their usage of South‘s property, hunting game, herding livestock, sending 
hogs to mast, damming creeks, cutting timber, mining coal and constructing cabins.  
Some even received state land patents that ignored South‘s preexistent grant, the latter of 
which had been based on one of the old Virginia grants that were becoming increasingly 
forgotten as the nineteenth century wore on.
207
  For decades this was a source of constant 
dismay for South, and numerous times he unsuccessfully attempted to recoup his profits 
by placing felled timber under attachment in court.  He also tried hiring some of his 
land‘s occupants to aggressively prevent trespassing, but this extralegal method also 
proved unhelpful; even legitimate tenants used the land as they willed because of South‘s 
sheer inability to physically survey all that he owned.  John Aikman, a long-time tenant 
of the South family and their estate‘s ―guard,‖ exploited Jeremiah South‘s absence and 
eventually used the courts to legally lay claim to a substantial mass of his property.
208
  
Despite his holding a grant to the land, the confusion of boundaries between other 
claimants and ostensible ―wild lands‖ resulted in four decades of litigation during South‘s 
life and afterward.
209
  Nearly thirty years after Jeremiah South‘s death, Breathitt County 
was said to have the worst problem with overlapping land claims in all of Kentucky, a 
harsh indictment in a state whose judicial system had been inundated with tenure 
litigation since the late eighteenth century.
210
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But, among those who occupied South‘s land, Aikman may have been one the 
only ones with ambitions of legal land ownership.  The wood denizens, thriving for 
decades after the Civil War, benefited from a superior knowledge of the terrain, a form of 
possession that was often more effective than contractual ownership.
211
  As long as their 
itinerant hunting, droving and timbering was sustainable, the wood denizens persisted, 
even without the capital necessary to seek out legal representation.  South‘s ownership of 
their land was a potential threat, but it was not an immediate one. Legal commodification 
was a less-than-formidable weapon against physical possession and occupation.  Breathitt 
County‘s forbidding geography acted as an equalizer between landed and landless.  Even 
Simon Cockrell, wealthy enough to own numerous slaves and act as a creditor for his 
neighbors, ―had no grass‖ and was obliged to graze his cattle on ―cane and other winter 
forage‖ on land that was not his own.212   
Further complicating the confluence of private and public interests through which 
Breathitt County had come into being, the perpetuation of the Democratic regime South 
created probably depended upon the votes of men who brazenly violated the sanctity of 
his property.  Given the continuation of vive voce until years after his death, this was 
probably knowledge shared openly by South, his landed fellows and his trespassers.
213
  
The result was a long-standing stalemate of cross purposes.  
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“…to perpetuate feudal conditions in Breathitt…” 
 
           Near the end of the nineteenth century, with the railroad recently arrived just north 
of Jackson, coal and timber extraction now the domain of corporations, Jeremiah South 
more than ten years dead, and ‗Breathitt‘ a nationally-recognized byword for rural 
violence, the county‘s first newspaper presented this stalemate as still going strong.  
Every early issue of the Jackson Hustler contained warnings against the taking of logs 
floating on the north fork that had been branded by individuals or companies, a practice 
that seemed to be almost as locally accepted as it was difficult to prevent and punish.
214
  
John J. Dickey, a Methodist minister and the paper‘s founding editor, attempted to appeal 
to his readers‘ religious faith to defend a modern conception of property.  ―In some places 
on the river this stealing is going on to such an extent, and is so tolerated and encouraged 
by persons regarded as respectable, that it is almost impossible to arrest or convict those 
engaged in this nefarious business‖ read one column.  ―A man is as much a thief who 
steals the saw logs of a rich corporation as the one who enters a church by night and bears 
away the Bible or the communion service.  That men should be guilty of this crime and 
yet ask to be considered respectable, is a marvel of impudence and effrontery.  The law 
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can not be too rigidly enforced against violators of law of any kind, and especially should 
it be done when the principal industry of this great country is so effected [sic].‖215  
             Alongside his own admonishments against crimes perpetrated by men performing 
a kind of extractive economy older than the county itself, Dickey also reprinted screeds 
from Social Gospel devotee Henry George and his acolyte John W. Kramer.  While 
George‘s advocacy for the ―single tax‖ on land seemed to be the pastor/editor‘s favorite 
subject, perhaps in reaction to the recent amalgamation of local land by railroads, Dickey 
also featured George‘s condemnation of land speculation.     
How speculative rent checks production may be seen not only in the valuable land withheld from 
use, but in the paroxysms of industrial depressions which, originating in the speculative advance 
in land values, propagate themselves over the whole civilized world everywhere paralyzing 
industry and causing more waste and probably more suffering than would a general war.  Taxation 
which would take rent for public uses would prevent this, while if land were taxed to anything 
near its rental value, no one could hold land that he is not using and, consequently, land not in use 
would be thrown open to those who would use it.  Settlement would be closer and, consequently, 
labor and capital would be able to produce much more with the same exertion.
216
 
 
As a relative newcomer, Dickey may well have been oblivious to the ironies in his 
reprinting the nineteenth century‘s greatest decrier of land speculation in a county 
originally founded for that sole purpose, nor in preaching property rights to local timber 
poachers.  By 1891 the county was no longer under the thrall of the men who had created 
it and, with Gilded Age policies in full swing, the old ideal of disinterested government 
they had violated was moot.  The accumulation of wealth was still Breathitt County‘s 
raison d'etre but it was no longer dominated by the same group of individuals who had 
devised it.  Much profit was being made during Dickey‘s time as editor but the conditions 
he spoke to were those of a new industrial era that Jeremiah South had perhaps foreseen 
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but had never truly gained from.  Meanwhile, the squatter economy that had vexed South 
evidently carried on.  The profitable discipline that Breathitt County was to have imposed 
upon the Three Forks region had become something approaching civil chaos (but with the 
Democratic predominance South had devised intact).  Perhaps unsurprisingly, Dickey‘s 
most outspoken critic (once going so far as to attempt to dynamite the Jackson Hustler 
office) was none other than Jeremiah South‘s grandson, Jerry South III.217     
The formation of Breathitt County and its subsequent history is a testament to the 
oft-overlooked significance of county government in American history.  Breathitt‘s crises 
of legitimacy and violence were the outcome of antebellum Kentucky‘s broadly defined 
standards of governance, as well as the particular aims of the individuals who sought to 
have it founded; a balance of inherency and contingency.  In many ways, Breathitt 
County was truly a ―little kingdom,‖ as nineteenth century Kentucky counties have been 
described.
218
  Like a true kingdom, the county came about under the auspices of an 
individual and depended upon the degree of authority this individual could exert and the 
legitimacy lent to him by the population.  While Breathitt‘s abrupt political divergence in 
the 1840s can be attributed to the actions of party bosses, subsequent events (namely the 
Civil War) demonstrated that county boundaries had greater ramifications than might 
otherwise be assumed.     
But within the insularity and autonomy suggested by the ‗kingdom‘ appellation, 
there were limitations.  The creation of Breathitt County happened at the behest of a 
minority of the population (and, it is worth pointing out, an exclusively white male 
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minority) whose control was limited to the abilities of local government, a range of 
control that was broad-reaching only as long as this government‘s legitimacy was left 
unquestioned.  The new boundaries drawn by the county‘s creation were of little social 
consequence to families and individuals whose political, social and economic 
relationships had been established before 1839 and persisted irrespective of new local 
government.  The creation of Breathitt County was beneficial to those who wanted 
greater access to courts and the sense of community and order they provided.  But it also 
solidified the commodification of land in a place in which many depended upon the same 
land remaining commonly available to all.  The new county‘s founding fathers could 
expect nothing but support from those who shared their interests, a relationship that did 
not necessarily extend to everyone.  Not only did South‘s utilization of eighteenth century 
land grants run counter to the lifestyle of the wood denizens who lived on his land, but 
his holding of local power suggested a potential direct threat to that lifestyle.  Jeremiah 
South‘s dual roles as local statesman and property owner were irrevocably intertwined.  
Thus, an essentially egalitarian society had thrust upon it a local government with 
decidedly un-egalitarian tendencies.  But the individualistic nature of wood denizen life 
made collective resistance unlikely.  As long as South was limited in his abilities to 
control who used his land, this remained only a nascent threat.  Conditions dictated that 
neither was able to fully surmount the other.  The discipline applied to the Three Forks 
region by the creation of Breathitt County was incomplete.     
South‘s legitimacy as statesman and landholder was limited, limited to his ability 
to exert authority over his own property and over local public institutions.  But the Civil 
War, an event unforeseen when Breathitt County was in its infancy, provided kinesis to 
100 
 
this potential conflict and challenged South‘s kingdom.  Although South himself 
remained personally aloof from the ensuing violence (a privilege that was not shared by 
all of his immediate family), his machinations were recognized as a contributing factor to 
the county‘s eventual record of brutality.  Writing just before Breathitt County‘s 
centennial, E.L. Noble insisted, ―The Souths, while not feudists, seem to have done more 
to perpetuate feudal conditions in Breathitt than any family otherwise directly or 
indirectly connecting her history.‖219 
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CHAPTER III 
―SUPPRESSING THE LATE REBELLION‖: GUERRILLA  
FIGHTING IN A UNION STATE 
 
 
 
―As the nation was rent apart, so was the commonwealth; as the state so was the county; as the county, the neighborhood; 
as the neighborhood, the family; as the family, so brother and brother, father and son.‖ 
     -John Fox, Jr. 
                The Little Shepherd of Kingdom Come 
 
 
In the winter of 1861, sixteen-year-old George Washington Noble, a lifelong 
believer in divine portent, saw a gigantic comet in the night sky and was told by his father 
(no doubt also informed by recent national developments) that it could only be 
interpreted as an omen of an impending war between North and South.
220
  Counting this 
as the first of many in a lifetime of witnessed messages from the Almighty, Noble felt 
called to defend his home territory.  Although well-ensconced within a neutral, and later 
Union, state, at the war‘s beginning he and (by his own observation) most other whites in 
Breathitt County were far more afraid of northern depredations than the possibility of a 
pillaging invasion from the South.  Within a few months rumors spread that Jackson 
would soon be occupied by the Union Army, prompting many local men to take their 
families and slaves ―to the hills‖ to ―lay out‖ the war, an option similar to that chosen by 
most white male Kentuckians of fighting age.  Unless one had the most fervent political 
convictions for either side, most saw no benefit to actively supporting either side in the 
escalating conflict, except in the defense of their own families and communities.
221
  But 
for a myriad of personal, social and political reasons, many made early decisions to take 
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active measures within or without the Union or Confederate militaries.  Young George 
Noble was among this number.  By the end of the same year, reasoning that the 
Confederate Army ―was just as good as the Northern Army,‖ and having heard that the 
Yankees were ―killing women and children and carrying off the negroes‖ Noble ignored 
his parents‘ pleadings and joined many other boys his own age in a locally-formed 
company, preparing for what seemed to them a foreign invasion.
222
  By the first week of 
November, 1861, ―groups of threes, fives and sevens, chiefly mounted, but many afoot‖ 
descended upon Prestonsburg, the county seat of heavily Democratic Floyd County and 
the site of eastern Kentucky‘s first Confederate mustering grounds.223            
Preoccupied by Confederate raids into the Bluegrass and western Kentucky, the 
federal army never successfully occupied Breathitt County and never really needed to.  
But the fear of federal incursion did not die down easily.  In the early months of the war 
Jackson was a vital center of southern sympathy within strongly Unionist eastern 
Kentucky and became the primary Confederate bastion of the Three Forks watershed.  
Judging by extant testimonials, the majority of the county‘s population was at least in 
sympathy with the forces of ―southern rights‖ if not adherents to ideas of southern 
nationalism.
224
  If this was not just a bizarre aberration of local feelings it most likely had 
to do with the county‘s antebellum party loyalties.  As a legacy of its Democratic 
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leanings within what had once been a firm Whig electorate, Breathitt‘s county seat served 
as one of only two recorded Confederate mustering grounds in the mountain counties (the 
other being Prestonsburg).
225
  Although initial fears were of a ―foreign‖ army, Breathitt 
Countians, along with other southern mountaineers from Virginia to Alabama, would 
come to find that the greatest danger during wartime came not necessarily from invaders 
from the ―outside world,‖ but from close neighbors.  Almost surrounded by counties of 
largely Unionist leanings, Breathitt became a maelstrom of close-quartered partisan 
fighting during the last half of the war.
226
  As in many other parts of the upland South, the 
war not only produced cleavages within the local community but also created a means 
through which old cleavages could find violent expression.   
Class concerns, supposedly eclipsed in the white South by herrenvolk democracy, 
were among these cleavages.
227
  For decades previous to the war Breathitt County was 
divided between large-scale speculative landowners, like Jeremiah South, and poorer 
farmers and drovers, many of whom illegally occupied South‘s tremendous parcels of 
land.  After taking over the state penitentiary in Frankfort, South rarely returned to the 
county he had sired.  However, under the guidance of his sons and other large-scale 
landowners who controlled the courthouse in Jackson, Breathitt County remained under 
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South‘s indirect control from afar.  But many of the county‘s squatters and poorer 
farmers did not join this coalition. Until 1861 the landowners‘ inability to monitor the 
entirety of their holdings, coupled with the relative complacency of the squatters, 
prevented any known confrontation between the two parties.  The arrival of the war 
provided a way for the community to become divided along these potential previously 
untested lines.  Perhaps in reaction to Jeremiah South‘s Confederate leanings, or perhaps 
uncaring of it, many of the county‘s poorer landowners and squatters went along with the 
majority of eastern Kentucky whites and supported the Union.  The opportunity to join 
standard Union military forces, and, more importantly, the opportunity to join quasi-
legitimate guerrilla groups (imprecisely labeled ―home guards‖) in the latter half of the 
war, established an unprecedented conduit for militant political organization among the 
county‘s poor.  Under the leadership of William Strong, a Breathitt County landowner of 
moderate means, this group of local Unionists took up an intense offensive against their 
pro-Confederate neighbors, an offensive fought under the auspices of preserving the 
Union but often taking on the appearance of personal vendettas, property theft in the 
guise of military confiscation and terrorism.  In turn, pro-Confederates in the county 
reciprocated in irregular fighting within Breathitt County and in neighboring counties.  
Due to a combination of geographic placement and nascent political rifts within the 
county and region, Breathitt County became the center point of guerilla warfare in eastern 
Kentucky, setting a oft-repeated local precedent for the use of violence to further political 
aims.   
The end result was a condition of violent intimacy, an essential element of the 
civil war paradigm evident in conflicts stretching from the seventeenth century‘s English 
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Civil War to this century‘s Iraqi insurgency.  Breathitt County, Kentucky‘s guerilla war 
was little different than the irregular fights that took place in many parts of the South and 
in most states of civil war in the modern era.  But, in popular memory, the intimacy of 
warfare in eastern Kentucky would be interpretively dictated by the discourse of feuding, 
a description of violence that set it apart from the exogenous national conflict and denied 
its political origins.    
Recent literature on what has been popularly labeled eastern Kentucky‘s ―feud‖ 
violence has tended to dissociate the war‘s legacy from later instances of factional 
brutality.
228
 This chapter contends that, considering the vast number of ways that other 
types of group political violence can become entangled with civil war, as well as the 
allegedly familial ―blood feud,‖ civil war violence that took place previous to these other 
forms should also be considered, if not only as a causal factor but also as part of a longer 
process.  This is partly because of the available local histories and personal accounts that 
insist on an overarching connection between martial violence and peacetime violence.  
Chroniclers of the ―feuds‖ that took place in the county over the ensuing decades, those 
from Breathitt County as well as ―outsiders,‖ consistently ascribed the Civil War as the 
starting point of the county‘s atmosphere of internal hostility.  Events in later decades 
suggest that the war was important in codifying political allegiances as well as 
introducing violence as a political agent.  Until the turn of the century, and perhaps 
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afterward, political socialization in the county fell within parameters and social networks 
that had been established by opposing commitments to the Union and Confederate causes 
on a local level.  As late as 1903 partisans in the county‘s industrial-era political struggles 
hearkened back to the war to justify their present-day enmity as well as to minimize the 
their own violent acts‘ more immediate implications.229  While such latter-day 
testimonials could be taken as nothing more than rhetorical justifications for killing, there 
is reason to grant them some measure of plausibility.  Events in the intervening decades, 
especially during Reconstruction, suggest that the war was important in codifying party 
allegiances, determining what it meant to support local political parties and also 
introducing violence as a political agent.  Civil War guerrillism was the first stage in a 
series of violent competitions for power within the territory and the first challenge to the 
county‘s governmental legitimacy.  This chapter illustrates wartime Breathitt County‘s 
political milieu as well as the deleterious effects that internal warfare had upon the 
county‘s social and political cohesiveness.  By attempting statewide neutrality before 
reluctantly joining the Union cause, Kentucky damaged its chances of maintaining 
internal political legitimacy after 1861.  The same damage was inflicted by Breathitt 
County‘s political elites with their attempt to steer their county toward the Confederacy 
while being virtually surrounded by Unionist loyalists. Unionism in eastern Kentucky 
was the status quo and was based upon relationships and ways of life that pre-dated 
Breathitt County and even ran counter to its purposes.  Finally, Unionist dissent within 
the county contributed to the formations of a polity ―beyond the visible end of the 
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spectrum‖ embedded in Unionist military organization, and refused to recognize the 
Democratically-dominated local government‘s legitimacy.230  At the same time, the 
county‘s dissenters were never able to gain political legitimacy for themselves either.  
The close-quartered nature of the ensuing guerilla conflict did not conform to Americans‘ 
memory of how their civil war had been fought.  Even though it was roundly 
acknowledged that postwar violence had its beginnings in the war, the use of feud to 
describe Breathitt County‘s history of violence denied its actual connections to the 
national conflict.  
 
“…a sublime spectacle of moral power, before which every other history of the world 
grows dim!” 
 
Breathitt County‘s role in the Civil War was determined by its placement in 
southern Appalachia as well as its being part of Kentucky.  Throughout most of 1861 
Kentucky struggled through an uncomfortable compromise of neutrality.  With the Civil 
War in its beginning months, the state that was birthplace to both Abraham Lincoln and 
Jefferson Davis suffered from an identity crisis.  Kentuckians had numerous reasons to 
distrust both sides of the burgeoning national divide.  With the second largest number of 
slave owners in the United States, the state had numerous cultural and political reasons to 
join its southern neighbors in defiance of the North.  Yet Kentuckians had also 
established longstanding economic ties with their northern neighbors and, for mostly 
pecuniary reasons, had few practical motivations for abandoning the Union.  The state 
did not have a significant number of fire-eaters with enough influence to steer the state 
toward outright secession, nor had the intensification of sectionalism in the late 1850s 
                                                 
230
Quoted from James C. Scott.  Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts.  
(Yale University Press, 1990): p. 183.   
108 
 
diminished the state‘s two-party balance as it had in other southern states.231  At the same 
time, Lincoln‘s win in the previous year‘s presidential election (a candidacy favored by 
less than one percent of Kentucky‘s voters) was a source of disquiet in the state.232  
Initially, the decision favoring neutrality was met with encouragement, since many 
believed that Kentucky‘s lack of partisanship would ultimately be the breakthrough to 
national reunion.
233
  Before Lincoln‘s inauguration Kentucky Senator John J. Crittenden 
made a failed attempt at compromise by proposing a reestablishment of the Missouri 
Compromise.
234
  Even after Crittenden‘s failure , and the first wave of secession, many 
Kentuckians retained their optimism that their state could set an example for an eventual 
mutually advantageous bargain.  A womens‘ auxiliary‘s petition presented to a special 
session of the state senate endorsing neutrality predicted that with ―one hand [stretched] 
to the palmy South- one to the pine-clad North- and so standing [Kentucky] presents a 
sublime spectacle of moral power, before which every other history of the world grows 
dim!‖235  However, as 1861 wore on Kentuckians came to realize that the national divide 
would not be healed as quickly as had been hoped when the first southern states had 
begun to secede earlier in the year.  Expecting an eventual invasion by either a northern 
or southern army, a special legislative convention decided upon an uncomfortable 
compromise of nonalignment that few assumed would last.  Neutrality ceased to be a 
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problem later in the year when the state was invaded by Confederate forces, prompting an 
end to neutrality and an official alliance with the Union
 236
  But this did not destroy the 
southern sympathies that had been fostered in 1861.  Ultimately, it was the initial failed 
attempt at neutrality that truly defined the state‘s Civil War experience.     
In comparison to the other unseceded Border South states, Delaware, Maryland 
and Missouri, Kentucky was far more divided in its internal loyalties.
237
  The months of 
neutrality provided a space for differing decisions to be made in the hinterlands‘ 
households and courthouses.  Kentucky eventually provided far more volunteers for 
Union military forces than it did for the Confederacy, and this singular fact established 
Kentucky as a loyal state in many Kentuckians‘ war memory.238  But military 
volunteerism is not a perfect standard for gauging wartime allegiances on a statewide 
level, since most white males of both Confederate and Unionist sympathies chose to 
avoid regular military service altogether while still taking an unofficial role in the war, if 
only on a local basis.
239
 For instance, many chose to join local militias for whom there are 
no extant county-by-county records or, in many cases, evidence that they were subject to 
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state oversight.
240
 Others avoided partisanship altogether and attempted to keep their 
sympathies out of the public record.  Judging by the diverse wealth of memory and 
history dedicated to the state‘s wartime contributions, Kentucky was claimed almost 
equally by the Union and the South, if not the Confederacy (although a Confederate 
―capital‖ was temporarily established in the state).241  Within the state‘s localities 
Kentuckians made claims of their own.         
Although the decisions of individuals and families affected the state‘s wartime 
trajectory, so too did county government.  As described in the preceding chapter, counties 
in nineteenth century Kentucky were virtually sovereign entities, holding a far higher 
amount of authority over commerce, electoral politics and public works than did the state 
government.
242
  The state‘s constitutionally-mandated decentralization was a major 
determinant during the debates over secession and the ensuing war.  Decisions regarding 
which side to support when war came were often made under the firm direction of county 
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courts guided by the political inclinations of the judges, sheriffs and county clerks who 
controlled these courts.  While the judgments of governor and legislature eventually 
resulted in a pro-Union stance, many of the state‘s county officials ―conducted 
themselves in ways approaching secession.‖243  Minority attacks on local governments‘ 
choice of partisanship, coupled with the fact that most white male Kentuckians chose to 
stay home and protect their interests during the war, resulted in fierce guerrilla warfare 
throughout the state in which aggressions were often directed against local enemies rather 
than national ones.  Kentucky‘s war was in many ways a series of small wars fought less 
over slavery and preservation of the Union than over control of local government, 
contributing to the eventual breakdown of ―segmented sovereignty,‖ the semi-federal 
sharing of power between county and state, and instead the emergence of ―fragmented 
sovereignty‖ that left the two at odds.244   
It was this fragmented sovereignty, a damaged connection between local partisans 
and central authorities, that gave birth to Kentucky‘s dreaded home guards.  The home 
guards were militia units originally formed in 1861 ―as a wholly defensive measure‖ to 
protect individual communities against incursions from invading armies, either southern 
or northern (although it was implicitly understood that even in the neutrality months 
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Home Guards were tacitly expected to provide Union support).
245
  The various home 
guard units that were established throughout the state, or rather the very phrase ‗Home 
Guard,‘ came to mean something far different than their intended purposes and meanings. 
Although the Home Guards were mandated and armed by the state government from 
early in the war, they were not under the state‘s direct authority.  After Kentucky‘s 
official joining of the Union, state oversight of the numerous county-based home guards 
came to an end, leaving the opportunity for preexistent units to act according to their own 
interests.  Early in the war Home Guard organization was so apolitical that some groups 
were shared by pro-Unionists and pro-Confederates (although the latter soon withdrew).  
One Bluegrass Kentuckian who was instrumental in forming his county‘s home guard 
unit did so for fear that ―in the present state of excitement the Negroes might break out‖ 
rather than to repel an invading military force.
246
 Other segments of the home guard, 
particularly those in and around Frankfort, began acting outside of what many 
Kentuckians considered their true mandate.  In the war‘s early months home guards 
clashed with the State Guard, another state militia that had been formed by pro-
Confederates within the state government.
247
  In the waning days of neutrality home 
guards summarily arrested state legislators suspected of having southern sympathies.
248
 
Early affrays between home guard and State Guard factions prompted the state 
government to declare martial law in Lexington from autumn, 1861 until the end of the 
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war.
249
  As has been the case with militia-related groups in many civil war settings, the 
home guards were ultimately more political than they were military, bent upon local 
state-building and unbuilding and attempts to reallocate local rule rather than defending 
their respective territories from invaders.
250
    
Many Kentuckians in the state‘s rural areas came to view the home guard as 
unauthorized guerrillas bent more upon brigandage than military victory and an 
aberration from the internal partisan lines that they came to accept as routine within a 
border state.
251
 Confederate Lieutenant William Guerrant, assigned with tracking down 
Union partisans in the Three Forks region, equated ‗home guards‘ with ‗bushwhackers,‘ 
the nineteenth century‘s most damning epithet for wartime irregulars.252 Months after the 
war‘s end Governor Thomas Bramlette publicly proclaimed the home guards‘ formation 
a deplorable failure.
253
 After the war ―home guard‖ was simply an imprecise pejorative 
for men who had taken advantage of the war‘s chaos for the sake of personal gain and 
love of havoc, despised by Unionists and Confederates alike for sullying an otherwise 
mutually noble cause.
254
  It was an affront to the legitimacy of cause that former 
Unionists and Confederates both claimed in their memory of the war.     
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The crises of legitimacy for both sides was felt most acutely in the eastern half of 
the ―two Kentuckys,‖ where sovereignty was more fragmented than anywhere else in the 
state.  The citizens of Kentucky‘s various counties were expected to follow the decisions 
of their respective county court officials, but the enforcement of those decisions 
throughout the citizenry was far from perfect, especially in rugged, mountainous territory.  
The classical portrayal of wartime Appalachia has asserted that southern mountaineers 
were consistently against slave interests and consequently supported federal authorities 
during the war, even against the efforts of their respective state governments and the 
Confederacy as a whole.
255
  This oversimplification of regional loyalties originated even 
before the war began.  During the secessions of 1861 one northern author predicted that 
the mountain southerners would stall the upper South from following the gulf states.   
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[The southern mountaineers] control the Secession movement in Virginia, North Carolina, and 
Tennessee, and would control it in Georgia and Alabama could they have been permitted to vote 
upon it, as were those of Tennessee and North Carolina.  They will no more submit to the dictation 
of the Montgomery [Alabama] oligarchs than New York or Pennsylvania.  Their interests are more 
directly opposed than those between the Cotton States and the extreme North, because the wide 
distance that separates the latter renders them independent of each other, while the Cotton States 
are seeking, by every possible means, to drag all the Slave States with them, for the purpose of 
compelling them to share their burdens, and of giving greater strength and dignity to their cause. 
 
This great tongue or wedge of land carries Northern ideas, Northern industry, and Northern 
population right into the heart of Cottondom and within two hundred miles of the Gulf of 
Mexico.
256
 
     
In 1862, a Minnesota journalist concurred, predicting that the assumedly slaveless 
mountaineers of ―Alleghania‖ would remain true to the United States and help provide a 
swift northern victory.  In ―the Switzerland of the South,‖ insisted the writer, ―a 
population exists on whom slavery has no hold, who are free and lovers of freedom, and 
who will undoubtedly co-operate with the Union in reestablishing its power.‖  Noting that 
the ―secession hotbed‖ of unseceded Kentucky was in its ―largest slaveholding district‖ 
the journalist optimistically predicted that these areas without an apparent dependence 
upon slavery would rally to the side of the Union.
257
  Just as Kentuckians made hopeful 
assumptions based on their middle ground status, concurrent assumptions were made for 
eastern Kentucky and the entirety of the southern mountains.  However, Minnesota was 
quite far from ―Alleghania,‖ and the mountain war, though overshadowed by the 
campaigns of northern Virginia and elsewhere, proved to be something far different than 
an unadulterated Union fifth column.       
Military recruitment records demonstrate that there was indeed reason to look for 
loyalty in Kentucky‘s mountains.  Despite their sparse populations, the eighth and ninth 
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congressional districts of the east surpassed all of the state‘s other congressional districts 
in sheer numbers for Union recruitment.
258
  However, in assuming that slavery was the 
only agent in white southerners‘ decision making, the northern journalist failed to 
recognize the complexities faced by Kentuckians both within and outside of the eastern 
third of the state‘s mountains during the previous year, as well as the vagaries of local 
politics in the mountain South.  Slavery was not a pervasive presence there, but it was a 
presence nonetheless; the South‘s definitive labor arrangement was obliged to be 
influential to some degree.  Moreover, in assuming that ―Alleghania‖ was consistently 
slaveless or consistently white, the journalist also failed to recognize the heterogeneity of 
interests within the mountains.  Regardless of their alleged isolation and highly 
pronounced individualism, southern mountaineers in both the loyal and seceded states 
still lived in communities in which they were economically, politically and socially 
involved, a condition that probably superseded personal inclinations as they did in the 
rest of the South.  Southern Appalachia, in Kentucky and further south, was a patchwork 
of loyalties determined not by a uniform regional ideology (of independence or otherwise) 
but by a multitude of local consensuses arrived at by the interests of discrete communities 
and their respective leaders.   
Historians have successfully debunked the myth of stolidly Unionist southern 
Appalachia, revealing a far more complex array of factors that contributed to the 
formation of divergent allegiances in the mountains.  The southern Appalachians were 
home to both pro-Unionists and pro-Confederates, as well as some who attempted to 
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remain neutral, all of whom, like other white southerners, made their decision of 
affiliation based upon any number of parameters determined by family, community, 
political affiliations and economic background.  Considering the numerous variations in 
loyalty witnessed in the mountains, the Civil War may have been a far more complex 
matter for mountaineers than for most white southerners.  Southern Appalachia‘s Civil 
War experience was more like that of the majority of the modern era‘s civil wars in 
which the larger war actually played host to a ―mosaic of discrete miniwars,‖ many of 
which had only peripheral connections to the ―master cleavage‖ (in the case of the United 
States, secession) that initiated a state of war.
259
  Civil wars create combatants, but they 
do not dictate that they fight uniformly and for uniform causes.  Breathitt County, one of 
many places in which the ―southern war experience in microcosm‖ was played out, had 
tenuous connections to the Civil War‘s master cleavage but, isolated from the ―outside 
world‖ as it supposedly was, few of its inhabitants were able to completely avoid the 
war‘s effects.260  By the war‘s end, its geographical and political placements had insured 
that it experienced this microcosmic war in full.   
 
“I liked the Southern people the best…”  
 
In 1859 Jeremiah South, the man who had guided Breathitt County‘s political 
character since its formation twenty years earlier, returned to the Bluegrass to become 
Kentucky‘s state penitentiary lessee.  He left behind his brother Richard and four adult 
sons and one of the largest expanses of property in Kentucky, as well as a network of 
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Democratic allies in control of the county court and all official functions of local 
government.
261
  When the war came, South joined his party‘s ―southern rights‖ faction.  
A former penitentiary inmate remembered South as a ―born and bred Democrat of the 
Southern stripe.‖  ―Upon the inauguration of the Rebellion,‖ South was ―in full sympathy 
with it‖ and did not hide his leanings.262  In the Bluegrass Confederate sympathies were 
tolerated, if not fully condoned, but in 1863 South‘s opinions were deemed a liability to 
the state and the General Assembly removed him from his position as lessee.
263
  But in 
the county he helped to create, his influence helped to create an island of Confederate 
support in a place relatively far from the actual Confederacy.   
It seemed that most of Breathitt County‘s white male citizenry, or at least those 
who left imprints on the public record, chose to follow the lead of ―Colonel South‖ in 
supporting the South.  Both members of the county‘s delegation to the special vote on 
neutrality in early 1861 voted against it in league with pro-southern Kentuckians.
264
  The 
following year, Jeremiah South‘s sons, Samuel, Jerry Jr., Barry and James and his brother 
Richard enlisted in the Confederate Army.
265
  Prominent Democrat and former county  
judge Edward Callahan ―Red Ned‖ Strong, a descendant of some of the Three Forks 
region‘s earliest settlers and a slaveowner of considerable means, joined Barry South in 
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organizing recruitment for Confederate forces in Jackson during the summer of 1861.
266
  
Their efforts met with a measure of success; in 1862 alone 126 young men from Breathitt 
and surrounding counties were recruited for the 13
th
 Kentucky Cavalry and other 
Confederate units, a healthy number for an area of small population and opportunity for 
many men to ―lay out‖ the war.267  Aside from being a rallying point for Breathitt 
County‘s native southern sympathies, Jackson also provided a chance for enlistment for 
military-aged men with Confederate sympathies who were from these neighboring 
counties.
268
  Under South‘s and Strong‘s guidance, there is little reason to doubt the 
fundamentally Confederate leanings of most people living in Breathitt County in 1861 
despite its being almost surrounded by Unionist counties.   
There is little reason to doubt the fundamentally Confederate leanings of most 
people living in Breathitt County in 1861 despite its being almost surrounded by Unionist 
counties.  Doubtlessly, in voting for or against neutrality and reacting to the war‘s arrival 
the county had to deal with issues common to the greater South in combination with 
conditions unique to the locality.  But in eastern Kentucky, or in Kentucky as a whole, 
the decision to support the Confederacy or join its military required a firm willingness to 
defy the state‘s white male majority.  Unionists and Confederates in Appalachian North 
Carolina, a seceded state, could justify their loyalties to either the Union or their home 
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state.  Pro-Confederate Kentuckians, however, made a far different calculation, choosing 
to defy both.  It is difficult to determine why one political unit‘s population surrounded 
by support for the opposition would exhibit such firm support for a rebellion.  Moreover, 
it is equally difficult to determine why a population that might have conceivably waited 
the war out under a condition of passive neutrality instead chose to participate so 
fervently.
269
 The young George Noble‘s trepidation toward the prospect of Union forces 
entering Jackson is a testament to the degree to which many Breathitt County residents, 
deep within the most staunchly Unionist sector of what would become an officially 
Unionist state, felt a kinship with the South and antipathy toward the North in the war‘s 
early days.  Years later, an older Noble by then living in Missouri recalled making an 
easy choice based upon kinship and regional identity. ―My grandfather came from the 
South, and I liked the Southern people the best.‖270 The wording of Noble‘s memory 
suggests an affinity for a region that Breathitt County could only be a part of in a nominal 
sense; the South that his grandfather ―came from‖ was relatively far away, and the 
younger Noble‘s loyalty to it was a political decision based upon a historical kinship 
rather than a desire to defend his present homeland.  If George Noble‘s decision to 
support the South was a manifestation of expatriated ―Confederate nationalism,‖ it was 
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one he had to create largely on his own.
271
  And, considering that Unionists from other 
mountain counties largely shared Noble‘s white southern heritage but made the opposite 
decision, other factors were clearly at work.      
While slavery was, as historian Carl Degler has said, ―neither simple nor obvious‖ 
as a primary determinant for most white southerners‘ decisions in 1861, it should not 
escape consideration as a possible issue in Breathitt County‘s wartime partisanship.272  
One local historian, himself descended from slave owners, remarked that ―[s]lavery was 
asserting itself in a degree‖ among the families who consequently ―held to the 
Confederate wing‖ without necessarily actively taking a side.273  Those who did own 
slaves in Breathitt County were little different than slaveholders in other parts of the state 
on an individual level.  Slave ownership was widespread in Kentucky but most slave 
owners owned fewer than ten slaves at a time, a rate that was scarcely different than the 
miniscule rate of ownership in the mountains.  Although the number of slaves in Breathitt 
County had increased since 1840 (while actually decreasing in surrounding counties) the 
county‘s largest slaveholding in 1861 was only fifteen, while most of the county‘s thirty 
five slave owners owned fewer than five.
274
  The number of slaves and slave owners in 
                                                 
 
271Although nationalism does not fully explain Confederate loyalty in a Union state, Noble‘s 
testimonial suggests its contribution in conditions in which it was not previously part of the political or 
cultural atmosphere.  ―Nationalism is contingent; its creation is a process.  It is not a substance available to 
a people in a certain premeasured amount; it is rather a dynamic of ideas and social realities that can, under 
the proper circumstances, unite and legitimate a people in what they regard as reasoned public action.  Such 
a view of nationalism, moreover, underlines the political nature of the undertaking, directing attention to 
the social groups seeking to establish their own corporate ideals and purposes as the essence of group self-
definition.‖  Drew Gilpin Faust.  The Creation of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in the 
Civil War South.   (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988): pp. 1-21 (quote from p. 6).  
 
272
Quote from Degler, The Other South: Southern Dissenters in the Nineteenth Century.   (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1974): p. 122.  
 
273
E.L. Noble (Vol. 2), p. 5.  
 
122 
 
the county was far below average for the state as a whole, but the typical Kentucky slave 
owner owned less than ten slaves as well.
275
  In terms of numbers of slaves owned, the 
Souths, Edward Strong and other slave owning families had little reason to see 
themselves as different from other slaveholders in Kentucky and the rest of the 
slaveholding South.  While Breathitt County‘s slave owners had no more of a 
dependency on the institution than did their brethren in the Bluegrass, they arguably had 
no less as well.   
Mountain slave owners may well have been even more reluctant to relinquish the 
institution than were many Kentucky lowlanders.  Up until the 1850s most white 
Kentuckians held an uneasy attitude toward slavery.  Recognizing the state‘s relative lack 
of need for bondspeople, Kentucky slave owners and non-slave owners were nevertheless 
hesitant to eradicate slavery for fear of the free black population that would result from 
immediate emancipation.  Beginning in the early nineteenth century, laws discouraging 
slave importation into the state were popular among all segments of the white population 
and exportation was simultaneously encouraged, mainly due to the assumption that the 
state‘s slave owners were most likely to sell their unruliest chattel out of state while 
retaining a more placid black population.  Abolitionist rhetoric, while never popular 
among most whites, was nevertheless left unstifled until only short years before the Civil 
War.  As Henry Clay advocated throughout most of his political career, Kentuckians, 
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even those who strongly disliked slavery, also preferred that it be allowed to die a slow 
death rather than a sudden one.
276
 
Or, in some slaveholders‘ minds, perhaps not die at all.  In the Three Forks region 
the dangers of a free black population would have been miniscule, numerically at least, 
and probably went without local whites‘ consideration.  By the beginning of the Civil 
War only twenty five free blacks lived in Breathitt County, comprising less than fifteen 
percent of the county‘s black population and less than one percent of the county‘s total 
population.
277
  Moreover, slaves were an important investment to the white mountain 
farmers who could afford them, particularly those with low-valued landholdings.  It was 
not unusual for Breathitt County slave masters to have slaves that were collectively worth 
more than the land they worked.  David Chandler, the owner of one of the county‘s 
largest chattel holdings in 1861, owned a total of thirteen slaves valued at $5500 yet only 
valued his 700 acre farm at $2000.
278
  Eastern Kentucky slaveowners, wealthy from the 
fruits of human bondage but not surrounded by a numerically superior population of 
potential insurrectionists, shared their lowland fellows‘ profits but perhaps not their fears.  
Chandler and Jeremiah South had little reason to share their fellow masters‘ ambivalent 
feelings and were consequently less likely ―to give up (their) slaves without a battle.‖279   
Slavery was not economically vital to the majority of the populations in 
mountainous locales like Breathitt County but it was not without political import since 
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virtually all officeholders were slave owners.  Although most whites did not own slaves 
those who did were particularly concerned at the war‘s onset.  Many Breathitt County 
yeomen probably felt a kinship to their slaveholding neighbors due to their shared 
position as property owners.  White southern mountaineers, within and outside of the 
seceded states, agreed with their lowland fellows that the alleged northern threat to 
slavery was an equal threat to all property and, therefore, autonomy.
280
 At the same time 
the clientalist influence these families had over their slaveless neighbors motivated 
support for the Confederacy.
281
  John Aikman, the South family‘s tenant who acted as 
their enforcer against squatter incursions, would go on to become Breathitt County‘s 
most fervent defender of the local Confederate cause at his patrons‘ behest.282         
But, when looked at within the context of its surroundings, slavery does not 
provide a full answer for Breathitt County‘s popular white rebellion.  The largest slave 
population in eastern Kentucky was in Clay County, Breathitt County‘s neighbor to the 
south, a county that apparently retained a staunchly Unionist government with little 
apparent disagreement within the white population.  At the same time, Breathitt County‘s 
neighbors to the north, Floyd and Morgan Counties, voted against neutrality, were noted 
for Confederate sympathy and miniscule recruitment for the regular Union Army but had 
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slave populations even tinier than Breathitt‘s.283  What these two counties did share with 
Breathitt was a longstanding loyalty to the Democratic Party lasting for decades before 
the war.  In contrast, Clay County had been a strongly Whig county since the Jacksonian 
era.  This suggests that southeastern Kentucky was consistent with the rest of the state 
since cursory analysis of Kentucky‘s sectional divides on the 1861 neutrality vote reveals 
a consistent correlation between Democracy and anti-neutrality.  The same areas that had 
supported Henry Clay and his Whigs during the party‘s salad days tended to favor 
neutrality in 1861 and contributed the greater amount of Union support after Kentucky‘s 
official participation in the war.  Counties that had continued Democratic leanings since 
the 1820s opposed neutrality and accordingly provided the larger numbers of Confederate 
volunteers over the next four years after the state‘s early attempt at neutrality was 
revealed as a clear failure.
284
  In many ways, the political decisions made by eastern 
Kentuckians in 1861, and their subsequent choices of military support, were simple 
reflections of traditional party affiliation.  Accordingly, guerrilla raids into heavily 
Unionist Owsley County in 1864 were said to have been blamed on ―A bunch of 
Democrats from Breathitt County.‖285          
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Attempting to determine Breathitt County‘s wartime direction cannot depend 
fully on either slavery or party habits.  By 1861, slavery and party politics were far too 
intertwined to identify one or the other as the chief incentive for the choosing of sides 
among mountaineers, Kentuckians and white southerners at large.  While most Kentucky 
slave owners in the state had traditionally voted Whig or Opposition, by 1860 most of 
them had recently recognized Democracy as their most effective vehicle for their political 
interests.
286
  In Breathitt County, support for the Confederacy, tacit or active, was based 
upon support for the county itself, its Democratic regime but more importantly its 
commercial significance.  Interest in supporting the South was equated with the county 
itself and how much one benefitted from its formation two decades earlier, the creation of 
Jackson and the future development promised by Jeremiah South and his landed fellows.  
One local war recollection records that the county‘s ―prominent landowners...owners of 
much live stock and fertile bottoms‖ tended to be the strongest Confederate sympathizers, 
if not active supporters.
287
  Most Breathitt County surnames were found exclusively on 
either Union or Confederate recruitment rolls, showing that kinship played a significant 
role in picking sides.  But the small number of surnames found on both sides, when 
compared to 1861 tax records, suggest that economic considerations sometimes trumped 
familial ones.  (see Figures 14-17).  Men with smaller tracts of land (less than fifty acres 
claimed), moderate tracts of negligible taxable value or no declared land at all were more 
likely to be Union recruits, while yeomen with larger holdings tended to side with the 
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Confederacy.  Confederatism‘s appeal to the more economically interested was not unlike 
conditions in the rest of the state.  In the mind of postwar southern apologists Kentucky 
Unionism as a whole was comprised of poorer whites bent upon tearing down the power 
of men like Edward Strong and Jeremiah South.  Regretting his own Union service after 
the war, one Bluegrass veteran remarked that ―the Kentucky troops in the Confederate 
Army, being fewer in number and from the richer and more educated part of the state, 
were as a whole a finer body of men than the federal troops of the Commonwealth.‖288   
What is also revealed in the case of Breathitt County (and arguably those of Clay, 
Floyd and Morgan Counties as well) is the remarkable degree of influence a ―prominent‖ 
minority of propertied men could have over their county‘s inhabitants and the singular 
importance of county government in the conveyance of this influence.  This was probably  
 
Figures 14-17: Names Found on Military Rolls and 1861 Breathitt County Tax Books  
Andrew Allen Confederate 550 
Ira Allen Confederate 200 
John Angel Union 200 
Levi Angel Union 0 
Nathan Arrowood Union 0 
Annanias Barnett Union  0 
Elijah Bowling Union  0 
George Belcher Union 200 
Edward Collinsworth Confederate 100 
Thomas Collinsworth Confederate 0 
William Crawford Confederate 500 
Jeremiah Davidson Union 75 
Edward Deaton Union 100 
George Deaton Union 0 
Joseph Deaton Union 0 
William Deaton Union  0 
Golden Flinchum Union 0 
Hiram Freeman Union 0 
James Freeman Union 0 
William Freeman Union 0 
William Gambill  Union  1000 
Henry Haddix Confederate 0 
Hiram Haddix Confederate 200 
William Haddix Confederate 300 
Hiram Haddix Confederate 0 
John Hall Union 200 
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William Harvey Union 50 
Alexander Herald  Union 500 
Stephen Hogg. Confederate 0 
Elisha Johnson Union 225 
James Johnson Union 300 
Jefferson Johnson Union 0 
Thomas Johnson Union 350 
Hiram Miller Confederate 0 
Samuel Miller Confederate 100 
Alexander Patrick  Confederate 1500 
Benjamin McIntosh Union 150 
Henley McIntosh Union 0 
Fugate McIntosh Union 150 
Nimrod McIntosh Union 0 
William McIntosh  Union  50 
George Miller Union 0 
Booker Mullins Confederate 100 
Elias Noble  Confederate 0 
John Noble  Confederate 200 
John Riley, Sr.  Union 50 
John Riley, Jr. Union 0 
Squire Riley Union 0 
Calloway Sebastian Union 100 
Lewis Sebastian Union  0 
Harden Sizemore Union 0 
Lewis Sizemore Union 0 
Irvine Spicer Union  0 
Edward Stamper Union 50 
Samuel Stidham Union 0 
Combs Family Members 
First Name Wartime 
Affiliation 
Land Wealth in 
1861 (acres) 
Alfred Confederate 800 
George Confederate 400 
Henderson Confederate 160 
Henry Confederate 100 
Jeremiah Confederate 100 
Mason Union 0 
Nicholas Confederate 0 
Seburn Union 0 
Tarlton, Jr. Union 0 
William Union 100 
William B. Confederate 100 
Jett Family Members                                                                                                       
Curtis Union 4600 
Granville Jett Confederate 1000 
 
Little Family Members 
First Name Wartime 
Affiliation 
Land Wealth in 
1861 (acres) 
Alfred Union 0 
Edward Union 0 
James Confederate 300 
John C. Confederate 1500 
William B. Union 0 
 
129 
 
the case in other areas of the Kentucky mountains as well; surprised by the amount of 
Confederate support he found in eastern Kentucky in early 1862, Colonel James Garfield 
complained that ―party leaders‖ in the mountains held far too much sway over popular 
opinion and advocated loyalty oaths for these heads of party, hoping that lead rams would 
change the direction of the flocks.
289
  ―Strong southern rights man‖ and prominent 
Democrat that he was, Jeremiah South had much personal responsibility for Breathitt 
County‘s support of the Confederate cause.290  Just as South had disciplined an otherwise 
Whiggish territory into a staunchly Democratic county in short years after petitioning for 
the county‘s creation, he, his families and their allies were able to perform a similar act of 
discipline at the war‘s onset.  As ―perhaps, the most popular and influential man in all of 
Eastern Kentucky,‖ South had enough clout within the county he had practically created 
to sway it against its surrounding Unionist neighbors.
291
  
Breathitt County‘s initial contribution to Confederate divisions was high but 
desertion among Breathitt County men was later rampant.  Most Union recruits from the 
Three Forks region patrolled their home locales, dealing harshly with neighbors who took 
the opposite side, always benefiting from being on familiar ground.  But Confederates 
from the area were more likely to be sent further afield, especially across the state line 
into southwestern Virginia.
292
  As a result, they were unable to watch over their families 
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and domestic economic interests during their time of service.  This distance eventually 
tested many Confederates‘ interest in the larger war effort.  As the South‘s military 
fortunes changed for the worse after the July, 1863 defeats at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, 
the men from Breathitt County who had chosen to support it through formal military 
service saw little reason to continue their support beyond their home territory.
293
  In 
August, 1863, John Aikman and as many as a dozen other Breathitt County enlistees 
abandoned their 5
th
 Kentucky Infantry company in Hansonville, Virginia.  Desertions 
from other units peopled by recruits from Breathitt County were also common.  Edward 
Strong, by then a lieutenant in the same company, requested a leave of absence from his 
position as company quartermaster around the same time of Aikman et als desertion to 
have his family moved to safety in Virginia and later procured an appointment back home 
in Jackson, returning to a formalized version of the recruitment position he had held at 
the war‘s beginning.294  By means both legitimate and otherwise, Breathitt County‘s 
rebels withdrew from a rebellion they had never been truly a part of.     
The mid-war return of a large number of Breathitt County‘s native Confederate 
soldiers was a pivotal moment in the county‘s further becoming a space of internal 
conflict.
295
  Rather than returning to the life of a noncombatant, Aikman and his fellow 
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deserters began fighting a ―parochialized‖ version of the war upon their return, perhaps 
compelled by a desire to further the Confederate cause but perhaps, especially in 
Aikman‘s case, to protect the interests of the local regime.296  But by doing so, he and 
those who joined him waged a quixotic struggle, since they were virtually surrounded by 
staunchly and actively Unionist populations in surrounding counties.  Moreover, this pro-
Confederate elite may not have considered the heights to which the county‘s internal 
dissidents would go to resist and usurp the former‘s authority.  A minority of the county‘s 
citizens, made up of marginal landowners and landless farmers, many of them squatters 
on property officially owned by the South family and other large landholders, fought 
against the county‘s Confederate leanings under Edward Strong‘s cousin William Strong.  
As a result an internal war was established in the county, the effects of which would be 
felt for decades afterwards.  But before these effects wore out completely, their origins in 
actual war would be obscured, denied and forgotten.   
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“…all Union men, bitter, prejudiced and ignorant.”   
In class terms, William Strong had more in common with his enemies than he did 
with the Unionist irregulars he sought out as his allies.  But Strong‘s Unionism was 
inspired by factors that pre-dated Breathitt County‘s existence and beyond the political 
influence that pointed it in a southward wartime direction.  Strong was a landowner of 
some substance, albeit with far smaller tracts than his wealthy cousin Edward, and a slave 
owner as late as 1860.
297
  Unlike Edward, William Strong had no associations with 
Jackson‘s South coterie or the Democratic politics it entailed.  His home was in the 
Crockettsville precinct, an area of the county that, considering that it hosted Breathitt 
County‘s only Confederate mustering grounds in 1862, seemed to rebel from Jackson‘s  
 
Figure 18: William Strong (photo probably taken sometime during the Civil War) 
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Figure 19: John Aikman (photo date unknown) 
 
Confederate tendencies.
298
  Crockettsville was in the southern corner of Breathitt County 
and situated on the middle fork of the Kentucky River.  As of 1847 it had the only post 
office outside of the county seat, so residents of the community and its surroundings had 
only to visit Jackson on court days.
299
 With Jackson on the north fork, the smaller town 
had greater social and commercial contact with Perry County, a Unionist hotbed, further 
to the south. 
    Perry County was the home of Major John Eversole and Wiley and Thomas Amis, 
also descendants of early Three Forks settlers and Strong‘s compatriots in the  Union 
cavalry.  Strong and the Amises were both descendants of participants in the Clay County 
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Cattle War six decades previous.
300
  Before joining the army together the Strongs, 
Amises and Eversoles were all related by marriage and, perhaps most importantly, shared 
a local society that pre-dated Breathitt County‘s apportionment from Perry County at 
Jeremiah South‘s request (benefiting from the county‘s formation, and living closer to 
Jackson, William‘s wealthier cousin Edward was apparently otherwise motivated).  As a 
testament to his family‘s persistence without regard for the new political delineations 
being drawn around them through the years, Wiley Amis‘ farm lay at the confluence of 
Breathitt, Perry and Owsley Counties.  Like many other Three Fork residents with 
property in Breathitt County, the county was an abstraction that meant nothing more than 
having to pay property taxes to a courthouse controlled by one‘s wartime enemies.301  
Had he a sense of a larger picture of local events, South‘s claim on the old Virginia land 
grant and formation of a new county may have seemed to William Strong the acts of an 
interloper, and a danger to his economic interests since he, like many mountain farmers, 
probably depended upon large areas of unfenced land for livestock droving and had little 
interest in land speculation.  Whatever his reasons, Strong chose the side of the Three 
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Forks region‘s majority and neighbors in another county in defiance of his own county‘s 
elites, a decision that notably never brought him into direct conflict with his cousin 
Edward but nevertheless caused his name to become anathema to pro-Confederates.  
Having joined the 14
th
 Kentucky Cavalry in 1862 and serving primarily in the 
Bluegrass, Strong was mustered out in 1864 and returned to Breathitt County, at which 
time he was said to have been immediately beset upon by local Confederates under Barry 
South‘s command.302 In reaction, William Strong and his allies began ―killing nearly 
every Southern citizen he found" as part of Kentucky‘s Three Forks Battalion (sometimes 
also called the ―Last Chance Battalion‖ since it served as the last chance for mountain 
Unionists mustered out of other units to ―get in the fight‖). The formation of the Three 
Forks Battalion reflected a turning point in the Civil War, after much of the seceded 
states were occupied by federal forces.  The 14
th
 Kentucky had been formed in 
anticipation of large-scale Confederate attempts to occupy the state.  In contrast, the 
Three Forks was one of ten battalions that made up Kentucky‘s 1st Regiment of Capital 
Guards, a unit authorized by Secretary of War Edwin Stanton for fighting pro-
Confederate forces from within the state.  Rather than fighting an invading enemy, Strong 
and his fellow Capital Guard officers were to wage war within their home locales 
potentially against their own neighbors.
303
  By the end of 1865 ―Captain Bill‖ had 
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established a reputation as one of Kentucky‘s most brutal partisans on either side of the 
conflict, a reputation supported largely by people who had known him for years before 
the war.  Although he never achieved a commission higher than captain, by all accounts 
William Strong was the undisputed leader of official and unofficial Unionist antagonism 
in Breathitt County and one of the most authoritative Union partisans in all of eastern 
Kentucky.  Fighting against his county‘s Confederate majority by the war‘s end, William 
Strong was said to have become ―the most powerful man in Breathitt County.‖304  
Strong‘s intimidation was felt so strongly that, from 1863 until 1865, Breathitt County 
Democrats stayed home from wartime elections, thereby making Breathitt the only 
typically Democratic county in eastern Kentucky to support Unionist candidates in 
wartime elections.
305
 
Strong‘s, Eversole‘s and the Amises‘ inter-county collusion of aggressive 
Unionism came about through old social arrangements generated by shared roles as the 
Three Forks region‘s ―first settler families,‖ an advantageous position in the Kentucky 
mountains that carried with it the potential for leadership status on either side of the 
conflict.
306
 They were assisted by a mysterious population made up of both Breathitt 
County‘s landless whites and people of color, two subaltern populations that are difficult 
to trace in the historical record.  Without slaves or land of speculative value, Breathitt 
County‘s poorest farmers had less reason to follow the lead of Edward Strong and the 
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South family.  Recruitment for regular Union outfits such as the 14
th
 Cavalry, and the 
subsequent Three Forks Battalion, attracted the Three Forks region‘s poorer elements, no 
doubt inspiring one Confederate officer assigned with tracking down William Strong to 
characterize the county‘s ―Union men‖ as ―bitter, prejudiced and ignorant.‖307  Yet, this 
was not necessarily an opposition based upon isolation, racial fear and willful ignorance 
of the ―outside world,‖ as mountain Unionism has been characterized.308  Opposition to 
Breathitt County‘s Confederates was also opposition to the threat to the squatter economy 
that Jeremiah South‘s county posed.  As mentioned earlier, this same population used 
their unfettered access to Bluegrass markets via the forks of the Kentucky River.  From 
an economic perspective, these landless farmers, many of whom were squatters on the 
South family‘s vast tract, were motivated by self determined participation, not complete 
isolation or ―traditional‖ modes of local economics.309 The ―wood denizens‖ did not 
resist commercial life but, occupying land that was contractually someone else‘s, 
preferred to encounter the market down the river under their own terms.  Breathitt 
County‘s poorer farmers‘ dissent against their county‘s majority brought about the 
―internal war‖ fought in many places in the upland South in which decisions of loyalty 
made by planter elites did not reflect the freeholder political economy, an otherwise 
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―innocuous‖ prewar cleavage that only became politicized and subject to polarization 
through the arrival of war.
310
  
Nor were they strongly motivated by an innate fear of the African race, as was 
also supposedly the case among mountain Unionists.
311
  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
some of Breathitt County‘s small black population took up arms as guerrilla fighters 
alongside the wood denizens, an ability born from the geographical dictates inherent to 
mountain slavery.
312
  Just as Breathitt County‘s hunter and drover economy was shaped 
by its terrain, so too was the condition of bondspeople. Gang labor, the use of slaves for a 
single, continuous task, was uncommon in the Kentucky mountains, since most 
slaveowners, like their slaveless neighbors, diversified their economic pursuits.  The 
tending of crops was accompanied by the herding of livestock, the felling of timber and 
the maintenance and mining of small farmyard coal mines.  The nature of their work 
afforded slaves a freedom of movement and lack of surveillance, two things rarely 
enjoyed by slaves in the plantation South.
313
  A slave ―with whom everyone in the county 
was acquainted‖ owned by Jeremiah South often traveled across great distances, acting as 
a messenger for his owner and their neighbors.
314
  The county‘s 1860 slave schedules 
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reveal a large number of manumitted slaves living alongside those still in bondage, 
further contributing to their physical mobility and the covert conveyance of 
information.
315
  Their small numbers and diversity of tasks allowed mountain slaves to 
sometimes interact within white society and, to a greater extent, with slaves from other 
farms and free blacks in the local area.
316
       
Few in number, those slaves who put an active effort into supporting the local 
Unionist efforts played an integral role in quieter fashions as well.  One unnamed slave 
owned by Confederate partisan John Duff acted as Eversole‘s spy, traveling to Perry 
County to warn him of an impending attack to be led by his master.
317
  Once he returned 
to Breathitt County after serving with the 14
th
 Cavalry, William Strong may have 
employed his and his father‘s slaves as fellow combatants and was recorded as ―carr[ying] 
off‖ one of his raid victims‘ slaves, a theft in the mind of the raid victim that was perhaps 
actually a recruitment.
318
  Still, local Confederate observers did not apparently fear 
internal insurrections among the small slave population as much as they did the prospect 
of federally mandated black soldiers.  One Confederate officer, well aware that eastern 
Kentucky had become a large source of recruitment for the U.S. Colored Regiments, was 
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nonplussed at the possibility of uniformed blacks, vowing that he and his fellow rebels 
―would not tolerate their taking up arms against us.‖  But when a ―fleetfooted negro‖ 
warned Unionists of his approach, the same officer was more annoyed than alarmed.
319
 
―Legitimate‖ Confederate soldiers did not initially see their shadowy war as a direct 
threat comparable to colored men in the legitimate Union uniform.  But this strange 
interracial wood denizen population proved to be a greater threat to eastern Kentucky‘s 
Confederate campaign than the United States Colored Troops.                  
Two violent associates of William Strong for years after the war, Henderson 
Kilburn and Hiram Freeman, are two of a very small number of names that can be 
identified within this unarticulated interracial group.  Historical records reveal little about 
Kilburn other than that he was a landless farmer at the beginning of the war (possibly on 
Jeremiah South‘s acreage).320  He was from a stratum of mountain society that may have 
cared little for either sides‘ larger goals.  Kilburn initially joined the Confederate 5th 
Kentucky Infantry but deserted after less than two months.  But for some unknown 
reason he later defected and joined the 14
th
 Kentucky Cavalry and returned to Breathitt 
County in early 1865 to join the Three Forks Battalion.
321
  After he served as a private 
under Captain William Strong‘s command Kilburn maintained a violent loyalty to his old 
commander.  As an assassin both during and after the war, Kilburn was said to be 
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Strong‘s ―chief Lieutenant‖ and his deadly ―right hand, right foot and right eye.‖322  
Hiram Freeman was the mulatto son of a manumitted slave from Clay County who 
relocated to Breathitt County after escaping a contract that would have amounted to 
indentured servitude.
323
  Freeman was part of the racially ambiguous population that 
William E. Lincoln had witnessed before the war and he used his biracial heritage to 
negotiate multiple, or overlapping, racial identities.
324
 Although he was listed as mulatto 
on the 1860 census, Freeman and at least one of his sons (all of whom were listed as 
white on the same document) were able to join the otherwise all-white 14
th
 Kentucky 
Cavalry, perhaps through William Strong‘s influence.325 Though not as brutal as Kilburn, 
Freeman was remembered as ―among the worst‖ of Strong‘s allies during the war and 
after.
326
   
Historian John Alexander Williams describes both mountain squatters and people 
of color as ―lead[ing] a shadowy existence,‖ a barely discernible presence in extant 
records that suggests to him that both may have enjoyed economic advantages unknown 
by their fellows in other parts of the South.
327
 In Breathitt County this ―shadowy 
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existence,‖ combined with the Unionist war effort, defined the ferment of violence in 
Breathitt County.  As different as they may have initially been, Strong, Eversole, the 
Amises, and the semi-anonymous multiracial wood denizens all shared motivations for 
disaffection toward Confederate Breathitt County: all either did not benefit from, or were 
potentially harmed by, the interests of the South family and, by extension, the county 
court.  Strong, Eversole and the Amises were simply going along with the Three Forks 
region‘s majority and most white Kentuckians, but were also basing their loyalties upon 
relationships dating back to the early days of white settlement in the Three Forks region.  
Utilizing his racial indeterminacy, Freeman, although born free, was fighting the white 
supremacy represented by Breathitt County‘s slave owning interests that peopled 
Breathitt County‘s political and economic elite, a fight he shared with the county‘s black 
and mulatto population, both free and enslaved.  Finally, Kilburn and other white 
squatters fought against the Souths‘ speculative economic interests, interests that could 
potentially damage the formers‘ livelihood as semi-itinerant drovers and forest 
farmers.
328
  Local Unionism, and its ability to organize disparate individuals and groups, 
provided a challenge to Breathitt County‘s more powerful elements and their attempt to 
veer eastern Kentucky toward the Confederacy.     
This organization was defined by the irregular methods and command style 
characterized by Kentucky‘s semi-official home guards.  Although the Three Forks 
Battalion was a unit mandated by the state of Kentucky and the US War Department, it 
approximated a more localized and irregular home guard detachment in form and 
function.  After the ―legitimate‖ Confederate Army had given up major raids into the 
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state, one southern officer complained that the units he identified as home guards were 
the primary source of Confederate failure in the Three Forks region and a recognition that 
political and military mobilization was carried out on the county level.  ―Their policy is to 
organize these mountain counties as speedily as possible against us.  Taking advantage of 
our retreat from the State, they are trying to convince the people that we have given the 
State up.  In this way they seduce many into their Home Guard organizations.‖329       
This was the so-called home guards‘ function within the ―master cleavage.‖330  It 
was within the war‘s local cleavages that units like William Strong‘s had their greatest 
lasting impact.  The decentralized authority and small numbers inherent to Kentucky‘s 
home guard units made their purposes and actions malleable to the wishes of individual 
commanders like Strong, and the insular concerns of the communities.  Membership in 
military units authorized by the federal government, a body that men like Strong, 
Freeman and Kilburn may never have given significant thought to before 1861, provided 
a means by which local actors and outside interests could form alliances of common 
purpose, blending the formers‘ commercial interests with the ―master cleavage‖ 
represented by the war en masse.  The wood denizens fought a war that was as much 
based upon local, almost personalized, issues as it was in the greater national struggle.  
However, they were able to do so under the banner of a national movement based upon 
the preservation of the Union and suppression of rebellion.  The war provided an 
―interface‖ between the national and the local.331  The ability to link their local cause to 
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the larger one proved useful after the war when Strong was able to have individuals with 
questionable military credentials placed upon pension rolls and to use his role as 
legitimate military actor when he was sued by his neighbors for confiscating livestock 
during the war.
332
     
Finally, the war, and the wood denizens‘ service under Strong‘s command, 
created an infrapolitical body independent of institutions commonly recognized as 
legitimate by the local state (i.e., the county court) heightening Strong‘s power as a 
―chieftain‖ of Breathitt County‘s squatter population and the county‘s ―special protector 
of the colored race.‖333 After the war, Strong‘s detractors suggested that he maintained a 
paternalistic hold over his allies, often in language that suggested the latter‘s primitivism.  
One local historian denied that the landless Unionists had any real conscious purposes in 
fighting under Strong‘s command, but characterized the wood denizens as tabulae rasa 
for his evil exploitation.  ―These men, in the main, had no opinion of their own.  They 
were ignorant and savage, having no desires of their own; they desired only to be clothed 
and fed; thus they were fit subjects to execute what others desired done.  They seemed 
void of conscience; knew nothing of the cause against which they fought.‖334  
However, perhaps the means by which Strong became a ―chieftain‖ went beyond 
whatever charisma he held over his more ―ignorant and savage‖ underlings and was a 
product of Strong‘s negotiation of multiple roles. In becoming a ―chieftain‖ among the 
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wood denizens Strong was benefiting from a political dynamic common to all civil wars 
in which authority is extended to individuals who are most willing to commit violent 
acts.
335
  Had Strong not received his commission in the 14
th
 Cavalry, and his subsequent 
captaincy in the Three Forks Battalion, his influence in the Three Forks region‘s society 
would have been limited only to his economic and social status, kinship and the rights 
and privileges afforded to any other white male landowner.  But by gaining authority in a 
martial capacity, and acting out that authority through acts of violence, the war enhanced 
Strong‘s ability to influence those around him, particularly since most, if not all, of the 
men who served under him were his neighbors from southern Breathitt County and 
neighboring Perry County.  Further, this military arrangement placed a landowner and 
slave owner like Strong in league with slaves and landless whites, an alliance that would 
not have taken place under any other circumstances.  Martial authority translated into, 
and was combined with, community authority, thereby giving Strong ―chieftain‖ status 
over a portion of the Three Forks region‘s population for decades after the war.  The 
pocket of Unionism within an otherwise Confederate state (at least as far as Breathitt 
County could be considered a state) crystallized into a ―small state‖ that subverted the 
larger state long after the war was over.
336
 
With pro-Confederate control over the county court, the only universally 
recognized governing body within Breathitt County‘s boundaries, the county‘s Unionists 
were robbed of conventional access to local public institutions, access that they had 
previously enjoyed as white male voters (with the probable exception of Hiram Freeman) 
before the war.  An 1863 petition submitted to the Kentucky House of Representatives 
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expressed concern for the ability of Union soldiers from Breathitt County being able to 
vote.
337
  Under the vive voce conditions that had already always given court officials 
inordinate surveillance and control over the electorate, Union sympathizers, or for that 
matter Union soldiers, could easily be prevented from voting by force or by simply not 
being counted (a practice that was likewise directed at Confederate partisans or 
sympathizers in strongly Unionist counties).   
 
“I knew the man I shot.” 
 
War fought within an enclosed community where opposing participants are 
familiar enough with one another to complicate (or prevent) combatants‘ use of self-
anonymity blurs boundaries between the political and the personal.  Given that those who 
returned to fight this internecine war were neighbors who had established peaceable 
interpersonal relationships before the war, the eventual fighting took on what Stathis 
Kalyvas calls an ―intimacy‖ of violence, an essential element of modern civil war.338 The 
conditions by which such a war are fought were tersely described in the postwar 
testimonial of an Owsley County partisan who intermittently battled incursions from pro-
Confederate neighbors from Breathitt County: ―I knew the man I shot.  He had been a 
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friend of mine but I knew we had to kill some of them or they would kill some of us and I 
had too good a bead on him to let him go.‖339 
As a geopolitical buffer between eastern Kentucky‘s pro-Confederate counties 
and pro-Union counties, Breathitt was ―ravaged by guerilla raids‖ and military 
occupation for the second half of the war.
340
  By 1864 conditions in the Three Forks 
region had deteriorated to the point that court days and elections were not held.
341
    
Despite its being well within pro-Union boundaries, Breathitt County saw more visits 
from regular Confederate units than from the federal army.  Led by Perry County native 
Major John Eversole, mountain Unionists had resisted the attempts of Generals Benjamin 
Caudill and John Hunt Morgan and Colonel Jack May to establish Confederate 
dominance in the Three Forks region.
342
  Breathitt County provided southern 
commanders with valuable access to the Kentucky River‘s headwaters and a relatively 
safe bivouac from which attacks into Kentucky‘s most fervently Unionist counties could 
be launched.  Among the boldest of Kentucky‘s native Confederate generals, Morgan 
attempted to claim control over Unionist Estill County, declaring Unionist home guards 
―enemies of the government‖ despite officially having the same status himself343  By 
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1863 the southern military presence in the county was so pervasive that Confederate 
currency was in wide circulation among the civilian populace (testifying also to the 
relative lack of available specie in the mountains).
344
  
While serving as a byway for southern armies, the county was a headquarters for 
the local Confederate effort as well.  Serving officially or unofficially under his landlord 
Lieutenant Jerry South Jr., John Aikman and many others augmented Confederate efforts 
in the Three Forks region with a smaller war of local state-dismantlement.  Clay County 
to the south and Owsley County to the west, both Unionist bastions, were often targets 
for Breathitt raiders, mostly for the forced appropriation of livestock.
345
 Aside from the 
theft of horses and cattle from noncombatant farmers, Owsley County‘s jail was burned 
and its county court records ransacked and destroyed, symbolically and effectively 
crippling local government.
346
  After his desertion in Virginia, John Aikman gained the 
reputation as one of the Three Forks region‘s most brutal Confederates, a reputation that 
was no doubt strengthened by the apocryphal story of his spitting out a lead ball after 
being shot in the back by one of Eversole‘s men and remarking on having been fed a 
―damned hot morsel.‖347   
John Aikman‘s reputation as a ―bad man‖ gained during the war was matched, if 
not surpassed by William Strong‘s reputation for brutality.  During his service in the 
Three Forks Battalion (or ersatz home guards) Strong garnered ill repute not only for his 
purportedly self-interested confiscation of property but also for the terrorism he directed 
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against ostensibly neutral civilians.  More than a decade after the war‘s end he was 
remembered by a Democratic newspaper as a source of wartime terror in Kentucky‘s 
mountains: ―The majority of the people (in Breathitt County) were Southern 
sympathizers, and that made them legitimate game for the devil, who appeared in the 
person of Captain Bill Strong.‖348  Whether or not Strong was truly more villainous 
toward his neighbors than his adversaries were to neighboring counties is questionable, 
since most post-war chroniclers were unsympathetic, while his allies remained 
unarticulated.  The only operative difference between Strong‘s and Aikman‘s styles of 
combat was that the former was more prone to attack, plunder and capture within his 
home county.  ―Intimacy‖ apparently worked in paradoxical ways in Strong‘s case; while 
the aforementioned Owsley County partisan was willing to overlook friendship in favor 
of partisanship, encounters between Strong and the young George Noble suggest that the 
reverse could just as easily take place.  When he was captured by Strong late in the war 
Noble was able to secure a quick release through negotiations based upon the former‘s 
personal familiarity with the Noble family before the war.
349
 Months later when William 
Strong‘s brother John was killed in ambush (supposedly due to being mistaken for 
William) Noble recalled feeling regret that his comrades had ―killed the wrong man‖ 
rather than relief that a dangerous enemy partisan had been eliminated.
350
  Breathitt 
County‘s intimate war dictated that local combatants were judged more for their personal 
selves than for their political stances after the war.               
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If Strong extended courtesies to others during the war as he did to Noble they   
were not recorded.  Murder, theft, intimidation and property destruction, actions that 
many in Breathitt County supposedly considered outside the bounds of acceptable 
warfare, were all attributed to him and the home guard.  The most egregious crimes 
attributed to Strong dealt with his treatment of civilians.  Years after the war a 
Democratic newspaper recorded the names of nineteen ―private citizens‖ killed by 
Strong‘s home guard.351 Like Aikman, Strong was also known for committing property 
crimes against families of opposing sympathies.  During the same aforementioned raid in 
which he ―carried away‖ a slave belonging to a farmer named Jesse Spencer, Strong and 
his men  
drove away most of Spencer's livestock, went into the house, split open the featherbeds with       
their knives, and poured jugs of ‗sorghum‘ molasses into the ‗Feather ticks.‘ Hams, middlings, and 
shoulders were taken from the smokehouse. They also destroyed what other property they could 
not take with them.352      
 
 
Suspecting that Strong and the Amises made such these and other acquisitions for purely 
personal gain, at least one of his victims unsuccessfully attempted to sue Strong after the 
war but was blocked by his invocation of federal authority.353  Strong‘s primary tactic 
was to surround the home of a suspected ―rebel scout‖ and demand the surrender of any 
men who formerly served with Confederate forces or provided them with support.  
Young Confederate Miles Spurlock, on winter furlough from service, was shot in the 
back by Strong while attempting to escape during a raid.  Soon after, David Barnett, ―an 
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innocent man" in George Noble‘s opinion, was summarily shot in his home.354 In terms 
of damaging the pro-Confederate hold on Breathitt County, Strong‘s most significant 
kills were Andrew Jackson South and Jerry South Jr., his opposite military numbers and 
the South family‘s remaining adult male representatives in their county.355  Thus, Strong 
eliminated the Three Forks region‘s predominant native Confederate partisan as well as 
chief enemy of the squatters who occupied South family property.       
 Cursory scrutiny of Strong‘s and Aikman‘s actions between 1863 and 1865 
reveals little but seemingly apolitical barbarism.  However, there is a greater complexity 
to the torture of their neighbors than might be assumed.  Both recognized that what the 
historian Stephen Ash has since called the ―communal nature of guerrillaism‖ blurred 
significant distinctions between soldier and civilian since the two were fundamentally 
interdependent, making seeming nonaligned individuals and families viable targets.
356
 
Provisions seized by passively hostile civilians not only fed the raider and robbed the 
raider‘s enemy, but also demonstrated the raider‘s superiority (and, by extension, greater 
claim to political legitimacy) to his victim.
357
  At the same time, both men had come to 
understand, as most of the war‘s officers came to realize after months and years of 
attempting to occupy hostile territory, that warfare in the midst of a civilian population 
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required a certain amount of regulation over their behavior.  In his raids against Clay and 
Owsley Counties, Aikman purportedly fought in the interests of the majority of Breathitt 
County whites.  Strong was supported by Major Eversole, the Amis family and the wood 
denizens but was forced to deal with a hostile population within his own county (which 
he clearly refused to abandon) as well as the negative attention of regular Confederate 
forces, many of whom were willing to mete out the same harsh treatment against Strong‘s 
forces as Strong did toward civilians.  By early1863 Confederate units still attempting to 
take hold of the Three Forks region began performing summary executions of prisoners 
that were said to be home guards.  Confederate Colonel Jack May, considered somewhat 
the guerrilla himself, ―murdered‖ a sergeant under Strong‘s command after he was taken 
prisoner.
 358
 Some civilians suspected of resistance were executed by enlisted men 
without the orders of their superiors.
359
  
The hostile intermingling of Confederate forces from outside, native Confederate 
partisans such as Aikman, and the so-called home guards under Strong made Breathitt 
County into a veritable no-man‘s land in which neither oppositional party had a clear 
advantage over the other.  But neither Aikman nor Strong held a superior claim to 
legitimacy within their respective campaigns.  Guerrilla warfare, usually a ―weapon of 
the weak‖ directed against superior forces, became the reciprocal norm for the native 
leaders of both sides, creating a situation in which neither had a firm grasp over either 
locally recognized moral authority or state approval.
360
  Complicating matters for the 
worse was the intimacy of violence made inevitable by the insularity of primary military 
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targets.  Aikman‘s and Strong‘s parochialization of the Civil War was brought about by 
the conflation of a national cause with the concerns of local popular politics; Aikman‘s 
Confederatism combined with the South family‘s economic agenda, while Strong‘s did 
the same with the agrarian revolt embodied by the wood denizens.  Through intimate 
brutality, this disruptive conflation of the local and the national was joined, and 
complicated, by a further intermingling of the political and the personal.
361
  Even though 
Strong was a de facto victor after the official surrender of Confederate forces in May, 
1865, the struggle that had taken place in Breathitt County was left unresolved.  Despite 
having been on the war‘s winning side, Strong was no closer to having won locally 
recognized legitimacy except among the wood denizens, many of whom recognized 
Strong‘s ―chieftain‖ status for years after the war.  Worse yet for him, his martial efforts 
would scarcely be recognized as such over the following years.  The intimacy of Breathitt 
County‘s war, although perhaps no more pronounced than in many other parts of the 
South, was eventually remembered not as warfare but as feud.   
 
“Previous to that time they knew nothing of pistols and bowie-knives…”  
 
Breathitt County‘s wartime partisanship, and its obvious contrasts with what 
Michael Fellman has called ―a stand-up war with uniformed, flag-carrying massed troops 
charging one another in open combat,‖ helped to establish its image as a place of intrinsic 
irrational violence.
362
 Local histories written by men who had experienced the war 
directly, or interviewed those who did, considered the political significance of the Civil 
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War and later ―feud‖ violence in the county an obvious fact.  When war was fought so 
intimately within such a small space, the distinction between violence in war and 
violence afterward became arbitrary.
363
 But to those looking in from the ―outside world,‖ 
Americans bent upon establishing a reunited nation, the possibility that Breathitt 
County‘s wartime conditions were part and parcel of the War Between the States was 
unacceptable.  With the United States bent upon reunion, it was necessary that the equally 
noble causes (albeit one of them a courageous ―lost cause‖) and the mutual gallantry of 
the northern Virginia campaigns overshadow the horrors that took place in corners of the 
South like Breathitt County.  It and other guerillism-ridden counties‘ individual wartime 
records did not stand out among mountain counties in Kentucky or the South.  The 
violence memory was lost amid the telling of war in the mountain South and its requisite 
contrast to the ―stand-up war‖ war fought in the more storied campaigns.  A regional 
inherency obscured the various contingencies that pulled many communities into the 
Civil War.  And the spirit of national reunion depersonalized the war, separating the 
opposing causes from the individuals who had fought for them.  Internally however, in a 
community such as Breathitt County, that was a difficult, or impossible, prospect.     
The myth of a solidly Unionist Appalachia, a myth that also excluded Breathitt 
County, was therefore important for comfortable reconciliation between the sections as 
well as the expansion of discourse on Anglo-Saxon purity in the region.
364
 So too was the 
idea that the Civil War had unfortunately ―happened‖ to the otherwise isolated, apolitical 
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yeomen of eastern Kentucky, as opposed to their having taken a direct  part in it and even 
harnessed it for their own purposes, or that the type of guerrilla warfare used in the 
mountains was something essentially foreign to the greater war effort.  Attempting to 
explain eastern Kentucky‘s barbaric wartime record carried out by men like Strong and 
Aikman, journalists (writing short years after eastern Kentucky‘s ―feuds‖ had arisen to 
national attention) credited the wartime mountaineers with a combination of patriotism 
for the Union and primeval innocence. 
I am told that this lawlessness has only existed since the war; that before, the people, though 
ignorant of letters, were peaceful.  They had the good points of a simple people, and if they were 
not literate, they had abundant knowledge of their own region.  During the war the mountaineers 
were carrying on a civil war at home.  The opposing parties were not soldiers, but bushwhackers.  
Some of the best citizens were run out of the country, and never returned.  The majority were 
Unionists, and in all the mountain region of eastern Kentucky I passed through there are few to-
day who are politically Democrats.  In the war, home-guards were organized, and these were little 
better than vigilance committees for private revenge.  Disorder began with this private and partly 
patriotic warfare.  After the war, when the bushwhackers got back to their cabins, the animosities 
were kept up, though I fancy that politics was little or nothing to do with them now.  The habit of 
reckless shooting, of taking justice into private hands, is no doubt a relic of the disorganization 
during the war.
365
 
 
In a similar vein, another reported…   
In the civil war this sturdy, honest people fought for the Union; previous to that time they knew 
nothing of pistols and bowie-knives.  The local war between themselves and the guerrillas which 
raged at the time, first accustomed them to blood-shed; and the feuds then created by outrages 
perpetrated in the name of patriotism, endure even to the present day.
366
     
 
Unable to fully explain the horrible acts that had taken place the writer also incorporated 
race as a determinant.  While the ―hospitable, gentle-mannered‖ mountaineers who 
fought for the Union were of ―English, Scotch-Irish and German origin‖ the ―guerrilla 
companies which infested the country during the war‖ were composed of ―[a] second 
class… 
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…of which there are only a few in the Kentucky mountains are a sallow, gypsy-like people, of 
unknown origin [my italics]; idle, vicious, thoroughly conscienceless, and ‗far more incorrigible‘ 
than either the Indian or the negro.
367
     
 
The myth of unswerving mountain Unionism served not only to separate the Kentucky 
mountains from the rest of the state (and from the South as a whole) but also to 
depoliticize the violence that had take place there.      
Previous to the arrival of a railroad and subsequent outside interest in the area‘s 
extractable resources, these attitudes were of little concern to the people who had been 
directly affected by the local war.  People who played a major role in the Three Forks 
region‘s Civil War had a difficult time leaving the war‘s legacy behind them.  John 
Eversole was killed in retaliation for his Unionism.
368
  Although he lived to a ripe old age, 
William Strong was forced to contend with old enemies and their successors for the rest 
of his life due to his violent role in the war, a situation that was complicated by his 
continuing role as the wood denizens‘ ―chieftain‖ and his own irascible nature.  While he 
managed to outlast the war by more than thirty years his eventual death was not peaceful.  
Jeremiah South, however, did not suffer loss of power or property because of the war.  
While his sons paid the price for fighting the war directly, South was able to remain aloof 
from the war‘s uglier side, remaining in the Bluegrass and continuing to have tremendous 
sway over the actions of state government.  In 1870, after Kentucky‘s Unionists had lost 
control over state government, he was reappointed as penitentiary lessee.
369
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Aside from introducing mass violence into local society, the Civil War provided 
kinesis for a potential conflict that had existed since the county‘s founding. It exposed 
local preexistent fissures in Breathitt County that had been gaining momentum since the 
county‘s formation and provided a source of organization to the less politically and 
economically able among the county‘s citizens.  The war, and the subsequent 
legitimization provided by ―suppressing the late rebellion,‖ strengthened William 
Strong‘s informal political authority for years after the war.  For decades after 1865 
Strong remained a ―chieftain‖ and was often, through the force of his willingness to use 
force, immune to the ardor he had stirred up against himself among his fellow citizens.  
When local conflict again emerged in the county years after the war, the oppositional 
parties were arranged according to the same alliances formed originally (and perhaps 
only ostensibly) by the fight for and against the Union‘s preservation.   
However, Strong‘s ―chieftain‖ status was not without potential problems and was 
the cause of many actual ones.  Since this new political arrangement was founded in war, 
codified through martial alliances, and did not benefit from peacetime state institutions, it 
continued to depend upon violence, or the threat of violence, for sustenance.  Also, the 
―intimacy‖ of violence experienced in Breathitt County‘s guerrilla war made it difficult 
for the county‘s citizenry to dissociate wrongs committed in a state of war from 
peacetime social relations.  The violent means by which Strong and the wood denizens 
attempted to enforce the Union cause incited nothing but anger and resentment among his 
victimized neighbors.  Along with this, Strong‘s fusing of his own interests with a larger 
political cause would have caused further resentment; the war he fought did not appear to 
his neighbors as a patriotic cause.  At the same time, South‘s local regime suffered from 
158 
 
its own crisis of legitimacy.  Although Strong was never successful in effectively 
wresting control of Breathitt County away from South and his allies, the latter were 
nevertheless on the losing side of a national war.  Whatever legitimacy the Souths and 
others had fought for during the war rested only upon institutions within their own 
community, not that of the state or the nation.  Managing to maintain a modicum of 
control over local pro-Confederate government within very pro-Union surroundings 
contributed to Breathitt County‘s political insularity and perhaps made the stakes for 
control over its public institutions that much higher in the years after the war.  And 
William Strong would continue to challenge that control.  While the rest of the United 
States started a movement toward peaceful national reconciliation, Breathitt County‘s 
war had only concluded its initial phase.  
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Chapter IV 
 
―THE WAR SPIRIT WAS HIGH‖: MOB VIOLENCE IN                                                    
AN UNRECONSTRUCTED COUNTY 
 
 
 In August or September of 1874 former Union captain William Strong led an 
interracial gang of sixteen men into the streets of Jackson and forcibly took possession of 
the Breathitt County courthouse.  The upheaval had little effect within the county.  Even 
though it had caused tremendous alarm in the press, Strong‘s temporary rebellion was 
only a small, benign reminder of the violence he had instigated during the Civil War ten 
years earlier.  Strong‘s war had primarily been fought against his neighbors who 
maintained pro-Confederate sentiments during the war.  Since then, he, his Three Forks 
Battalion compatriots, and other partisans whose participation in the war was somewhat 
less official, had maintained their armed vigilance long afterward, partly out of defense 
against the enmity they had earned from their wartime enemies, but also partly out of a 
continuing sense of unity.  After the war Strong remained the ―feudal hero‖ of Breathitt 
County‘s landless population and the ―special protector of the colored race in Breathitt,‖ 
labels that illustrated the longevity of Strong‘s informal political authority established by 
his martial leadership, as well as the seemingly pre-modern nature of his influence.
370
  
These groups‘ continuing unity under Strong‘s leadership insured that Breathitt County‘s 
tenuous claim to governmental legitimacy would remain in doubt even after the Civil 
War was over.  Having been on the winning side of the Civil War, Strong was dismayed 
that the victory he helped to bring about was not reflected in his home county.  By the 
                                                 
 
370
HGH, 10 May, 1894; WPA, In the Land of Breathitt, p. 59. 
160 
 
time Kentucky‘s state militia arrived from the Bluegrass in October to restore order and 
reestablish court sessions Strong was present but no longer holding the courthouse 
hostage.  His apparent attempt at local insurrection was ultimately more a demonstration 
than an attempt to affect political change.   
 It was the company he kept during his riot that may have alarmed most 
Kentuckians at the time.  Strong‘s revolt, reported in one Kentucky newspaper under the 
headlines ―White and Negro Rioters,‖ was in the waning years of Reconstruction, a 
period of armed racial antagonisms throughout the South.
371
  Incidents like Strong‘s 
attempted insurrection were common across Kentucky in the 1870s.  When the Kentucky 
state militia was sent to Breathitt County, it was only one of three counties in the state 
simultaneously occupied by the militia or federal troops in similar situations of civil 
disorder.  Animosities between former Unionists and Confederates and violent reactions 
to the emancipation and enfranchisement of freedpeople contributed to one of the worst 
statewide records of violence during Reconstruction, especially for a border state with a 
numerically small African American population.  Before incarnations of the Ku Klux 
Klan appeared in the state as early as 1869, other ―regulator‖ groups of varying political 
adherences continued the state‘s guerilla war in a chaotic bid for political control.  The 
announcement of the U.S. Senate‘s passage of a civil rights bill (passed by the House the 
following year) provoked riots in various Kentucky counties and reawakened rumors of 
an impending race war (rumors that white conservatives had propagated since the 
announcement of the Thirteenth Amendment nearly ten years earlier).
372
  While 
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Kentucky‘s disturbances were given due notice by the press, during August and 
September the northern media‘s attention was focused more keenly on Louisiana‘s White 
League revolt.
373
  Strong‘s attempt to usurp authority in his home county was met with 
local alarm but, considering contemporaneous events, his attempt at group mayhem was 
commonplace in 1874.   
Given the changes in the state‘s politics during the latter part of the war and 
ensuing years, Strong‘s problematic postwar position was one shared by many other 
Kentuckians in all parts of the state.  He was a Unionist, fervent in his efforts to enforce 
his side‘s victory in a state that ―seceded in 1865.‖374  Kentucky‘s Democrat-controlled 
postbellum state government did little to support Unionists and did little to prevent 
violence against them, especially in the eastern half of the ―two Kentuckys.‖  Primarily, 
when also faced with violence in more densely populated areas of the state, the state‘s 
Reconstruction-era governors preferred to err on the side of enforcing the law in more 
developed, racially-mixed parts of the state (particularly the Bluegrass) rather than the 
sparsely populated mountain counties.  The latter were less likely to involve racial 
antagonism and therefore less likely to attract negative attention from the federal 
government and the northern press.  Secondarily, local law enforcement was less 
effective in these counties since violent actions were often carried out by, or at the behest 
of, local political leaders.  In many cases what was reported to the public as vigilante-
style violence was actually the enforcement of local state policies.
375
  In a state still 
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uncomfortably wedged between North and South, the depoliticization of violence was a 
popular tactic for both Democrats and Republicans who, unable to deny their state‘s 
troubles, could at least redirect the blame for them.  Violence used to suppress, or even 
assert, the civil rights of black and white Kentuckians could be written off as 
directionless havoc with no discernible meaning.         
This depoliticization had its most pointed manifestation in Breathitt County‘s 
evolution from an isolated, little-known mountain locality to the epitome of feud violence.   
As journalist and novelist John Fox, Jr. would observe early in the following century, 
Breathitt County was eastern Kentucky‘s first feud setting or, as a later survey of feud 
violence would show, the first place that the nineteenth century media would use to prove 
that a peculiar kind of white intraracial violence was endemic to the southern 
mountains.
376
  When Strong‘s attempted insurrection gained the attention of the state 
government and the national media, his incitement of mass violence was initially judged 
to be part of a larger southern problem.  In the twenty years following the war, the forms 
of mass violence employed by both Strong and his enemies, the capture of public 
buildings, rioting and lynching, were part and parcel of what the rest of the South had 
come to know as more than familiar.
377
  But while his actions, and those of Strong‘s 
                                                                                                                                                 
375
Ireland, Little Kingdoms, pp. 73-76.  In this instance the term ‗state‘ is used here not in the sense 
that Kentucky was a state within the American union of states but rather in the sense that the sociologist 
Max Weber used the term to describe an organization or body that monopolized legitimate violence within 
a given territory or, more generally, the institution through which allocations of power are mediated.  Due 
to the remarkable decentralization of government and jurisprudence in Kentucky, the individual counties, 
rather than the capitol in Frankfort, constituted true ‗states‘ in that sense of the word.  However, unless 
otherwise indicated, ―the state,‖ as used in this paper, refers to Kentucky as a whole.  
 
376John Fox, Jr. ―On the Road to Hell-fer-Sartain,‖ Scribner‟s, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3 (September, 
1910): pp. 353-355; Waller, ―Feuding in Appalachia: Evolution of a Cultural Stereotype,‖ in Billings, Mary 
Beth Pudup, Waller (eds.) Appalachia in the Making: The Mountain South in the Nineteenth Century, 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995): pp. 348, 354.  
 
163 
 
wartime opponents, were indeed motivated by the war‘s legacy, observers from outside 
Breathitt County would eventually come to disassociate the county‘s subsequent cycle of 
violence from its actual origins.  Later, however, observers noted that this event took 
place in the mountains rather than the lowland South (where one was accustomed to 
hearing of violence in the mid-1870s) and suggested the event was something sui generis, 
an event purely inherent to the mountain fastness of eastern Kentucky without relation to 
the war‘s political contingencies.   
This chapter examines Breathitt County‘s postwar instances of mass violence.  
During the war oppositional parties in the county used the war as legitimization for 
deadly force and employed it both within and outside of formal military parameters.  The 
end of the war left both sides with the same unresolved conflicts but without the 
legitimizing influence that the war had provided.  The result was the mutual employment 
of mass violence in groups organized according to wartime loyalties, demonstrating that, 
while the war‘s provision of a larger cause was convenient, it was not essential.  With the 
withdrawal of federal troops from the former Confederacy over a year in the past, 
chroniclers from both North and South were more than willing to believe that the 
politically motivated violence taking place in an isolated corner of the upper South was a 
product of internal strangeness rather than remnants of a national divide.  As a result, 
feud, a descriptor of communal violence familiar to most nineteenth century Americans, 
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supplanted the true political causes of Breathitt County‘s violence and their relations to 
the national effort to recover from disunion.  
  
“The Hypocritical Cry of Union” 
 
Kentucky‘s standing, or lack thereof, in the Reconstruction narrative has never 
reached a perfect historiographical consensus.
378
  This has been partly because of the 
disjunction between statewide and local studies.  Most historians‘ interpretations of the 
state‘s postwar politics fail to consider anything but the formal ―legitimate‖ actions of 
electorate and government as actual political action.  All of the histories of the state 
during Reconstruction deal primarily with the actions of the state government and large 
business interests, and fail to take into account the decentralized nature of governance in 
nineteenth century Kentucky that led to its complex political landscape.  As was the case 
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with many southern states during the era, the most dramatic violent actions were carried 
out in places far from the state capitol for stakes that were almost exclusively local.  
Kentucky‘s county courts held far more authority over the maintenance of law and order 
and public power associations than did Frankfort.  Whether or not the various governors 
and legislators chose to forget the memory of the war had little to do with the actions of 
judges, law enforcement officials and private citizens whose political and factional 
identities had been forged during the war were the primary actors.  In his conservative 
reading of Kentucky‘s wartime and postbellum experiences, E. Merton Coulter gave 
considerable attention to the state‘s postwar violence but attributes ―ku kluxing,‖ 
―feuding‖ and other similar incidents to ―weakened respect for state authority‖ rather than 
attempts to affect or suppress political change.
379
  But this separation of politics and 
violence is misleading.  In fact, violence was very much a means of enforcing ―state‖ 
authority as well as defying it.  The tendency to view violence as simply an outcome of a 
lack of social order does not take into account the functional nature of violent acts in 
causing or preventing political change.
380
  Violence, whether carried out by agents of the 
state, paramilitary organizations with no formal affiliation with a state, or individuals, 
was as much a means of allocating or reallocating power as were the laws passed by the 
state house and were arguably more effective in doing so.  Postwar Kentucky was a place 
defined by what sociologist Alfredo Schulte-Bockholt has called ―oligopolies [Schulte-
Bockholt‘s italics] of violence,‖ a condition in which the state no longer (in Max Weber‘s 
famous phrasing) monopolizes legitimate violence but is forced to share it with dissident 
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minority groups whose claims are popular enough to afford them a secondary measure of 
political legitimacy.
381
         
The formation of oligopolies of violence was a trait Kentucky shared with other 
southern states after the Civil War.  In many ways, however, Reconstruction-era 
Kentucky appears significantly unlike other parts of the South, especially considering its 
high level of white intraracial violence, in contrast with the more familiar southern 
history of ―white-on-black‖ interracial violence.  The state‘s white intraracial violence 
revealed internal divisions that existed in the other southern states but with a somewhat 
smaller (but not absent) African American population that reflected antebellum 
Kentucky‘s relative lack of economic dependence upon slave labor.382  ―In many ways,‖ 
says one of the few historians to address the state‘s conditions during this period, 
―Kentucky was a microcosm of conflict between the Bourbon and the yeoman, the 
slaveholder and the independent farmer, the agriculturalist and the commercialist, and the 
states‘-righter and the Unionist.‖383  In the 1860s and 1870s Kentucky was far from 
peaceful but the contrast between it and the contemporaneous records of states such as 
South Carolina or Louisiana have led some historians to make overreaching assertions 
such as the claim that ―…the problems of Reconstruction-resulting from the 
emancipation and enfranchisement of the Negroes-were settled in Kentucky more quickly 
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and peacefully than in much of the Deep South.‖384  But, as the small wealth of books on 
black Kentuckians in the nineteenth century have revealed, violence against blacks for 
political and economic reasons also defined the period.
385
  As in the formerly rebellious 
states, the suppression of black rights was a fundamental motivation for post-war 
violence in Kentucky during Reconstruction.  Between 1866 and 1870 67 black men were 
lynched for alleged crimes, usually coinciding with local or state elections.
386
  Lynchings 
were accompanied by countless other murders, arsons and harassments performed by an 
assortment of paramilitary groups and gangs and that one Reconstruction historian has 
called ―the military arm of the Democratic Party.‖387  African Americans, although 
emancipated and technically enfranchised, had to deal with what some said was a greater 
degree of race-based oppression than in the unreconstructed South.  ―The anti-Negro 
feeling,‖ remarked the Republican New York Times in 1870, ―influences political action 
more in Kentucky than in Alabama- more in Maryland than in Georgia.‖388 Post-Civil 
War Kentucky presents a case in which establishing too great of a distinction between 
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interracial violence and intraracial violence as problems in the history of the US South 
may be misleading and impractical.          
As detailed in the preceding chapter, Kentucky never seceded but, partly due to its 
1861 attempt at neutrality, the state was never fully loyal to the federal government and 
contributed large numbers of Confederate volunteers.  As the war progressed, federal 
actions such as the first and second Confiscation Acts, the presidential suspension of 
habeus corpus, and the Union Army‘s manumission and arming of African Americans 
disillusioned otherwise loyal white Kentuckians, hardened the resolve of their pro-
Confederate neighbors and generally increased sympathy for the Lost Cause.  After the 
war, the state was not subject to presidential or congressional Reconstruction, leaving the 
war torn state without significant federal oversight (although the suspension of habeus 
corpus continued long after the war by presidential proclamation, as it did in the 
rebellious states).
389
 After the war, attacks on African Americans and former Unionists 
went about with relatively little punitive action from state authorities.  Recognizing that 
conditions in Kentucky were on par with the states that were subject to federal occupation, 
Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, the leader of the US Senate‘s radical faction, 
advocated placing Kentucky under federal military authority.
390
  ―Congress has passed 
certain laws for the government of the rebels,‖ Sumner wrote in 1867.  ―Why exclude 
rebels in Kentucky or in any other state from their benefit?‖391  Kentucky‘s postwar 
intransigence was later confirmed by a historian who had no admiration for Sumner or his 
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policies.  In Merton Coulter‘s phrasing, the state seemingly ―seceded in 1865.‖392  
Decades later, C. Vann Woodward, a more moderate historian, concurred: ―Despite 
Kentucky‘s failure to secede and join the Confederacy, no state below the Ohio River 
presented a more solidly Confederate-Democratic front in the decade after 
Appomattox.‖393  
For reasons both political and constitutional, Sumner‘s suggestion was never 
enacted.  Any justification for occupying a state that had never attempted to leave the 
Union would have been met with constant protest.  Moreover, there were many white 
Kentuckians who had supported the Union cause that would have been further angered at 
the federal government for being treated like rebels after the war.  Concordantly, loyalty 
to the Union in Kentucky did not translate into an overflow of support for the Republican 
Party in the latter half of the 1860s.  Unlike other states of the upper South that had 
remained in the Union, most notably West Virginia and Missouri, Republicans were 
never able to form a majority in a Kentucky state legislature that ―clung to the decaying 
body of slavery.‖394  The Republican Party was weak in the state due to the existence of 
the moderate alliance of Democrats and former Whigs known as the Union Party until the 
latter‘s ―Unconditional Unionist‖ faction began to merge with Republicans late in the 
1860s.
395
  To ―Southern Rights‖ Democrats, a faction that initially favored secession and 
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went on to gain considerable strength in Kentucky after 1864, the Union Party was little 
different than the Republicans and represented the same threat to state sovereignty.  The 
party, said the Southern Rights Kentucky Tri-Weekly Yeoman, ―hopes to deceive the 
people by its name.  It dodges and denies, and sometimes abuses, the measures of its 
Northern ally.  This is a part of its scheme of deception and fraud upon the people.  The 
veil that covers its deformity should be stripped off.‖  By the second year of peace, the 
party that had gained its wartime strength through what the paper decried as ―the 
hypocritical cry of Union‖ was becoming little more than a foil for a thriving and 
resentful Democracy.
396
    
Government was left to these fragmented and increasingly cynical Democrats, 
and Kentucky‘s conservative turn reflected the opinions of a political party ―indissolubly 
wedded to Confederate traditions.‖397  The combination of Union Democrats and the 
party‘s ―Southern Rights‖ faction were unwilling to enforce punitive measures against 
former rebels as other states initially did.  In 1865 Kentucky‘s General Assembly restored 
political and civil rights to Confederate veterans and sympathizers.  Local and state 
elections in 1866 placed the state under the firm control of many Confederate veterans.  
Even before that election, no efforts were made for a postwar constitutional revision, 
making Kentucky the only southern state that did not revise its constitution to prohibit 
slavery (although the legislature passed a civil rights bill in 1866 that recognized the 
demise of the institution and repealed the state‘s antebellum slave codes).398  Having 
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failed to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, the General Assembly continued its 
recalcitrance over the next five years by rejecting the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments as well.
399
  The Freedmen‘s Bureau, hated by most white Kentuckians due 
to its attempts to disrupt the racial status quo, was the only materialization of federal 
intervention and never proved to be as effective as in other parts of the South.  Citing lack 
of cooperation from local governments, the Bureau was removed from the state in 
1869.
400
 
The Kentucky state government‘s greatest failure during the Reconstruction years 
was the maintenance of civil order, partly out of the government‘s limitations but also 
because the ruling Democratic majority often benefitted politically from much of the 
state‘s violence.  The constitutional power afforded to the central state government was 
particularly lacking in situations of civil disorder.  The ―Skagg‘s Men,‖ composed of 
Confederate veterans, terrorized Unionists and freedpeople in the Bluegrass‘ Marion and 
Boyle Counties soon after the war, while ―Rowzee‘s Band,‖ did the same nearby until the 
early 1870s.
401
  Less identifiable groups loosely known as ―regulators‖ roamed the state 
until 200 men collectively surrendered to state authorities in Louisville in 1880.
402
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The emergence of the Kentucky‘s Ku Klux Klan, perhaps as early as 1868, 
demonstrates that the name and iconography of an organization formed in the former 
Confederacy was attractive to white Kentuckians who wanted to perform violent acts in 
solidarity with other white southerners outside of their own state.
403
  Even after the 
organization‘s presence in the state had become a plain fact Kentuckians minimized its 
significance in order to avoid a federal incursion.  In the face of accusations that Klan 
criminals were not being properly prosecuted in his state Senator John W. Stevenson 
went to great rhetorical lengths to prove that the Klan was not ―a political 
organization.‖404  White southern resistance to the changes brought about by the Civil 
War was as virulent in Kentucky as it was in the Deep South, as Charles Sumner 
recognized.  Federal forces stationed further south after the onset of congressional 
Reconstruction were met with endless frustration in attempting to quell violence.  But as 
a state not subject to federal occupation, Kentucky was even more ineffective in doing 
so.
405
  Perhaps not surprisingly, the Ku Klux Klan had a greater longevity in Kentucky 
than in any other state in the nineteenth century.
406
  Even as late as the 1890s, gangs that 
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still claimed the Ku Klux Klan banner continued to be violently active in eastern 
Kentucky, albeit on a smaller, more secretive scale than thirty years earlier.
407
                                 
While southern Unionists of either skin color further south typically took 
defensive postures after the war, the offensive was claimed by both sides in Kentucky.  
Even in areas with larger amounts of Confederate support, former Confederates were also 
subject to harassment, forced exile or murder perpetrated by pro-Union partisans.  In the 
far western edge of the state, an area where Confederate recruitment had been strong 
during the war, Unionist vigilance committees were organized in 1865 to punish ―men 
formerly identified with the rebellion‖ upon their return.408  A ―quasi-military‖ chapter of 
the Union League in Lexington and a secretive Loyal League in Louisville each 
promoted the Republican vote through subterfuge and public shows of arms.
409
  On the 
eastern side of the two Kentuckys, an area with few African Americans and somewhat 
more consistent Unionist loyalty, armed groups identified as Loyal Leagues intimidated 
Confederate veterans and Democrats during elections.
410
 In 1874 a Republican party boss 
in the Bluegrass town of Lancaster armed a number of local African American men in an 
effort to capture the Garrard County courthouse during a hotly contested election (local 
Democrats engaged the group in a week long gunfight, prompting the arrival of federal 
troops from nearby Fort Dick Robinson).
411
 Soon after a group labeled, apparently 
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without irony, ―Negro Ku Klux‖ were said to harass local black voters who supported 
Democratic candidates in a hotly contested county election elsewhere in the Bluegrass.
412
  
In Kentucky, perhaps more than in any other southern state, collective violence was a tool 
employed almost equally by those who resisted the Civil War‘s outcome and those who 
championed it.  Legislation that officially recognized political vigilantism as a punishable 
crime was delayed for years by debates over whether or not the Klan was to be officially 
addressed in statute or if groups like the Loyal League should be included as well.
413
 The 
law that was eventually passed had little effect.  It allowed the governor to issue rewards 
for the arrest of members of groups that wore disguises in public and threatened local 
populations for any reason.  The law provided no way for local law enforcement to be 
compelled to assist in captures, an important omission since local sheriffs and constables 
were often complicit in acts of extralegal violence.  The state militia after the war was 
also of limited usefulness.  White Kentuckians were disturbed by the imposition of 
martial law during the war; accordingly, laws were passed that made it so Kentucky 
governors could only dispatch the state militia upon the request of circuit court judges.
414
   
The oligopolies of violence involving both Democrats and Republicans, and the 
relative decentralization of the Klan and other ―regulator‖ groups, worked to the 
advantage of Kentuckians who preferred to portray their state as less politically 
tumultuous than the rest of the South, particularly conservative Democrats.  Fearing the 
sort of federal intervention that Sumner suggested, Kentucky Democrats duly condemned 
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vigilante violence but, like Senator Stevenson, also went to great lengths to devalue its 
political significance.  Violent acts, even those carried out by groups rather than 
individuals, they insisted, was the work of criminals rather than political or military 
partisans.
415
  Most northerners believed, and only a few white southerners denied, that the 
Ku Klux Klan had become firmly associated with a white-dominated Democratic Party in 
the southern states at least by 1870.
416
  But, in Kentucky, there was room for a measure of 
plausible deniability.  South Carolina‘s and Tennessee‘s manifestations of the Klan came 
about through resistance to northern tyranny (and accordingly had clear links to the 
southern Democratic Party), said Louisville Courier-Journal editor Henry Watterson, 
who, as a former lieutenant for one Nathan Bedford Forrest, claimed some authority on 
the subject.  In Watterson‘s estimation the Kentucky Klan, in contrast, ―…was not an 
outgrowth of civil war.  Neither was it made up of ex-Confederate soldiers.‖  ―One third 
bully and two-thirds whisky, a thorough coward and scoundrel, it disgraced the name of 
KuKlux when it assumed it.‖417  Thus, the state‘s predominant Democratic organ, and the 
leader of the centrist ―New Departure,‖ could simultaneously decry ku kluxing while 
denying that Kentucky‘s continuing cycle of violence had any political implications.418  
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Republicans, even those who saw a clear need for federal intervention, knew that such an 
action could only hurt their already weakened standings at the polls.  Even Kentucky‘s 
leading Republican newspaper, a publication usually in the habit of connecting all things 
harmful and disorderly to the Democratic Party, attributed white intraracial bloodshed to 
―heated blood, family difficulties, old grudges, intoxication, and inborn malevolence‖ 
rather than organized reaction to post-war change.
419
  After initially reporting a ―terrible 
war between the whites and blacks‖ during the Lancaster riot, it assured readers that the 
riot was not between whites and blacks but that ―the connection of blacks in the affair is 
purely from their friendship for the contesting parties‖ (this of course omitted the fact that 
Kennedy‘s Democratic factions included only white men).420  As long as such outrages 
remained in the hinterlands and not in the streets of Louisville, Lexington and Frankfort, 
it was easy business for the state‘s urban press to frame violence apolitically for 
interested outsiders.  A northern missionary, wishing to defend Kentucky‘s continuing 
loyalty to the Republic, insisted that white intraracial violence ―mistakenly attributed to 
the Ku Klux.‖ was simply the outcome of ―family feuds,‖ a violent scenario that, as will 
be described in a later chapter, nineteenth century Americans considered insular, 
anecdotal, antiquated and very much ―beyond the polis.‖421  White Kentuckians of both 
parties were less than willing to see the state subjected to the humiliations the federal 
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government inflicted on the rest of the South, and the depoliticization of their 
acknowledged state of native violence became an important tactic.       
 Although Charles Sumner recognized that the ostensibly loyal state of Kentucky 
was in need of federal oversight, few white Kentuckians, particularly those in the 
Bluegrass, were in agreement.  In a sense, New Departure optimists like Henry Watterson 
were correct; by the end of Reconstruction, Kentucky did not have to accept the bargain 
of exchanging white dominant state autonomy for economic for the North‘s ―neocolonial 
domination.‖422  Democrats dismissed the long record of interracial and intraracial 
violence that followed the war and cited the state‘s ostensible loyalty to the Union, with 
the media tactic of depoliticizing mass violence commonly employed for this purpose.  
However, the persistence of violence could not be completely ignored in a state that 
considered itself the economic and social vanguard of the New South.  Terrorism in 
eastern Kentucky became one of the greatest challenges to the state‘s image of progress.   
 
 
“…the revolutionary and destructive designs of Radicalism…” 
 
 Even after the Unconditional Unionists joined their ranks, the position and 
ultimate importance of the emerging Republican Party in Kentucky was questionable. 
Unlike states with larger black populations, it never became an effective vehicle for 
upholding the rights of freedpeople.  The party‘s only dense core of support was 
mountainous, predominantly white, eastern Kentucky, the state‘s poorest and least 
politically influential region.  As previously described, the state‘s highlands were the 
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most consistently pro-Union section of the state, although the section‘s Unionism was 
somewhat exaggerated, leading to the political contrast with the Bluegrass that led to the 
popular belief in the two Kentuckys.  A Unionist heritage and resentment toward the pro-
Confederates who had dragged the state into an internal war made the mountains a fertile 
territory for Republican politicians in the 1860s and 1870s.  But these mountain 
Republicans were more conservative than most southern party members.  To many white 
southerners in the mountains, the Republican Party ideology of free labor was less 
important than the party‘s function as a platform of dissent against Democratic elites in 
the postwar years just as the Whig Party had served the same purpose a decade earlier.423 
Even during the hottest years of Reconstruction, most Republicans softened their images 
as former Unionists and did not take firm civil rights stances.  As was the case throughout 
most of the Appalachian sections of other southern states, Republican voters were not 
willing to support the racial reforms espoused by the national organization.  Their 1866 
state caucus went as far as opposing black suffrage, supporting the restoration of habeus 
corpus, and removal of the Freedmens‘ Bureau from the state.424  Local platforms 
became less and less related to national ones and became increasingly isolated from the 
national party, especially after the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870.  Since 
Republicans were never able to control the state government, as in the reconstructed 
states, they managed to survive the later years of congressional reconstruction without 
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causing significant resentment among voters.  Even the passage of the 1875 Civil Rights 
Bill (the action that caused the most massive retreats of white voters from the southern 
Republican Party) did not do fatal damage to the party in mountain counties, since voters 
disassociated their own local affiliates from the national ―radicals.‖425  Such was the key 
to the mountain Republicans‘ survival.    
Conservative as they were next to other party members, Kentucky‘s mountain 
Republicans still raised their Democratic neighbors‘ hackles.  White Republicans, mostly 
former Unionists, suddenly ascendant in places in which the party had only recently come 
into existence, were seen as usurpers of a local status quo that hearkened back to 
Jacksonian ideas of community autonomy.  Unlike mountain Republicans, mountain 
Democrats clung to the larger party platform.  Even though racial politics had little 
impact on local government, mountain Democrats joined their compatriots in the other of 
the two Kentuckys in ―opposition to the revolutionary and destructive designs of 
Radicalism,‖ as stated by Perry County‘s 1867 party caucus.426  Less than a year after the 
war‘s end, Confederate veterans in Floyd, Morgan and Wolfe Counties (three contiguous 
bastions of the Democratic Party in the mountains) organized to expel federal revenue 
collectors.
427
  As anti-federal and, by extension, anti-Republican and anti-black sentiment 
grew in eastern Kentucky, membership in Ku Klux Klan enclaves grew as well.
428
  While 
klan organization may have been considered only a white reaction against African 
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American suffrage and social liberty, the flagrancy with which the group grew in largely 
white eastern Kentucky suggests that the organization (or locally organized bands that 
imitated its iconography, rhetoric and practices) had a broader meaning to some southern 
white mountaineers.  Unlike Democrats in other parts of the state, party leaders in the 
eastern counties did not attempt to hide their association with vigilante groups and openly 
used it as a means of enforcing party policy and intimidating voters.  Estill County‘s state 
senator and local Democratic boss served as the head of a multi-county Ku Klux Klan 
klavern in the early 1870s, inspiring ire against recently arrived freedpeople attracted by 
employment in the county‘s iron mining industry.429  Although his membership in the 
klan in a largely Republican county was a matter of public record, his loss to a 
Republican opponent in 1872 was accredited to his public drunkenness rather than his 
politics and associations.
430
  The proliferation of klan organizations in the Kentucky 
mountains demonstrates that white mountaineers saw connections between their own 
local conflicts and the larger struggle between conservative southern whites and the 
encroachment of black enfranchisement and federal authority.
431
  After the war George 
Noble parlayed his Confederate service into a job as Jackson‘s town constable and soon 
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after one of the county‘s leading Democrats. He joined the Klan in the early 1870s and 
soon became the chapter‘s ―vice president‖; he laconically recalled years later that 
membership in the group ―gave a man great power over his neighbor.‖432  Noble‘s 
nonchalance belied the Klan‘s actual brutality; in fall, 1870 nineteen whites, all of whom 
were Union veterans or known Republicans, were killed in Klan attacks in Breathitt and 
three surrounding counties.
433
  Federal efforts against Kentucky‘s mountain Ku Klux 
Klan was practically crippled.  After the federal government took a direct role in hunting 
down mountain Klan factions, federal marshals had to patrol the Kentucky mountains 
with little familiarity with the territory and little trust from the public.  When, in 1871, 
federal marshals and US cavalrymen managed to capture four wanted klansmen near 
Breathitt County, the arrest was a rare enough federal victory to receive national media 
attention.
434
 
The position of African Americans in the mountains was even more precarious.  
Even though they lived in a region that was supposedly the most stolidly pro-Union area 
of the state, African Americans probably stood a greater chance of postwar persecution in 
the mountains than in most other sections of Kentucky.  Being few in number, 
freedpeople in Appalachia had little opportunity for sizeable organization with which to 
protect their rights to liberty, property and, after 1870, the ballot box.  The Freedmens‘ 
Bureau, never a strong presence in any part of Kentucky before its 1869 removal, was 
nonexistent in the eastern third of the state, as was any other sort of federal presence from 
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which the local freedpeople could gain support and advocacy.  Eastern Kentucky played 
host to a fifth of the state‘s interracial lynchings between 1866 and 1870, even though 
blacks made up less than five percent of most counties‘ populations.435  The loss of 
slavery had a small impact on eastern Kentucky‘s local economy and, for simple 
numerical reasons, freedpeople were not a serious challenge to white political and social 
supremacy after passage of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.  However, as it did 
in other parts of the postbellum South, emancipation in eastern Kentucky represented a 
revolutionary societal change, subverting old beliefs and hierarchies.  Breathitt County, a 
place that had never had a tremendous number of slaves, was nevertheless founded by 
slaveholders for a commercial order that had depended upon the institution before the 
war.  This commercial order was instituted by Democrats who probably saw themselves 
as little different from conservatives in other parts of the South and attempted to 
reestablish their hegemony after it was challenged during the Civil War.  Although small 
in number, the county‘s African Americans were among those who continued to 
challenge these Democrats‘ governmental legitimacy afterward.  They did so as part of a 
rare interracial alliance that embodied the most radical elements of Reconstruction.   
  
“…to rid the county of all but republicans.” 
 
In the first few years following Appomattox, William Strong‘s campaign for local 
Union victory was met with some success.  During the war Strong and his local adherents 
managed to temporarily dictate Breathitt County‘s political direction in favor of the 
Union.  Confederate recruitment had caused a drain on the county‘s men of fighting age,  
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Figure 20: William Strong, ca. 1876 
 
 
leaving behind families that may have had publicly known political leanings favoring the 
Confederate cause but were, for the most part, willing to remain neutral on election days.  
Working with allies from other more heavily Unionist neighboring counties as well as 
Breathitt County‘s landless and people of color, Strong harassed, threatened and 
killedany of the county‘s male population that he saw as an obstacle to the Union cause, 
184 
 
regardless of their affiliation with the Confederate military.  Strong‘s bullying tactics, and 
the absence of a large segment of the adult male population, provided Breathitt County‘s 
only gubernatorial defection from the Democratic Party in the nineteenth century.  In 
1863 only forty-seven men were willing to vote for the Democratic gubernatorial 
candidate, Charles Wickliffe, giving Breathitt County an overwhelming majority in favor 
of the Union candidate, Thomas Bramlette (like many other eastern Kentucky counties, 
there were no available returns from Breathitt County for the 1864 presidential election).  
Two years later the strongly Democratic county uncharacteristically polled a 212-17 
majority for the Union Party‘s candidate for state treasurer.436  Decades later, a local 
historian described Strong‘s wartime and postwar activities as a campaign to ―rid the 
county of all but republicans.‖437  
Strong may not have had any affiliation with the fledgling Republican Party that 
had begun to gain limited electoral success in many of Kentucky‘s mountain counties.  
His commander in the Three Forks Battalion, Henry Clay [H.C.] Lilly, followed his 
military service with a longstanding political and legal career, serving as circuit court 
judge for years after the war.
438
  Strong, however, apparently had no ambitions for using 
his military record or his standing among the wood denizens to run for political office, 
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and, considering the fury he had stirred among his pro-Confederate fellow citizens his 
chances of success would have been doubtful.  Like many former Unionists, Strong 
might have otherwise been content to follow his military service with a return to a 
peaceful civilian life.  However, Strong‘s relationship with Breathitt County‘s landless 
white populations and role as ―special protector‖ for the local black population suggests 
his partisan motivations may have been somewhat more complicated and long-lasting.
439
 
Strong‘s association with both groups probably originated as a wartime marriage of 
convenience.  But Strong maintained his wartime associations and never disarmed.  The 
longevity of his association with these groups suggests that Strong‘s wartime experience 
had an effect on Strong‘s ideological outlook.  One American Civil War historian has 
suggested that martial participation has a politicizing effect, prompting many soldiers to 
conflate their initial individual or communal reasons for fighting with the war‘s larger 
calling.
440
 Such politicization may or may not have happened to Strong, but the war 
clearly established him as a leader among Breathitt County‘s black and white poor.  
Nevertheless, Strong did not retreat from the ties he had formed with Breathitt County‘s 
squatter population and the county‘s small number of African Americans, forming a 
loosely organized paramilitary alliance known locally as the ―Red Strings.‖441 
For Strong‘s postwar group to be known as Red Strings is as telling as his 
erroneous wartime identification as a home guard.  The Red Strings or ―Heroes of 
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America‖ was a secretive organization of white southern Unionists who acted as spies 
and saboteurs during the war in Virginia and North Carolina.  For years after the war the 
term was later used to describe regulators who enforced Republican policy just as the Ku 
Klux Klan did for southern Democrats.
442
  The organization had a class-based 
significance, supposedly composed of ―the small farmers, tenants, laborers and rougher 
classes of the region.‖443  Aware of their secretive opposite numbers in their midst 
(particularly in the North Carolina piedmont), the Ku Klux Klan included Red Strings in 
a litany of organizations ―whose intention is to destroy the rights of the South, or of the 
States, or of the people, or to elevate the negro to a political equality with [themselves]‖ 
in an 1871 oath of membership.
444
  The longstanding identification of William Strong and 
his supporters as Red Strings is the only evidence that the term was used for groups 
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outside of the former Confederacy and that ―Red String‖ was a commonly recognized 
term for the Unionist underground.  Moreover, William Strong‘s militant group lasted 
until the 1890s, long after Reconstruction, showing that Breathitt County‘s underground 
polity lasted long after the war and Reconstruction were only bitter memories in other 
parts of the South.  And, those who interpreted Strong‘s actions against his home county 
between the 1860s and 1890s acknowledged a direct continuity between his wartime 
brutality and his later recalcitrance.  Even after Breathitt County was widely understood 
as ―feud country,‖ rife with communal violence, the very political legacy of the Civil War 
could not be fully denied.           
As the Ku Klux Klan emerged in the Three Forks region, ―a more determined 
democratic element‖ returned to electoral authority in Breathitt County after 1867.445  
Even while William Strong maintained a level of organized militancy, some of his former 
enemies attempted to maintain an uneasy peace, a peace balanced by national Union 
victory and the desire of local Democrats to return to their old political order with as little 
further damage as possible.  But the restoration of the old order probably did not come 
about entirely without violence.  The courthouse, the only seat of formal government 
immediately available, was considered the best setting to reconsolidate a modicum of the 
antebellum social order.  Conflicts born during the war were negotiated in court cases, 
both civil and criminal.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, Strong was the target of 
postwar litigation for his actions as a Union officer.  Aside from terrorizing families that 
he saw as political or martial enemies, one of Strong‘s other tactics was to commandeer 
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property, usually livestock, from farmers with purported Confederate sympathies.  
Lawsuits against Strong and his allies for the loss of property were generally 
unsuccessful, since they always testified that his wartime acquisitions were carried out 
for the purpose of ―suppressing the late rebellion.‖  Even Hiram Freeman, whose 
questionable whiteness would have eliminated him from legitimate membership in the 
14
th
 Kentucky Cavalry in many people‘s eyes, used the same defense successfully.  
Breathitt County‘s circuit trials were presided over by Republican judges elected by the 
Republican majorities in surrounding counties within the same judicial district, and they 
acknowledged Strong‘s invocation of Unionist loyalty as just cause to have the lawsuits 
transferred to federal courts in Louisville.
446
 
Strong‘s legal wranglings and his obstinate behavior in the late 1860s demonstrate 
the ways in which southern mountaineers negotiated issues of political affiliation and 
social ties in the war‘s aftermath.  The ―intimacy‖ with which the local war was fought 
extended to the postwar years as well.  During the war Strong had acted as a bandit, 
killing men with whom he had undoubtedly shared social and probably kinship ties 
before the war.  The ―strong Rebel‖ sentiment applied to the dissenting juror and others 
suggests that many in the county still considered the war as a motivation for punitive 
legal action.  However, despite his irascible behavior, at no time was Strong viewed 
simply as an abject criminal, even by the pro-Confederate Democrats who had been his 
primary targets.  The fact that Strong was a defendant in civil suits rather than criminal 
trials demonstrates that even his Democratic enemies recognized his theft of cattle as an 
act that could be construed as something beyond just a breach of the public peace, but 
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rather part of a national struggle that had been imposed upon the community from beyond 
its boundaries.  Paradoxically, the fact that he was sued at all demonstrates that his acts of 
confiscation were viewed by some (particularly the victim of his ―theft‖) as legally 
illegitimate and did not recognize Strong‘s conflation of his local malfeasances with a 
national struggle as a legitimate excuse.  Even though Strong had gone against the 
majority of his neighbors by joining the Union Army and later leading the Red Strings, he 
could not be treated as nothing more than an enemy after the war out of recognition of his 
citizenship within the community.  While his supposed ―home guard‖ had fought a far 
more brutal and punitive war in the Three Forks region than had the federal army, the 
latter was composed of ―outsiders,‖ a title that not even Strong‘s bitterest enemies could 
impose upon him.
447
    
To complicate his position, Strong was not above using physical intimidation 
during his court trials, and not without success.  After assaulting one of his plaintiffs, 
Strong was sued for $500 on the grounds of assault and battery.  Washington Noble, one 
of the jurors on the case, confessed later that he had persuaded the jury (including one 
―strong Rebel‖ who advocated imposition of the full fine) to reduce the fine to $100 for 
fear of further threats from Strong.  Noble defended his reduction of the fine as a means 
of ―soften[ing] the enemy rather than hardening him,‖ considering that, even two years 
after the end of official hostilities ―the war spirit was high and…it was pretty hard to 
enforce the civil law.‖ The defendant seemed to be somewhat willing to play along; 
                                                 
447The Appalachian understanding of the Civil War as a fight between ―outsiders‖ and organic 
communities is described in Waller, Feud…, pp. 31-33.  
190 
 
Noble recounted that after the trial Strong ―treated‖ the jury at a Jackson grocery store 
which also served as a tavern.
448
    
Even though they had been on opposite sides of the war years earlier, Strong also 
maintained peaceful relations with his cousin Edward C. Strong, a Confederate veteran 
who served multiple times as a Democratic county judge.
449
 While their shared family 
name had not been enough reason to come to an accord during the war, kinship was 
apparently enough to keep the Strong cousins on peaceful terms even when the two each 
held membership in the respective vanguards of antagonistic political factions.  Through 
ties of kinship and martial ties established during the war, William Strong was able to 
negotiate an intermediate position between Breathitt County‘s elites and the area‘s poor 
and, during elections, was respected by his Democratic adversaries as a formidable power 
broker among the county‘s landless.450  Even though the closeness of combat in 
Appalachia literally turned neighbor against neighbor and relative against relative to a far 
greater degree than in most parts of the South, strategies such as Noble‘s judicial 
compromise had a limited amount of success in attempting to return war torn localities to 
a peaceful status quo.  Attempts at compromise made after the war between former 
enemies suggest that mountaineers recognized the challenge presented by the war‘s 
complexities and were willing to react in ways other than overt retribution.        
This did not mean that Strong‘s standing in the community was fully restored 
outside of the county court.  Around the time of the trial the South family placed a $500 
                                                 
 
448
G.W. Noble, pp. 82-84.  
 
449
LCJ, 16 January, 1879.  
 
450
Census records show that in 1870 Strong had the fourth most valuable tract of land in the 
county‘s Crocketsville precinct; Breathitt County Census Records, 1870, (KDLA).  
191 
 
bounty on him.  The family‘s patriarch, Jeremiah W. South, suffered the loss of three 
sons during the war, probably at Strong‘s hands or those of someone under his command.  
Up until his death in 1880, South was far too busy being politically besieged for his 
controversial handling of the state penitentiary to return to Breathitt County.
451
  However, 
during the war Strong had proven to be the greatest threat to South‘s economic interests 
and his family.  After his last lawsuit, Strong was attacked by an unknown knife-wielding 
assailant while spending the night in a Jackson hotel.
452
    
At the same time Strong had conflicts with former allies as well.  In 1867, 
Strong‘s father, William Strong, Sr., sued Wiley Amis and Wilson Callahan for 
compensation for wartime confiscations (unlike his son, the slaveowning Strong Sr. was 
apparently a pro-Confederate or was treated as such).
453
 Around the same time, the 
younger William Strong ran afoul of Amis and Callahan over the apportionment of their 
own confiscated livestock.  The ensuing conflict was acted out in the circuit court as well 
as on the field of battle, the latter without apparent interference from local authorities.
454
  
Wilson Callahan and at least three members of the Amis family were killed, after which 
the rest of the Amises migrated to Missouri sometime before 1873.
455
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Owing to the fact that Amises, Callahans and Strongs had all been combatants in 
the Clay County Cattle War sixty years earlier, and considering that the more recent 
conflict was ostensibly started over livestock, it was widely assumed later on that this 
―feud‖ was nothing more than a continuation of ancient hatreds.456  Years later, the affray 
between Strong‘s Red Strings and his former Union allies was remembered as the 
―Strong-Amis feud,‖ Breathitt County‘s first prolonged state of factional violence since 
the Civil War and the first evidence that it was ―more fully imbued with the feudal spirit‖ 
than anywhere else in the Kentucky mountains.
457
  But since the new conflict involved 
the Ameses‘ and Callahans‘ (in E.L. Noble‘s phrasing) ―turn[ing] democratic,‖ the 
conflict could also be interpreted as the collapse of the Three Forks region‘s Unionist 
leadership.
458
  The fact that Wilson Callahan‘s son became a leading light in the 
Democratic Party and the Ku Klux Klan in the 1880s lends credence to this possibility, as 
do the broader trends in and around Breathitt County.  By the time of Strong‘s ―feud‖ 
with his former allies, the Democrats had retaken control over the county.  As landowners 
of some means the Amises and Callahan had less reason to continue their strife with the 
powers that be.  They had fought for the Union and conformed to the majority of eastern 
Kentucky‘s pro-northern inclinations, but, with the war over, they were willing to 
observe the will of the majority in their home county, a choice that echoed that of many 
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other former southern Unionists.  The greater mystery is William Strong‘s decision to 
remain defiant (on occasion) toward the Breathitt County Democrats and to continue 
organization of the Red Strings.  Hiram Freeman (who became Strong‘s farming 
employee after the war and was injured during the affrays with the Amises) and 
Henderson Kilburn remained loyal to Strong, further proving the solidity of the strange 
alliances formed during the war.  But, with men who shared his relative wealth no longer 
on his side, Strong‘s role as the ―chieftain‖ and ―special protector‖ of the county‘s black 
and white poor had become even more solidified.  Perhaps as a show of solidarity with 
the wood denizens, Strong performed mock deference to Democrats of his own social and 
economic standing, refusing to ―drink before [his] landlord‖ when one poured him the 
first dram of brandy.
459
             
Even though he remained able to negotiate a safe position between the poor and 
the landed, Strong was at the center of a roiling class conflict fueled dually by the 
expectation of an approaching railroad and an element of suppressed tension left over 
from the war.  Speculation, the motive for the county‘s founding, once again became an 
economic factor in the county.  In 1872 the Kentucky General Assembly passed a bill 
allowing Breathitt and Perry Counties‘ courts to increase the price of their ―vacant and 
unappropriated lands‖ in preparation for the unimproved lands‘ public sale.460  Edward 
Strong, serving another term as county judge, sold a large segment of the county‘s ―wild 
lands‖ around Troublesome Creek, a large tributary to the north fork of the Kentucky 
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River, to a land company from outside of the county.
461
  A number of Troublesome 
Creek‘s inhabitants, most of questionable legal status, formed an armed squad and 
dissuaded Judge Strong‘s surveyors from recording their findings.  Although they were 
unable to prevent the sale, their demonstration of armed force delayed further surveying 
of the area for years.
462
  The following year ―republicans of the war element‖ burned the 
courthouse in Jackson, possibly in order to destroy extant land grants, thereby preventing 
further speculations on unimproved land in the county.
 463  
 Landowners whose only basis 
for legitimacy lay in their ownership of the oldest land grants, like Jeremiah South, were 
dealt a serious blow and were forced to defend their ownership in court for decades 
afterward.
464
  Whatever the unknown assailants‘ goals may have been, the courthouse 
burning represented an act of defiance against the Democratic elites like Edward Strong 
and (in absentia) the South family, demonstrating that, nearly a decade after the war‘s end, 
segments of Breathitt County society refused to recognize their legitimacy as community 
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leaders.  William Strong was implicated in the arson but was never indicted.
465
  It was 
only now that the incongruity between national Union victory nearly a decade earlier and 
Democratic persistence in Breathitt County began to appear as a danger.  In 1879 Strong 
told an interviewer that, after his service in the 14
th
 Kentucky Cavalry (he gamely omitted 
his service in the more notorious Three Forks Battalion), he had ―returned home to live in 
peace‖ and had only gone after the Amises after other Breathitt County citizens had asked 
him to form a supposedly bipartisan militia to end their postwar depredation.  Strong also 
denied that he was the ―head of a belligerent faction ever since the war‖ and, even as 
class tensions mounted in the early 1870s, he maintained a low profile.
466
         
 The confrontation with the surveyors and the courthouse fire did not completely 
circumvent Judge Edward Strong‘s plans, plans that reflected the confluence of private 
and public interests upon which Breathitt County was founded.  In 1876 he co-founded 
the Troublesome Creek Boom Company, a firm established to invest in a boom across the 
tributary for the acquisition and marketing of logs felled further upstream.  The charter 
allowed for the crossing of logs owned by those outside of the company, but it also 
provided an impediment to the wood denizens‘ river traffic by recognizing only the 
passage of legally owned timber.
467
  More and more of Breathitt County‘s citizens who 
had once been at odds over the Civil War were now accepting what they considered 
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economic realities; that, as was the case before 1861, acquiescence to, and alliance with, 
the county‘s moneyed interests was in the interest of the entire population.  The 
antebellum white consensus that had only shown the smallest of weaknesses was being 
restored.   
It took a racially-motivated murder to provoke William into action.  Strong‘s 
attempt to forcefully capture the rebuilt courthouse in 1874, his first public act of 
violence in years, came soon after the tumultuous state elections, when a black man 
named William Hargis was murdered by a white man named David Flinchem.
468
  
Breathitt County‘s Red Strings did not interpret the murder as an isolated event.  With 
Hiram Freeman, Henderson Kilburn, and Freeman‘s sons William and Daniel, ―Nigger 
Dick‖ Strong (said to be a freedman that had once belonged to Strong‘s father) and ten 
other unnamed men of both races performed what one newspaper termed an attempted 
―coup d‘état,‖ taking possession of the courthouse and supposedly all of Jackson.469  
Strangely, Strong seemed to have encountered little resistance.  He, the Freemans and 
their party staged the uprising by force of arms, but there is no evidence that they killed 
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or injured anyone in Jackson, nor did he apparently attack Flinchem for killing Hargis.  
His taking the courthouse, however, demonstrated his refusal to recognize the legitimacy 
of the county‘s law enforcement and the men who controlled it.470   
In mid-September rumors spread between Frankfort and Louisville that a ―party 
of 200 desperados‖ had barricaded themselves in and around Jackson‘s courthouse.471  
Unknown parties contacted Governor Preston H. Leslie with a request to send members 
of the militia to reestablish order in the county.  Having been accused of hesitation in 
dealing with klan violence in the recent past, and alarmed by the exaggerated reports, 
Leslie dispatched a militia company to Breathitt County and requested that Republican 
Circuit Court Judge William H. Randall suspend his court dates in order to schedule a 
special session in Jackson, one that would allow no continuances.
472
  After false reports 
that the company had been attacked, Leslie anticipated further requests from Breathitt 
and sent four more companies.  By the end of September more members of the state 
militia had been sent to Breathitt County than to any of the Bluegrass counties that had 
requested intervention the previous month.
473
  
By the time of the militia‘s arrival, Strong and the Red Strings had relinquished 
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control of the town, and subsequently allowed themselves to be disarmed.
474
 Beside the 
fact that they were far outnumbered by the militia, Strong and the Freemans were less 
reluctant to give up their arms knowing that the court was to be handed over to Randall.  
As a Republican with a strong civil rights background, Randall appeared as an ally to the 
county‘s black and white Republican partisans and a meddling enemy to the Democratic 
majority.
475
  Perhaps not surprisingly, Strong himself was not indicted for his attempted 
insurrection, and the Freemans, although indicted by a county magistrate in Crocketsville 
for delinquent murder accusations, were dismissed from trial due to a lack of witnesses 
for the prosecution.
476
  Randall‘s leniency to the Strong party may have been reported to 
the state government, because shortly after the beginning of the special court session 
Governor Leslie instructed Randall to turn the court over to Breathitt County‘s 
Democratic county judge, James Back.  In November, Back indicted Strong and the 
Freemans for carrying concealed weapons, but all four men were found not guilty.
477
  But 
Back did not attempt to reverse any of Randall‘s rulings, nor did he further pursue Strong 
and the Freemans for their earlier crime.  Randall‘s dismissal altered Leslie‘s original 
plans for the special court session.  After Back was given control of the court, both 
criminal and civil cases were carried over to future court sessions against Leslie‘s 
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instructions.
478
  No one was ever indicted for Hargis‘ killing.               
Breathitt County‘s 1874 courthouse attack revealed yet another act of violence 
arising from a combination of political contingencies and local inherency, the 
reproduction of violent trends taking place all over the South.  Temporary usurpations of 
courthouses carried out to protest the actions of local government were not uncommon in 
the 1870s.  Unlike Strong‘s, the majority of recorded instances of southern courthouse 
captures or fires were carried out for counter-insurrectionary purposes, carried out by 
groups like the Ku Klux Klan to protest or prevent black participation in elections or 
jurisprudence.
479
  By temporarily taking the building in reaction to Hargis‘ murder, rather 
than simply attacking the accused killer, Strong demonstrated that the county‘s 
Democrat-controlled government was as much to blame for Hargis‘ death.  It was, 
however, a far different violent act than the destruction of the courthouse the previous 
year, an act that echoed the county‘s wartime past and the courthouse burnings that were 
a common modus operandi for both northern and southern armies.  Breathitt County‘s 
legitimacy was not the issue, but rather that of the Democrats who ran it despite their 
national defeat in the war and the injustices they allowed.  Strong considered Hargis‘ 
murder one of these injustices.       
The confluence of personal grievances, class division and racial violence 
endangered the political and social balance in Breathitt County during the later years of 
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Reconstruction, mobilizing the Red Strings and yet again calling the county‘s 
governmental legitimacy into question.  Jurisprudence in the county, carried out by men 
who had a greater stake in maintaining control of local government than in enforcing a 
peaceful social order, was consequently highly politicized.  William Strong‘s attempted 
insurrection demonstrated his refusal to recognize Democratic authority in his home 
county as well as the determination of his martially-based polity to maintain its 
continuing existence.  The leniency showed to him by a Republican with superior judicial 
authority appeared to local Democrats, particularly those in control of the county court, 
as a threat to their autonomy as well as their local hegemony, both of which had probably 
motivated them to support the Confederacy in the previous decade.  The violence that 
resulted from the next perceived threat to Democratic authority indicated the 
determination of elites to remain in control in the face of further efforts toward 
―reconstruction.‖  
 
“Any man who is elected in this county and will not take sides with the lawless will be 
killed by them.” 
 
Edward and William Strong were again embroiled in a deadly political conflict 
four years later, when a controversial election for county judge prompted a return of the 
state militia and a far greater degree of attention on Breathitt County from the national 
media.  In the end, the Red Strings‘ show of force in 1874 did little to challenge the 
county‘s Democrats and may well have hardened many voters‘ resolve against the former 
Unionists.  In the 1876 presidential election Breathitt County had its largest Democratic 
vote in its history, a showing that may very well have been partially determined by the 
201 
 
continuance of Klan activity in the Three Forks region.
480
  But William Strong was given 
a new opportunity for having greater influence in the local courthouse in 1878, when a 
newcomer to the county successfully challenged the local Democratic cabal for the 
position of county judge.  John W. Burnett, a young lawyer from Virginia, moved to the 
county in 1875, joining the local bar organization and making friends with then sheriff 
James Hagins and other Jackson residents.  Even though Burnett had a reputation for 
brashness (he was rumored to have come to Breathitt County to escape punishment for a 
duel he had won in Virginia), in the three years since his relocation to Kentucky he had 
managed to remain personally aloof from the county‘s internecine political conflicts.481  
In 1878 Burnett decided to use his popularity in a bid for county judge.  Although Burnett 
was a Democrat, as a political neophyte with no preexistent ties to the county he was an 
interloper within the local political scene, and the more stalwart Democrats nominated 
Edward Strong.  The weeks leading up to the August election were fraught with threats of 
violence; a third candidate chose to withdraw after being intimidated by unnamed parties.  
A fellow Democrat (and Klan member), concerned that the county‘s past political 
disharmonies were about to reemerge, had warned Edward Strong that ―any man who is 
elected in the County and will not take sides with the lawless will be killed by them.‖482 
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―The lawless,‖ Strong and the Red Strings, were still a political force to be reckoned with, 
both as a threat to civil order and as a considerable voting bloc.  Seeing his chance, 
William Strong readily endorsed Burnett after rejecting his cousin‘s request for support, 
giving Burnett a narrow win thanks in part to the squatters who had been angered years 
earlier by Edward Strong‘s land sale.483 Burnett‘s resultant eight vote victory over 
Edward Strong represented the first electoral challenge to local Democratic rule in the 
county since the Civil War.
484
   
Burnett‘s term in office was complicated by personal conflicts with a local farmer 
that eventually expanded into Breathitt County‘s largest instance of mob violence.  
Before his election as judge, Burnett had been deputized by Hagins in the arrest of Jerry 
Little.  Burnett was said to have acted with particular brutality in carrying out the arrest 
and, after Little‘s subsequent acquittal, the former had earned the enmity of the latter‘s 
extended family.  When Little‘s uncle, Jason Little, was arrested months later for 
murdering his wife, Burnett had him arrested and transferred to the city jail in Lexington 
more than one hundred miles away.  But after being narrowly elected with the support of 
a controversial quasi-bandit like William Strong, local Democrats interpreted his arrest 
and removal of Jason Little as politically-motivated affronts.  When Little was returned to 
Jackson for trial in late November, a mob led by John Aikman and fellow Confederate 
veteran Alfred Gambrel amassed outside of the jail in an apparent threat to forcibly 
release Little.  The mob was confronted by William Strong, the Freemans, Henderson 
Kilburn and approximately a dozen other Red Strings.  The ensuing street fight resulted 
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in the shooting deaths of Daniel Freeman and Tom Little (a cousin of Jason Little who 
William Strong later said had threatened to lead ―two hundred Kuklux‖ from neighboring 
Wolfe County).
485
  Calm was temporarily restored.  However, as Burnett was walking to 
the courthouse to convene court with William Randall the following day, Gambrel fatally 
shot him, prompting Randall to flee the county.
486
 
At first, the homicide of a county judge was not enough to persuade Governor 
James McCreary to take executive action in Jackson as Governor Leslie had done four 
years earlier, despite Judge Randall‘s constitutionally-mandated official request that he 
do so.  Reluctant to dispatch the militia, McCreary had initially dismissed the reports of 
rioting in Jackson as exaggerations.  The governor had considerations regarding the use 
of the militia that his predecessor had not been obliged to deal with, considerations that 
made him hesitant to dispatch militia units far away from the cities of the Bluegrass.  In 
1877 Louisville had been the scene for one manifestation of the Great Railroad Strike, 
bringing commerce to a halt and resulting in massive property damage (as well as a 
disturbing new cooperation between working class white and blacks).
487
  Kentucky‘s 
militia law was quickly revised later in the year, and in early 1878 the ―Louisville 
Legion,‖ an urban militia unit that had not been mustered since the close of the Mexican 
War, was revived.  Bearing in mind the political ambiguity that the State and home 
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guards represented during the war, the Legion was captained by both Confederate and 
Union veterans (although the former outnumbered the latter four to one).
488
   
Considerations of a blue and gray past notwithstanding, the state‘s new military 
arrangements represented a stark divergence from the mentalities and strategies that had 
dominated military life in the state since the war.  As an economically progressive 
southern state, it was deemed important that Kentucky use its military to protect its urban 
commercial interests from further labor disruptions.  With the rural disorders of 
Reconstruction resistance apparently at an end, the Bluegrass and urban middle class now 
recognized that threats to civic order in the state would now be more likely to come from 
the cities than the countryside.  Klan and regulator violence had ebbed in the closing 
years of Reconstruction, and Kentuckians, particularly those of Henry Watterson‘s 
commerce-minded New Departure school of thought, were reluctant to believe that 
violence born of the war could still menace the state.  As an economically progressive 
southern state, it was deemed important that Kentucky use its military to protect its urban 
commercial interests from further labor disruptions.
489
  In 1874, William Strong‘s 
courthouse capture made Jackson one among a number of trouble spots in Kentucky.  In 
contrast, Breathitt County in 1878 did not appear to urban Kentuckians as a continuation 
of old problems with violence and disorder, but rather an unfortunate distraction from 
newer ones.   
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But these same economic considerations also depended upon good relations with 
northern business interests.  In that light the deluge of condemnations of the Jackson 
situation from the North‘s still-vengeful newspapers was still stinging.  The Republican 
New York Times, almost as eager to report bad news about white southerners as it had 
been during the worst years of Reconstruction reported that, thanks to Kentucky‘s lax law 
enforcement, ―[n]ot one man in 10 who commits murder in Kentucky is hanged.‖490  ―It 
may, perhaps, occur to Governor McCreary that it is disgraceful to have such scenes of 
violence and bloodshed enacted in a sovereign state of the Union,‖ the usually apolitical 
New York Herald crowed.  ―but in any case the need of preserving the ‗prominent citizens‘ 
of even so small a place as Jackson should move him to action.  The State of the ‗Mill 
Boy of the Slashes‘ [a nickname for the late Henry Clay] has no ‗prominent citizens‘ to 
spare just now.‖491  Conscious of criticism from the northern press as well as Kentucky‘s 
papers, and equally conscious of the ramifications of a public official‘s violent death, 
Governor McCreary reluctantly dispatched the Legion to Jackson in early December.
492
    
Soon after their arrival, Judge Randall returned and court was reconvened, only to 
have proceedings interrupted by political maneuverings.  After Randall convicted Jason 
Little for his wife‘s murder, the Republican judge was removed from the bench and 
replaced by Louisville probate judge William Jackson to try the ―conspirators‖ in 
Burnett‘s murder.  Randall‘s party affiliation and his flight from the county a month 
earlier made him too controversial a figure to try the case.  Jackson convicted Alfred 
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Gambrel for Burnett‘s murder, while Wallace Maguire, the only one of Strong‘s allies to 
be put on trial, was convicted for the killing of Tom Little.
493
  Aikman had fled the 
county on the advice of a Klan collaborator but was later captured and sentenced for 
conspiring to murder Burnett.  His killing of Daniel Freeman the previous day was 
ignored.
494
  Before his capture, letters that were supposedly composed by Aikman were 
printed in Kentucky‘s predominant Bourbon Democrat paper accusing William Strong of 
using the chaotic situation in the county for material gain.
495
  In recognition of their role 
in attempting to uphold Democratic control over the Breathitt County court, the 
influential South family eventually interceded on Aikman‘s and Gambrel‘s behalf, and 
they were pardoned.
496
  Breathitt County‘s old Democratic order was now truly restored, 
partly due to its own actions but not without help from the Kentucky state government 
and the figures in the other half of the two Kentuckys who had always guided the county 
from afar.        
Upon their return to the Bluegrass, the Louisville Legion was welcomed in 
Frankfort with a brass band and a welcome address by Governor McCreary, who cited 
the Second Amendment‘s call for a well regulated militia and commended their defense 
of the ―good name and fame of Kentucky‖497  In his message to the Kentucky General 
Assembly late in 1879, McCreary declared the state government successful in pacifying 
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Breathitt County, stating that, ―no county is more orderly or peaceable than Breathitt.‖498 
McCreary‘s pronouncement of success failed to acknowledge that, less than a month after 
the Louisville Legion withdrew from Jackson, the log building used as Breathitt County‘s 
jailhouse had been destroyed by a mob in apparent reaction to the convictions of Little, 
Gambrel and the other conspirators in Judge Burnett‘s murder.499  The destruction of the 
jailhouse, in contrast to the Republicans‘ destruction of the courthouse six years before 
which called the county itself into question, protested what Democrats considered the 
wrongful arrests and convictions of their own by higher state authorities.  The following 
May a Confederate veteran named Andrew Carpenter was killed in ambush while 
working in his field.
500
   
With Reconstruction newly over and the reins of southern self-rule returned to 
Democratic white hands, white intraracial killing was suddenly quite strange, even with 
Kentucky‘s egregious statewide repute.  One national publication judged Breathitt 
County‘s troubles to be the outcome of ―an imperfect organization [resulting] from the 
practical isolation of the people, the unlettered authorities, and the absence of schools and 
moral example‖ as well as the lack of contact with ―more advanced communities,‖ a 
summation happily echoed in the Bluegrass, the collection of ―advanced communities‖ 
that had only just begun to eye the mountains‘ untapped natural wealth.501  The 
distinctions between the two Kentuckys, and the larger implications that they would soon 
reflect upon the rest of the South, had become more visible because of Breathitt County, 
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and it would not be long before any and all troubles in the southern mountains would be 
offhandedly defined as communal rather than political.           
 
“…a better, healthier public sentiment”   
 
Andrew Carpenter‘s end was exemplary of the Red Strings‘ change in tactics after 
1878.  Strong was never again presented with the possibility of challenging his county‘s 
Democratic cabal through legitimate means, and his unwillingness to accept their victory 
was always made known.  If the deaths that resulted from his support of Judge Burnett 
had proven anything to Strong, it was that the benefits of his own public displays of force 
were limited and, in the end, Kentucky‘s state government would always support his 
Democratic enemies.  Also, as the Ku Klux Klan‘s influence on local government grew, 
guided by the son of Strong‘s former ally Wilson Callahan, so too did their capacity for 
mass violence.  For this reason, Strong chose to fight their authority through individual 
―bushwhacker‖ killings rather than through public displays of force on the streets of 
Jackson in the light of day.  Over the next few years Henderson Kilburn, broadly 
estimated to be the deadliest of the Red Strings, supposedly killed nine men in this 
manner.  Violence in Breathitt County was still as ―intimate‖ as it had been during the 
Civil War.  Even if Strong and Kilburn could be implicated in these homicides, most men 
in Breathitt County knew each other by name, face or reputation.  Strong‘s new, more 
secretive, tactic guaranteed that witnesses and jurymen would be wary of being the next 
victim.   
The Red Strings‘ continuing violence prompted the first major reprisal from his 
enemies in the spring of 1884 in a way that once again reflected trends elsewhere in the 
209 
 
South.  In January Henderson Kilburn and Ben Strong, probably a former Strong family 
slave or a descendant thereof, were arrested for the murder of a purported klansman 
named William Tharp.  After their arraignment both men were kept in the jailhouse 
without bail.  One night the following April they were forcibly extracted from the jail by 
approximately fifty Ku Klux Klansmen and hanged side by side from the courthouse 
portico.
502
  Just as William Strong‘s capture of the courthouse ten years earlier 
represented the Red Strings‘ attempt to reaffirm their wartime victory in Breathitt County, 
the hangings of two of their number in front of the same courthouse demonstrated that the 
Red Strings‘ crimes were in violation of the local commonweal.  In the minds of many 
locals, the Democrats‘ mass ―counterrevolutionary instrument‖ was no less brutal than 
their enemies‘ crimes in past years.503  Strong, Kilburn and other Red String affiliates had 
remained free from prosecution for their crimes for years because of juries‘ fears of 
reprisal.  The murder of Judge Burnett and the lynchings nearly six years later showed 
that local Democrats had come to the realization that extralegal violence was necessary 
for the maintenance of the status quo as it had for the Red Strings‘ attempts at armed 
rebellion.  It also represented the fortification of Breathitt County‘s commercial order, 
one that would insure the triumph of the county‘s landowners in bringing it economically 
closer to the other half of the two Kentuckys.  Having witnessed various small crimes 
supposedly brought about by alcohol and isolation since arriving in Jackson a year earlier, 
Methodist missionary and Bluegrass native John J. Dickey assured himself that Kilburn‘s 
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death reflected ―the sentiment of the county‖ and ―a better, healthier public sentiment.‖  
Even though he was evidently unsure of their identities, Dickey felt comfortable that 
―these regulators [were] of the better class.‖504         
The hangings proved to have their intended effect.  The lynching of his most 
brutal compatriot and the black man who shared his surname marked the end of William 
Strong‘s more aggressive efforts against Breathitt County‘s Democratic elites.  Even 
though rumors circulated that he would avenge Kilburn‘s and Ben Strong‘s deaths, 
William Strong simply requested that their bodies be sent to him so that they could be 
―both buried in the same grave on his farm among their friends.‖505  Until his death in 
1897, Strong remained the ―chieftain‖ of the county‘s squatters and, presumably, the 
dwindling black population as well.  But he would no longer attempt insurrections, act as 
a public endorser or enforcer during elections or order the assassinations of his political 
enemies.  His informal political authority would now take a defensive, rather than 
offensive, stance against the changes brought on in the years since the Civil War.  Any 
serious challenge to Democratic authority in Breathitt County, at least in the violent form 
that Strong preferred, had now come to an end.       
In many ways, this act of mass violence resembled many others that would be 
reproduced in other parts of the South, the ―outside world,‖ in the following decades.  In 
violent synchronicity with much of the rest of the South, Breathitt County did not 
experience its first lynching until some years after the end of Reconstruction.  Even 
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though the sparsely populated mountain county was never subject to the regulatory 
presence of federal troops or the political sea change of black suffrage, the region-wide 
phenomenon appeared there at roughly the same time it began to become prevalent in 
other southern states.
506
  The lynching of the two men at the county‘s seat of government 
indicated that their deaths were not only the will of the majority of the county‘s 
population, but also that the lynching had been acted out in the interest of law and order, 
a law and order determined by the wealthier landowners who headed the local 
Democratic Party and the county‘s Ku Klux Klan faction.507  The act gained its 
legitimacy by being carried out by a white male crowd, a ―majority‖ of the county‘s 
population.  In its highly ritualized performance it was communal but, like many other 
southern lynchings of the era, it was overtly political as well, since it was directed at 
those who had challenged the prevailing political party.
508
  In most of its characteristics it 
was an event inherent to its time and place.  However, the peculiar contingencies of life 
in Breathitt County gave this lynching its most unusual trait: the biracialism of its victims.  
The double lynching of the freedman (or freedman‘s descendant) and the white squatter 
reflected the unusual postbellum alliance of white and black that William Strong‘s Red 
Strings embodied.  But neither interracial paramilitary union nor the broader phenomenon 
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of lynching fit easily into the interpretation of violence embodied by feud.  The 1884 
lynching would go on to be the most forgotten recorded incident of violence in Breathitt 
County‘s history. 
  
“…there is no distinction between races up in that country…” 
 
The mass violence witnessed in Breathitt County during, and in the wake of, 
Reconstruction was obvious at first glance.  When William Strong‘s courthouse capture 
made national news in 1874, the Republican New York Times lambasted, not Strong or 
Breathitt County, but the state of Kentucky as a place where political disputes continued 
to slow the state‘s postwar development.  Continuing political scuffles were a natural 
outgrowth of the creation of ―pauper counties,‖ the result of partitioning its counties into 
smaller and smaller units for electoral purposes while simultaneously creating smaller, 
poorer tax bases and ―a Democratic luxury for which the remainder of the state must pay.‖  
Yet at the same time, the correspondent also blamed the county‘s inhabitants for their 
troubles, not in the context of their being mountaineers but rather in their identity as 
white Kentuckians.  ―Too much attention to politics and not enough to corn,‖ said the 
Times reporter, ―has brought want to many households, even in this corn-producing 
region.‖509  Concurrently, a Republican Cincinnati newspaper reacted to the governor‘s 
dispatch of the state militia by speculating that he only did so for fear that ―frequent 
outbreaks in the South, especially at this time, will injure the prospects of Democratic 
candidates in the North at the approaching elections,‖ or that this and other contemporary 
outbreaks would result in federal involvement.  ―This modern activity of Governor Leslie, 
after hesitating so long with the Ku Klux raiding within sight of his residence, it is said, is 
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the result of his fear that Uncle Sam will suppress the lawlessness in the State if the 
governor is unable or unwilling to do such work.‖510     
The first application of feud to Breathitt County was used by Democrats to parry 
these attacks.  When news of Breathitt County‘s troubles were as yet rumors in the 
Bluegrass and beyond, the Kentucky Yeoman, the state‘s preeminent Bourbon paper, was 
already dismissing the subsequent reports.  ―The troubles in the county of Breathitt,‖ it 
wrote, ―have been much exaggerated, especially by the radical press of Louisville and 
Cincinnati.‖  The courthouse capture was simply the ―outgrowth of an old feud between 
two families of the county‖511  The Yeoman‘s primary adversary, the Republican 
Louisville Commercial, used the same familial language to attack the remains of 
Kentucky‘s planter elite.  ―Men who carry on a controversy of open violence for years 
always involve others in their difficulties, especially if they belong to the so-called 
‗respectable families,‘ families of ‗high social position.‘  There is no more dangerous or 
delusive influence exercised in society than that of ungentlemanly gentlemen and 
families of mythical respectability, who strut about with a package of penitentiary morals 
hidden under silk and broadcloth.‖512   
 Both of these Bluegrass newspapers‘ accounts of the 1874 courthouse capture 
distorted the actual event but nevertheless demonstrated the strength that the language of 
the familial held for their own antagonistic purposes.  While the Yeoman used family to 
dissociate the incident from contemporary ku kluxing and such, the Commercial used the 
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language of kinship to denounce what it saw as the harmful remnants of the South‘s 
ancien régime.  Feuds, as they were understood in a nineteenth century context, were a 
family-based phenomenon associated with the southern aristocracy.
513
  The fact that the 
courthouse raid was not acted out by a family group, of the planter class or otherwise, 
was immaterial to either account; both accounts, however, served the papers‘ more public 
agendas.  In further coverage, the Commercial scolded the Yeoman for failing to compete 
with smaller ―stiff Democratic paper[s]‖ in the amount of coverage it gave to the 
incidents, implying that the Yeoman was insensitive to the state‘s problems with civil 
unrest.
514
  Regardless of the actual details, Kentucky‘s most partisan members of the 
fourth estate saw Breathitt County as a foil for larger political purposes.   
It became the task of Henry Watterson‘s occasionally centrist Louisville Courier-
Journal to diminish Breathitt County‘s political significance.  The paper initially 
acknowledged the Red Strings‘ interracial makeup, entitling one of its earliest articles on 
the incident ―White and Negro Rioters in Breathitt,‖ a headline that reflected the 
incident‘s similarity to contemporary events in other parts of the state (although the 
newspaper never referred to Strong‘s band as ‗Red Strings‘ until the 1890s when the 
title‘s political significance was dying in popular memory).515  The Courier-Journal 
willingly grouped the courthouse capture with more blatantly race-based crimes in 
Kentucky that had taken place a few weeks earlier.
516
  However, the Courier-Journal was 
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more intent on distancing Breathitt County from the rest of the state and, as was 
customary in its and other papers‘ treatment of their state during Reconstruction, 
depoliticizing the use of violence.  Rather than placing the county‘s disorder within a 
larger regional or statewide political context, the Courier-Journal highlighted the 
county‘s isolation.  Breathitt was a ―beautiful, wild semi-barbarian county.‖517  The 
racially amorphous Freemans were briefly identified as having been ―the terror of this 
county‖ since the Civil War but were scarcely given any other specific mention in the 
interest of diminishing the story‘s potential for racial significance.518  After the arrival of 
the state militia, the paper‘s coverage of Breathitt County dwindled until the only subject 
of interest was the militia‘s day-to-day activities, which were apparently without incident; 
the paper‘s final story dealt mainly with a baseball game played between two of its two 
companies, complete with box scores.
519
  The Courier-Journal‘s primary objective in its 
coverage of the story seemed to be the maintenance of a valuable middle ground between 
Kentucky‘s left and right flanks.  Other than placing implicit blame on the small number 
of people of color involved in the courthouse incident, Watterson‘s paper was less willing 
to make hay out of it than Republican newspapers but still willing to address the story to 
a greater extent than the Yeoman.    
In 1878 Watterson‘s paper was still acutely sensitive to Kentucky being portrayed 
as a place of political and racial discord and, for a time, acknowledged the Jackson riot‘s 
larger political meaning.  After the Louisville Legion was sent eastward, the Republican 
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Cincinnati Daily Gazette announced, ―At the last State election [Breathitt] county was 
Democratic by a vote of nearly three to one.‖520 When news arrived that many of the 
participants were of the same party of former Unionists that had captured the courthouse 
in 1874 editor Henry Watterson countered the paper‘s insinuation with the subheading 
―Bad News for Deacon [Richard] Smith [the Daily Gazette‘s editor]- the Mobs Said to be 
Loyal [Unionist] Bushwhackers.‖521  The fact that the riot had multiracial participation 
did not mean it was racially motivated, reasoned the Courier-Journal, since Breathitt 
County‘s population included only thirty-one black men over the age of twenty-one.  
―Those figures are sufficient to convince even that truly good and pious man, Deacon 
Richard Smith that the present trouble is not one of races, though one of the killed and 
one of the wounded are negroes.‖522  Watterson was determined that the latest riot was 
not to be pointed to as a persistence of rebellion in Kentucky, and went to lengths to see 
to it that the blame for the riot was placed upon the former Unionists, while ignoring the 
fact that their adversaries were led by Confederate veterans John Aikman and Alfred 
Gambrel.
523
  Even though it was the latter who had ambushed the county judge, 
Watterson distorted the facts by saying that Burnett was killed due to ―his being a 
Democrat.‖524         
Just as it had four years ago, however, the Courier-Journal changed its portrayal 
of Breathitt County after other papers‘ interest flagged, accentuating the distance between 
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the two Kentuckys and depoliticizing the county‘s violent roots.  On the same day the 
New York Times unfavorably compared ―the desperadoes who infest the ravines and hills 
of Breathitt‖ to the Ku Klux Klan, the Courier-Journal described Breathitt County as a 
savage environment with ―meadows that were stripped of all pastoral suggestions‖ and ―a 
land which did not overflow with honey and where civilization was but a puling strangled 
infant.‖525  When reports of a courthouse riot in neighboring Perry County reached 
Louisville shortly after the Louisville Legion‘s return to the Bluegrass, Watterson curtly 
remarked: ―The people in the mountain counties need civilizing.‖526   
Watterson‘s epilogual assessment of the eastern half of the two Kentuckys did not 
explicitly employ feud, as he and other observers would later, to describe Breathitt 
County and its environs.
527
  It did, however, demonstrate a commonly held determination 
to depoliticize a blatantly political problem in his state.  Even when the fact that violence 
was born out of competition between political parties could not be denied, the 
significance of race could be.  As the harsh memory of Reconstruction became more 
distant, even northern members of the media followed suit.  One delusional northern 
newspaper went as far as to explain that ―there is no distinction between races up in that 
country,‖ a contention thrown into doubt by John Aikman‘s recorded announcement that 
he intended to ―take a dead nigger‖ immediately before shooting Daniel Freeman on the 
streets of Jackson in 1878.
528
  The prewar assumption that ―Alleghania,‖ and by 
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extension Breathitt County, was a purely white section of the South was reestablished and 
its African American residents forgotten.              
Just as Breathitt County‘s ―intimate‖ warfare fit uneasily into the more popular 
―stand-up war‖ interpretation of the American Civil War, it seems even stranger within 
the larger narrative of Reconstruction.
529
  Indeed, Breathitt County‘s Reconstruction era 
troubles did not have the same definite attachment to race as did those of the formerly 
rebellious states.  The entire state of Kentucky remained unreconstructed after the war, 
and was consequently allowed a postwar white sovereignty not immediately allowed to 
the rebellious states.  The emancipation and enfranchisement of the county‘s black 
minority never would have presented the same challenge to white supremacy that it 
would have in Louisiana or South Carolina.  But, for a brief moment it appeared as 
something conceivably more dangerous in the minds of white Kentuckians.  Even in an 
overlooked corner of an officially un-rebellious state, it played host to the greatest source 
of anxiety among elite whites: the armed union between freedpeople and poor whites that 
suffused the aspirations of many southerners but proved tenuous and temporary in other 
parts of the South.
530
  Unlike most white southerners, the Red Strings were willing to 
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overlook racial difference in the interest of forming a militant class solidarity.  Seeing 
little threat from black political participation, the whites among their number could not 
fall prey to shibboleths of race employed by conservatives in other parts of Kentucky, 
and the South at large, to woo white dissenters into the Democratic fold.  The fact that the 
interracial Red Strings were willing to take a violently offensive posture was the seeming 
fruition of what conservative Democrats feared most.  The types of mass violence used 
by the Red Strings and their enemies-the capture and destruction of public buildings, riots 
and lynchings- were used elsewhere in the South as well.   
Breathitt County‘s purported strangeness alongside contemporary violence in 
Kentucky and the rest of the South was not only due to its inherent qualities.  It was also 
a product of white Kentuckians‘ broader effort to depoliticize their state‘s native turmoil 
in the face of northern/Republican censure, censure that was part and parcel of 
Reconstruction.  Essentially, Breathitt County‘s connections to Reconstruction in the 
―outside world‖ were evident, both in events that took place in the county and they ways 
they were used by outside observers.  The Democratic hegemony over Breathitt County, 
imposed through violence, was politically advantageous to Kentucky‘s state government 
so interference in local matters was limited to the two-month imposition of martial law in 
1878 and 1879 (for instance, the 1884 lynching was ignored by the state capitol even 
though it happened after Kentucky passed anti-lynching laws).
531
  The idea of the 
peculiar southern mountaineer, and the beginnings of the use of feud to describe his use 
of violence, belied these connections.  By using the term, with its implied allusion to pre-
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modern antiquity, observers from both the North and the South could dismiss the modern 
political implications of violence in the mountainous hinterlands of the South, beginning 
the process of placing the area in the past and ―beyond the polis.‖532  Ultimately, the 
image of the bestial mountaineer was more palatable, and more politically advantageous, 
than the unrepentant southern rebel to an American public that preferred to believe that 
the South had truly been reconstructed.         
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
―KEEPING UP THE OLD TROUBLE‖: THE PAROCHIAL, THE PAST AND THE 
DEATH OF A FEUDAL HERO 
 
 
On May 9, 1897, while he and his grandson were riding home from a grocery 
store on a pair of mules, former Union Captain William Strong was shot to death.  
Though few of his neighbors in Breathitt County would have doubted that Strong would 
come to a violent end, even at seventy-two, most would have expected it to have come 
years earlier when Strong had put himself in harm‘s way in the streets of Jackson, 
publicly presenting himself as the leading dissenter against the county‘s Democratic 
majority.
533
  Nor would the manner of his killing- five to seven rifle shots fired by a 
hidden gunmen- have surprised them since it was almost identical to murders he himself 
was said to have engineered years earlier.  His death came less than a month after making 
peace with Edward Callahan, an old antagonist with high positions in the local 
Democratic Party and Ku Klux Klan.
534
  Strong was said to have recently joined his wife 
in regular church attendance and had put aside his old petulance out of acceptance of his 
own dotage if not his sincere repentance.  Whatever ongoing alliances he may have 
maintained with Union veterans, African Americans or local squatters were not 
mentioned in the press reports that announced his death.  Since Strong had first grabbed 
the Louisville Courier-Journal‘s attention in 1874, other areas of the Kentucky mountains 
had erupted with ―feuds‖ in the 1880s, but, for the most part, these conflicts had 
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subsided-though not without giving eastern Kentucky an indelible infamy for lawlessness.  
Accordingly, the same newspaper that, in 1878, branded Strong a ―Loyal [i.e., Unionist] 
Whangdoodle,‖ who exhibited the ―Wonderful Effect of the Firing on Fort Sumter‖ now 
poignantly lamented the passing of an aged ―mountain fighter‖ who was ―one of the most 
picturesque characters in Breathitt County.‖535  Many Kentuckians probably considered 
William Strong‘s death the turning point from age-old primitivism to peace and progress.  
 Strong‘s death may well have had more to do with old hatreds than it did with 
current events.  The county in 1897 was far different than it had been when Strong began 
his violent campaign against the county‘s Democrats decades earlier.  During the 1880s 
Breathitt County was a prime target for Protestant missionaries who equated their 
Christian mission with educational advancement and greater inclusion in the national 
economy.  The railroad arrived on their heels in 1889 and, over the next few years, edged 
closer to Jackson as citizens were obliged to cede land, hire on with new timber and coal 
ventures or get out of their way.  In the minds of progressive optimists this economic 
integration was the surest treatment for the county‘s violent past and, to many within and 
outside of the notorious county, these predictions seemed to be coming true.  Like most 
mining and timber locales in the nineteenth century, Breathitt County continued to be a 
decidedly rough-and-tumble locale but, by the beginning of the 1890s, past troubles 
between organized factions had seemingly ceased to appear.  William Strong was 
apparently the last remainder of Kentucky‘s ―feudal‖ past. 
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But his death may also have had as much to do with the turn-of-the-century 
present as it did the past.  The political complexities that had produced a man like 
William Strong were larger than most Kentuckians and Americans preferred to consider.  
He was a landowner of considerable wealth by Breathitt County‘s impoverished 
standards and potentially had much to gain from the railroad‘s arrival.  But he was also 
an ally and defender of the county‘s landless population, whose livelihood was threatened 
by Breathitt County‘s new fortunes.  As a ―leader among the ex-Federal soldiers and a 
strong Republican,‖ Strong‘s divergent interests reflected the conditions faced by 
Kentucky‘s Republican Party as a whole: a party that had, since the war, had its greatest 
appeal among the state‘s black and white poor who used it as a mechanism for fighting 
the state‘s local Democratic machines.536  But over the course of the 1880s the party had 
also begun to seek out alliances with corporations intent upon exploiting eastern 
Kentucky‘s coal and timber.  For both reasons, most eastern Kentucky counties retained 
an unyielding loyalty to the party throughout the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century.  While remembered as a ―strong Republican,‖ a mark that placed him within a 
context with nationwide familiarity and political significance, the same obituary gave him 
a title laden with strangeness to the late nineteenth century reader: ―feudal chieftain.‖  
Short years after the Louisville Legion left Breathitt County in 1879 incidents arose in 
various parts of eastern Kentucky that came to be similarly referred to as feuds.  By 1890, 
the ―mountain feud‖ was widely believed to be a phenomenon specific to the 
mountainous section of the state (over the passage of years it would eventually be 
assumed rampant throughout southern Appalachia).  Although virtually all of the feud 
conflicts arose from competition for electoral power, by 1890 they were assumed to be 
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primordially distinctive to the ―mountain white‖ regardless of intent.  By the time of 
William Strong‘s death the image of the mountain feudist was well-ingrained in the 
national imagination and, consequently, his life and death were defined as such, as were 
virtually all reported violent incidents in the southern Appalachians for years.   
This chapter explores the changes Breathitt County underwent during the years 
when feud violence in eastern Kentucky was first contributing to the construction of 
Appalachia, a construction that involved a reputation for violence as well as a marked 
political divergence from most of the white South.
537
  During the 1880s it was becoming 
apparent to many Americans that the mountains of eastern Kentucky contained a 
population unlike any other, a population defined chiefly by its isolation and inability to 
conform to modern norms.  Among other traits, eastern Kentuckians did not join other 
white southerners in flocking to the Democratic Party but, instead clung to the 
Republican banner that represented their wartime Unionism.  But this political 
crystallization coincided with an eruption of white intraracial violence that launched the 
longstanding association between southern Appalachia and feud.  The mountain white 
was judged to be a member of a parochial political culture and no longer a valid 
republican citizen.  In this light, his violence was of a communal, rather than a political, 
nature.  The memory of William Strong, and the violent local history that he represented, 
was summarily depoliticized.       
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“It is current belief that the mountains of Kentucky are cradles of illiteracy and 
lawlessness…” 
 
 As detailed in previous chapters, the strength of the antebellum Whig Party had 
translated into adamant Unionism in most eastern Kentucky counties during the Civil 
War and a fertile field for the growth of the Republican Party afterwards, especially when 
candidates were willing to ignore the national platform‘s emphasis on civil rights for 
African Americans.
538
  Aside from the business-minded Republican coteries in urban 
areas, by 1900 the party had become almost exclusively peopled by either increasingly 
disfranchised African Americans or white mountain men.  After Kentucky‘s postwar 
readjustment, the party found the same source of growth as it did in other economically 
comparable pockets of the South.
539
  For many poor whites (and eastern Kentucky was 
consistently the state‘s poorest area) the Republican Party offered a clear alternative to 
the bourbonism that overtook the Democratic Party after Reconstruction.
540
  A political 
study of the state based upon exhaustive county-by-county electoral surveys concluded 
that, in the last decades of the nineteenth century, ―poor whites and poor blacks,‖ in 
Kentucky ―voted as they had grown up to vote- Republican.‖541  In 1880 Kentucky‘s 
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Democrat-controlled legislature gerrymandered a new congressional district that included 
most of the counties in the old Whig Gibraltar.  The move effectively segregated almost a 
majority of the state‘s Republican electorate while also insuring that this new eleventh 
district would always send Republicans to Congress.
542
  But these southern mountain 
Republicans did not always toe the national party line; during the populist surge of the 
1890s the district managed to produce a pro-silver Republican, a rare bird within a party 
scarcely divided on the issue of the gold standard outside of the western states.
543
  Clearly, 
even as southern Republicans floundered in other southern states, Kentucky mountaineers 
clung to the party they saw as ―the logical successor to the federal army.‖544     
The growth of Republican homogeneity in eastern Kentucky coincided with a 
growing nationwide belief in southern Appalachia‘s social, and even racial, uniqueness 
within the American South.
545
  Loyalty to the Republican Party, a trait northerners 
assumed absent among white southerners by the 1880s, was deemed solid evidence of the 
Kentucky mountains‘ isolation and abnormality.  During a statewide trough in 
Republican popularity in the late 1880s, a travel writer (one clearly influenced by the 
throng of local color writing initiated by Will Wallace Harney) remarked that ―in all the 
mountain region of eastern Kentucky I passed through there are few to-day who are 
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politically Democrats.‖
546
  Decades later, an early twentieth century visitor who shared 
the contemporary belief in the strict distinction between the ―mountain white‖ and 
lowland white southerners noted that eastern Kentucky‘s ―staunch adherence‖ to the 
Republican Party was so well-established that ―topography has defined the mountain 
section as one of the political divisions of the State by a kind of common law of both 
political parties in their conventions and in common parlance.‖547  At a time when the 
southern Democracy still carried with it the taint of Confederate recalcitrance, white 
mountaineers‘ Republican loyalty represented to northerners an uncommon patriotism 
that would be incremental to the sectional reconciliation.
548
  But accepting these southern 
mountaineers as part of the (northern) American political mainstream was difficult when 
they were simultaneously being portrayed as strange, primitive and ―vastly out of step, 
culturally and economically, with the progressive trends of industrializing and urbanizing 
nineteenth-century America.‖549  After white northern self-consciousness about national 
reunification waned, the significance of mountain Republicanism remained.  Eastern 
Kentucky was proof of ―the geological distribution of politics‖ but it was a distribution 
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based partly on empirical fact but also upon speculation, faulty anthropology and colorful 
mythology.
550
 
Republican dissent was one of the many traits used to portray Kentucky‘s 
mountaineers as peculiar, but perhaps only peculiar among fellow white southerners.  
John Fox, Jr., the novelist who determined the way in which most Americans viewed 
eastern Kentucky in the early twentieth century, expressed this politically-enmeshed 
abnormality in The Heart of the Hills (1913), one of his last novels.  The protagonist and 
narrator was a plucky young mountain boy who (typical to leading characters in most of 
his books) prospers by embracing the education afforded to him by the ―outside world‖ 
(i.e., the ever-progressive-but largely Democratic- Bluegrass) without rejecting his alpine 
manliness.  The young man, now college-educated but still a ruggedly masculine Anglo-
Saxon, witnessed the beginnings of a political intrigue that threatened to tear Kentucky 
apart while also heightening his section‘s electoral importance.  He ―knew that at home 
Republicans ran against Republicans for all offices, and now he learned that his own 
mountains were the Gibraltar of that party, and that the lines of its fortifications ran from 
the Big Sandy [River], three hundred miles by public roads, to the line of Tennessee.‖  In 
the process, ―in spite of the mountaineer‘s Blue-grass allies,‖ the young mountaineer hero 
―had come to believe that there was a state conspiracy to rob his own people of their 
rights.‖551  Even though he had become somewhat assimilated into the refined, semi-
urban, Democratic Bluegrass culture surrounding Transylvania University, Fox‘s young 
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protagonist was still set apart by the in-born prejudices of his native political party, a 
party that acts as literary proxy for mountain strangeness.                      
Along with this party identification came the section‘s status as a haven for rampant 
―lawlessness.‖  The levying of the first postbellum whiskey tax was a source of social and 
legal disruption in the Kentucky mountains and the uplands of other states further south.  
The distillation of homemade liquor had endured since the Jefferson Administration; 
southern mountaineers considered the 1867 tax law a violation of their commercial rights 
and went to great efforts to resist federal efforts toward regulation.
552
  Large-scale 
organization of outlaw distillers, sometimes in numbers that encompassed whole 
communities, was used to resist and expel federal revenue enforcement.  While the Civil 
War had created a means by which the wood denizens could be organized into a 
concerted effort, the protection of whiskey distillation sustained it for years afterward 
while also increasing disillusionment toward the federal government for whom many of 
them had fought.  Republican loyalty in Kentucky had once stood for fidelity to the 
Union.  But when that Union‘s central government began to actively infringe on native 
rights, this was to change.
553
  The tenacity with which mountaineers clung to their illicit 
liquor sale was interpreted by many in the ―outside world‖ as a tenacious clinging to the 
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liquor itself.  Outside of their locality, their zeal for commerce was considered nothing 
more than zeal for imbibing.   
The mass organization of illegal distillers took place primarily in the remotest 
reaches of the eastern Kentucky hinterlands and represented an abiding disaffection for a 
distant government shared by many Americans in the years after the war.  The towns, 
however, were also spaces of conflict that were far more internalized and resulted in 
more losses of life.  In the mid 1880s factional disputes borne out of party-based 
courthouse disputes erupted in numerous eastern Kentucky counties.  In Rowan County 
accusations of vote tampering resulted in a series of riots pitting the followers of the 
county‘s Republican and Democratic ringleaders.554  Shortly thereafter a conflict between 
a Republican son of a Three Forks Battalion veteran and a Democratic newcomer in 
Perry County demonstrated similar results.
555
  Both resulted in short occupations by the 
Kentucky state militia, the first times that the militia had been used for such situations 
since the Louisville Legion had left Breathitt County in 1879.
556
  The ―French-Eversole 
feud‖ and the ―Rowan County War‖ (also known as the ―Martin-Tolliver feud‖) fortified 
national belief in what was coming to be known as a distinct localized phenomenon of 
violence in the 1880s.   
Aside from both having local power struggles result in street fights and 
assassination, these two counties were significantly different places.  The respective 
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political situations, and the roles played by their respective Republican enclaves, 
reflected these stark differences.  Rowan County, situated in the hilly northeast quadrant 
of the state, was commercially vibrant, with a spur of the immense Chesapeake & Ohio 
Railroad and relatively simple access to the market of the greater Ohio Valley.
557
  Rowan 
County‘s Republican leadership was made up of a business-minded middle class with 
interest in increasing the economic presence of ―outside‖ investment.  Amidst the 
economic giddiness of the 1880s, John Martin, a frequent Republican candidate for 
various offices, was forced to contend with a Democratic challenge from Craig Tolliver, 
a recent arrival from a lesser developed, heavily Democratic mountain county.  The 
Democrats led by Tolliver were mostly a ragtag group of young disadvantaged men 
whose economic autonomy was threatened by Martin‘s railroad-friendly Republicans.  
Fearful of civil unrest but eager to cut another chink in the mountainous Republican 
stronghold, the Democratically-controlled state capital allowed the Tolliver faction to 
terrorize Rowan County‘s electorate for months before acting.558  When Governor J. 
Proctor Knott finally intervened, it was as a mediator rather than an executive enforcer of 
peace.  The New York Times groused that Knott had ―treated the ruffians with all the 
consideration due from one great nation to another.  He had ambassadors appointed by 
each of the contending factions, received them in Louisville, and after two pleasant 
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‗conferences‘ with the murderers induced them to sign a treaty of peace, and sent them 
home with his thanks.‖559     
In contrast, Perry County, located in the sparsely populated mountainous 
southeastern corner, consisted of small subsistence farms and rudimentary timber and 
coal extraction operations with only minimal access to remote markets provided by the 
Kentucky River‘s seasonally navigable forks.  Republican Joseph Eversole‘s private war 
with Democratic rival Fulton French originated in the former‘s efforts to protect local 
landowners from the machinations of land speculators, with whom the latter had formed 
an alliance.
560
  To counter Eversole‘s role as Perry County‘s poorer landowners‘ 
aggressive advocate, French, a newcomer to the county, felt obliged to seek out 
mercenary support from neighboring Breathitt County‘s Democratic ―thugs.‖561  Jerry 
South III, the grandson of the originator of eastern Kentucky‘s most ambitious land 
speculation scheme to date-the creation of Breathitt County-was among French‘s 
―lieutenants‖ in the conflict.562  Since his father had been a member of the controversial 
Three Forks Battalion during the war, Joseph Eversole‘s leadership in the conflict 
inevitably reawakened generation-old rivalries as well.  Despite multiple pleas from 
circuit court judge H.C. Lilly, himself a former Three Forks Battalion officer and a 
Republican, Democratic Governor (and lauded Confederate veteran) Simon Bolivar 
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Buckner delayed sending the state militia until after an undetermined number of men had 
been shot and killed in Perry and surrounding counties.
563
     
These local conflicts demonstrate the divergent political cultures that the 
Republican Party attempted to cater to in the upper South as well as the party‘s Gilded 
Age transition from its ―free soil, free labor‖ origins to one based upon ―modern forms of 
communication and political organization,‖ the latter of which involving a closer alliance 
with corporations such as the Louisville & Nashville Railroad (L&N) and the burgeoning 
coal and timber industries, with the Civil War never completely forgotten.
564
  The 
troubles in Perry and Rowan Counties, as well as other outwardly similar incidences of 
factional violence in eastern Kentucky, provided the state‘s Democrats with a steady 
source of propaganda to use against mountain Republicans and, by extension, the party as 
a whole.  As factional violence began to appear elsewhere in the section in the 1880s, the 
term ‗feud‘ proliferated as a name for many types of violence in Kentucky (and, 
eventually, only eastern Kentucky and, by extension, southern Appalachia as a whole), 
conjuring images of a distant antiquity rather than the contemporary depravity 
experienced all over the South.
565
  An 1889 letter to The Nation explicitly stated the 
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subaltern social and racial associations Kentucky Democrats imposed upon the state‘s 
Republican Party, as well as its supposed associations with innate violence.   
The Republican vote of Kentucky is made up very largely, if not almost entirely, of negroes and 
mountaineers.  As a Union soldier I was fond of the old chestnut about the mountains being 
cradles of liberty, because our volunteers in Kentucky were mostly recruited from these cradles.  It 
is current belief that the mountains of Kentucky are cradles of illiteracy and lawlessness, and that 
deadly feuds are rife in these Republican strongholds.
566
 
 
What were eventually called the ―mountain feuds‖ served to further establish the regional 
otherness of Appalachia, creating a generalization that ultimately overlooked both the 
fact that these incidents were almost exclusive to the mountain section of a single state 
and their clear political origins.
567
 While it was true that most of the ―feuds‖ reported in 
Kentucky during the 1880s were in the eastern ―Republican strongholds,‖ the reason they 
happened there was generally overlooked.  In most cases they began not within 
homogenous Republican white male populations, but instead had their origins in 
interparty conflict.  And this conflict was not strictly horizontal as was suggested by their 
mutual association with feud.     
But the linkage between politics and violence was not lost on Kentuckians, 
especially Kentucky Democrats who saw it as advantageous.  ―[N]egros and 
mountaineers‖ were two segments of the population that lowland Kentuckians had come 
to see as inferior.  They were not maligned equally; the mountain white was defined by, if 
nothing else, whiteness.  But they were both nonetheless maligned.  Their shared 
membership in the hated Republican Party was a valuable weapon in the Democratic 
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arsenal, one that became significantly strengthened by the wars and rumors of war 
reported in the mountains.  By the turn of the century, even Democratic newspapers in 
the eastern mountains derisively referred to their own section as the ―feud belt.‖568 The 
feuds of the eastern counties could not be fully depoliticized to the point that they were 
viewed as simply the product of personal disagreements and heated blood.  In contrast to 
the image of the patriotic and loyal mountaineer of the Civil War, the declaration of the 
―feud belt‖ established Republican eastern Kentucky as a political culture distinct from 
the American norm.  In the long run, political motivations for feuds were, if not 
dismissed, substantially minimized.  Writing of the Martin-Tolliver feud in the first 
decade of the twentieth century, a Kentucky state militia veteran recalled that ―the trouble 
in the beginning was somewhat connected with politics, but afterwards assumed the form 
of organized brigandage.‖569  ―Brigandage,‖ as was the case with feud, was deemed a 
definitively apolitical pursuit.    
The political and social othering of nineteenth century Kentucky‘s mountainous 
area from the ―outside world‖ can be viewed using the decidedly twentieth century 
concept of ―participatory‖ and ―parochial‖ political cultures.570  In ―participant political 
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cultures‖ citizenship defines social relations and the relationship between individuals and 
the state and, by extension, the citizen expects the state to serve as a means to preserve, or 
gain, popular expectations.  In opposition, the area of Kentucky that was increasingly 
referred to as the feud belt constituted a ―parochial‖ political culture in which there is an 
absence of specialization among political roles.  Parochial cultures are associated with 
―tribal‖ government, political bodies that American citizens generally associated with 
either their own distant European past or members of races deemed inferior, most notably 
Africans or Native Americans.
571
  The conflation of feud violence with the state‘s 
Republican vote fortified Democratic power within the state and invalidated its native 
Republican population in the eyes of northern Republicans.  With communal violence as 
evidence, the white male Kentucky mountaineers‘ inclusion in a participatory political 
culture (as demonstrated by their taking part in state and national elections or 
membership in nationally-recognized political parties) and, by intimation, their very 
citizenship, could be dismissed or completely ignored.  Even when the feud belt‘s body 
politic was acknowledged it was done so often by employing the language of the 
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communal.  In describing the conditions that had led to nineteenth century feuds, Thomas 
Clark, Kentucky‘s most lauded state historian, described county judges (a democratically 
elected position commonly the product of a participant political culture) as ―feudal lords‖ 
and ―chieftains‖ titles more associated with parochial politics than with the American 
Republic.
572
   
Americans who read of troubles in Rowan County, Perry County and (ultimately 
the most famous ―feud‖ of all, the one that came to define how Americans thought of the 
very word ‗feud‘) the ―Hatfield-McCoy feud‖ on the Kentucky-West Virginia border, 
were, by and large, no strangers to the concept of internal violence on their own soil.  An 
adult reading of Kentucky‘s feuds as late as 1890 was familiar with the American Civil 
War, white southerners‘ counterrevolutionary violence against black southerners 
following the war, the ―Indian wars‖ in the Trans-Mississippian West, and the growing 
rumblings among the urban working class exemplified most dramatically by Chicago‘s 
1886 Haymarket Riot (which was largely written off as the irrational actions of non-
Anglo-Saxon foreigners).
573
  A large part of the reason that the eastern Kentucky feud 
phenomenon appeared strange to people outside of its vicinity was that this violence 
could not be legitimized in terms that late nineteenth century Anglo-Americans could 
easily understand.  White northerners and southerners devised ways of finding legitimacy 
in the preservation of the American nation and/or white supremacy when dealing with the 
recent memory of the war. Even northerners who despised white southerners‘ defiance 
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during Reconstruction probably understood that the latter were fighting for the 
preservation of what they considered a political status quo threatened by black 
citizenship.
574
  And skirmishes with the western Indian nations were widely considered to 
be an expanding nation‘s culling of an obstinate, dying race and, therefore, in the United 
States‘ best interests.575  But factional fighting between white Americans for outwardly 
obscure reasons in obscure places could not be easily attached to the available 
legitimacies of furthering white supremacy and nationalism.  Outside of these contexts, 
violence could not be politically motivated but could only be defined as, if not primordial, 
inexplicable and senseless.
576
         
While fighting emerged in the Kentucky mountains, outside observers rarely noted 
that such conflicts always seemed to remain within county boundaries (the Hatfield-
McCoy feud being a notable exception).  In the nineteenth century Kentucky counties 
were the very essence of participatory republics in microcosm, albeit often oligarchic and 
corrupt ones.  The causes of violence in the Kentucky mountains were far more 
complicated, and far more linked to participatory politics, than Bluegrass Kentuckians 
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and out-of-state observers preferred to think.
577
 The center of the so-called feud belt, the 
county for which the blood feud had first become irrevocably attached to the Kentucky 
mountains, was actually one of the section‘s few Democratic bastions.  Breathitt County, 
the first locale to inspire the ‗feud‘ terminology‘s irrevocable association with eastern 
Kentucky, would ultimately be the last as well, ultimately setting in stone explanations 
that replaced politics with parochialism, ignorance and primitiveness in place of political 
considerations.                
 
 “…but the crying cause back of all this violence and bloodshed is the want of religion.” 
 
 In late 1884, the Louisville Courier-Journal published an unsigned letter from a 
Breathitt County citizen urging potential Bluegrass investors to notice ―the richest 
undeveloped timber, coal, and iron district in America,‖ near the planned route of the 
long-anticipated Kentucky Union Railway, a railroad that would soon make Jackson ―a 
capital city,‖ connecting Kentucky‘s commercialized center with the Harlan County 
coalfields and the Cumberland Gap by railway for the first time.  After years of eyeing 
the county, the Kentucky Union guaranteed that a line was to built soon, and the looming 
promise of industry had caused a ―marked change‖ in the ―minds and purposes of our 
people…‖  Citing the chartering of a new school and the growth of Methodist and 
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Presbyterian congregations, the writer urged readers to recognize the county‘s natural 
wealth despite its checkered past.  Even this most booster-minded of communiqués was 
obliged to mention the county‘s unfortunate recent past, but was careful to do so in a 
manner that would encourage the interest of potential investors rather than scare them 
away.  
Our county people are not lacking in the qualities that have made mountain people famous in 
history, if their bottled-up energies in times past have found vent in partisan faction fights and 
neighborhood broils.  With no communication with the outside world and no other way of 
working off superfluous steams, they must not be wholly blamed.  They have had few 
opportunities for education of any kind.  If their past annals have been more akin to those of the 
Highland Scotch and the boys of Tipperary, please believe that the days of local warfare are past, 
and nowhere will you find more quiet, earnest thought as to a great future then among some of the 
leaders of our county, which may yet pay more taxes into the State treasury than any two of the 
richest Bluegrass counties.
578
   
The letter may not have presaged later referencing of a supposedly Celtic past and 
seclusion from the ―outside world‖ to explain the Kentucky mountaineers‘ peculiarity by 
very many years, and may have simply repeated postulations by local color writers that 
had already been published.
579
  In either case, these primordial explanations for violence 
were no different than those applied to the county from outside.  But when economic 
advancement was at stake, particularly for Breathitt County‘s more affluent citizenry, 
declarations of isolation and ethnic purity were deemed necessary even when speaking of 
their own locale.  The writer‘s clear intention was that the ―bottled-up energies‖ and 
―superfluous steams‖ of his (or her?) less enlightened neighbors be channeled toward 
more profitable motives in the near future.  With the county‘s refractory Red Strings now 
apparently at bay (the double lynching of Henderson Kilburn and Ben Strong having 
taken place just seven months earlier), the political origins of recent troubles were left 
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unspoken, and for good reason, since potential Bluegrass financiers surely did not need to 
be reminded of the Civil War.  The county‘s Democratic majority was sound, scarcely 
challenged and prepared to guide its hilly terrain into commerce and advancement.                 
The media discourse on violence in Breathitt County had been intertwined with a 
concurrent discourse of industrial modernization since the county first gained national 
notice short years earlier.  During the trials that followed Judge Burnett‘s death in 1878, 
multiple articles stressed the importance of economic development in eastern Kentucky 
toward ending the area‘s lawless atmosphere.  ―The late disturbance in Breathitt county is 
only another argument in favor of improving the navigation of the Kentucky river,‖ the 
Bourbon Democratic Kentucky Yeoman opined.  ―If we had good locks and dams, it 
would be an easy matter to send troops from Lexington or Frankfort to quell any 
unlawful outbreak in that remote quarter.‖580  And in a later article, the ―insurrection 
against the civil authority‖ was blamed on ―the further want of the civilizing and 
Christianizing effects of material improvement and development.‖581  For sectional and 
political reasons, the New York Times preferred to editorialize on Breathitt County as a 
place whose problems were symptomatic of Kentucky rather than the Kentucky 
mountains, but prescribed a similar cure; ―…all her best citizens deplore and condemn 
the violence which has so long disgraced her and made her seem deliberately barbarous.  
Kentucky is, as everybody knows, a fine State, which needs development…‖582  Other 
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articles, ostensibly about recent crimes, expressed surprise at the wealth of coal seams 
and virgin timber that they had ―discovered.‖   
The newness of these discoveries may have been exaggerated for the sake of 
highlighting Breathitt County‘s isolation; as mentioned before, the county had been 
geologically surveyed decades earlier, and the findings had long been a matter of public 
record.  A sample of Breathitt cannel coal mined by a locally-owned mining company 
had won a gold medal for best in its category at Philadelphia‘s Centennial International 
Exposition in 1876.
583
  Nevertheless, in terms of placing new attention on the area for 
other reasons, there is little doubt that reports of the riot that resulted in the death of 
Judge Burnett and the resultant militia occupation of Jackson accelerated interest in 
investment toward the future exploitation of Breathitt County‘s valuable coal and timber.  
In 1885 an Ohio land speculator acquired 67,000 acres of timber and coal land and 
published an account of its potential wealth.
584
  Echoing his report, it was estimated in 
1888 that Breathitt County‘s untouched cannel coal seams ―excel[led] the most 
celebrated coals of Great Britain‖ and it was predicted that it would ―have a market all 
over the country when the railways reach it.‖585  But, a year later, as the ―outside world‖ 
geared to enter Breathitt County for its untapped wealth, violence returned when 
hostilities associated with the French-Eversole feud in Perry County spilled over, 
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delaying courts for months and allowing murderers to go unpunished.
586
  As Judge H.C. 
Lilly ineffectually implored Governor Buckner to send troops to his court district, 
Breathitt County once again experienced the troubles it was already known for, but, this 
time, not due to its own internal divisions.
587
  
Railroads and coal and timber companies could only arrive at a rate that was 
geographically and economically allowable.  The laying of tracks from the Bluegrass to 
the Cumberland Plateau represented a tremendous expenditure for even the most well-
heeled investment firms.  Before the railroads could be built there Breathitt County‘s ill 
repute attracted what Appalachian scholars have considered the principal harbinger of 
industrialization in the region: outside evangelists.
588
  Breathitt County‘s ―native‖ 
Christian faith that developed among its earliest white settlers was the ―Hardshell‖ or 
―Iron Jacket‖ variety of Antinomian Baptists, strict predestinationists, supposedly not 
amenable to evangelicals from the ―outside world‖ (a reputation perhaps partly evidenced 
by the reception given to abolitionist preacher William Lincoln in the 1850s) whose only 
access to corporate worship were occasional camp meetings organized by itinerant 
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preachers.
589
  In the early 1840s the Disciples of Christ (also known as the Christian 
Church or the ―Campbellites‖ after the denomination‘s founder John Campbell), a 
denomination then thriving in the Bluegrass, arrived in the person of travelling preacher 
―Raccoon John‖ Smith.  Jeremiah South and his family were associated with the 
Disciples of Christ and the Bluegrass-centered denomination‘s arrival paralleled their role 
in connecting Breathitt County with the other side of the two Kentuckys.
590
 But, lacking 
church buildings and permanent congregations, the Disciples of Christ were as limited to 
the occasional camp meeting as were the more decentralized Baptists.  When the 1878 
Jackson courthouse riot exposed Breathitt County to national scrutiny, its apparent lack 
of organized Christianity made it one of the earliest inspirations for the Protestant ―home 
missions‖ movement.  In reaction to plans for New York missionary societies to send 
missions to Breathitt County (they reasoned that southern mountaineers‘ prior knowledge 
of the English language made them better subjects for proselytizing than Africans or 
Indians) the Republican Cincinnati Daily Gazette said that ―Free American citizens who 
break up courts, and shoot Judges, and carve their political opponents, would not be 
likely to tolerate missionaries.‖591 But urban scoffing could not completely deter the 
outpouring of interdenominational missionary zeal flowing in all directions in the years 
following Reconstruction.  By the mid 1880s, the eastern Kentucky mountains were 
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―strongholds of cruelty and oppression‖ to be ―invaded‖ by Protestant enlightenment.  
Boasting of his successful conversions in 1886, one home missionary proclaimed that 
―people who had been kept under the power of darkness for a century past were brought 
to see the glorious dawn of a better day.‖592  Throughout, it was agreed that Breathitt 
County was ―a type of all that was darkest and most God forsaken in the mountains of 
[Kentucky].‖593       
While Breathitt County caught the eye of northern missionaries Bluegrass 
evangelists, attracted by the lack of the Gospel evidenced by feud, had the most lasting 
impact upon the county.  The ―Mountain Evangelist‖ George Owen Barnes visited 
shortly after the murder of Judge Burnett. Although he found one local boy to be ―a 
young savage, as ignorant as a Hottentot,‖ he was impressed by his congregation‘s 
willingness to include negroes in what he called ―a better looking crowd than the average 
of court crowds in the Bluegrass.‖
594
  He was succeeded in 1882 by John Jay Dickey, a 
Methodist minister who had initially passed through out of ―curiosity to see the people of 
Breathitt County because of the feuds‖ but eventually decided to remain to preach and 
expand the county‘s meager sources of public education.595  Finding no church buildings 
in Jackson, Dickey held services in the courthouse using a pipe organ Barnes had left 
behind.
596
  With help from the Kentucky Union‘s president, Dickey raised money for the 
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construction of what was to become the Jackson Academy (later Lees College), Jackson‘s 
first attempt at schooling beyond the primary level.
597
   
Dickey was followed in 1884 by William Guerrant, a Presbyterian whose last 
previous visit to the county had been two decades earlier, when he was a Confederate 
lieutenant pursuing William Strong and the Red Strings.  Parlaying local acquaintances 
from his army days, he established a Presbyterian church soon after his arrival.  Guerrant 
spent the next seven years attempting to wrest control of Breathitt County‘s religious life 
away from Dickey (although the latter seemed to be unaware of there being any 
competition for most of the time) and establish an exclusively Presbyterian presence.
598
  
Aside from their their respective denominations‘ doctrinal differences, the contrast 
between the views and methods of Guerrant and Dickey demonstrates that there was 
some amount of diversity within the home missions movement, or at least the segments 
associated with Breathitt County.  With his unconcealed prejudice toward mountain 
society (a prejudice that originated during his Confederate service) Guerrant fit somewhat 
the mold of the many other missionaries who considered their mission a conflation of 
spreading the Gospel in tandem with being a ―civilizing‖ force.  To explain the violent 
history that had initially attracted him to Breathitt County, he recorded, ―The law is slow 
and lax in its administration, and so the people take it into their own hands.  There is 
some excuse for this; but the crying cause back of all this violence and bloodshed is the 
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want of religion. The want of the Gospel of peace and forgiveness and love.‖599  His later 
writings display the common late nineteenth century explanations of Appalachian 
otherness that combined racial determinism and spacial isolation. 
They are today the purest stock of Scotch-Irish and Anglo-Saxon races on the continent.  For 
hundreds of years they have lived isolated from the outside world, with no foreign intermixture.  I 
do not remember seeing a foreigner in the Cumberland mountains.   
 
They are not a degenerate people.  They are a brave, independent, high-spirited people, whose 
poverty and location have isolated them from the advantages of education and religion.  They have 
been simply passed by in the march of progress in this great age, because they were out of the 
way….
600
  
 
While other evangelists to the Kentucky mountains believed that localities like Breathitt 
simply suffered from meager church enrollment or uneducated clergy, Guerrant was 
convinced that many, if not most, Kentucky mountaineers were ―as utterly ignorant of the 
way of salvation as the heathen in China,‖ and that his ministry was reaching 
unprecedented territory.
601
  While his ideas on racial purity probably generated little 
controversy among white mountaineers, some publicly took issue with his assumptions of 
their ―want of the Gospel‖ previous to his arrival.602  ―We may be mighty ignorant back 
here,‖ one of Breathitt County‘s ―principal men‖ told another Presbyterian evangelist, 
―but we‘re not such fools as to not know who Jesus Christ is.‖603   
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Dickey did not seem to harbor the same feelings toward his Breathitt County 
parishioners.  He and Guerrant were both Bluegrass natives but, while his competitor 
portrayed Breathitt County as a far-flung exotic locale, Dickey seemed to feel a kinship 
to most of the people he met there- they were, after all, fellow white Kentuckians with 
plans to improve their state.  Though he had initially thought Breathitt Countians to be 
―primitive‖ before his arrival, he never seemed to have wanted to radically change the 
environment in which he preached (his connections with the Kentucky Union Railroad 
notwithstanding).  Nor did he patronizingly extol the virtues of his parishioners‘ ―pure 
[racial] stock‖; as a white Kentuckian himself, Dickey probably considered himself of the 
same stock and thought it nothing unusual (Guerrant, a white Kentuckian himself, 
espoused the common belief that the mountains‘ ―pure stock‖ was somehow different 
than his own, if not by nature then by nurture).  He conducted numerous interviews in 
inquiry of local genealogy but did so more for the sake of constructing a local history 
than attempting to draw an unbroken lineage reaching backward to Albion.  Unlike 
Guerrant and others who considered Breathitt County unchurched before their arrival, 
Dickey recognized that there were numerous preachers in the vicinity (mostly lay 
ministers) and gladly entered into ecumenical services with many of them.  Over the 
following years, Dickey not only shepherded the establishment of worship services and 
public education but also, in 1891, founded the Jackson Hustler, Breathitt County‘s first 
newspaper, which swiftly became a Democratic organ.  The establishment of religious 
services in the courthouse strengthened the structure‘s centrality in the lives of its citizens, 
bestowing on its otherwise profane activities an element of the sacred.  Rather than 
attempting to challenge or reform pre-established status quo, Dickey‘s activities 
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increased the administrative and symbolic strength of the Breathitt County court and the 
men who controlled it.  While Guerrant never seemed to have abandoned his image of a 
homogenous mountain population, Dickey recognized from early on that his adopted 
community was led by a ―better class‖ of white propertied men, and accordingly 
fashioned his appeals for help in his enterprises in a way amenable to the Three Forks‘ 
middle class and landed gentry.
604
  When he went to establish a new mission in London, 
Kentucky in 1895 he left behind a county that had become more interconnected with the 
urban centers of the Bluegrass while still retaining its internal political autonomy.  
 
 
“What a mighty revolution!”    
 
Part of the reason for this continuing autonomy in the 1890s came from the 
relative weakness of the Kentucky Union, the one railroad willing or able to make 
inroads into Breathitt County in the nineteenth century.  By 1884 the company had 
bought more than 200,000 acres of land in and around Breathitt County in anticipation of 
eventually connecting its cannel coal fields to the Bluegrass and creating a trans-montane 
connection to southwestern Virginia.
605
  The Kentucky Union‘s promoters predicted that 
theirs would be the Bluegrass‘s first direct overland access to the greatest coalfields on 
the continent.  One Harvard geologist offered his high expectations of the future rail 
line‘s capabilities in a Kentucky Union promotional booklet.  
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The line of the Kentucky Union Railway has…certain especial advantages over any other, in that 
it crosses the coal and iron belt at its widest part, and where there is the heaviest timber…The 
distance from the eastern coal field to Louisville by this line would be shorter than by any 
other…I believe it to be one of the most important roads for the mineral interests of Kentucky that 
can possibly be built…The mountains of Kentucky, far from being a barrier to the passage of 
railways, constitute on the whole, a region more fitted for their passage than the Bluegrass 
Country…‖606    
 
After nearly three years of laying tracks (an enterprise that was said to have employed 
more than 2000 men), in 1891 a spur connected northern Breathitt County with 
Beatyville, the commercially vibrant county seat of Lee County at the confluence of the 
Kentucky River‘s three forks.607  By this point the more ambitious plan of connecting the 
Bluegrass to Virginia had been forgotten.  Still, the railway connection of Kentucky‘s 
―darkest and most God forsaken‖ county to Lexington was considered an incredible 
transformation.  ―What a mighty revolution!‖ Reverend Dickey proclaimed in his infant 
newspaper.  ―Go to Beatyville by rail and steam boat in about two hours where formerly 
it required a day‘s hard riding on horse back.‖608  The best was yet to come; two years 
later the Three Forks region‘s new connection to American enterprise was 
commemorated with a display of Breathitt County cannel coal in Chicago‘s World 
Exhibition.
609
  But almost immediately afterward, soon after finally reaching Jackson, the 
Kentucky Union lost backing and fell into receivership.
610
  Even after it was reestablished 
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as the Lexington & Eastern (L&E) in 1894 the railroad could not afford to extend further.  
Although the wealth of bituminous and cannel coal was touted over and over again 
throughout the 1890s, even the ever-growing L&N octopus did not eye the L&E and 
Breathitt County with any serious consideration until the twentieth century.
611
  Still, to be 
connected to the small metropolis of Lexington by any railway was indeed a welcomed 
―revolution‖ for Breathitt County.  Within two years of the railroad‘s arrival Jackson was 
considered (but eventually rejected) for the site of a new federal district court, a 
consideration that would have been unimaginable short years earlier.
612
          
As the L&E attempted to become a successful railroad, river traffic on the 
Kentucky River‘s north fork continued, but under new conditions.  The river was no 
longer the freely-accessed egalitarian commercial conduit that it had once been.  By the 
mid-1890s, timber companies, some leasing Kentucky Union/L&E land and others 
buying their own, monopolized river passage, constructing log booms from its banks to 
control the movement of timber and clogging the north fork with far more logs than it had 
ever floated before.  One journalist noted the organization of the new transportation 
system. 
Cheaper as the boom system is than the rafting, the cost seems a big item when put into figures.  
The construction of pockets, etc., for a two and one-half mile boom, in Breathitt County, for 
instance, came to eight thousand dollars recently.  Near the pocket ends of the shears and at the 
openings in the booms, platforms are built on which the ‗sorters‘ are stationed, men who, with 
pike poles, pull in the logs as they float by.  The work is sometimes fast and furious, as when logs 
are going by at the rate of from fifty to ninety a minute.  Sometimes the men are obliged to work 
for two or three days and nights at a time, only the excitement of the work sustaining them.  Their 
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food during such an ordeal is taken by ‗jerks and snatches,‘ and lucky is the ‗sorter‘ who is 
excused for a cat nap.
613
 
 
What had once been the free domain of yeoman and squatters was now the possession of 
corporations and, for the first time, wage labor was imposed upon a large segment of 
Breathitt County‘s male population.  The sorters who now worked for these corporations 
were probably the sons of men who had cut their own logs short years earlier.  The 
continuance of unauthorized felling of timber showed that older traditions carried on to 
some extent
614
  But, for the most part, the freebooting economy of the ―wood denizens‖ 
was becoming a thing of the past.       
Still, ―the civilizing and Christianizing effects of material improvement and 
development‖ did not abate the violence the county was known for, and may well have 
increased its national notoriety as an inherently vicious place.  Even as Dickey and 
Guerrant drew the attention of other missionaries, many considered Breathitt County too 
dangerous even for the most intrepid.  One member of the American Missionary 
Association warned, ―Last fall a friend of ours had occasion to ride through the country; 
he was assured by the best citizens that it was not safe for a man to be on the [Jackson] 
streets after dark.‖  (This was particularly outrageous for a small American community 
with ―no foreign-born residents.‖)615  The county‘s enduring disrepute was a subject of 
enduring consternation and self-consciousness in the county that bled out to its 
surroundings.  Wolfe County‘s Democratic Hazel Green Herald, the closest newspaper 
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before the Jackson Hustler was established, exhibited a realization of Breathitt County‘s 
pivotal position during the construction of the Kentucky Union line (as well as the 
manner in which the neighboring county reflected on Hazel Green‘s image).  Citing the 
recent construction of ―two handsome church edifices and an elegant high school 
building,‖ the Herald declared that ―Breathitt county is awakening to the fact that she 
does not deserve the malignant epithets which in the past have so frequently been bandied 
around and boosted by the press at large.‖616  Reporting on a political rally that was said 
to have numbered between 600 and 800 men, the paper was careful to mention that 
―everything passed off in the most perfect order.‖617 Even after an 1886 Election Day 
stabbing, the Herald insisted that ―the fighting [was] not so bad as reported.  Bloody 
Breathitt is not so bad, after all, when she gets justice.‖618 When the courthouse 
mysteriously burned to the ground two months later, a Breathitt County correspondent 
did not draw what some might have considered obvious correlations with the 1873 
courthouse burning, but instead reasoned that the fire had settled the long-debated 
question over building a new one.
619
   
Alcohol, a nationally popular scapegoat, was a popular replacement for more 
troubling primordial explanations for violence.   Jackson, Hazel Green, and perhaps other 
mountain towns quickly growing with the approach of the Kentucky Union played host to 
a growing number of ―blind tigers‖ for the sale of illicit alcohol.620  This gave the Herald 
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a source of blame for violence that was increasingly popular among investment-minded 
flatlanders, while also having a reason to praise Jackson‘s increasingly efficient law 
enforcement, after the town‘s incorporation in 1890 necessitated the appointment of a 
constable and a police judge.
621
  The Democratic paper was torn between defending 
political allies in the neighboring county and conceding that Breathitt County did indeed 
seem to be a repository for civil disorder.   
But the ambitious townspeople of the less notorious Wolfe County saw that their fortunes 
would soon be connected to those of their rowdier neighbor, both physically and in 
portrayal, so ameliorating Breathitt County‘s image was in everybody‘s best commercial 
interest.       
But members of the fourth estate with less of a stake in the Three Forks region‘s 
fortunes had little reason to worry over nuance.  Even after two relatively peaceful 
decades after the 1878 riot that established ―Bloody Breathitt,‖ the national press still 
retained an interest in reporting any novel accounts that would further contribute to its 
purported primitiveness, isolation or general strangeness.  A drunken shooting in a 
Jackson blind tiger (a common enough case of manslaughter in an era of high alcohol 
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consumption) was selected via wire service by the Chicago Daily Tribune which 
whimsically predicted it to be the beginning of ―a new feud.‖622  The New York Times 
reported that four men were cut in a Breathitt County dance hall brawl ―in addition to the 
seven lynchings [in Kentucky as a whole] for the week.‖623  Even nonviolent items 
caught outside attention because of the county‘s notoriety; when former county judge 
Edward C. Strong‘s granddaughter attempted to elope with a black man and was pursued 
and brought home by a posse, the story of what might have otherwise been only a local 
scandal in a community steeped in white supremacy somehow reached the national wire 
service.  It was suggested that the degeneracy that had led to the county‘s brutal history 
could also somehow produce miscegenation among even the county‘s leading families.624 
The wording of these nationally published accounts of Breathitt County‘s alleged 
civil insanity from the 1880s to the 1890s provide clues as to why violence in such a 
place might have seemed strange to the urban reader.  With the rise of urban labor unrest 
and the specter of anarchism creeping into the United States, many were prompted to 
associate violence with ―foreign-born‖ elements, particularly among the growing influx 
of immigration from southern and eastern Europe.  At the same time, the Kentucky and 
the rest of the South was at the pinnacle of race-based lynchings.
625
  Even the first 
quantitative study of comparative homicide rates in the North and South (a study that 
demonstrated a higher proclivity toward deadly acts in the latter) concluded that since 
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―less than three per cent of the population are of foreign birth…[t]he excessive number of 
homicides in these States is absolutely without excuse.‖626  Yet the manner in which 
white killings were placed specifically in Breathitt County, while the locales of the 
week‘s lynchings were not given, demonstrates that the former was deemed a very 
different series of events than the latter.  As a place with very few African Americans and 
virtually no foreign elements, any amount of pronounced violence would have seemed 
aberrant to Americans steeped in a culture of racial determinism (thereby feeding the 
growth of mountaineers‘ Anglo-Saxon and/or Celtic heritage as explanations for 
Kentucky‘s rash of feud violence).627  In an age of Anglo-Saxon nationalism, white 
Americans were loathe to believe that political differences between white Americans 
could rise to such levels as would result in killing, and, as a result, well-publicized 
political causes for violence were ignored or dismissed as narcissisms of small 
differences.  Like places all over the United States with economies becoming more and 
more dependent upon extractive industries, with the attendant rise in dependence upon 
wage labor in a place not long before populated chiefly by yeomen, Breathitt County 
could not escape a certain amount of turmoil.  But while internal causes may have been 
economic in nature, outside observers insisted that they be cultural or racial.  The 
proposed cure for the county‘s troubles was much the same as it had been in the 1870s: 
heightened influence from outside business.  Writing as reports of shootings from 
Breathitt and its southern neighbor Clay County came to national attention, one journalist 
suggested that the section‘s population had simply not yet been transformed into proper 
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proletarians.  ―The understanding is that the raw material of humanity in these counties is 
good, and that the trouble is that it is not properly worked up.‖628 
By the end of the 1890s, violence was a burden placed upon Breathitt County 
from outside of its boundaries based upon events both real and imagined (or exaggerated).  
There was little denying that, as it grew in population, Jackson was becoming a difficult 
town to tame.  Most of the disorder seen after the arrival of the Kentucky Union/L&E 
was familiar to any extraction-based boom town of the period and quite different from the 
mass political violence of the 1870s (as well as the lynching of 1884).  But since then, the 
eruption of white intraracial violence in surrounding counties dictated that Bloody 
Breathitt be considered the center of the ―feud belt,‖ a vague geographical determinism 
that obscured the internal contingencies that made it seem a violent place.  The events 
that would give the greatest credence to its being inherently violent had not even yet 
taken place.        
 
 
“…a sort of feudal hero, exercising over his own neighbors a greater power than ever 
did landed baron in the days of night-errantry.” 
 
 The confusion of property boundaries that had long defined Breathitt County‘s 
existence was still a problem by the 1890s, and new developments complicated it further.  
Poor surveying and rugged terrain combined to a point at which scarcely any local 
landowner could make an undoubtedly legitimate claim to ownership.  At the same time, 
with the L&E‘s direct line connecting Jackson with Lexington, the promise of future 
development raised land values considerably.  Since Jeremiah South‘s death in 1880, the 
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heirs to his enormous Breathitt County property had been in a constant legal imbroglio 
attempting to claim it.
629
  Barry South, Jeremiah‘s son, was forced to contend with other 
claimants to his father‘s land, but was also unable to survey the land himself because of 
the squatter population and their continuing protection from his family‘s old enemy, 
William Strong.  In order to bring his suit to trial in federal court, South required 
depositions from the land‘s illegal occupants, but testified that he was unable to even 
―invade the neighborhood‖ for fear of coming to harm from Strong and the ―lawless and 
desperate‖ Red Strings.  Strong was above the law in Breathitt County, since he was so 
feared that no one could prosecute him.  ―Strong is a sort of feudal hero,‖ said the South-
sympathetic Hazel Green Herald, ―exercising over his own neighbors a greater power 
than ever did landed baron in the days of night-errantry.‖ It was claimed during the 
proceedings (no doubt in the interest of raising the hackles of a federal judge) that he was 
the guardian of an unknown number of whiskey stills and had supposedly planned to 
immolate a revenue agent short years earlier.
630
     
Testifying for South‘s opponent in the case was thirty-five-year-old James 
Buchanan Marcum, Breathitt County native and William Strong‘s nephew.  Despite his 
namesake, James Marcum was a rising star in Kentucky‘s Republican Party, and one who 
illustrated the changes the party had gone through since his uncle‘s heyday and the 
commercial integration with the western half of the two Kentuckys it avowed.  Marcum 
served as a trustee for Lexington‘s University of Kentucky, and he had been appointed a 
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U.S. Commissioner by the Benjamin Harrison administration.
631
 There is little doubt that 
Marcum inherited his Republican affiliation from his elders, whose political socialization 
had more to do with choosing sides during war than it did economic concerns.  But he 
was not the same variety of Republican ―of the war element‖ as his uncle.632  The closest 
he came to being involved with ―feudists‖ was acting as counsel for Joseph Eversole‘s (a 
relative and fellow Republican) faction during the trials that followed their feud with B.F. 
French‘s adherents.633  He had more in common with the pro-business Bluegrass 
Republicans of his own generation who favored the gold standard and railroad expansion.  
As a legal representative for the Kentucky Union, and later the  L&E, he probably would 
not have been so quick as his uncle to defend the rights of squatters and farmers with 
tenuous ownership (for that matter, Marcum also did not seem to have publicly shared his 
uncle‘s interest in supporting local African Americans).634  Yet Marcum was well aware  
of the tremendous amount of power the Democratic Souths used to exert in Breathitt 
County and was determined that their reestablishment in the county be delayed or 
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Figure 22: James Buchanan Marcum 
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prevented.  If he was attempting to aid William Strong‘s cause (doubtful since the L&E 
was probably equally confounded by squatters), it was of secondary importance to the 
county‘s economic growth and the defeat of its Democratic hegemony (although Marcum 
did later help his uncle secure an immensely valuable tract of land that he had been 
contesting for years).
635
  Whatever his kinship or professional affiliations, no one could 
characterize Marcum as having ―feudal‖ origins in ―night-errantry.‖   
Unlike his nephew, William Strong seemed to be fighting a future that was 
becoming more inevitable every year.  During the ongoing litigation for the South land, 
he became embroiled in an ongoing war of attrition with a renewed Ku Klux Klan 
allegedly led by the same man who had headed the organization‘s local chapter in the 
1880s.  The newer, mysteriously reemerged Klan was said to be primarily peopled by 
new arrivals resident only ―since the advent of the railroad.‖636  In Strong‘s view, Edward 
Callahan, the grandson of Strong‘s former Red String ally Wilson Callahan, who had 
remained consistently powerful in the Democratic Party since the 1880s, was its most 
likely ringleader.  Unlike most of William Strong‘s most relentless enemies, Callahan 
was not from Jackson or the area around the county seat.  He was a native of 
Crockettsville, the town further to the south, that had been less inclined toward 
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supporting the Confederacy years before and had served as a Union mustering ground.  
Callahan was one of the wealthiest men in that less developed area of Breathitt County, 
was the owner of one of the only mercantile establishment outside of Jackson and, by 
1897, had been elected chairman of the county‘s Democratic Party Central Committee.637  
Considerably younger than Strong, Callahan represented an influential Democratic 
presence in a part of the county that Strong had indirectly controlled during the 1860s and 
1870s.      
Knowing of Callahan‘s previous association with the Klan‘s older incarnation, 
and fearing a new threat in his area of the county, Strong openly named him as its 
ringleader (an accusation that Callahan never actually denied).  The elderly warlord no 
longer had the authority he held in the 1860s and 1870s, and his condemnation of 
Callahan might have been ignored.  But he and his associates still drew fire for it.  After a 
number of Strong‘s cattle were shot, a descendant of a Three Forks Battalion veteran, and 
probable Red String, was murdered.
638
  Soon after, in an apparent retaliation, a purported 
klansman was found shot to death alongside a wagon road.
639
 Fearing that this pattern of 
violence was about to escalate, county judge C.B. Day swore out warrants against 
Callahan and Strong and orchestrated a public peace treaty between them.  Perhaps 
expecting a confrontation in front of the courthouse like the one nearly twenty years 
before, Callahan and Strong each arrived for Court Day with more than two dozen armed 
men.  But the fight that they each apparently expected did not come to pass.  Callahan 
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Figure 24: Edward Callahan  
 
 
and Strong peaceably appeared before Judge Day, shook hands and assured the court that 
they harbored no personal animosities.
640
 Day apparently did not admonish the men for 
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arriving in the company of small armies; rather than addressing the men‘s respective 
Klan and Red String leadership roles, and the larger significance these roles might have 
reflected upon the county at large, Judge Day accepted their individual assurances of 
peace and adjourned court.  Strong‘s late conflict with Edward Callahan was considered 
an elevated personal grievance and so the arranged handshake between the two men was 
assumed to be the end of the matter.  A public display of mass violence was averted but 
without any acknowledgement of the larger problems that the continuing presence of the 
Red Strings and the Klan represented.  Soon thereafter, Strong told a Cincinnati 
newspaper correspondent that ―he was at peace with all the world, and hoped 
his declining years would be free from strife.”
641
       
Less than three weeks later Strong was found shot to death under his mule‘s 
carcass on a road ten miles south of Jackson.  Strong‘s wounds and evidence found 
nearby suggested that he had been waylaid by multiple gunmen who had knowledge of 
his usual travel routes and knew where to find him.  After he and his mule were shot from 
afar, members of the killing party approached his body and shot him several more times 
to insure that he was dead.  His young grandson was found screaming nearby and, out of 
trauma or lack of recognition, was unable to give the names of any of the gunmen.
642
   
The old man‘s death did not go unnoticed outside of Breathitt County.  In 
recognition of Strong‘s controversial role in a nationally-known county, various 
newspapers recorded the circumstances of his death.  A brief negotiation between 
differing interpretations of William Strong‘s colorful record ensued.  The political lineage 
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of violence represented by Strong‘s death was well-known by 1897.  Strong‘s obituary in 
the Courier-Journal, relying upon wire reports from its Jackson correspondent, relayed 
his war record as a Unionist and Republican as well as his more recent opposition to the 
Ku Klux Klan and the ensuing trouble he faced against Edward Callahan.   
It is true a number of killings which occurred from time to time in Breathitt County were laid at 
Capt Strong's door by those who were at enmity with him, but there was never enough evidence 
against the Captain to cause a grand jury to indict him, and he lived in peace for many years until 
the trouble between him and Callahan broke out two years ago. It seems that shortly after the war, 
and after Capt Strong had gone to work to pay for his home, the Ku Klux began to terrorize the 
community. It was generally conceded that the clan was composed chiefly of young men who 
were not old enough to enter the army at the breaking out of hostilities between the States, but 
who had grown up with a deep-seated prejudice against the Unionists. Capt. Strong was 
considered a leader among the ex-Federal soldiers and a strong Republican. He was outspoken 
against the depredations of the Ku Klux, and is credited with having organized an anti-Ku Klux 
party, which did much toward putting down the clan.
643
 
 
But the paper omitted how Strong‘s role as ―strong Republican‖ had manifested itself in 
the 1870s, deeds that never involved running for office.  His audacious publicized actions, 
the attempted courthouse capture in 1874 and his defense of young Judge Burnett four 
years later, the stories that the Courier-Journal had reported years before, were left 
unmentioned.  Instead, the ―Strong-Amis feud,‖ whereby Strong‘s former lieutenants had 
defected to the Democrats around 1870, was given lengthy attention, treated as a strictly 
property-based conflict and suggested to be the original event that led to his death.  
Strong‘s continuing role as a ―Red String chieftain,‖ despite its now-obscure associations 
with the Civil War‘s memory, was treated as a strictly local curiosity.  The association 
between ―Red String‖ and southern Unionism was not exhumed.  Nor did the paper 
express outrage, surprise or approval that an organization not heard from for years was 
active in eastern Kentucky.  ―The leading men of the ‗Kuklux,‘‖ while openly admitting 
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their membership in a once-vilified group, disavowed any knowledge of the slayers‘ 
identities.
644
          
The Cincinnati Commercial-Tribune printed a description of Strong‘s life and 
death that differed little from the Courier-Journal‗s, except for a slightly lengthier 
account of his military service.  The Ohio paper told of Strong‘s service in the 14th 
Kentucky Cavalry and, later, the Three Forks Battalion, but skirted the fact that this 
service had involved terrorizing Breathitt County (by this time the myth of eastern 
Kentucky‘s exclusively Unionist leanings was well-entrenched).  Strong was portrayed as 
being quite popular among ―the most powerful and influential citizens of Breathitt.‖645  
The New York Times left out any mention of Strong‘s political affiliations but repeated a 
prediction that ―Strong‘s friends…will never rest until his murder is avenged,‖ thereby 
casting his killing as part of an interpersonal feud rather than a factional conflict with 
origins in wartime politics.
646
  When William Strong captured the Breathitt County 
courthouse and traded bullets with Confederate veterans on the streets of Jackson these 
newspapers had been nominally willing, as shown in the preceding chapter, to use him 
and his actions as grist for their own political ends.  But, since the 1870s, the widely-
circulated newspapers of cities far from the Three Forks region had abandoned their more 
obvious sectional and political biases and ―claimed to be independent of party 
dictation.‖647  Had more partisan broadsheets, particularly the persistently party-based 
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newspapers then printed in the mountain counties, taken a greater interest, the full 
implications of his death might have been explored further.
648
  
Much of the publicity surrounding Captain William Strong‘s death acknowledged 
his bizarre political role in a place where the two-party system had remained somewhat 
militarized.  But Strong was to be remembered more for being a ―feudal hero‖ rather than 
a ―strong Republican.‖  When the newspapers of Louisville, Cincinnati and New York 
had first taken notice of Strong in the 1870s the memory of the war was pervasive but the 
idea of the primitive mountain South was in its infancy.  Then, feud was only a word used 
to depoliticize white intraracial violence at a time when it was commonplace in the South.  
Since that time, the ―feuds‖ of Rowan, Perry and other counties had since been 
established in the public consciousness as horizontal conflicts fueled by the mountain 
white‘s barbarism and primordial need for vengeance rather than issues of local state 
power.  The conflation of these trends with mountain Republicanism (compounded with 
the party‘s diminished status in the South after the end of Reconstruction) further 
belittled the role of party politics in these fights.  The ensuing attention of evangelists and 
their bestial portrayals of Kentucky mountaineers encouraged this communal 
interpretation.  Although his own war-making pre-dated this reification of the ―two 
Kentuckys,‖ Strong‘s memory fell victim to this mass depoliticization, his most overtly 
political acts of violence forgotten and veiled by his personal and allegedly familial ones.   
But, most of all, William Strong and his embodiment of Bloody Breathitt was 
propelled into the past.  In the interest of demonstrating that feud violence was not a 
product of Kentucky‘s present, the recent killing (or its motivations) were placed as far 
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back in time as possible by both Breathitt County natives and newspapers from the 
―outside world.‖  When he was interviewed in 1898, John Aikman, Strong‘s old wartime 
enemy who was implicated in the murder but never charged, insisted that Strong‘s death 
was a very late retaliation for the circa-1870 dispute between Strong and Wilson Callahan 
that involved the latter‘s defection to the Democratic Party (having no association with 
these former Unionists, telling this story was probably Aikman‘s claim of innocence).649  
Befitting feud‟s medieval associations some spoke of Strong in language that sent him 
back much further.  What may have been a misspelling on the part of the Courier-Journal 
is nonetheless telling: ‗clan,‘ a word Americans would have associated with extended 
families and Scottish warlords of past centuries (a decidedly parochial time and place) 
was used in place of ‗klan,‘ which, in contrast, referred directly to a recent crisis of 
legitimacy in the American South.
650
  Within six years, when violence in Breathitt 
County had again gained national interest, the events that had led to Strong‘s shooting 
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1983): p. 93.  
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had become collectively known as the ―Strong-Callahan feud.‖651  Similarly, a history of 
Breathitt County produced by the Works Projects Administration in the 1930s described 
Callahan‘s source of authority as ―a paternal rule, in the rustic style of a Scotch clan 
chieftain.‖652  The aberrational late post-Reconstruction persistence of the Ku Klux Klan 
in Breathitt County, their Red String enemies, and the fact that these groups founded 
during the South‘s internecine political wars in the 1860s and 1870s somehow remained 
in one isolated corner of Kentucky, were all but forgotten.  With the passing of a 
generation, these causes that men had once killed and died for were becoming as distant 
and archaic as a Scotch clan chieftain.     
But William Strong‘s death was not simply the outcome of a personal dispute, as 
would be suggested by its placement within a feud narrative.  Even if the ―Strong-
Callahan feud‖ was personal it was also political by virtue of the respective past and 
present roles of the men who took part in it.  Strategically, the ―bushwhacking‖ of Strong 
in 1897 was little different than the double lynching of Henderson Kilburn and Ben 
Strong thirteen years earlier.  By the time of his death Democratic control over the 
courthouse was in no electoral danger and the old Republican patriarch probably had far 
less authority as a political arbiter than he had in the 1870s.  The county‘s African 
American population had dwindled to an even smaller number than in previous decades 
and the old man‘s former role as ―special protector of the colored race in Breathitt‖ did 
not garner him even a small measure of local support.
653
  What little political legitimacy 
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653During the 1890s Strong‘s ties to Breathitt County‘s African American population seemed to 
have diminished.  A possible reason for this is that, after 1870, the already tiny segment of the population 
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he might have once held, gained by his fighting for Unionism and the county‘s poor, was 
gone.  However, even if Strong had ceased his belligerence he and the Red Strings 
represented the county‘s past, a past that stood in the way of its continuing economic 
development as well as its abandonment of a parochial political culture.  The pocket of 
defiance he had established as a guerilla officer during the Civil War could not be 
tolerated as Breathitt County became a more influential part of Kentucky and the New 
South.  His death was the demarcation between a dark past and a progressive present.  
Even if William Strong‘s murder was not considered a clear victory for the Democratic 
Party it did mean the elimination of their most consistent antagonist.  Moreover, William 
Strong was not to be remembered as a kind of political leader but rather a pre-modern 
curiosity.  Feudal chieftains had to be a thing of a distant history, in fact as well as name.  
With Strong dead, the use of mass violence as had been employed by the Red Strings and 
the Ku Klux Klan in past years was no longer necessary.  After 1897 the former 
apparently dissipated; in turn, groups of men that openly went by the latter‘s name were 
no longer heard from.
654
  The internal crisis of legitimacy that they represented had been 
resolved for the time being.  Violence in Breathitt County had not come to an end but it 
would no longer be dressed loudly in emblems of the past.   
Strong had enough enemies for Edward Callahan to avoid being directly 
implicated.  But, given their history of political differences combined with mutual 
                                                                                                                                                 
had shrunk steadily.  Hiram Freeman and his family had left Breathitt County sometime in the 1880s and, 
by the late 1890s, the Red Strings had apparently become an exclusively white group; Ernest Collins, p. 10.  
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antagonisms, Callahan was believed to be the one who had dispatched the last remaining 
threat to the age-old Democratic rule in the county, and this reputation added to his 
political stock considerably.
655
    Strong‘s violent demise meant the end of future 
challenges for Callahan, at least challenges that drew their power from the barrel of a 
gun.
656
  The next threat to Callahan‘s power came from the ballot box and ballot box 
rather than backwoods ambush.  And even if Strong had not been so great a threat to 
Callahan in those later years, the former‘s death had a symbolic significance, a 
demarcation between Bloody Breathitt‘s dark feudal past and its bright future in the New 
South that also worked to Callahan‘s and other Democrats‘ favor.  When James B. 
Marcum publicly accused the ascendant Democrat of complicity in his uncle‘s death a 
few years later, Callahan could have vowed vengeance for the sullying of his honor and 
reputation, a likely response from a ―feudist.‖  Instead, he simply upbraided Marcum for 
―keeping up the old trouble.‖657  But the county‘s next political debacle, one that placed 
the county under the greatest national scrutiny and censure in its history, produced a new 
turn toward violence that could not be tucked so neatly into the past.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
―THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE BITTEREST POLITICAL FEELING IN THE 
COUNTY.‖: THE COURTHOUSE RING AND THE AGE OF ASSASSINATION 
 
 
 
 
By the fall of 1897 it seemed that the age-old Democratic control over Breathitt 
County was more secure than ever.  Since the end of the Civil War there had been 
scarcely any legitimate challenges to the party‘s rule.  And the only consistent 
illegitimate challenger, William Strong, who had never forgiven the county‘s Democrats 
for opposing the Union, was now dead.  By being one of a very few Democratic islands 
in heavily Republican eastern Kentucky, Breathitt County‘s statewide political capital 
was on the rise as well.  During the last few years Breathitt County had become famous 
for breeding violence while simultaneously amassing fame for its largely untouched 
hoard of timber and cannel coal.  This had brought the L&E railroad to the county as well 
as heightened attention from the cities of the Bluegrass and America at large.  Only short 
months after the death of his old enemy, the politically ambitious merchant Edward 
Callahan entered into a career as a legitimate politician, rising in the county‘s Democratic 
ranks and eventually becoming sheriff.  Along with his partner, county judge James 
Hargis, Callahan formed a political machine whose power and influence throughout the 
state reflected his county‘s new importance.  The isolation and degeneracy associated 
with the nickname ―Bloody Breathitt‖ was a thing of the past and the history of violence 
that had inspired it could have been assumed to be a thing of the past as well.        
But Breathitt County had yet to experience what would become its most famous 
murders, murders that would seal an already-established reputation as the center of the 
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―feud country.‖  Almost exactly six years after Strong was killed, his nephew, James B. 
Marcum, lawyer, US Commissioner and a prominent figure in Republican politics, was 
gunned down in front of the Breathitt County courthouse after challenging Democratic 
party bosses Callahan Hargis.  His death came in the wake of the fatal shooting of 
Governor William Goebel short years earlier, an event that revealed the stark divisions in 
Kentucky politics, as well as the newly au courant form of political violence: public 
assassination.  Goebel‘s legislative attempts to reform state elections divided his own 
party, as did his antagonism of the powerful Louisville & Nashville Railroad (L&N).  His 
contested election in 1899 led to his death and a new period of political acrimony in 
Kentucky.  With the new courthouse ring‘s political fortunes connected to Goebel, the 
conflict he generated was recreated in miniature.  Assassination, a form of political 
violence inherent to the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, supplanted older 
varieties of violence experienced in Breathitt County in the past.  What followed was a 
prolonged scandal that laid bare the corruption that Breathitt County‘s most powerful 
men had long depended upon to maintain control, followed by a reawakening of violence 
in the county that seemed to confirm popular theories regarding Kentucky mountaineers‘ 
preternatural propensity for taking lives.  By the time of James Marcum‘s death in 1903 
eastern Kentucky had been viewed as a space of irregular violence for more than a 
decade.  On a national scale this image of mountain otherness was based primarily on 
geographical isolation, poverty and racial (i.e. Anglo-Saxon or Celtic) vestigiality, all of 
which established an extrapolitical existence rife with horizontal kinship-based conflicts.  
Marcum‘s death caught national attention as a reawakening of ―feuding‖ in the region, 
contributing further to the association between eastern Kentucky and communal violence.  
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The political motivations for Marcum‘s death were concealed and, as was the case many 
times before, the county‘s violence was depoliticized.    
This chapter examines the crisis of legitimacy that followed the career and death 
of William Goebel and its impact on Breathitt County.  As had been the case during the 
1870s, the language of feud, with its implications of antiquity and kinship, was a popular 
tool in forming a usable explanation for white intraracial violence that would not present 
too great a challenge to New South progress.  With feud established as a widely-
acknowledged social phenomenon with unquestionable connections to eastern Kentucky, 
descriptions of political violence were confounded by an ever-present impulse to define 
Breathitt County‘s problems instead as cases of communal violence.    
 
“He apparently desired the world to surrender on its knees” 
 
Eager to abandon any remaining legacies of the Civil War and embrace industry 
and reform, Kentuckians resolved to write a new state constitution in 1890, the first in 
forty-one years.  Kentucky was the only former slave state to leave its antebellum 
constitution unrevised during the Reconstruction years.  But few white northerners still 
pointed to Kentucky as a relic of Old South white supremacy (after all, white intraracial 
violence had overshadowed interracial atrocities since the 1880s), instead criticizing its 
lack of governmental efficiency and preparedness for industrialization, both embodied by 
its abundance of tiny, impoverished, corruption-ridden ―pauper counties.‖   One delegate 
to the constitutional convention, incensed by the carelessness with which counties had 
been continuously carved out for decades, insisted that a minority of ―fifteen or thirty or 
forty people‖ had been empowered by new county creation in order to create legislation 
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―not for the benefit of the people at large, but only for the benefit of people who were to 
be enriched by them.‖658  It is impossible to know if the delegate had Breathitt County‘s 
―father‖ Jeremiah South (by this time ten years deceased) in mind when he made this 
allegation; however, it was clear that the propagation of counties subdivided into such 
small units that their respective tax bases came closer and closer to nil as years 
progressed (to say nothing of the impunity of pro-Confederate county courts during the 
war), had convinced many Kentuckians that 119 counties was a good number to cease 
upon.  Among the new constitution‘s reforms were provisions to make the formation of 
new counties difficult.
659
  The new state constitution represented a common hope of 
breaking, yet again, from the state‘s difficult past and producing a new, profitable future.     
The new constitution was a largely bipartisan affair.  Unlike most southern states, where 
post-Reconstruction ―redemption‖ virtually eliminated all challenges to the Democratic 
Party after 1877, Kentucky remained a ―genuine‖ two-party state, albeit one with a 
consistent Democratic majority for most of those years.
660
  However, the 1890s was a 
time of unprecedented triumphs for Kentucky Republicans, triumphs helped along by the 
Democratic Party‘s internal divisions on both the state and national levels.  The 1888 
                                                 
 
658
Kentucky, Constitutional Convention, Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates in the 
Convention: Assembled at Frankfort, on the Eighth Day of September, 1890, to Adopt, Amend, or Change 
the Constitution of the State of Kentucky, (Frankfort: E. Polk Johnson, 1890): p. 395.  I am grateful to John 
R. Burch for directing me to this quote.  For further convention debates on county government, also see pp. 
328-329, 333, 358, 368-369, 391, 399, 403-404. 
 
659
The new rule was tested in 1904 when the legislature voted to form a new county, Beckham 
County (after the names ‗Hardscrabble‘ and ‗Goebel‘ were rejected), but a lawsuit charging that the county 
was too small for the parameters drawn out by the constitution prompted the new county to be dissolved.  It 
was not until 1912 that another county, McCreary County, was formed to become the state‘s 120 th, and last, 
county; Ireland, Little Kingdoms, p. ; Martha J. Birchfield, ―Beckham County: A Political Folly,‖ FCHQ, 
Vol. 64, No. 1 (Winter, 1990): pp. 60-70.  
 
660Thomas Louis Owen, ―The Formative Years of Kentucky‘s Republican Party, 1864-1871,‖ 
(unpublished dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1981): p. 165.  
276 
 
death of vive voce had stifled the power of Democratic county regimes all over the state 
and allowed some Republicans to coast into local offices via the secret ballot.
661
  
Democrats were weakened by internal divisions over the Free Silver issue and lost votes 
to the Populist insurgency, especially in the western counties‘ black leaf tobacco belt.662  
The state‘s agrarians had initially expected the Democrats to conform to their needs but, 
after a dissatisfying term of office under Governor John Young Brown, the strongest 
advocates of silver coinage and legislation that stifled the power of railroads began to 
look elsewhere.
663
  Kentucky Populism had been defined by a strong spirit and weak 
flesh.  Just as it had been caught uncomfortably between North and South during the 
1860s and 1870s, Kentucky was again wedged between oppositional forces, this time 
being the state‘s agrarian past and industrial future.  Agrarian organization and protest 
against the ascendancy of corporations had emerged just as divisions between Bourbons 
and New Departure Democrats were beginning to heal in the late 1870s.
664
  The growth 
of the L&N Railroad and the monopoly power of tobacco trusts were enough to fuel 
some interest in the party.  Sympathy for its causes ran high in the state, but the party 
confronted two major parties that remained strong enough to ignore any of their third 
party competitor‘s entreaties to bargain.665  As they and the Democrats floundered, the 
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Republican vote increased steadily over the course of the 1890s, resulting in the election 
of William O. Bradley, Kentucky‘s first Republican governor, in 1895 (as well as a 
Republican majority in the state house of representatives).
666
  William McKinley‘s 
narrow majority over William Jennings Bryan in the following year‘s presidential 
election, coupled with the election of the state‘s first Republican U.S. senator, cemented 
the party‘s new clout.667  Throughout, these new electoral successes depended upon the 
consistent support of mountain Republicans and, for the first time, men from the eastern 
half of the two Kentuckys rose to statewide offices.  Eastern Kentucky, in concurrence 
with its economic importance granted by coal and lumber, had become politically 
important as well.     
The loss of the governor‘s mansion to a Republican was simply unacceptable to 
many Democrats, especially considering that Governor Bradley was interested in 
effecting actual change in the state.  While much of the Republicans‘ national success 
had come from their abandonment of the war‘s partisan legacy in favor of ―the old Whig 
conservatism,‖ Bradley attempted racial reforms at a time when most of the white South 
was circling the wagons of Jim Crow.
668
  His plea to repeal the state‘s ―separate coach 
law‖ was met with bipartisan white jeers, and his calling out of the militia during a 
prolonged legislative conflict between Gold Democrats and Silverites angered both 
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factions.
669
  To those who wanted to maintain racial segregation, and those who feared 
martial law, Bradley seemed an unwelcome authoritarian.  Although a vigorous two-party 
competition had been established under relatively honest means, Kentucky Democrats 
were incensed by Bradley‘s attempts at reform and increasingly refused to recognize 
Republican legitimacy.  As suspicions of corporaatte influence in his administration grew, 
the latter half of the Bradley administration marked the beginning of the most intense 
political confrontation to come out of the 1890s‘ array of southern reform movements.  
Concern over the L&N‘s growing influence in government (and increasing freight prices 
for farmers) resulted in continuous unsuccessful calls for heightened regulation.
670 
 The 
L&N railroad, with mileage in Kentucky and further south constantly expanding, 
promised to be an interstate ―Railway Emperor‖ and soon came to have what many felt 
was undue influence in state government.
671
   
The growing distrust toward the railroad fueled the political career of one of the 
South‘s most unlikely political figures, Pennsylvania native and firebrand Democrat 
William Goebel.  His opposition to the L&N, paired with political acumen in dealing 
with more traditional courthouse Democrats, increased his popularity among a large 
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number of discontented Democrats and some Populists in the latter half of the 1890s.
672
  
In the process Goebel became the most controversial political figure to emerge in 
Kentucky since the flamboyant abolitionist Cassius M. Clay, upsetting conservative 
members of his own party and producing fears among Republicans that a new era of 
demagoguery had arrived.  As the son of immigrants and a watchmaker by trade, Goebel 
had far more in common with Kentucky‘s urban minority than with its rural majority.  As 
a Pennsylvanian by birth (and the son of a German-born Union veteran to boot) he did 
not fit the mold of a Kentucky Democrat imagined by party members who still retained 
sympathy for the Lost Cause.
673
  But he did master Kentucky‘s vaunted art of killing.  In 
1895 Goebel was confronted by an armed Republican banker for an unflattering article 
the former had written, to which Goebel swiftly responded with a bullet to the banker‘s 
head.  Since both men were armed, many accounts of the shooting interpreted it as a 
traditional southern duel.  However, there was no previous planning for the encounter and 
Goebel probably dispatched his target before the banker had pulled his own gun, a 
scenario that hardly qualified as the traditional (and, by this time, sharply declining) 
white southern ritual.
674
 Goebel was acquitted on grounds of self-defense, but his public 
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killing of a prominent financier was only the beginning of the controversy that 
surrounded him for the rest of his short life.  When banditry broke out in the Bluegrass to 
protest toll road fees and the fencing of hunting land, the young state senator expressed 
sympathy for the protestors, prompting conservative legislators of both parties to 
associate him with lawlessness.
675
   
Goebel‘s defense of free land access and his attacks on railroad-influence in 
government were in keeping with a political culture that was expanding throughout the 
South and West during the 1890s, one that, in states other than Kentucky, Populists were 
able to exploit for sizable political gain.
676
  But the call for railroad regulation shared by 
many other southern politicians paled in comparison to his drafting of a bill that was 
meant to revolutionize Kentucky‘s electoral process. Bradley‘s win in 1895 had 
radicalized the General Assembly‘s Democrats, who refused to accept a revival of two-
party competition as anything more than conspiracy.  They began insisting with an even 
more unified voice that the state‘s Republican Party was nothing more than the L&N‘s 
fraudulent tool, winning allies for the young firebrand.  But Goebel (who was by this 
time Senate President Pro Tem) proposed a bill to centralize the management of elections, 
a measure that would theoretically strengthen Democrats.  Republicans considered the 
bill a disenfranchisement measure every bit as egregious as other states‘ poll taxes, but 
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the bill passed over Bradley‘s veto.677  While what became known as the ―Goebel 
Election Law‖ may have increased the power of the General Assembly in manipulating 
elections, thereby increasing Democratic power, it diminished the ability of local courts, 
many of whom, though Democratic, disliked the loss of decentralization from which they 
had initially gained.  To compound further divisions within his party, Goebel also began 
to run afoul of its silver faction by negotiating with pro-Gold Bourbons, betraying his 
former inroads with populists.
678
  By 1898 Goebel seemed to be riding upon an angry 
Jacobin minority‘s support while alienating the majority on his left and right flanks.  But, 
even after he alienated many fellow Democrats, his political capital never sunk so low to 
prevent his running for higher office, and a run for governor began in 1899.             
 Goebel‘s summer, 1899 victory in the race for the Democratic nomination was 
widely attributed to the selection of his friend and former Senate bench-mate, ―ardent 
Democrat of the Jeffersonian school‖ and Breathitt Countian, Circuit Judge David B. 
Redwine, , as convention chair.
679
  To an outside observer, Goebel‘s selection might have 
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seemed improbable.  Judge Redwine‘s court circuit included some of the poorest and 
most isolated territories in eastern Kentucky.  He was not a member of one of th8e state‘s 
great dynastic political families like the Clays or the Breckenridges and had relatively 
obscure origins even within his own section of the state.  There, he had been accused of 
accepting ―boodle‖ and assisting in local election-fixing since early in his judicial 
career.
680
  Perhaps most importantly, his residency in Breathitt County brought with it a 
certain amount of pariah status; anyone outside of eastern Kentucky who had heard of it 
since 1878 associated it with nothing more than the irrational violence and depravity 
implied by feud.  The first book-length account of the Goebel affair (written from a 
Goebel-friendly perspective at that) published within less than a year of Goebel‘s death 
introduced Redwine as being from Breathitt County with no need for a fuller 
explanation.
681
  As the political drama was recounted over the following years, 
particularly from Republican memory, the young judge was better remembered as being 
from ―‗bloody‘ Breathitt.‖682   
But it was for these very reasons that the selection of Redwine was masterful.  As 
a dark horse of the mountains, Redwine had fewer relationships with powerful Democrats 
and was conceivably less easily swayed by their influence.  More importantly, he was 
from one of the few Democratic stalwarts in a section of the state that had remained 
heavily Republican and had managed to be elected judge in a circuit district that rarely 
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elected Democrats.
683
  The selection of an easterner diminished the possibility of 
sectional prejudice being thrown against Goebel.  It was also fancifully suggested that a 
convention chairman from bloody Breathitt was the only selection intrepid enough to 
stare down a hostile convention hall.   
Somehow, with or without the benefit of his home county‘s reputation, Redwine 
did manage to bring the infamous Louisville ―Music Hall Convention‖ under control, but 
not in a manner that satisfied the mass of Kentuckians.  Once it began, the June 
convention was nationally known as a meeting of the worst dregs of Kentucky society 
brought to act as delegates.  Louisville‘s waterfront roustabouts and gamblers mingled 
with policemen and firemen summoned to vote their respective ward bosses‘ wishes.684  
The entire proceedings were defined by incessant brass band music, raucousness and a 
constant threat of riot.  A disgruntled Republican memoirist later recalled that Redwine 
was somehow able to take absolute mastery over the rowdy convention with no respect 
for parliamentary procedures.  ―He apparently desired the world to surrender on its knees.  
Parliamentary usages formed no part of his code.  He was not there for the convention to 
direct, but to direct the convention.  There was but one man he obeyed, but one man he 
served, and that man was William Goebel.  Him he served with all the fidelity with which 
a slave serves his master.‖685   
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In actuality, the lack of parliamentary procedure could just as easily be blamed 
upon the entire room of delegates.  Redwine somehow managed to maintain the 
convention in the direction of a Goebel nomination (despite physical threats from hostile 
delegates) by insisting on a dizzying flurry of roll call votes, accompanied by his own 
refusals to adjourn until Goebel‘s other conventioneers could negotiate a firm majority.  
He managed enough aplomb to remain onstage to beat time with his walking stick to 
some angry delegates‘ impromptu rendition of ―We‘ll Hang Jeff Davis from a Sour 
Apple Tree‖ with his own name substituted for Davis‘.686  Throughout the proceedings, 
Breathitt County‘s James ―Big Jim‖ Hargis was working behind the scenes as ―one of the 
main manipulators,‖ quietly cajoling delegates and supposedly threatening Redwine with 
bodily harm when he considered leaving the lectern for fear of his own safety.
687
 The 
twenty-sixth ballot produced a nomination for Goebel and a nationwide outrage from 
Goebel‘s left and right flanks; Republicans saw correlations between Goebel and the 
specter of anarchy, while some Democrats reproved the Goebel election law as an 
oligarchical attack on ―home rule.‖688  The reputations of David B. Redwine and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, that of the enigmatic Judge Hargis, were indelibly connected to 
Goebel‘s contentious nomination.  Among Republicans and anti-Goebel Democrats, the 
name ‗Redwine‘ was anathema for years.  For a shorter amount of time, the remainder of 
William Goebel‘s life, the Democratic Party was fragmented.      
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As his campaign began, Goebel continued his standard tack of demonizing the 
L&N and going so far as to suggest that any other candidacy represented the railroad‘s 
executive domination.  His Republican opponent, Attorney General William S. Taylor, 
was scarcely mentioned by name in Goebel‘s fiery speeches.  ―There are only two 
candidates for governor of Kentucky,‖ he announced a month before the election.  ―There 
are more than that number who pretend to be candidates, but the only real candidates are 
the Louisville Company (i.e., the L&N) and the person who addresses you.‖689  In 
response, much of the bile spilled against Goebel did indeed involve the L&N and its 
presumed influence in the legislature.  But his election bill, by far his most outrageous 
legacy, was considerably more complex and problematic than his attacks on the railroad.  
By the time he ran for governor, even anti-Goebel Democrats favored railroad regulation, 
especially regarding the prevention of extortion.  The only difference between the 
platform of these ―Honest-election‖ Democrats (who nominated former governor John Y. 
Brown as their candidate) and that of the pro-Goebel faction was Goebel‘s election 
bill.
690
  Even with the support of William Jennings Bryan, and a reluctant late 
endorsement from the authoritative Louisville Courier-Journal, Goebel‘s lack of support 
within his own party (as well as the persistence of the Populists who pilloried his election 
law and ultimately robbed him of crucial votes in Kentucky‘s western tobacco belt 
counties) ended in his apparent narrow defeat.
691
  For their part, Republicans had taken 
advantage of Democratic furor over Goebel and concentrated solely on state issues (this 
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at a time when Republicans elsewhere were winning elections by touting issues of 
national and international reach).
692
  The review board created by Goebel‘s own 
notorious election bill surprised everyone by finding in William Taylor‘s favor.693      
 Although Goebel personally conceded defeat shortly before Taylor‘s December 
12 inauguration, Democrats decried the Republican ticket and the L&N for corrupting the 
election by using fraudulent ballots and by intimidating railroad workers at the polls.
694
  
Invigorated by this newfound support, Goebel rescinded the previous month‘s concession 
and returned to the General Assembly in January, 1900 with accusations against the 
election returns from more than a third of the state‘s counties.  The apparent Taylor win 
had brought with it few gains in the legislature, and the Democratic majority selected a 
committee made up of nine fellow party members (including James Hargis), one 
Republican and one Populist to review the evidence of fraud.
695
  Armed Democrats 
patrolled the streets of Frankfort in anticipation of a Republican attempt to confound the 
review process.  In retaliation, Republicans summoned more than 1000 militiamen from 
the eastern ―Whig Gibraltar‖ counties (which the Democratic press dubbed the ―bloody 
Eleventh‖ since most of them came from the mountainous eleventh congressional 
district), the state‘s most heavily Republican section, to Frankfort with the dual purpose 
of guaranteeing fair proceedings and intimidating the Democrats.
696
  The L&N openly 
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volunteered its rolling stock to transport the armed Republicans from the foothill and 
mountain counties without charge except for (according to one horrified Democrat) an 
alleged ―pistol to get a free pass.‖697  Throughout January, Frankfort was occupied by a 
seething armed crowd whose tenuous claim to militia status was legitimized only by its 
attachment to the Republican Party.  As members of both parties awaited the committee‘s 
findings, Democrats in the pro-Goebel and anti-Goebel camps united to protest the 
group‘s presence, while Republicans defended the freedom-loving mountaineers as a 
peaceful assembly gathered to ―protect their liberties.‖698     
 On the morning of January 30th, while accompanied by two Democratic friends, 
Goebel was shot by a hidden rifleman while walking by the state house to the senate 
chamber.  Soon after he was carried back to his hotel, rumors spread that he was killed, 
and the capitol was surrounded by armed men who, hours later, prevented the entrance of 
the election committee.  Probably knowing as little as most of Frankfort‘s populace as to 
Goebel‘s condition, the committee soon announced a party-line decision that Goebel had 
received the largest number of votes (but without giving the exact numbers of the returns).  
Governor Taylor took this as an act of sedition and dismissed the General Assembly with 
instructions to reassemble in the ―bloody eleventh‖ congressional district‘s Laurel County, 
the point of origin for many of the Republican militiamen.  Only the Republican 
legislators complied, while the others assembled in the hotel where Goebel lay dying in 
order to ratify the election committee‘s decision.  While being fed oysters and 
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succumbing to a fatal case of pneumonia, Goebel twice took the oath of office from two 
friendly Democratic judges.
699
  Even while Governor Taylor presided over a reassembled 
General Assembly in the Kentucky mountains, Democrats declared his recumbent 
opponent the state‘s thirty-fourth governor.     
 His death three days later did not settle matters for either party, since Democrats 
had become incensed with the possibility that Governor-elect Taylor had directed 
Goebel‘s assassination.  After sixteen initial indictments, eastern Kentucky native Caleb 
Powers, Republican secretary of state and the primary assembler of the mountain 
militiamen, was convicted for planning Goebel‘s murder.700  He was joined by two fellow 
Republicans, one of whom, Jim Howard, was also an eastern mountaineer with a well-
known past as an enforcer for Clay County party leaders.
701
  Caleb Powers was sentenced 
to life imprisonment by a jury ―made up entirely of Democrats,‖ but ensuing appeals 
brought about years of politically-charged trials and the eventual pardoning of all three 
men (Powers and Howard were both pardoned by the state‘s next Republican governor, 
Augustus Wilson).
702
  Taylor fled to Indiana, where the Republican-dominated 
government refused to extradite him back across the Ohio River, even after testimony 
was delivered that directly implicated him in the conspiracy.  After a long series of court 
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battles (during which the US Supreme Court demurred from hearing the case), J.C.W. 
Beckham, Goebel‘s running mate for lieutenant governor, ended up as governor.703  
Goebel‘s impact on Kentucky politics lasted years after his violent death.  In the 
minds of many Kentuckians of both major parties, Goebel‘s election law had produced 
nothing but ―hopelessness and chaos.‖  During the campaigns for the November, 1900 
special gubernatorial election, Republicans demanded its repeal, alleging that ―whole 
counties [were] deliberately disfranchised‖ (the Kentucky Populist Party also denounced 
the statute).   Pro-Goebel Democrats countered with accusations that, for bringing the 
troop of mountain Republicans to Frankfort a year earlier, the Republicans depended 
upon ―the mob and the assassin‖ for their successes.704  The next Republican 
gubernatorial victory, Augustus Wilson‘s win in 1907, could have been counted as the 
party‘s vindication and redemption, but, haunted by memories of January, 1900, was 
instead mired in a ―slimy trail.‖705  After his controversial pardons of the supposed 
conspirators, Governor Wilson‘s term in office was spoiled by Goebel‘s memory 
becoming ―the bloody shirt of Kentucky politics‖ and an obfuscation of unrelated issues 
in the General Assembly.
706
 The name ‗Goebel‘ was both cursed and glorified in 
Kentucky‘s Democratic Party for nearly a decade after the assassination, although his 
being killed at an early age helped his memory more than it hurt it.  When Beckham ran 
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for reelection in 1903, even Democrats who had once hated Goebel frequently conjured 
up his ―martyrdom‖ for the party.707     
But because his revolutionary policies were paired with implications of his 
attendant hypocrisy (his election review bill), the ―bloody shirt‖ of Goebel‘s assassination 
could never become morally instrumental for Kentucky progressives.  The introduction of 
stark class and interest differences within Kentucky‘s Democratic Party; the inordinate 
lobbying power of one expanding corporation within state government; the passage of a 
controversial bill that favored the interest of one party in statewide elections; the virtual 
establishment of martial law on Election Day; the refusal of both parties to recognize the 
legality of a gubernatorial election; the assassination of a (debatable) Governor-elect; an 
internal insurrection of government by the establishment of a second General Assembly 
outside of the capital; and the politicization of trials for Goebel‘s accused killers: this 
series of events created a crisis of legitimacy never before experienced within an 
American state, almost ―plunging a state into civil war.‖708  Yet, unlike the civil war that 
took place earlier in the state‘s history, the alignments of opposition were not clearly 
drawn.  Goebel‘s categorization as a Populist and Progressive ran counter to his 
dependence upon machine tactics and undemocratic courthouse rings in many parts of the 
state.  One of the foremost Kentucky historians of recent decades characterized the 
Goebel campaign as the ―breaking down‖ of ―old political alliances‖ that had existed 
since 1865.
709
  But, while he attempted to make clear who Kentuckians‘ economic 
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enemies were, he never developed a critique of the state‘s political process.  He was too 
dependent upon the capricious support of conservative Democrats to truly revolutionize 
the party.  His inability to negotiate differing strains within his own party prevented the 
class-based suppression of corporate interests that Goebel had hoped for.  His successor 
and protégé, Governor Beckham, eventually became a firm friend of the L&N.             
But the Goebel campaign also displayed a newer division that had taken place in 
Kentucky since the end of the Reconstruction period: a sectional delineation by which the 
state‘s eastern third had come to appear peculiar to central and western Kentuckians, as 
well as the United States as a whole.  Since the Civil War this area of the state had been 
politically different in that it served as a Republican enclave within a predominantly 
Democratic state.  But eastern Kentucky had also achieved a not-undeserved reputation 
for internal violence as well.  When the state‘s principal Democratic newspaper called the 
Republican-assembled militiamen milling about in Frankfort at the time of Goebel‘s 
assassination ―the roughest crowd ever gotten together in the mountains‖ it was meant to 
be taken as a telling hyperbole regarding eastern Kentucky‘s innate meanness (as well as 
an indictment of the railroad and political party that had brought them).
710
  The supposed 
gunman in the Goebel killing, Jim Howard, was said to have agreed to act as sniper in 
exchange for a pardon for a feud-related murder which he expected to be convicted in the 
near future.
711
  But Goebel‘s Democratic nomination, perhaps a greater feat than an 
unquestioned election as governor might have been, had, by many accounts, also 
depended upon the assistance of his personal friend, Breathitt County‘s Judge David 
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Redwine.  There was little doubt that the successes, failure and eventual tragedy 
experienced by William Goebel in his doomed campaign for governor could all be traced 
to the Kentucky mountains.   
If viewed from outside Kentucky, Goebel‘s assassination may have come as little 
surprise to many.  No other nationally-known candidate for public office, save perhaps 
Eugene V. Debs, had used such language against enemies both real and imagined, let 
alone enjoyed some broad measure of support in doing so.  But the apparent involvement 
of a militant troop of ―ignorant and uncouth‖ ―Republican mountaineers,‖ a population 
maligned for over a decade, resonated with other implications for turn-of-the-century 
newspaper readers.
712
  In hindsight, Goebel‘s death was the product of the class tensions 
and political partisanship endemic to the 1890s on a national scale.  However, during the 
month of January, 1900 the mass of armed eastern Kentuckians was looked upon by 
Kentucky Democrats as an ersatz peacetime military occupation not only by Republicans 
but by an unambiguously primitive population.  The convictions of Jim Howard and 
Caleb Powers, both natives of the mountain counties, only bore this conflation of party 
animosities and sectional prejudices out. 
Aside from providing the Kentucky Republican Party‘s militant backbone, these 
mountaineers were the source of fear for other reasons, since their section had become 
known as a space of constant internal violence.  The apparent proliferation of ―feuds‖ 
between families, factions or (as the media tended to imprecisely term them for rhetorical 
effect) ―clans‖ in the 1880s had established eastern Kentucky as a place radically apart 
from the economically thriving Bluegrass and populated by a population unrepentantly 
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uneducated and innately prone to violence.  Consequently, the utilization of their 
numbers by the L&N and the Republican Party during the Goebel affair brought with it 
an air of danger that required little exposition beyond their eastern (or ―mountain‖) 
origins.  Furthermore, for Kentucky Democrats, it lent to Goebel‘s resultant death 
implications far more ominous than the simple product of a fierce party war; a day after 
his shooting the state‘s leading newspaper, already assured that the culprits were among 
the ―army of mountaineers,‖ announced that he had been shot with the ―mountain method 
of ambush‖713  But the army of mountaineers was not an assemblage of political actors, 
but rather (according to the same paper) a primal phalanx used by the state‘s Republican 
elites.  Days before Goebel was shot, Democratic spokesmen had issued a warning that 
―if a single Democrat is harmed the guilt will be upon the Republican leaders and not the 
ignorant men‖ that the party had ―corralled in this little city.‖714 Another Democrat 
condemned the Republican-arranged ―invasion of hill billies from the Eleventh district‖ 
and hoped that they would disperse with the unusually cold January weather.
715
  During 
the trial of Caleb Powers the role of ―feudists‖ in peopling the Republican militia was 
announced by the prosecution.
716
  As they had done during the worst years of ―feud‖ 
violence in the 1880s, Democrats depoliticized mountaineers by imbuing their violent 
reputation and actions with communal, rather than political, significance.  Had it not been 
for the already-established association between Republican eastern Kentucky and feud, 
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the prosecution of Powers and his alleged conspirators might not have been as successful 
as it was.    
The memory of Goebel and the supposed dangers posed by Kentucky 
mountaineers were entwined for years afterward and provided a means for Kentuckians 
and other Americans to reconcile (or confuse) political and communal uses of violence 
and draw boundaries between the two Kentuckys.  In John Fox, Jr‘s. fictionalized account 
of Frankfort in January, 1900, published more than ten years later, Goebel‘s death 
provided an ironic twist in the plot of an imaginary feud between the ―Hawns and 
Honeycutts‖ in an unidentified eastern county.  The threat posed by ―the autocrat‖ (an 
unnamed fictionalized Goebel) necessitated the two families‘ swearing ―that they had 
buried the feud for a while and that they would fight like brothers for their rights…‖  
Soon after, a member of each ―clan‖ is implicated in the governor-elect‘s murder.717  In 
the account, the feud between the Hawns and Honeycutts had begun over small 
differences of a strictly personal nature; politics, the cause of the real-life ruptures that 
had been labeled as ―feuds‖ years before, was instead treated as the force through which 
warring clans could be united against a common enemy worthier of their heretofore 
misplaced wrath.  The communal conflict that had led to their initial division was 
subsumed by the political conflict that not only united them, but prompted the Hawns and 
Honeycutts to engage the more modern world of the Bluegrass in a manner that bettered 
them with exposure to the ―outside world‖ without stripping them of their native nobility 
and egalitarianism.  The ability of the Kentucky mountaineer to accept the progress of the 
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―outside world,‖ rejecting communal violence while maintaining his nobler qualities, was 
a typical theme of Fox‘s portrayals of the region.718  The use of a Goebel figure as the 
unseen antagonist in a Fox novel reflected the danger that mountain Republicans saw in 
his candidacy but, as a literary device, represented the overly bureaucratized republic‘s 
loss of democracy that only the re-involvement of the ―pure‖ Anglo-Saxon yeoman could 
heal.  In Fox‘s (albeit patronizing) portrayal published years after Goebel‘s death, the 
―ignorant men‖ who occupied Frankfort in the winter of 1900 could be heroes.                   
If eastern Kentucky‘s ―bloody Eleventh‖ congressional district (so named the day 
after the L&N‘s delivery of many of its armed constituents in Frankfort) was the danger 
that Democrats said it was, it was largely a danger of their own making.
719
  Kentucky 
Democrats were not above ―corralling‖ mountain Republicans themselves; in 1880 the 
Democrat-controlled General Assembly gerrymandered a new district between the Three 
Forks region and the Bluegrass in an attempt to contain the overwhelming bulk of 
Republican votes within the area and weaken the party‘s influence in the rest of the 
state.
720
  The concentration of Republican votes into one discreet area of the state only 
ended in creating a unified electoral (and, as seen in Frankfort in January, 1900, 
paramilitary) force opposed to the perceived dangers represented by Goebel‘s reforms.  
But while the massively Republican ―bloody eleventh‖ congressional district gained 
notoriety in the Goebel affair, it was a traditionally Democratic county in the neighboring 
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tenth district that was not only to continue the political battle based upon loss of 
legitimacy started by Goebel, but also seal eastern Kentucky‘s renown for communal 
feud violence. 
 
“…Breathitt’s debut into political circles in her long robes of state.” 
 
 A few months after his nemesis William Strong‘s death in May, 1897, Edward 
Callahan, chairman of the county‘s Democratic Party, was involved in a scheme that 
would have ended his political career in many other places.  During the August primaries 
Callahan came to odds with another merchant and newer arrival to Breathitt County 
politics, James Hargis, over Democratic nominees for county school superintendent.  
Callahan‘s favorite seemed to win by a mere six votes in the initial canvass, but Hargis 
somehow managed to have his man nominated when the count came to the party 
committee.  Still comfortable in using force of arms to meet his ends, Callahan led an 
armed party into the courthouse in Jackson, captured the ballot box, and re-canvassed the 
returns, not surprisingly finding in favor of his own candidate.  Hargis recognized that he 
was in no position to directly confront Callahan and, instead of challenging him through 
force of arms as would have been done short years before, sent word to the chairman of 
the state party organization and was promptly recognized as the new county party 
chairman (a position that would soon place him in good stead during the Goebel race).  
Hargis had seemingly led a coup by responding to the threat of violence with an appeal to 
higher authorities, a clear indication that bureaucratic modernity was surmounting 
Breathitt County‘s history of ―rifle rule.‖721             
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 To turn-of-the-century local color writers, the growing intra-party dispute 
between the Hargis and Callahan factions could have been interpreted as the flowering of 
conflict between two of Breathitt County‘s oldest ―clans.‖  Callahan was the descendant 
of the Three Forks region‘s oldest white settlers and was related by blood or marriage to 
many of the ―first families‖ in the Three Forks region.  Hargis was the great-nephew of 
John Hargis, one of the Bluegrass Democrats who had helped engineer the creation of the 
county in 1839.  Had the potential dispute over local party nominations come to blows (as 
was probably expected) it could well have been framed as the scion of a pioneer family 
fighting off the ―usurper‖ descended from Bluegrass interlopers.  Callahan‘s history as a 
―feudist,‖ a label that brought with it a small measure of antediluvian honor, would have 
served to veil his old association with the comparatively cosmopolitan Ku Klux Klan.   
But this was not to be the case.  By 1899 Callahan and Hargis (along with David 
B. Redwine, who had been elected circuit court judge in the same election that had 
created the initial rift between Callahan and Hargis) had entered into a political 
partnership based upon their shared interests as merchants (Hargis in Jackson, Callahan 
in Crockettsville) and a desire to see that Breathitt County‘s Democratic Party remain 
paramount.
722
  Their respective relationships to Breathitt County and its history was the 
key to their alliance‘s success.  Aside from his familial primacy, Callahan bridged the gap 
between the practice of subaltern mass violence after the war and legitimate political 
action.  Hargis‘s first cousin was former state Court of Appeals judge Thomas F. Hargis, 
one of the state‘s most influential career politicians.723  Hargis and Callahan had little 
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interest in exhuming the county‘s old mayhem.  Both had been small children during the 
Civil War, and as a result had no direct exposure to the ensuing troubles.  Although 
Callahan clearly had the inclination to continue being a ―feudist,‖ with William Strong 
dead he had no real enemies of any great influence or authority.  Most importantly, 
Callahan, Hargis and Redwine were all fellow Democrats.  With a Republican in the 
governor‘s mansion, thanks largely to the votes of other mountain counties, their 
Democratic home county‘s political stock was at its zenith.  Having proven his acumen at 
the party‘s state convention in 1899, Hargis quietly became the first Breathitt County 
resident to be appointed to his party‘s state central committee, a position that gave him 
patronage privileges over his entire congressional district and a voice in the party‘s 
highest statewide echelons.
724
  Hargis endeavored to guide the Democratic Party from the 
shadows, as he had done on the floor at the Music Hall Convention that summer, and 
went so far as to forbid any photographs be taken of him so that his face would be 
virtually unknown outside of his home environs.
725
  Suddenly, men from Kentucky‘s 
most nationally embarrassing locality were wielding authority throughout the state.  More 
than three decades, later a local historian proclaimed the Hargis-Callahan partnership 
(with Redwine as a fellow traveler) ―Breathitt‘s debut into political circles in her long 
robes of state.‖726     
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 The partners‘ shared foray into county politics coincided with the rise of William 
Goebel, and all were instrumental in supporting his nomination and election.  Aside from 
Redwine‘s and Hargis‘s direction of the Music Hall Convention (which Goebel gratefully 
acknowledged in a campaign appearance in Jackson), Callahan saw to it that Breathitt 
County would be fully behind Goebel the following November.
727
  A party mass meeting 
held earlier in the summer produced a ―a healthy rebuke to McKinleyism, Hannaism [in 
allusion to William McKinley‘s campaign manager Mark Hanna], and the Phillipineism‖ 
in the following year‘s presidential race, as well as a supposedly unanimous show of 
support for Goebel.
728
  The eventual entrance of John Y. Brown as a more conservative 
Democratic option was an enticement for some, even those who may have supported 
Goebel at the mass meeting.  Repeating a smaller version of the gambit he had tried two 
years earlier, during the November polling, Callahan hired men to guard the ballot boxes 
in the county‘s most heavily Republican precinct (probably his own Crockettsville 
precinct) and repel Republican election inspectors under threat of physical harm.  A 
similar guard was placed at one other precinct.  When the final count was to be held in 
Jackson‘s courthouse, an armed gang of ―Goebel desperadoes‖ entered and fired pistols 
in the air, driving all of the Republicans from the room and securing the ballot box.  
Supposedly, according to the state Republican campaign chairman‘s accusations, 400 
votes were secured fraudulently.  Even in the precincts where Republicans were allowed 
to remain as inspectors, all of the accompanying Democrats were in favor of Goebel, with 
none present for Brown, who, in such a heavily Democratic county, may well have been 
the heavier threat to Goebel.  Partly due to ―bulldozing never seen in Breathitt County 
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before,‖ Goebel won the county with 756 votes.729  After the election the only other 
counties that reported similarly ―severe‖ illegal tactics to secure the Goebel vote were 
those with large cities.
730
 
―Bulldozing never seen in Breathitt County before‖ rightfully suggested that the 
methods of intimidation used by the new Democratic party leaders had reached a new 
height and had been met with far less resistance than in the past.  The 1899 gubernatorial 
election marked the first major vote since the Civil War without an organized 
arrangement of minority dissent.  With William Strong, the county‘s ―strong Republican,‖ 
dead for nearly three years, there was no individual available to aggressively resist or 
repel the extralegal electioneering techniques that had been employed numerous times for 
decades.  Breathitt County‘s Republican Party had only been established due to an appeal 
for Unionism during the war and, with the war becoming a more distant memory as years 
went by, had since failed to generate a significant rationale for attracting voters.  The 
voter intimidation displayed during the November, 1899 elections was decried by 
Republicans but was a far cry from the deadly engagements that had prompted the two 
interventions of the state militia in the 1870s, both of which had taken place at the request 
of a Republican circuit judge.  As had been the case under the 1849 constitution, 
governors were still required to await the request of a circuit judge for the militia to be 
summoned; even if Governor Bradley saw fit to do so, Judge Redwine was hardly 
inclined to make the petition, since the ―bulldozing‖ benefitted his gubernatorial endorsee.  
Even with the communication enhancements since provided by the arrivals of the 
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telegraph and railroad, whatever embarrassment that reports of Breathitt County‘s 
persistence of violence might have caused Bluegrass Democrats was outweighed by the 
advantage of having a Democratic bastion in the mountains.  If the county‘s violent past 
and present provided Republicans with grist for propaganda, it was severely stifled after 
Goebel fell to what was apparently their own party‘s utilization of ―the mountain style of 
ambush‖ early the following year.  As before, Breathitt County was left to its own 
devices.  
 And, ultimately, the use of violence was, at least for a time, no longer the primary 
issue.  Having themselves been accused of employing methods of intimidation and fraud 
in the 1899 elections, Kentucky Republicans did not consider Breathitt an especially 
egregious case, except for its standing out as an island of support amongst counties that 
had gone heavily for Taylor.  It only stood out as the most overtly forceful example of 
―the Goebel methods,‖ and was acknowledged as such again a year later during the 
special election that secured the governor‘s office for J.C.W. Beckham.731  Breathitt 
County, long known for its singular record of violence, had become simply another piece 
of evidence for the crisis of governmental legitimacy suffered throughout the entire state.   
 Callahan and Hargis‘s reasoning for supporting the Goebel candidacy is difficult 
to ascertain precisely.  But the Goebel platform potentially benefitted the Breathitt 
County courthouse ring for both economic and political reasons.  In Jackson, James 
Hargis had only one other mercantile competitor, while Callahan‘s store in Crockettsville 
was in one of the most isolated parts of the county and had virtually no direct competition 
for providing common finished goods.  Both men had investments in numerous coal and 
timber interests that could only be helped by strengthened transportation networks.  The 
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L&E railroad, the very thing that had made Jackson an increasingly important town, was 
similarly vital to both men‘s personal interests and respective zones of influence.  And 
the L&E was a significantly small railroad, one that had not yet been absorbed by the 
ever-growing L&N.  After its period of receivership in the early 1890s, the railroad had 
begun to thrive, but on a modest level that did not threaten to dictate terms to Breathitt 
County‘s merchants and farmers.  Consequently, Goebel‘s attacks upon the L&N 
probably appealed to Hargis and Callahan (and very possibly the vast majority of 
Breathitt County voters as well), since any reduction or regulation of the larger railroad 
kept their own native line at a manageable size.  The influence the L&N exhibited during 
the 1899 gubernatorial election and its aftermath, using employees to bully voters and 
shipping trainloads of mountain Republicans to the streets of Frankfort, no doubt 
confirmed their justification for wanting to keep what was becoming a regional monopoly 
out of their county.        
 It was the Goebel Election Law, however, that may have been the primary 
enticement.  The law established a state board of commissioners for the regulation of 
elections as well as a corresponding board in each county.  With a Democratic majority in 
the General Assembly, and the consequent Democratic control over the majority of 
county election boards, Callahan and Hargis could conceivably maintain their party‘s 
power within Breathitt County indefinitely.  In 1901 Hargis and Callahan were elected 
county judge and sheriff respectively, cementing the hold on Breathitt County‘s 
government that they had already established as heads of the Democratic Party.  Their 
connections to William Goebel, and the methods that had been used to win the county for 
him, dictated that a perpetual air of controversy would follow them both.  Even during 
303 
 
Jeremiah South‘s lifetime so much authority had not been contained into so few hands in 
Breathitt County.  Although their party had been a majority force for six decades, this 
was the first effective ―courthouse ring‖ in the county‘s history.  As in the past, a 
dissenting minority emerged to challenge it. 
 
“There is no politics in the law.” 
 
Hargis‘s and Callahan‘s capture of the Breathitt County courthouse was little 
different than political maneuverings elsewhere in the South, a region-wide effort that 
established Democratic machines in many states.  The blatant armed seizure of ballot 
boxes was only one of many counter-revolutionary measures employed by southern 
Democrats after federal oversight of elections had become a thing of the past.
732
  What 
Breathitt County‘s Democratic elites lacked was the ability to justify themselves with the 
―shibboleths of party‖ based primarily upon ―white unity, and deliverance from the 
‗horrors‘ of black rule.‖733  This popular Democratic device was practically useless in and 
around Breathitt.  In his bid for circuit court judge in 1897 David Redwine entered into 
an agreement with Wolfe County‘s Hazel Green Herald for the latter to run a series of 
race-baiting cartoons depicting his Republican opponent as an advocate of social equality 
for black Kentuckians.  Such a threat was apparently lost on many of the judicial 
district‘s voters, however, and Redwine decided to abort the scheme without paying the 
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Herald, thereby prompting the paper to astonishingly give his opponent an eleventh hour 
endorsement.
734
  
Ideologically, he, Callahan, and Hargis had little to offer voters as incentive 
against party-bolting, and relied instead on patronage (particularly in the hiring of 
sheriff‘s deputies), the electorate‘s customary loyalty to their party, and intimidation.  
With the two highest county offices under their control, and a solid ally in the circuit 
court, Callahan and Hargis collectively constituted what political scientist Charles Tilly 
has labeled a ―low-capacity democratic‖ state, a condition given to relatively high levels 
of political participation and vigorous party mobilization but with pronounced 
―involvement of semi-legal and illegal actors in public politics, and substantially higher 
levels of lethal violence.‖735 However, even in a county with consistent one-party loyalty 
extending back to the Jacksonian period, their courthouse ring was unable to prevent 
oppositional party activity.  Although the days of Red String Republicanism were at an 
end, Breathitt County had developed in its place a ―modern‖ Republican Party that 
reflected its new economic progress.  The arrival of the L&E in the early 1890s increased 
employment opportunities in Breathitt County to a higher level than in many surrounding 
counties, most of which were traditionally Republican.  In-migration consequently 
increased the Republican vote, though without effectively challenging Democrats in most 
elections.  But despite their strength in the ballot box Callahan and Hargis were still 
intent upon using extralegal tactics to preserve the power of their party.  Their importance, 
and the new electoral importance of Breathitt County to the state Democratic Party after 
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the Goebel fiasco, gave the courthouse ring the ability to use questionable methods 
without fear of reprisal from higher authorities.  Having direct or indirect influence over 
―at least one-half the business interest of Breathitt county,‖ in combination with their 
control over the courthouse, they were said to have ―entire control of the juries of 
Breathitt county, and [could] convict or acquit a person charged with crime at their 
pleasure.‖736  In juxtaposition, Democrats indicted in criminal cases, even on the federal 
level, could go un-arrested and allowed to appear in court at their leisure.
737
  Even though 
they controlled what amounted to a very small portion of one of the South‘s only two-
party states, the two politicians had formed a semblance of one-party hegemony similar 
to most of the rest of the section in 1900.
738
                  
But their respective roles in forming this hegemony were different.
739
 As the more 
locally controversial of the two, Edward Callahan‘s legitimacy was more questionable 
than Hargis‘s, who, even after helping to engineer the Music Hall Convention, was still 
considered a political newcomer.  As popular as he was with many local Democrats, 
Callahan had a difficult time escaping his past reputation as a ―feudist,‖ and his narrow 
election as sheriff in 1901 brought with it controversies other than his and Hargis‘s 
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connections to Goebel.  After he had won the office by a mere sixteen votes in a ballot 
said to be fraudulent on both sides, Callahan‘s opponent contested the outcome, 
prompting Judge Redwine to declare the election void.
740
  In his capacity as county judge, 
James Hargis appointed Callahan as acting sheriff until a new election could be held, 
creating an uproar in both parties.  His right to retain the office was challenged in the 
Kentucky State Court of Appeals (which sustained Hargis‘s and Redwine‘s decisions) but, 
by the time the case could be heard by the higher court in 1903, Callahan had been 
serving as sheriff for nearly two years.
741
  Hargis‘s appointment of Callahan in lieu of a 
neutral party further proved their collusion.      
Later in 1901, dissident Democrats resorted to a fusionist strategy similar to those 
devised by various states‘ contemporary Populists against an ascendant Democratic Party.  
In many parts of the South in the last years of the nineteenth century, party fusions 
among Republicans, Populists and unhappy Democrats were last ditch interracial efforts 
against all-white Democratic juggernauts, often resulting in counter-insurrectionary 
violence from the latter.
742
  Breathitt County‘s fusionists were not only using the same 
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tactic employed by Populists a few years before, but were doing so out of a similar 
impulse.  Before it became a national movement with far-away northern plutocrats as 
targets, Populism‘s political manifestation had its beginnings in small farmers‘ disgust 
with local courthouse elites.
743
   
The strategy of fusionism itself presented a feasible precedent even in Jackson.  
The fusion was organized by Democrat Jim Cockrell, Jackson‘s town marshal, and 
attorney James Marcum, Breathitt County‘s most influential Republican, who had 
represented Callahan‘s opponent in the election for sheriff.744  Neither man could be 
accused of ―carpet bagging‖; both were descended from the county‘s first families.  Most 
importantly, in terms of familial local ties, Marcum was the nephew of the late William 
Strong, and carried with him all of the loyalties or discord that his late uncle had earned.  
Since his uncle‘s death, Marcum had risen through Kentucky‘s Republican ranks, and by 
1903 was the state party chair.  His challenge to Breathitt County‘s courthouse ring 
constituted the beginnings of a fight between two of the most powerful members of the 
two parties in Kentucky (James Hargis being the other) in a county that, short years 
earlier, had been a sparsely-populated backwater ignored by most of the rest of the state- 
save for its nationally-known proclivity for violence.                           
Due to the Breathitt County Democracy‘s longstanding influence throughout the 
county‘s general populace, the fusionist campaign was almost an abortive effort from the 
beginning.  The only hope that Marcum and Cockrell had was to raise ire against the 
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individuals in the courthouse rather than the party itself.  Repudiations of the Democratic 
Party would not work, and denouncement of the local party leaders could only do so 
much.  Their first flawed sortie came from their ally, former Democratic county judge 
and aspiring newspaperman J. Wise Hagins.
745
  When he released an anti-Hargis circular 
in 1901, the only criticisms of Hargis that Hagins could muster was to preposterously 
accuse Hargis of supporting Republican candidates for the past two decades, jibes that 
Hargis was able to easily dismiss by invoking the names of Goebel and William Jennings 
Bryan.
746
  In a sharp rebuttal, Hargis accused Hagins of approving of the Goebel 
assassination, implying that not only was Hagins not of good moral character but, 
perhaps more importantly, he was not the ―right kind‖ of Democrat if he was indeed a 
true Democrat at all.  Hagin‘s bolting from Democratic orthodoxy earned him 
comparisons to Judas Iscariot and Benedict Arnold in the Hargis-friendly Hazel Green 
Herald.
747
  Political attacks in the guise of personal vilification could only validate views 
that the growing intra-party conflict constituted an interpersonal ―feud.‖              
After the war of words initiated by Hagins, confrontation between the two 
factions emerged in public settings corresponding to Breathitt County‘s governmental 
and non-governmental public spheres.  Although James Marcum led the fusionist 
opposition to Callahan and Hargis, the courthouse retained his law partner O.H. Pollard, a 
Democrat, which brought about conflict within Marcum‘s own place of business.748  
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Sometime in early 1902, a verbal altercation in their law office led to drawn pistols 
between the four men, and a warrant was issued for all of them by the police judge (an 
unstated supporter of the fusionists).  Hargis refused to appear in the police court and 
instead surrendered to a county magistrate, whom he considered a political 
collaborator.
749
  In order to allay any future confrontations, Marcum moved for the case 
against Hargis to be dismissed, but not before Jim Cockrell and his brother Tom Cockrell 
(whom he had enlisted as deputy marshal) attempted to serve warrants to Hargis in the 
courthouse, leading to another incidence of un-holstered pistols.       
 Within the walls of judge‘s chambers and law offices, the mutual threat of 
violence was sufficient to maintain an uneasy stalemate, albeit a stalemate that did not 
stifle Hargis‘s and Callahan‘s power.  However, subsequent incidents outside of these 
jurisprudential spaces were not subject to the same level of self-restraint.  A few weeks 
afterward, in February, 1902, Tom Cockrell confronted Hargis‘s younger brother Ben in 
a Jackson blind tiger.  Both young men threw down and each was seriously injured by 
four bullets fired by Hargis and others in the room.  Cockrell was taken to the home of 
his ―guardian‖ (the Cockrells were both young men in their twenties and orphans) Dr. 
Braxton D. Cox and recovered under the physician‘s care.  But the more severely injured 
Ben Hargis died in Judge Hargis‘s home the following day.750   
Within the context of its time and place, Ben Hargis‘s death was nothing unusual.  
An intensely masculine environment in a place in which violence had been common for 
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decades, fueled by readily available supplies of whiskey, combined to form situations in 
which violent acts like Hargis‘s death were almost inevitable.751  As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, violence in Breathitt County‘s blind tigers was rampant and had been 
for years, a trend that had augmented the county‘s feud reputation.  The sale of illicit 
alcohol and the inability of local authorities to stymie its production, distribution and 
consumption was a widely accepted cause of violence all over the South at the turn of the 
century, irrespective of the reasons given for barroom fights.
752
 Isolated unto itself, 
Hargis‘s end was a symptom of the various social ills, ranging from lax law enforcement 
to the semi-legal sale of whiskey, touted by early twentieth century progressives.    
But the manner in which Ben Hargis‘s death was framed and presented to the 
―outside world,‖ primarily by his brother, dictated that it be interpreted as part of a much 
longer series of events and a wrong that could justifiably be avenged in the minds of 
many Americans.  Utilizing Breathitt County‘s past and its association with feud, Judge 
Hargis portrayed his brother‘s death as part of a long history of communal violence, 
rather than the outcome of a recent spate of political violence.  In the 1890s James and 
Ben Hargis‘s other brother, John, became unruly in a passenger car and was shot and 
killed by an L&E railroad detective.  The detective, Jerry Cardwell, was convicted of 
murder, but was summarily pardoned by Governor William Bradley.
753
  Cardwell‘s 
shooting of John Hargis had no connection to later events other than his kinship to men 
that Judge Hargis currently considered enemies (Cardwell‘s brother was the police judge 
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before whom Hargis had refused to appear earlier in the year, while Dr. Cox was married 
to Cardwell‘s sister).  James Hargis, still angered by his brother‘s death at the hand of the 
brother of a sworn political enemy, was able, years later, place the killing within the 
larger narrative of a ―family feud,‖ a narrative with which few would argue, considering 
that this type of conflict had been considered endemic to eastern Kentucky since the 
1880s.   
Even though Breathitt County had a far more violent history than the state‘s other 
―feud‖ locales, kinship had never seemed to play an explicit role in factional fighting in 
the past.  What had become known as the ―Strong-Amis feud‖ of the late 1860s and early 
1870s had taken place between former home guard allies related by marriage but 
nevertheless carried out over the allocation of livestock from mutual political and military 
enemies.  The ―Little-Burnett Feud,‖ the name given to the events leading to the death of 
Judge Burnett in 1878, centered around the election of a bachelor with no relatives in 
Breathitt County.  More recently, the ambush of William Strong in 1897 did not seem to 
have any familial significance but was in apparent reaction to Strong‘s unrelenting 
antagonism toward political enemies.  But Judge Hargis‘s insistence that 1902‘s events 
be spoken of in familial language (an insistence that much of the Kentucky press chose 
not to dispute) was corroborated by assumptions that Bluegrass Kentuckians and 
Americans in general had accepted about Kentucky mountaineers, and these assumptions 
could work to Hargis‘s political advantage by taking the story of violence in Breathitt 
County out of the political realm and placing it in the familial.  Hargis‘s obfuscation of 
these events proved effective in posterity; future popular accounts of the events of 1902 
placed the death of John Hargis within that year rather than in the previous century, 
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exacerbating the view that the roiling ―feud‖ had begun with a concerted assault on the 
Hargis family.
754
  By establishing that his family was under attack, Judge Hargis justified 
any future violence directed at his enemies as retribution, while simultaneously obscuring 
its political import.  Even though he might be ridiculed as a ―feudist‖ like so many of 
Kentucky‘s local politicians had before him, Hargis would still retain power.     
The shooting and subsequent death of Dr. Braxton Cox on the night of April 13, 
1902 seemed to bear out the claims that a state of mutual antagonism that could constitute 
a ―feud‖ now existed.755  Cox was killed after receiving a telephone call requesting a 
medical visit.  The call had proven to be false, and Cox was on his way home when he 
was riddled with buckshot.
756
  Although no one was ever willing to come forward as a 
witness to his slaying, it was rumored that the fatal shots had come from either the 
courthouse or the livery stables co-owned by Judge Hargis.  Cox‘s eighty-year old 
mother-in-law, aloof from the political arguments that led to his death by virtue of her 
age and sex, was the only Jackson resident willing to publicly accuse Judge Hargis of his 
death.  His wife‘s death from a fever later in the year lent his death an air of Victorian 
romance.
757
             
James Cockrell was shot and killed within yards of Cox‘s place of death the 
following July, a deadly act that attracted far more statewide attention than his 
guardian‘s.758  This time the shooting took place in the middle of the day, and it was 
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widely acknowledged that the rifle shots had come from an upper window in the 
courthouse.  Cockrell was trundled onto a railroad car and transported to a hospital in  
 
Figure 25: Dr. Braxton Cox 
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Lexington, where he died the next day.
759
  His emergency arrival was telegraphed ahead 
of the northbound L&E locomotive, catching the attention of Lexington newspapers and 
broadcasting the news of the ongoing feud to readers all over the state.  Before his 
expiration from internal bleeding, the press had already placed his impending death 
within a feud narrative that swapped facts for conformity to a prearranged plot; as he lay 
dying, one Lexington paper announced the young town marshal as the latest victim of the 
―Breathitt County feuds‖ and faintly praised him as ―superior in every way to Thomas 
Cockrell, his brother,‖ whose killing of Ben Hargis was implicitly blamed for beginning 
the chain of events that had led to the older Cockrell‘s imminent demise.  The jumbled 
evening edition announcement called Ben Hargis the son and the brother of Judge Hargis 
at different places in the article, foreshadowing future media errors in the reporting of 
Breathitt County‘s violence.760     
Even though it was clear to many that Cox‘s and Cockrell‘s assassinations were 
both the work of the courthouse ring (or according to its will), the motivations were not 
entirely clear.  Both deaths could conceivably be interpreted as either feudal acts of 
revenge for past wrongs or acts of violence carried out for the purpose of eliminating 
political opponents.  Initially, the revenge motif seemed more likely, especially in light of 
the fact that an armed altercation between a Cockrell and a Hargis had preceded another 
Cockrell‘s murder.  The Republican Lexington Leader, the paper that had produced the 
stirring account of Cockrell‘s death the day before, expressed confusion regarding any 
clear political basis for the feud. ―One of the strangest features in connection with the 
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feud is that while it originated in a political contest, and was increased by the killing of 
Ben Hargis by Tom Cockrell, both factions are Democrats, so that whatever political 
feeling exists in the feud it is all on one side and in one party.‖  Instead it was suggested 
that James Cockrell had been disposed of so that his brother, awaiting trial in another 
county, would be utterly defenseless in his imminent trial for murder.  While the 
Cockrells had been successful in securing a change of venue, Governor J.C.W. Beckham 
had assigned Judge Hargis‘s Bluegrass cousin and fellow Democratic State Committee 
member, Thomas Hargis, as special judge. 
761
  Thomas Cockrell, the Leader predicted, 
was ―to be left to the tender mercies of his enemies who are now said to be in control of 
the legal machinery of the county.‖  As in past interpretations of feud violence in eastern 
Kentucky, Cockrell‘s death was headlined as only ―Another Dark Chapter Added to 
Bloody Breathitt‘s Terrible Record that Savors of Middle Age Barbarism.‖762          
Wolfe County‘s Democratic Hazel Green Herald‘s reportage of its troubled 
neighbor‘s trials and tribulations addressed the heightened attention on the Three Forks 
region with a typical combination of local defensiveness and regional solidarity coupled 
with attempts to keep Breathitt County at arm‘s length.  During the weeks leading up to 
Thomas Cockrell‘s trial, it criticized other printed accounts of ―the Hargis-Cockrell feud 
in Breathitt‖ for factual errors, most notably those regarding familial relations.763  Shortly 
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after James Cockrell was killed, the paper criticized the Leader‘s (and that of all other 
―outsiders‖) sudden interest in Jackson‘s internal affairs.  The people of Breathitt County 
were having ―‗a hell of their own,‘‖ and ―people outside the immediate trouble do not 
know the cause of any of the parties involved, save as retailed to them, and are apt, 
therefore, to misjudge.‖  Without explicitly announcing a ―feud‖ between the Hargises 
and Cockrells, the Herald assured readers that the troubles were strictly part of a ―family 
affair.‖764  Weeks later, when Hazel Green was selected as a change of venue for Tom 
Cockrell‘s murder trial, the Herald editor crowed that a trial ―out of the range of the ‗feud 
belt‘‖ would put an end to the sordid series of events.765  But while the reciprocity of 
violence that defined a feud was acknowledged, Judge Hargis was not implicated 
personally.  No doubt noting that heightened exposure of Breathitt County would 
probably be damaging to his administration, he stated that he and his adherents ―were 
never in any feud‖ and elected to abort his pursuance of a murder conviction for Tom 
Cockrell a month after James Cockrell‘s unsolved murder.766   
The judge‘s use of feud to depoliticize recent events was not entirely successful.  
The existence, or denial, of an ongoing ―family feud‖ would have been an effective 
device for depoliticizing James Cockrell‘s death had some of the individuals involved, 
namely Hargis and his ally David Redwine, not attained such high profiles in Kentucky 
politics.  As circuit judge, Redwine might have remained aloof from what had become 
known as the ―Hargis-Cockrell feud‖ had he not denied Tom Cockrell‘s first petition for 
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a change of venue.
767
  Redwine was still a pariah among Republicans for his role in the 
Music Hall Convention, and many still considered him the prime mover in initiating the 
Goebel disaster.  Extant hatred toward him motivated many to blame him, at least 
indirectly, for deaths in the streets of Jackson as well.  Months after Judge Hargis 
seemingly ended the feud by withdrawing from Tom Cockrell‘s prosecution (which 
ended in acquittal), the Lexington Leader kept up its printed assault on the Breathitt 
County court, using William Goebel‘s memory as a rhetorical weapon.768  ―There never 
would have been an hour during the entire trouble when the Circuit Court could not have 
controlled the situation absolutely, if [Redwine] had injected into it one-hundredth part of 
the zeal shown on the occasion of the foul assassination of Mr. Goebel at Frankfort when 
the state was taxed $100,000 and every piece of its constabulary was set in motion to run 
down the assassins,‖ the Leader accused.769  A few months later the paper again exhumed 
Goebel in connection to Redwine and Hargis: ―Breathitt county is today the political 
stink hole of Kentucky, and elections there are nothing more than licensed orgies of 
brutality and crime.  Judge Redwine was the chairman of Goebel‘s Music Hall 
Convention and Judge Hargis was one of the master spirits of the Goebelites on the floor 
and, under their absolute sway Breathitt County is today the best exemplification of the 
horrors of Goebelism to be found in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.‖770  With the 
exception of the Louisville Courier Journal, a paper that had long attempted to find an 
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ever-vanishing middle ground in Kentucky politics, the only newspapers that took special 
notice of the killings did so out of recognition for Breathitt County‘s connections to the 
state‘s recent tumult.  The Courier-Journal, whose editorial helm had only grudgingly 
accepted Goebel‘s candidacy, was joined in calling for further investigation of Cox‘s and 
Cockrell‘s murders (both of which had gone uninvestigated) only by newspapers who had 
bitterly opposed Goebel three years earlier.
771
  Even if many believed that Breathitt 
County‘s feud was a kinship-based conflict in a county widely notorious for directionless 
violence, the fracture of legitimacy created by Goebel dictated that unproven 
malfeasances committed or abetted by the men who helped to elect him be broadcast as 
politically motivated.   
After James Marcum alerted the newspaper that he had been receiving death 
threats since the death of Dr. Cox, the Leader enhanced its attack, printing letters from 
Marcum, Hargis and Callahan but allowing Marcum the larger share of column space.  
The Republican newspaper accepted Marcum‘s claims whole cloth, and they were 
reprinted throughout the state, but primarily in other party papers.
772
  He produced an 
affidavit signed by Mose Feltner, one of his clients in a criminal case, claiming that Judge 
Hargis and Sheriff Callahan had offered the latter money for killing Marcum months 
earlier.
773
  Hargis and Callahan both responded bitterly, claiming that Marcum had lied 
for reasons that they could not comprehend.  Hargis cited his own record of shutting 
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down blind tigers as evidence for his county‘s lack of troubles.774  Callahan was more 
candid, acknowledging that Marcum might have reason to be alarmed since ―two 
prominent men‖ had been killed in Jackson in recent months.  As sheriff, Callahan had to 
own up to the civil disorder that the county was suffering, but he was quick to deny that it 
was anything but undirected disorder rather than a ―conspiracy.‖775  Marcum responded 
by denying Hargis‘s ignorance of a conspiracy, openly naming Callahan‘s deputies, 
Curtis Jett and Tom White, as part of a conspiracy to kill him, but did not go so far as to 
unequivocally repeat his implication of the judge and the sheriff, except to say that they 
would all rejoice at his leaving Jackson (he did, as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
accuse Callahan of involvement in the murder of his uncle, William Strong, in 1897).
776
  
Marcum‘s most damning accusation, echoed by his friends at the Leader, was that his 
county‘s courthouse ring was being protected by Democrats all over the state.  ―[Hargis 
and Callahan] have men employed, newspaper correspondents, to misrepresent the facts,‖ 
Marcum asserted, ―and Hargis is now trying to arouse political prejudices in order to 
secure the sympathy of the Democratic press.  There is no politics in the law.  It was 
made for all parties and should be obeyed by all, even the ‗leading Democrats in Eastern 
Kentucky.‘‖777  Hargis directed Breathitt County‘s grand jury to indict Marcum for 
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criminal libel, stifling Marcum‘s ability to make more public accusations for the next 
seven months (the charges were eventually dismissed).
778
   
Figure 23: Curtis Jett, late 1890s 
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In May, 1903 Marcum was shot and killed in a manner almost identical to the 
previous year‘s publicized killings, again within sight of the courthouse (this time in its 
doorway) and very near to where Cox and Cockrell had also been killed.
779
  Marcum‘s 
claims that he had received death threats were borne out by his behavior in the weeks 
leading up to his death.  During the winter and spring of 1903 he had rarely left his home 
and, when he did venture past the courthouse to his office on Jackson‘s main street, it was 
always in the company of women, or while carrying his infant son.  This strategy of 
remaining in the company of non-political innocents for safety seems to have been 
effective; on the day he died, it was supposedly his first attempt in 1903 to walk in front 
of the courthouse in the company of other adult men.
780
  By dying violently after publicly 
announcing threats against his life and implicating the courthouse ring, Marcum 
succeeded in his goal from the previous year, exposing the questionable actions of 
Breathitt County‘s government and demonstrating that what the United States knew as 
the Hargis-Cockrell feud was not a horizontal ―family affair‖ but instead the outgrowth of 
a statewide struggle for legitimacy that Kentucky had dealt with for years.  The violent 
death of such a prominent figure, carried out in the middle of the day in the presence of 
Jackson‘s citizenry, proved to be the beginning of the end for Jackson‘s courthouse ring.             
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 “…this is only one of many similar feuds which have disgraced the State…”                                            
James Marcums‘ was the most widely-publicized and commented-upon ―feudal‖ 
death to occur in Kentucky since feuds had apparently begun to run rampant in the 
mountains thirty years before.  Marcum was one of the state‘s most high-ranking 
Republicans, a US Commissioner and corporate attorney of some importance and, 
perhaps most importantly, a symbol of eastern Kentucky‘s future potential for success 
through economic and political integration with the ―outside world.‖  The murder of such 
a well-known individual was more newsworthy than the bushwhacking and street 
homicides of county politicians and their underlings that had comprised the French-
Eversole feud and the Rowan County War or, for that matter, the deaths of Judge Burnett 
in 1878 and William Strong in 1897.  James Marcum‘s homicide presented a conundrum 
for Bluegrass Kentuckians who had previously interpreted the eastern third‘s feud 
phenomenon as a sui generis product of isolation or racial (Anglo-Saxon or Celtic) 
peculiarity.  His seemingly accidental involvement in a drama that was supposed to 
involve only disreputable men was confirmed by Tom Cockrell‘s assertion that Marcum 
―was never implicated in any feud.‖781  An editorial in the Louisville Courier-Journal 
printed soon after his death illustrates the turn in interpretation of what many 
Kentuckians considered a familiar occurrence presented by the Hargis-Cockrell feud‘s 
latest death.   
The feud which took Mr. Marcum‘s life has caused, it is said, no less than forty deaths in the last 
two years.  This would be an astounding statement to any one who was a stranger to these 
mountain vendettas.  But this is only one of many similar feuds which have disgraced the State 
and will continue to disgrace it until the State shows a more resolute purpose and power to uphold 
the law. 
 
These feuds have too often been looked upon as romantic episodes of primitive life in our 
backwoods.  That is entirely too charitable a view to take of them.  There is nothing romantic or 
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manly about them.  Originating in some trivial quarrel, they continue for generations of cowardice, 
treachery and assassination.  The murders which are their outcome are not even committed man to 
man, in the open, but almost invariably are perpetrated after patient lying-in-wait and ambush 
extending over months and years.
782
   
 
The editorial provided a succinct description of Kentucky‘s endemic feud violence as it 
was understood nationally: series of violent acts employing ambush-style homicides (as 
the same paper had described the death of William Goebel) taking place deep in the 
mountains, caused by disagreements of an unknown or unimportant nature, producing an 
undetermined number of deaths and lasting over the course of generations by a mutual 
motivation of vengeance (the editorial notably omitted the family or ―clan‖ as the basis 
for feud factionalism).  But the ways in which the Hargis-Cockrell feud did not fit into 
this previously formed mold, namely its chronological brevity and fairly clear political 
motivations, were generally ignored.  Only the Lexington Leader, virtually the only 
member of the press eager to examine the killings of 1902 through a political lens, placed 
Marcum‘s death within the lineage of Cox‘s and Cockrell‘s, referencing Marcum‘s 
accusations from the previous November.
783
  The vast majority of Kentucky newspapers, 
most of them Democratic (and more openly partisan than the Courier-Journal), preferred 
instead that Breathitt County‘s killings be considered the product of extra-political 
―lawlessness.‖784  ―Officers of the law and courts of justice‖ did not direct the actions of 
―assassins and anarchists‖ in this interpretation of events, but were instead cowed by 
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them.
785
  When the Courier-Journal did eventually censure Hargis and Callahan for 
protecting Marcum‘s accused killers, they were identified as ―law officers‖ of ―the so-
called county of Breathitt,‖ suggesting that the very county itself, not just its 
officeholders, a place that the paper and its readers were well aware of, was bereft of 
legitimacy.
786
 Well aware of the ever-present danger of libel charges, most newspapers 
throughout Kentucky were careful to treat Breathitt County‘s violence as a sin of the 
local authority‘s omission rather than violence directed with political certainty.       
Even though Marcum‘s murder could not successfully challenge the flawed feud 
explanation for violence in the highlands, it did call into question, at least temporarily, 
the assumption that eastern Kentucky was a ―barbarians‘ world beyond the polis.‖787  
Throughout the coverage of Breathitt County that spanned the summer of 1903 after 
Marcum‘s death, the press displayed an internal tension, a tension between blaming 
certain individuals and blaming some unknowable quality in and about the mountain 
county that made it inherently violent.  The latter explanation seemed to be the preference 
of the largely Democratic press, since blaming specific people, namely James Hargis, 
David Redwine or Edward Callahan, would confirm the partisan accusations made by the 
Lexington Leader and delegitimize their party and the gains it had made in the wake of 
the Goebel affair.  Hargis‘s best tactic was a continuation of feud-related rhetoric with 
himself cast as indignant victim.  The previous year he had cast the death of James 
Cockrell within a larger feud narrative that acknowledged enmity between his family (but 
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not necessarily himself) and the Cockrells, one that had nothing to do with politics.  Now, 
however, Hargis acknowledged Marcum as one of a number of ―[R]epublican leaders‖ 
who had ―endeavored to run [Hargis] out of the county.‖  But Hargis still insisted that 
this was a conflict of a communal sort and determined by family and old, bitter memory, 
not current party matters.  More than six years dead, William Strong‘s memory was 
exhumed to put a finer point on the feud issue.  When Hargis was a boy, Strong had 
raided his family‘s farm and left him hungry and shoeless.788  Curtis Jett‘s mother had 
rescued him.  Marcum, he said, had been ―reared in an atmosphere of feuds‖ and that 
there was ―not a family in Breathitt county some one of whose members has not been 
slain by Marcum blood,‖ (my italics) an indictment that doubtlessly referred to Marcum‘s 
notorious relative.
789
  Breathitt County‘s violent past, cast in communal terms and 
intermingled with the feud theme established in other parts of eastern Kentucky, was 
putty in Hargis‘s hands.  
An insistence upon the determinism of kinship as a source of violence disguised 
political motives- except when it was advantageous to announce political prejudice under 
the banner of William Goebel‘s memory.  Even Democratic papers that had no interest in 
using the language of feuding insisted on at least acknowledging that, since ―murder is 
murder‖ regardless of politics, Marcum‘s slaying ―was as bad as the murder of Goebel,‖ 
while another praised Breathitt County‘s ―Democratic officials‖ for ―using every effort to 
bring the guilty to justice‖ unlike when Goebel ―was assassinated on the capital grounds 
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under Republican rule…‖790 While Republicans had hindered Powers‘ and Howard‘s 
prosecutions, the Democratic press, in contrast, could now claim to be ―on the forefront‖ 
of nonpartisan justice in avenging ―the Republican son of Breathitt.‖791       
In the first few weeks after James Marcum‘s death, the only person in Breathitt 
County willing to publicly suggest a courthouse ring conspiracy was his widow Abrelia 
Hurst Marcum.  During May, 1903, it was often said that the identities of Marcum‘s (and 
Cox‘s and Cockrell‘s) killer(s) were widely known and that fears of reprisals kept most of 
the populace silent.  But as a woman, Abrelia Marcum was immune from the kind of 
violence that had been used to repress dissent in Jackson.  As a woman and mother, 
Abrelia Marcum represented to the men of Breathitt County home and family, communal 
institutions that had not often been violated by the county‘s decades-old cycle of violence 
since the Civil War.  Brutality toward women, especially spousal abuse, was not unheard 
of in Breathitt County any more than it was anywhere else in the United States  (after all, 
a wife murder had been a factor in the confrontation that led to the death of Judge Burnett 
in 1878).  But deadly violence that had such clearly political purposes could not be 
directed at women, since they were not recognized as political actors.  James Marcum‘s 
tactic of shielding himself with women and children in the weeks before his assassination 
demonstrated the sacredness with which the ―separate sphere‖ was regarded and the 
determination of even the most ruthless men to keep violence, perhaps especially 
politically motivated violence, as far from women as possible.
792
 Just as Braxton Cox‘s 
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elderly mother-in-law felt free to speak out against the courthouse ring because of her 
status, Abrelia Marcum was able to do the same.  Far from acting as a motivation for 
violence, as feud suggested, family, represented by women and children, was instead an 
obstruction to violence.                                       
Abrelia Marcum not only implicated Hargis‘s ―clan‖ with her husband‘s homicide, 
but broadly blamed ―the administration of Judge Hargis‖ for leading to a general 
atmosphere of lawlessness.  As was the case with contemporary critiques of Breathitt 
County from within Kentucky, she indiscriminately blamed the courthouse ring for both 
committing crime and failing to prosecute it.  Her accusation regarding her husband‘s 
murder was fortified by a broader proclamation of the Hargis courthouse‘s illegitimacy as 
a keeper of the peace:   
Judge Hargis and the whole state knows that there have been thirty-eight homicides in Breathitt 
county during his administration as county judge.  What attempt has been made by him as the 
highest official in the county to have the laws enforced?  When he became county judge about two 
years ago there was no more peaceful county in Kentucky.  Our people walked the streets at night 
in the pursuit of their vocations with absolute safety and no thought of danger. 
 
Today business men who can are leaving.  Our citizens do not dare to express their opinion for 
fear of assassination.  Citizens dare not leave their homes at night for fear of being the mark of 
men who are immune from punishment.  Every man whose life‘s blood has stained the soil of 
Breathitt county during Judge Hargis‘s administration of law has bit the dust at the hands of some 
adherent of their clan, or his identity remains unknown and no strenuous effort has been made to 
find him.
793
  
 
Although Marcum interchangeably blamed Hargis for crimes of malice as well as 
negligence, she notably blamed the entirety of Breathitt County‘s violence on him with 
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no reference to past troubles.  If Breathitt County was presently a place where violence 
was tolerated, it was because of individuals currently in positions of power, not because 
of the brutal state of being suggested by the decades-old nickname ―Bloody Breathitt.‖  
Even though she made reference to the Hargis administration‘s ―clan,‖ her attack made 
no reference to the existence of ―feuds‖ past or present.  In fact, the very existence of a 
―clan‖ in and around the courthouse was an indictment of corruption in and of itself.       
Initially, Mrs. Marcum‘s accusations had little effect on the courthouse ring.  
Soon after Governor Beckham offered a $200 reward for James Marcum‘s murderer, 
deputy sheriff Curtis Jett was accused and indicted.
794
  Jett‘s being a direct subordinate of 
the courthouse was not forgotten but was minimized somewhat by the rumor that he and 
James Marcum had ―quarreled‖ publicly shortly before the latter‘s death, a rumor that 
emphasized personal enmity over political calculation.
795
  Jett hired James Marcum‘s old 
rival B.F. French as his attorney, and went to lengths to see that he was tried in Breathitt 
County (soon after, deputy Tom White was indicted as well).
796
  Suspecting that Jett‘s 
trial would prove to be politically charged, and chagrined by growing criticism of his 
relationship with the Hargis courthouse, Governor Beckham issued an executive order 
sending the state militia to Jackson.
797
  During the peaceful atmosphere that pervaded 
Jett‘s and White‘s trial, Beckham announced that the ―situation‖ in Jackson ―has been 
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exaggerated‖ and was hesitant to send more members of the militia to fortify the ones 
already sent (less than four weeks later, the militia unit was ordered back to the Bluegrass 
to prevent a potential lynching during a highly publicized murder trial of three black 
men).
798
  Ed Callahan recused himself from his role in summoning witnesses for the trial, 
and he and Hargis took a very public role in supporting Jett‘s and White‘s defense.799  
The public role that they and French, all well-known political enemies of James Marcum, 
took in defending the deputies prompted many to suspect that there was a large-scale 
effort to prevent Jett and White from eventually plea bargaining and implicating them all 
in a larger conspiracy.  The northern Republican Harper‟s Weekly attacked Breathitt 
County as only an example of a larger problem endemic to Kentucky as a whole.  ―These 
assassinations in Kentucky are attributed by some observers to the system of county 
politics in Kentucky,‖ it announced.  ―The struggle for the county offices is so intense 
that rival politicians and their partisans are led to murder to attain their ends, and 
assassination is further fostered by the spirit of the vendetta which prevails in the 
mountainous regions of the State.‖800  A fire that destroyed a hotel belonging to a witness 
for the prosecution during the trial prompted many members of both political parties to 
concur with the magazine‘s assessment.801  Yet Circuit Court Judge Redwine, a firm ally 
of the house of Hargis and Callahan, managed to remain personally aloof from most 
criticisms.  When the trial in Jackson ended with a hung jury rather than an acquittal 
(with Redwine on the bench), the Hazel Green Herald sardonically surmised it could 
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only mean an end to the ―holy alliance of Hargis & Redwine.‖802  A change of venue to 
what was considered a neutral county eventually resulted in life sentences for Jett and 
White.
803
  
Throughout the trial Hargis‘s position in the state Democratic organization 
remained fairly untarnished.  He retained his place in the central committee and was 
honored with a dinner arranged by Lexington Democrats shortly after Jett‘s and White‘s 
change of venue.
804
  But on higher, more publicly visible levels of party and government, 
embarrassment was harder to hide.  Smarting from continued accusations of his 
complicity in Breathitt County‘s record of violence, and the inordinate number of 
pardons he had issued there, Governor Beckham was forced to address the matter of the 
unhappy county at the beginning of his campaign for reelection.  With manifold 
references to William Goebel‘s death at Republican hands, Beckham countered that far 
more pardons had been issued in Breathitt County by Republican Governor Bradley, and 
bandied the name of accused conspirator James Howard (Howard released an angry reply 
from his cell accusing Beckham of using Howard‘s name to ―distract the public gaze 
from [Beckham‘s] conduct, his political pardons, his trades and unholy alliances…).805  
Beckham also parried with northern critics over the quantity of violence in his state as a 
whole, a quantity he contended was not on scale with much of the North.  ―The calling 
into service of the entire national guard of one of the northern states to suppress a strike, 
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where hundreds may be slain, does not attract one-half the notice as does the use of one 
company of Kentucky militia in aiding some Circuit court in trial of a criminal.‖806   
As the summer months of his campaign passed, the issue of Breathitt County did 
not go away, and Beckham was obliged to address it even in front of an exclusively 
Democratic assemblage.  At the official opening of the Democratic state campaign, he 
declared, ―that the Democratic officials have done everything in their power to put an end 
to the troubles in Breathitt County no one disputes.  They were purely local, and not half 
as serious as the feudal outbreak in Clay County during the last [Bradley] administration.  
If the Republicans had shown the same desire to punish the assassins of William Goebel 
that the Democrats did to punish Marcum‘s assassins, both crimes would now be avenged.
 
 
Let the past be forgotten, and let us stand together henceforth shoulder to shoulder as 
Democrats, with our hearts full of devotion for the welfare of our State and Nation.‖807  
Beckham‘s address to the party had multiple implications.  Even many members of his 
own party may not have been convinced that Breathitt County‘s killings were rooted only 
in local conflicts.  Breathitt County‘s violence had to be, as had always been the case in 
other eastern locales (especially one ruled by Republicans), purely internal and without 
any greater significance or implication.  In addition, his reference to an analogous ―feud‖ 
situation in a Republican county during a Republican administration negated whatever 
attempts Republicans might make to pillory his party for sanctioning violence.   
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Breathitt County‘s recent assassinations and the ―Clay County War‖ were, by 
virtue of their placement in the state‘s (supposedly Republican) primitive mountains, cut 
from the same cloth, even if they had grown from two separate conflicts and under 
different regimes.
808
  Even if local party affiliations were the origin of violence, they 
were based upon small differences between decidedly local politicians and their 
henchmen, with no relation to larger issues faced by the state or national parties.  
Implicitly, this suggested that these feuds were hardly political at all, but rather primeval 
products of their mountain environment and far into ―the past‖ which was better 
―forgotten.‖  Beckham echoed the tone taken by the Courier-Journal in portraying 
Breathitt County after the riot of 1878.  Against the threat of northern/Republican censure 
it was to be carefully defended.  But, when addressing the issue to an audience within the 
state, it was more advantageous to rhetorically place the mountains outside of Kentucky 
and outside of the present.  ―Purely local‖ ―feudal outbreak[s]‖ could be easily dismissed, 
especially when individuals with direct connections to the governor‘s office were left 
unmentioned.  Beckham‘s November victory indicated that sacrificing the reputation of 
eastern Kentucky (at least when done to a Kentucky audience) was an effective 
Democratic tool.  In his annual address the following January Beckham repeated these 
claims, but, safely back in office, used language that restored the highlands back into the 
state at large while repeating his earlier critique of the North‘s urban crime.  
―‗[I]rresponsible romances‘‖ had inflated Breathitt County‘s conditions.  ―‗It is not an 
exaggeration to say that there was not a day during the past year that human life was not 
safe in Kentucky, even in Breathitt County, than it is any night upon the streets of 
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Chicago or New York, from the sanguinary columns of whose voracious journals the 
people have been told day after day of the awful condition of lawlessness and crime in 
Kentucky.‘‖809           
 
The conviction of Jett and White revealed a small chink in the courthouse ring‘s 
armor, especially after the county had experienced more scrutiny ―than any other section 
of the world‖ over the summer.810 Watterson‘s Courier-Journal declared what many 
already believed, that Jett and White were simply ―pawns‖ under the sway of higher 
authorities, and that Hargis, Callahan and Redwine were expected to be directly 
implicated in the future (although, at the time, Watterson refrained from naming 
names).
811
  J. Wise Hagins, now almost alone in his concerted effort to fight the 
courthouse ring, nevertheless felt safe to publish an anti-Hargis Democratic paper, 
endorsing a Republican for sheriff rather than Hargis‘s and Callahan‘s ―Midnight Ticket,‖ 
so-named because of their nomination by a six-man Democratic committee ―in a lonely 
hall, long after honest yeomanry of the county had retired, and, in the company of the 
bats, owls and midnight marauders…‖812 Within Jackson, the sheriff and judges could do 
little more than show up for Salvation Army street services to reaffirm their respective 
upstanding roles in the community (Hargis and Callahan had previously been known for 
usually remaining behind closed doors).
813
  But events in late 1903 and early 1904 
suggest that Hargis‘s and Callahan‘s positions within the county and state party apparatus 
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was not irrevocably damaged.  Despite Hagins‘ continuing attacks on his legitimacy as a 
candidate, Callahan was reelected sheriff in November against the Republicans‘ ―Law 
and Order Ticket.‖  Hagins accused members of the state militia of fixing the election for 
Callahan, an accusation that was never proven and did little to help Hagins‘ case.814  If 
the militia‘s tampering was the sole cause of Callahan‘s victory, it revealed unspoken 
support from state authorities, namely the militia‘s commander-in-chief, Governor 
Beckham.  If Hagins‘ accusations were false, it meant that Callahan‘s reelection was the 
will of Breathitt County‘s white male majority and, therefore, legitimate.  By the end of 
1903 it appeared that the Marcum murder had far less of an impact on Breathitt County‘s 
political status quo than many had suspected months earlier.  The ―Hargis-Cockrell feud‖ 
that spawned it was all but forgotten for the time being. 
James Hargis‘s restored, or perhaps undamaged, position in the Kentucky 
Democratic Party was revealed in the passage of what came to be known as the ―Day 
Law,‖ one of the most far-reaching pieces of Jim Crow legislation in American history.815  
In January, 1904, Breathitt County‘s state representative, Carl Day proposed a bill to 
effectively prohibit integrated educational facilities for all private institutions 
(Kentucky‘s public education system was constitutionally segregated), a bill whose sole 
target was Berea College, virtually the only integrated school south of the Ohio River.
816
  
                                                 
 
814
BCN, 6, 13 November, 1903.  
 
815
George C. Wright.  A History of Blacks in Kentucky, Volume II: In Pursuit of Equality.  
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1992): pp. 136-148; ―The Founding of Lincoln Institute,‖ 
FCHQ, Vol. 49, No. 1 (January, 1975): pp. 57-70;  Klotter & Tapp, pp. 396-400, 418-425; Paul David 
Nelson, ―Experiment in Interracial Education at Berea College, 1858-1908,‖ The Journal of Negro History, 
Vol. 59, No. 1 (January, 1974), pp. 13-27; Betty Jean Hall and Richard Allen Heckman, ―Berea College 
and the Day Law,‖ RKHS, Vol. 66, No. 1 (January, 1968): pp. 35-52.  All of these secondary source 
accounts of the Day Law have far more to say about its effects than its legislative origins.   
 
335 
 
With no fear for the negative publicity their presence might bring, Judges Hargis and 
Redwine attended the state house‘s educational committee closed session (representatives 
from Berea College were excluded) to express their support, as well as that of their 
―section.‖  Although his name had become synonymous with ―feudism‖ during the past 
year, the press did not portray Judge Hargis‘s presence at the capitol as peculiar or 
deleterious to the bill‘s potential passage.817  The popularity of Day‘s House Bill No. 25 
among white Kentuckians was confirmed not only by its 73-5 passage in the House but 
also by its five dissenters‘ (all from eastern Kentucky districts) respective failures to get 
reelected the following November.
818
  After only five senators also voted against it, 
Day‘s bill became law the following summer.  In October, 1904 Berea College was found 
to be in violation, thus beginning a four-year legal battle that concluded with the Supreme 
Court‘s upholding the Day Law.819  The original bill‘s provenance in the mountains, and 
persistent rumors that Day and Berea president William G. Frost had collaborated in the 
bill‘s drafting, may well have fed this suspicion and helped prevent an arrangement that 
never came to be: a Republican alliance between blacks and mountaineers in Kentucky 
(this irrespective of the fact that Day was a Democrat).  
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Liberal northern indignation against the Day Law was aimed at both the general 
and the particular, targeting Breathitt County, the state of Kentucky and the South as a 
whole.  One ingenuous author, apparently ignorant of Carl Day‘s mountain roots, decried 
―the other two thirds of the State‖ for imposing upon eastern Kentucky a needless 
inoculation against race-mixing and even favorably compared Berea to Breathitt 
County‘s own Jackson Academy.820  Since he still needed whatever support he could get 
in eastern Kentucky and the Bluegrass, Frost himself did not explicitly blame Day or 
even race prejudice itself, but spread, the blame broadly across the ―Bourbon movement 
which had extended over the whole South‖ propelled by Democratic one-party rule.  ―To 
understand the South,‖ Frost wrote to northern benefactors, ―we must remember that the 
Southern States have never had a really democratic government and that the majority of 
the people of the South have no comprehension of what fairness, equality, and republican 
institutions really are.‖821  Northerners, however, were far more eager to place fault more 
precisely.   One member of Berea‘s board of trustees blamed the ―notorious‖ Breathitt 
County itself while another attacked Day as ―that polished and cultured statesman from 
Breathitt County-Bloody Breathitt-who is not sure whether Shakespeare was the 
discoverer of America or the inventor of a new kind of breakfast food.‖822  Breathitt 
County was sure to be the root cause of Kentucky‘s moral backsliding due to its general 
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ignorance, if not its politics.  The imprecise attribution of the county‘s violence to 
―ignorance‖ worked equally well for its apparent production of state-mandated race 
hatred but failed to acknowledge the Day Law‘s overwhelming popularity among other 
white Kentuckians.  
In the years after the Day Law‘s June, 1904 passage, various commentators 
blamed its unprecedented enforcement of segregation on Carl Day‘s egregious personal 
racism or a personal vendetta toward Berea College.
823
 But by ignoring the ―notorious‖ 
mountain county‘s politics, and the men who directed it, the complex relationship 
between the seemingly all-white county and the passage of the maligned statute was lost.  
Day‘s proposal to legislatively prevent ―the contamination of the white children of 
Kentucky,‖ and Hargis‘s and Redwine‘s public endorsement, was undoubtedly a product 
of an enduring popular belief in white supremacy even in place with a miniscule black 
population.
824
  Their espousal of forced segregation reflected the conservative 
Democratic regime that had officially controlled the county since the Civil War.  But it 
was a means to a more tactical end as well.  The Hargis courthouse‘s role in introducing 
the bill was every bit as utilitarian as it was ideological.  The killing of James Marcum, 
and its fallout, was potentially the Kentucky Democratic Party‘s greatest embarrassment 
since William Goebel‘s election law.  The Day Law was a way of re-ingratiating 
Breathitt County‘s Democrats to the rest of the state by appealing to the popular 
Democratic current of legislated racism. It demonstrated that, though Hargis had been the 
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source of scandal for employing well-publicized assassinations to consolidate his power, 
he was nevertheless loyal to, and a white supremacist exemplar of, the state party at large.
 
 
The Day Law established Breathitt County‘s place in the sectional and party-based in-
state division established by the Goebel assassination.  One defender of Berea‘s co-racial 
education avowed that, aside from its being ―evidence of the negrophobia which is 
sweeping over the South,‖ Day‘s bill was just as likely ―a political move [on the part of 
Hargis and Day] to win the favor of those who desire to keep the colored people in 
subjection, and also of those who dislike Berea‘s work for the education of mountain 
Republicans.‖825  It represented Breathitt County‘s continuing importance to the party as 
a bulwark of Democracy within the Republican mountains, an importance that was 
perhaps not as damaged by the Marcum assassination as some may have assumed. While 
it may have redeemed the Hargis courthouse in the eyes of his fellow party members, it 
may have instead demonstrated that it was never in need of redemption.     
Embittered by the wound sustained by its home town institution, the Republican 
Berea Citizen groused that the formation of a new mountain judicial district ―for the sake 
of enthroning the famous Judge Hargis‖ was next on the General Assembly‘s agenda.826  
Four days later, a redistricting that made Breathitt part of a theoretically Democrat-
majority district was passed.
827
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“Every Goebel Democrat in this county is hot for us.” 
 
The ease with which Hargis, Redwine and Callahan moved within Democratic 
circles outside of their home county after the Marcum murder suggests that the man‘s 
death was not generally viewed as an embarrassment to the party, and very well may 
have been looked upon with approval by some.  The Goebel affair had radicalized both 
Democrats and Republicans in Kentucky, and politically-motivated assassination was 
considered less odious than at other times in the state‘s history.  Still, early twentieth 
century-Kentucky was, as always, concerned with its image to outsiders, and the 
problems associated with Breathitt County had to be addressed more fully than could be 
achieved by the conviction of the two deputies.  The Courier-Journal‘s assertion that Jett 
and White had been ―pawns‖ had to be balanced with Hargis‘s barely-damaged statewide 
political clout.  Just as Hargis‘s strategy of placing the deaths of Cox and Cockrell within 
a larger and more nebulous feud narrative served his needs in 1902, the same sort of 
contextualization suited the state as a whole.  Breathitt County was best treated as a pit of 
inherent communal violence rather than a place where discernible individuals had 
committed violent acts.  Within short years of the Marcum murder, the events that 
comprised the ―Hargis-Cockrell feud‖ were almost completely depoliticized in public 
memory.      
But Hargis could still use his role as a politician to parry his next challenge.  Soon 
after Hargis‘s Frankfort appearance in support of Day‘s segregation bill, Abrelia Marcum 
sued Hargis, along with Edward Callahan, B.F. French and his brother and business 
partner Alexander Hargis, for $100,000.
828
  Marcum was quite aware that the labyrinthine 
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details surrounding her husband‘s death were not going to be delved into at any great 
length after Jett‘s and White‘s conviction, and did not expect justice from the state.  By 
attacking Hargis Et al in a civil case, Marcum hoped to avoid the politically-concerned 
jury situation that Hargis and Callahan had used to their collective advantage in the past 
(she also filed the lawsuit outside of Breathitt County).  In contrast to his earlier attempts 
to make the Cockrell killing appear to be the outcome of an ancient, ongoing familial 
battle, Hargis used his party affiliation in defense.  He delayed proceedings by branding 
the trial judge as an old intra-party political enemy and therefore subject to bias.  Hargis 
admitted that, ―as leader of the Democratic forces of Breathitt County,‖ he had earned the 
judge‘s potential wrath by openly denouncing his campaign for the state court of appeals 
bench years earlier.  An ―existing and continued state of hostile feeling‖ between judge 
and defendant was, according to Hargis, grounds for dismissal.
829
 Hargis‘s motion was 
denied, and he and Callahan were eventually found to be culpable for James Marcum‘s 
death.  However, the jury only awarded Marcum $8,000, while the plaintiff was unable to 
connect French and Alexander Hargis to the crime (although both were charged with 
contempt of court for arranging to bribe witnesses for the prosecution and spirit at least 
one out of state).
830
 Abrelia Marcum‘s tort strategy was an alloyed success but still did 
little immediate damage to her targets‘ power.  During the trial Sheriff Callahan was 
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unanimously re-nominated as chairman of Breathitt County‘s Democratic central 
committee.  A fellow Democrat praised Callahan‘s prior record and attributed his 
reappointment to his ―executive ability and services to the party.‖831   
The civil suit brought the details of the Jackson killings of 1902 and 1903 directly 
to a Bluegrass audience, and the following month Hargis, Callahan and a number of 
confederates were indicted for the murder of Jim Cockrell in Lexington, on the grounds 
that he had died within its judicial jurisdiction.
832
  Wise Hagins‘s anti-Hargis Breathitt 
County News announced the indictment as ―a revelation to the outside world‖ of what 
residents of Jackson had known for years.
833
  Although less than three years earlier many 
Lexingtonians volunteered for ―arbitration in the Breathitt county feud,‖ the possibility 
that the killings had been acts of mutual reciprocity was now proven false; there was 
sufficient evidence that the murders of 1902 and 1903 had been carried out at the behest 
of powerful individuals.  Fayette County‘s circuit court judge proclaimed that the trial of 
Hargis and the others was really based upon ―the serious charges made against the civil 
government of Breathitt county‘‖ rather than the accused individuals.834  But the criminal 
trial for Cockrell‘s murder, and those for Cox‘s and Marcum‘s murders that followed, 
which lasted collectively for more than two years, did not prove Hargis‘s guilt or that of 
any one of his compatriots.  With a massive number of testimonies against him, Hargis 
managed a hung jury and then an acquittal for the Cockrell murder by using a defense 
based upon Kentucky‘s age-old belief in county sovereignty-he challenged the Fayette 
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County court‘s right to try him for a crime committed in another county.835  After 
Hargis‘s acquittal in Lexington, his trial in Lee County for the Marcum murder was an 
even greater disaster for the prosecution.  Even though he had previously signed an 
affidavit that implicated Hargis and Callahan, Curtis Jett refused to testify that he had 
been hired to murder Marcum.  Instead, he attributed his actions to his own drunkenness 
(this he did while appearing on the witness stand inebriated according to one newspaper 
account) and swore to the jury (said to be packed with Democrats) that Marcum had been 
his personal ―bitter enemy,‖ a testimony that fit neatly into the general conception of feud 
behavior that trumped political conspiracy.
836
  Hargis and Callahan were again acquitted, 
and this time in less than a week.
837
  Finally, the trial for the murder of Braxton Cox, held 
in northeast Kentucky‘s tiny, mountainous and isolated (as well as heavily Democratic) 
Elliott County, was dismissed before it had even commenced, due to the prosecution‘s 
failure to produce key witnesses.
838
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The acquittals of Hargis, Callahan, and their various other indicted confederates 
can be attributed to the factors that made murder convictions difficult in the early 
twentieth century, not the least of which being the wealth of the men involved.  Hargis‘s 
and Callahan‘s wealth made them ―the uncrowned Czars of Eastern Kentucky‖ charged a 
New York Times correspondent, ―enable[ing] them to maintain an army of retainers and 
dependents, as did the great feudal lords of the middle ages.‖839 This sort of personal and 
pecuniary influence could not be ruled out, especially in light of Curtis Jett‘s change of 
testimony.  But party affiliation, membership in the continuously militant Kentucky 
Democratic Party, brought with it a privileged position as well.  The judge specially 
appointed by Governor Beckham to try Hargis, Callahan, French, John Abner and John 
Smith in the criminal trial for Marcum‘s murder was known for his ―unwavering 
allegiance to the Democratic Party.‖840  The trial for Braxton Cox‘s murder had taken 
place in one of the most intensely Democratic counties in the state, where Judge Hargis 
was allowed to spend most of his time awaiting trial outside of the jailhouse shooting 
marbles with locals, and had concluded more quickly than the two before it.
841
   
While he and Hargis were incarcerated in Lexington during the trial for Jim 
Cockrell‘s murder, a Democratic merchant treated Edward Callahan to ―50 quarts of 
whisky and about 50 boxes of cigars a two bushel tub of apples and case of beer all free‖ 
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for him to serve to the ―at least 3000‖ visitors to his cell.  Callahan assured one of his 
tenants of the local support he, Hargis and the others enjoyed while on trial in Lexington.  
―The Fayette County Democrats are Red hot for us they want to fight for us too.  Every 
Goebel Democrat in this county is hot for us.‖842 Callahan‘s linkage between his and 
Hargis‘s recent trials and the Goebel legacy at such a late date indicate that he, and 
perhaps Hargis, since he had a far more direct role in the Goebel campaign, justified his 
actions as part of an ongoing continuation of the Goebel faction.  Even before he was 
elected sheriff, Callahan had for decades displayed a willingness to employ violence to 
ensure Democratic victories in his own county.  With William Goebel‘s assassination and 
would-be administration still a subject of radical dissension among Kentucky Democrats, 
the support shown to Callahan during his incarceration in Lexington vindicated his 
actions and placed him on a higher pedestal than ―mountain feudist.‖  His actions, even if 
they were not the execution of the will of the party, were nonetheless carried out in the 
party‘s interest.  Still disheartened more than five years after his death, urban Democrats 
who had supported Goebel recognized the contributions Callahan had made to Goebel‘s 
campaign and sympathized with the brutal methods that Breathitt County Democrats had 
employed to bolster one-party rule.  In less than three years Breathitt County‘s old status 
as ―the best exemplification of the horrors of Goebelism‖ had been roundly forgotten in 
the press.
843
  But, having been at the center of it all, Callahan had not forgotten.            
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Despite Callahan‘s popularity among Bluegrass Democrats, the murder trials 
proved to be the beginning of the end of his and Hargis‘s political careers.  While Hargis 
was still awaiting trial for the Cox murder, he and Callahan were defeated in a county-
wide Republican/fusionist landslide, a telling contrast to the considerable Democratic 
gains in local and district elections in most of the state.
844
  The negative attention 
attracted to Breathitt County by its executives caused voters to flee from supporting the 
courthouse ring.  Hargis‘s statewide power began to crumble soon afterward.  In October, 
1906, six men elected to the Democratic state central committee from various counties 
produced a petition stating that Hargis had arbitrarily deprived them of committee 
membership for unstated reasons.
845
  The authority that Hargis had wielded among 
Kentucky Democrats had come into question for the very first time since his involvement 
in the Goebel campaign.  With the faithfulness of its most Democratic county so 
weakened, Kentucky‘s Tenth Congressional District elected its first Republican U.S. 
House representative since the 1890s the following month.
846
       
After overseeing a remarkable Democratic ascendancy throughout the state, 
J.C.W. Beckham was implicated by proxy for the crimes committed in faraway Jackson.  
Although Beckham had made enemies within his own party with his support of statewide 
prohibition, it was also broadly suspected that his complicity with Breathitt County‘s 
Hargis courthouse had seriously damaged his political future as well.
847
  Republicans 
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charged the governor with being an ally to ―assassination chiefs,‖ and personally 
embodying all of the corruption associated with ―Gobelism, Redwineism and Hargisism‖ 
that had been the basis for his initial victory in 1900.
848
  He was branded with imposing 
―many indignities on Breathitt County‘s peaceful majority‖ through his mishandling of 
the Hargis trials.
849
  Hargis‘s boast that he could get anyone pardoned was enough to 
make many Kentuckians suspect direct connections between Beckham and he, and 
created fodder for the Republican press.  Beckham‘s pardoning of Tom White seemed to 
confirm this suspicion, as did the fact that Curtis Jett, although never pardoned for his 
conviction for murdering James Marcum, had previously been pardoned by Beckham for 
an unrelated crime.
850
  Statewide Republican victories in 1907 narrowed Democratic 
control of the General Assembly to a slim majority.
851
  When Beckham attempted to run 
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for US Senate in 1908, four Democrats bolted from the party line, sending former 
governor William O. Bradley to Washington D.C. as Kentucky‘s first Republican U.S. 
senator in a victory over Beckham.
852
  
Tiny, reviled and isolated, Breathitt County and its crimes had directed the 
South‘s last two-party state, but had done so in far too ostentatious a manner to go 
unnoticed.  The assassinations of white officeholders stood in stark contrast to the untold 
number of African Americans targeted by political violence during the same years in 
Kentucky and further south and, consequently, produced far more outrage.  In possibly 
the most dramatic display of the injury done to the Democratic Party by the accusations 
against Hargis and Callahan, William Jennings Bryan was edged out by William Howard 
Taft in Breathitt County‘s ballot box in 1908, the only time between 1840 and 2008 the 
county was ever carried by a Republican presidential candidate.
853
     
The ―Hargis-Cockrell feud‖ had the potential to challenge most Kentuckians‘ 
preconceptions regarding their mountainous section‘s apparent penchant for feud 
violence, as well as the preconceptions many Americans had toward Kentucky.  During 
Jett‘s and White‘s trials, a Louisvillian distressed over the state of Breathitt County‘s 
media coverage insisted to a New York newspaper that there was ―no family feud in 
Breathitt‖ but instead ―one powerful, bold, bad man, served by minions and ruffians 
among them officers of the law, who lords it over his neighbors in the fashion of a 
mediaeval baron (even though the epistler insisted that Jackson did not have a feud 
situation, he used sixteenth century Sicily, a well-known setting for vendetta violence, as 
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a useful analogy in illustrating his point).
854
  In its extended coverage of Abrelia 
Marcum‘s lawsuit in 1904, the Courier-Journal wrote detailed local genealogy 
describing the manner in which almost everyone involved in the Hargis-Cockrell feud 
was related by blood or by marriage.  The reporter concluded that, if familial relations 
were not the central cause of the recent assassinations, he would nonetheless refuse to 
rule them out as a causal factor.  ―Factional strife in Breathitt County is equivalent to 
family dissension. Internal warfare is waged not against aliens, but against one's own 
flesh and blood. The kinship of the people whose names have been prominently 
mentioned in connection with the troubles here is very close in instances, and it appears 
links of blood relation ought to tend to bind them together.‖855  The article made note of 
the web of intermarriages among the Marcums, Hargises, Callahans and Strongs, thereby 
suggesting a clear kinship-based narrative going back to James Marcum‘s semi-famous 
uncle‘s first forays into feudalism.  The following month the same paper printed what 
amounted to a concession to its familial explanation, although it did not phrase it as such, 
acknowledging what Republican newspapers had long insisted upon: a definitive political 
element to the county‘s troubles based upon its peculiarly Democratic voting history.  
―As a rule, the Kentucky mountain counties are Republican, but Breathitt is unique in that, 
almost without exception, it has ever been found in the Democratic column.  There has 
always been the bitterest political feeling in the county, and politics has been more or less 
directly responsible for every one of the feuds, and is to-day the cause of the terrible state 
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of affairs there.‖856  Owing as always to its policy of New Departure moderation, 
Watterson‘s flagship could admit both pre-modern ―feudal‖ behavior and the political 
motives that were quite clear to many Kentuckians as equal dynamics in the disreputable 
county.   
But what might have been the most summative and accurate media statement 
about Bloody Breathitt was lost in a barrage of more flamboyant interpretations that 
consistently evoked feud.  By including the events amassed into the Hargis-Cockrell feud 
into the longer lineage of ―feuding‖ in the county, the origins of the most recent troubles 
in Bloody Breathitt were completely forgotten.  Assassinations that encapsulated the 
statewide furor over William Goebel were ultimately nothing more than ―the human 
nature‘s daily feud.‖857  Accordingly, any and all news from Breathitt County was related 
in some way to the existence of an extant feud; relying on wire reports, the Chicago 
Daily Tribune reported a random knifing at a fiddle show outside of Jackson as ―feud‖ 
related.
858
 When Judge Hargis‘s nephew Matt Crawford, who had no prior involvement 
in his uncle‘s political wranglings, was killed near his illegal whiskey still in 1910, it was 
blithely recounted as part of ―a feud which has long been carried on in Breathitt 
County.‖859  Perhaps the most dramatic explication of the familial concealing the political 
appeared in a 1917 law review article in which James Marcum was characterized as a 
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family rather than an individual in order to fit into the ―family feud‖ mold.860 Whatever 
its purposes, the feud narrative required kinship and historical longevity as its driving 
forces even if these themes were not complemented by facts.  Even though the murders 
James Hargis directed eventually cost him his political office (the prize that had 
motivated murder in the first place), his strategy of casting the deaths of Cox and 
Cockrell within the context of an ongoing family feud was an overwhelming success.  
―The Hargis-Cockrell feud was like nearly all the other mountain feuds,‖ Lewis Franklin 
Johnson wrote in one of the first book-length efforts at cataloging Kentucky‘s mountain 
feud phenomenon, ―it was a family difficulty.‖861     
Ensuing events went even further to provide suggestions that, even if there was no 
ongoing feud in Breathitt County by the first decade of the twentieth century, the place 
nevertheless seemed to be fraught with a preternatural penchant for violence, and not 
always violent acts performed in the carrying out of a ―feud‖ or political scheme.  During 
Judge Hargis‘s trials, his oldest son Beech entered into a profligate spree, and his father‘s 
agents had to retrieve him from Lexington brothels multiple times.  After one incident in 
February, 1908 the disgraced former judge beat his son almost to the point of 
unconsciousness.  A few days later Beech shot his father to death in the latter‘s general 
store and later attempted suicide by swallowing morphine.  Although it had nothing 
directly to do with past factionalism, the in-family homicide appeared to be a ―natural 
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sequel‖ to recent events.862  Although his father‘s old ally David Redwine was Beech‘s 
chief counsel in the following murder trial, he was also represented by a less obvious 
choice of representation, newly elected Senator Bradley.  The legal team complicated the 
trial by charging the Republican judge with political prejudice, and the young man was 
eventually acquitted on a plea of self-defense.  Beech Hargis lived in Jackson for years 
afterward, but with the onset of World War I left to join the Canadian army and was 
never heard from again in Kentucky.
863
   
After the death of his former partner, Edward Callahan gradually withdrew from 
politics, but not without first being implicated in causing Breathitt County‘s worst 
election-related riot since 1878, to which Republican governor Augustus E. Wilson 
responded (less reluctantly than his Democratic predecessors) with militia occupation.
864
 
Afterward, Callahan grew increasingly paranoid, avoiding Jackson and building a 
protective bunker around his home in Crockettsville.  On the seventh anniversary of 
James Marcum‘s May 3, 1903 assassination, an unknown rifleman fired at Callahan as he 
stood at a window in his house, wounding him in the groin.  When John Fox, Jr. visited 
him forty days later, the author found him in comfortable convalescence, wearing the 
same bullet-punctured trousers he had been wearing when he was attacked.  Asked if he 
should leave Crockettsville, he insisted that ―they would say I was a coward‖ were he to 
leave his home and business interests.
865
 Exactly two years later, a rifle shot fired in the 
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exact same manner killed Callahan just as he was concluding a telephone conversation 
with his old adversary J. Wise Hagins.  While the timing of Callahan‘s murder suggested 
a motive of revenge for Marcum‘s death, the ―noted feudist‖ had amassed too many 
enemies, both personal and political, for there to have been a definite suspect.
866
  The 
same could be said for others as well.  Mose Feltner, James Marcum‘s legal client who 
was the first male to explicitly implicate Hargis and Callahan in the deaths of Braxton 
Cox and James Cockrell, was killed by a federal revenue officer.
 
 Even though his only 
role in the Hargis-Cockrell feud had been trying to prevent further killing by announcing 
Judge Hargis‘s culpability, he was eulogized in the press primarily as a ―noted feudist.‖ 
867 
Only Judge David Redwine, the only major political figure who had always managed 
to remain only on the periphery of controversy in Jackson, managed a peaceful passing 
and a posthumous reputation untarnished by feud.
868
     
 The gunshots that killed Hargis, Callahan and Feltner were the effect of any 
number of factors that helped to portray Breathitt County and eastern Kentucky (and, 
again by extension, the mountain South in its entirety) as an environment of directionless 
―lawlessness.‖  In the course of a history of extra-political lawlessness, the huge amount 
of support from Kentucky Democrats for the Hargis courthouse was conveniently 
forgotten.  Even John Fox, Jr., who contributed to eastern Kentucky‘s renown for familial 
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vengeance more than virtually any writer of fiction or nonfiction, was obliged to 
recognize a broader (but still quite parochial) political motif at the heart of Breathitt 
County‘s ill-gotten fame.  
The outside world couldn‘t very well omit Breathitt when it made law, and Breathitt accepted the 
gift with gratitude so far at least as it should serve the personal purpose of the man who held the 
law in the hollow of his hand.  Not that there are not bitter complaints of lawlessness in Breathitt, 
and stern upholders of the law.  There are: but I observed that the bitterest and the sternest were 
not allied with the party that happens just now to be in power.
869
 
With the possible exception of Callahan‘s ambush (carried out in a fashion strikingly 
reminiscent of William Strong‘s end that Callahan was suspected to have directed fifteen 
years earlier) their deaths were not directly related to the ―feud‖ that caused the three 
most famous murders of 1902 and 1903.  At the time of James Marcum‘s killing, 
however, the violent deaths of his political enemies were far in the future and many 
observers within and outside of Jackson‘s civic borders saw a more calculated source for 
recent violence, one that challenged the very idea of the ―feud‖ scenario.  Late in 1903, 
during the brief lull in public interest in Breathitt County that followed the convictions of 
Curtis Jett and Tom White, one of the bluntest, most unalloyed accounts of recent 
troubles was composed, but may never have seen print.   
For several months the gaze of the public press had been turned almost daily upon the little 
mountain town of Jackson, Kentucky, the county seat of ‗Bloody Breathitt‘ County the scene 
during the previous year of three assassinations of increasing boldness and atrocity, and occurring 
within a [sic] 100 steps of the business centre of the town. In the many newspaper accounts of the 
tragedies the word "feud" has been almost universally employed to denote the state of affairs in 
Jackson. "Feud" is a choice word for picturesque, romantic, and unique effects. It has a pleasant 
medieval sound, a distinct flavor of the antique, but in this instance it is misleading. An 
acquaintance of several years with the town and the people, including all these prominently 
connected with recent events in Jackson, leads me to think it necessary to look for other motives 
than those usually supposed to actuate participants in a family feud. 
The three men who were assassinated were, it is true, in certain legal and business relationships to 
one another; but there was not among them any tie of blood so close as that subsisting between 
one of the victims of assassination and the man who according to the testimony of an eyewitness 
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shot him deliberately from a well-selected hiding place. Personal feeling entered into the situation, 
as it must, but as will appear in the sequel political motives have been to all appearance at least as 
strong in their influence. And the so-called "other side" has not, so far as I am informed, fired a 
shot or attempted to fire a shot. If such a state of affairs constitutes a "feud," it is, as regards active 
participation, a solitaire game. 
The author concluded that, instead of a feud proper (if such a thing existed), the deaths of 
the three men were the outcome of ―a conspiracy on the part of those in official power to 
accomplish criminal ends.‖870    In this, it was not rare or unprecedented; other 
observations on the deaths of Cox, Cockrell and Marcum, especially those of the 
Lexington Leader, had expanded upon the political motivations surrounding their deaths 
and had tended to agree that the deaths on Jackson‘s streets were indeed a non-horizontal 
―solitary game‖ carried out by men in power and unanswered by those they wished to 
eliminate.  However, it was the only account that questioned the appropriateness of using 
feud to describe Breathitt County‘s troubles.  The author fully acknowledged that the 
―family feud‖ was an existent social phenomenon and probably would not have denied 
that Breathitt County had experienced feuds proper in the past.  But the murders of 1902 
and 1903, it seemed, were something different.  The clear irrelevance of kinship in the 
affair removed the vital element of this form of institutionalized violence.  Perhaps most 
importantly, the newly vital commercial center was only ―90 miles by rail from the center 
of the ‗Bluegrass,‘" an observation that reflected Breathitt County‘s loss of isolation.  
Feuds were an antiquated occurrence with no place in thriving Jackson, a town ―by no 
means wholly outside the pale of civilization and progress.‖871 This recent rash of killings, 
with clear political motivations, was a product of newer trends and a variety of violence 
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that seemed more at home in such a progressive, modern setting.  Assassination, it 
seemed, was a different animal than feuding.     
    
“…it is rare indeed, that one of these assassins and anarchists is brought to 
punishment.” 
 
  In February, 1900 the New York Journal printed a quatrain penned by Ambrose 
Bierce, alluding to William Goebel‘s recent demise, while also proving prophetic for 
another well-known office holder of the day.  
"The bullet that pierced Goebel's breast  
Can not be found in all the West;  
Good reason, it is speeding here  
To stretch McKinley on his bier." 
 
The Journal was the property of William Randolph Hearst, one of President William 
McKinley‘s most flagrant journalistic detractors.  When McKinley was killed by self-
professed anarchist Leon Czolgosz nineteen months later, rumors flew that a clipping of 
Bierce‘s poem had been found in the assassin‘s pocket after his arrest.  Bierce swore that 
he had never meant for his stanzas to be taken as a veiled threat against the president, but 
that it was to alert readers of the dangers posed by the growing population of ―foreign 
elements‖ who espoused anarchism.872  A broad swath of Americans had feared the 
vaguely-defined philosophy since a bomb thrown in Chicago‘s Haymarket Square in 
1886 killed seven.  For the rest of the nineteenth century, men who espoused Georges 
Sorel‘s ―propaganda of the deed‖ attempted to turn political luminaries into ―an 
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endangered species.‖873  In Italy, France and Spain the public deaths of a king, an 
empress and two presidents between 1894 and 1898 (and, in short years, the U.S.‘s 
McKinley) revealed the emergence of a new style of political violence reflective of the 
industrial era disillusionment that French sociologist Emile Durkheim labeled anomie.
874
  
This new method of violent death, no longer exclusive to Europe, appeared to be the 
American Republic‘s greatest threat at the time of Bierce‘s writing, not only for its 
causing death and destruction, but also for its origins among the throngs of non-Anglo-
Saxon immigrants.  When the president was killed, Bierce‘s point was apparently 
substantiated.  But before that, his poem placed Goebel‘s assassination within an 
international milieu much larger than the vagaries of one southern state‘s governmental 
discord, much less the decidedly non-foreign ―mountain method of ambush.‖  
Assassination, with the onset of anarchism, had become de rigeur even in the most 
provincial places.  
 ‗Anarchist‘ was already a widely-used epithet by the Goebel campaign‘s 
beginning, and the term was frequently used during and after his death to describe both 
him and his eventual slayers.  In light of his anti-corporate stance, Goebel was 
condemned for turning the Democratic Party over to ―Anarchists, Socialists and 
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Populiste.‖875  Later, a San Francisco anarchist used the Kentucky Republicans‘ 
purported guilt for killing Goebel to defend his party from persecution after McKinley‘s 
death.
876
  But his point was made in vain; although some of its members were clearly 
implicated in doing away with Goebel, Republicans firmly entrenched within the two-
party system were beyond the same type of popular reproach reserved for anarchists.  
Violence was allowed, or stripped of, legitimacy according to the politics of the groups or 
individuals that wielded it.  Nevertheless, when Bluegrass Kentuckians were alarmed by 
James Marcum‘s murder in the streets of Jackson, similarities with this new, insidiously 
foreign method of political violence were already widely recognized.  Within days of 
Marcum‘s death the Louisville Courier-Journal bemoaned the ―cowardice‖ with which 
men had been murdered in the state‘s mountains, but did so using words that would never 
have been applied to eastern Kentucky short years earlier.  ―It is by stealthy methods and 
implacable spirit that they intimidate whole communities, including the officers of the 
law and the courts of justice,‖ the paper accused, ―the result being that it is rare indeed, 
that one of these assassins and anarchists is brought to punishment.‖877   
The conspirators behind William Goebel‘s death, as well as that of James Hargis, 
Edward Callahan, Curtis Jett and other accused conspirators in Breathitt County‘s 
assassinations of 1902 and 1903, were, to a man, probably unaware of continental 
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anarchism‘s ideological underpinnings.  But the murders they coordinated utilized ―the 
propaganda of the deed‖ in a manner unprecedented in Kentucky‘s violent history but 
imitative of more recent trends.    Guerilla warfare during the Civil War was carried out 
throughout the state with no measure of uniformity and often according to the whims of 
local military leaders with tenuous ties to the Union and Confederate causes.  It was 
based upon material wartime goals, the weakening of the local state, the punishment of 
civilians with oppositional loyalties and whatever other meaning it had came about 
inadvertently.  The mass violence of the Reconstruction years, and the intraracial feuds of 
the 1880s, were, with the exception of the symbolically-charged act of lynching, without 
elaborate orchestration.  Furthermore, these parochial acts of violence were generally 
aimed at victims whose political or social significance was, outside of their immediate 
communities, obscure.  They were acted out between intimates.   
In contrast, assassination as it was used in Frankfort in 1900, or Breathitt County 
in 1902 and 1903, had broader implications in both means and ends.  It replaced the 
violent intimacy of the Civil War and Reconstruction years with violent anonymity.  As 
mentioned before, William Goebel‘s assassination in January, 1900 was initially 
attributed to the ―mountain method of ambush,‖ the surreptitious ―bushwhacker‖ style of 
sniper-killing devised during the Civil War and used afterward to slay such famous 
feudists as William Strong.
878
  But the mise en scène of Goebel‘s death belied the 
circumstances suggested by the name ―mountain method.‖  The latter was best suited to 
the unpopulated quiet of isolated wagon roads and footpaths found throughout a chiefly 
rural state but found in the greatest conditions of isolation in the mountains.  Goebel was 
killed in the morning while walking through Kentucky‘s capitol grounds, as befitted his 
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position in government.  The rifleman‘s identity was concealed, but the building from 
which he fired was not, nor was the firing of the gun from this locale.  While the true 
identity of his assassin was never completely determined to the satisfaction of historians, 
if not prosecutors (proving the importance of anonymity), it was widely known that the 
rifle shot came from the second story window of the State House next to the capitol, a 
building ―tenanted by Republicans exclusively.‖879 Even if the assassination was not 
sanctioned by Secretary of State Caleb Powers as was charged, the conditions through 
which Goebel came to an end were meant to publicly demonstrate his illegitimacy as (had 
he ever had the chance to assume the office) governor-elect.
880
  Even with Frankfort‘s 
streets teeming with ―dangerous mountaineers,‖ no one attempted to dispute that the 
killing shot had come from within a state building, a placement that may have been more 
intentional than many Kentuckians might have assumed.  It was orchestrated so that it 
appeared to be the will of the state, even though it was evidently only that of one political 
party‘s leaders.  Had Jackson been as hidden from the ―outside world‖ as it had once 
been, the ploy may have worked, at least locally.   
 The murders of Braxton Cox, James Cockrell and James Marcum took place 
under very similar circumstances.  Dr. Cox was killed in the dead of night with a shotgun 
blast in an area of Jackson‘s main thoroughfare close to both the courthouse and James 
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Hargis‘s commercial property (one newspaper account erroneously said that Cox was 
leaving a church service when he was shot).
881
  With the cover of darkness available, the 
assailant was able to use a weapon that was effective only at close range.  Cockrell and 
Marcum were more directly linked to the ensuing political conflict, so their respective 
assassinations were more public and flamboyant than Cox‘s.  They were killed by 
gunshots aimed from the Breathitt County courthouse in broad daylight with numerous 
potential witnesses present (Judge Hargis and Sheriff Callahan were in the general 
proximity).
882
  The killings, all within a small physical space, confirmed the courthouse 
square as ―the assassination center of Jackson.‖883  Even though Judge James Hargis 
grouped at least two of the deaths (Cockrell‘s and Marcum‘s) within ongoing kin-based 
feud narratives, the manner in which these deaths were spatially arranged confirmed that 
they were the will of the local powers that be, even if men in their employ were accused 
individually.      
 The new role of anonymity also set the assassination stage of violence in Breathitt 
County apart from past incidents.  In the 1870s most public acts of political violence were 
performed openly, with the assailants and victims unconcealed.  When Marcum‘s uncle, 
William Strong, attacked his neighbors during the Civil War, he did so under the 
authority of the Union Army, but he was at no more of an advantage than his Confederate 
enemies since so many locals had decided to renounce the Union‘s local legitimacy.  
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When he captured the courthouse on the same street in 1874, or when he faced down 
former Confederates to defend the newly elected county judge in 1878, the ―ownership‖ 
of this symbol and repository of the local state was under dispute.  The violence 
employed to ―capture‖ it reflected this crisis of legitimacy.  But as political life in 
Breathitt County became more complex and less parochialized (with transportation and 
political alliances strengthening local elites‘ relationship with the Bluegrass), a greater 
measure of surreptitiousness was deemed necessary.  Curtis Jett and the other assassins 
employed by the courthouse ring carried out their appointments from hidden places 
within buildings rather than (as was the case in 1878) meeting their potential victims 
openly on the street.   
This strategy reflected Judge Hargis‘s modus operandi in state politics.  Even 
though he was heavily interested in the affairs of the statewide Democratic Party, Judge 
Hargis attempted to maintain a semblance of the isolation that had benefitted Breathitt 
County Democrats in the past.  Hargis himself employed a measure of anonymity in 
furthering his influence in the Democratic Party.  Since the Music Hall Convention, 
Hargis‘s statewide political strength had been bolstered by a healthy measure of stealth.  
At least after the initiation of the Hargis-Cockrell feud, Hargis tended to avoid public 
settings, even in Jackson.
884
  For this reason he had attempted to discourage interviews 
with members of the press from outside his area.  In 1902 Hargis had a Louisville 
reporter threatened by ―toughs‖ and, a few years later, threatened a visiting playwright 
who planned to write a dramatic account of Jackson‘s 1902-1903 assassinations.  Before 
his first indictment in 1904 he had long avoided having his photograph taken for 
newspapers and, during one of the ensuing trials, even entered the camera-free safety of 
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the courtroom with a quilt over his head (he later reluctantly relented to having a 
photograph taken).
885
  Being the faceless judge of the mysterious Bloody Breathitt, a 
place that had only become more mysterious and exotic through the propagation of 
newspaper descriptions, brought with it a measure of power.  It was not the use of 
directed violence itself that brought about Hargis‘s downfall, but rather the unwanted, 
and unexpected, publicity attracted by the deaths of Cox, Cockrell and (to the greatest 
extent) Marcum.         
As the fallout from these killings gained national attention, other violent deaths 
were overshadowed in the process.  During the proceedings of Abrelia Marcum‘s lawsuit 
against Hargis and his conspirators, Breathitt County experienced one of the most vicious 
acts of violence in its history, but one that, nevertheless, went relatively unnoticed.  A 
white man living in Frozen Creek, a community nine miles from Jackson, invited a group 
of negroes to his home with the promise of free liquor.  When the party arrived at his 
door, the host opened fire on the group in an apparent attempt to exterminate the lot, 
killing one of them.
886
  The crime was reported in only two local papers, neither of which 
attempted to contextualize the racially-motivated killing within a larger narrative of 
lawlessness or white supremacy.  The press‘ lack of interest in another killing in Breathitt 
County, an erstwhile popular subject, indicates that violence that fell outside the 
parameters of either political assassination or communal feuding when it happened there 
was deemed of little consequence.  A story of interracial mass murder did not support the 
larger description of a place dominated by inherent white intra-racial violence and 
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challenged the delineation that Bluegrass elites, Democratic or Republican, preferred to 
have drawn between their own section and the mountains (white violence against black 
Kentuckians was still a common occurrence in 1904).
887
  Consequently, the story was 
unnoticed or discarded.  Whether members of the press endorsed or opposed the Hargis 
courthouse, violence that did not support their argument was unimportant.        
Breathitt County‘s assassinations, and the ensuing trials of the accused assailants, 
were known to have broader connections to the ―outside world‖ when they took place.  
But the Cox, Cockrell and Marcum homicides were often included within the older 
narrative of violence that had earned the nickname ―Bloody Breathitt‖ years before, a 
cycle of convincingly inherent violence.  The political significance of violence in the 
county was recognized as well, and emphasized most broadly by the Republicans who 
despised the island of mountain Democracy and its continuity with the hated Goebel 
legacy.  But feud endured as the dominant descriptor, again encouraging interpretations 
that accentuated the prevalence of communal violence with purely insular, local causes.  
This was not only because of the influence of Democratic elites outside of the county, 
elites who, like their brethren further south, profited from the use of parochial violence 
yet strived to distance themselves from it.  Breathitt County‘s violence was depoliticized 
also by an American culture that interpreted or legitimized violent acts according to 
parameters of race, class, geography and history, parameters that could not easily include 
eastern Kentucky.  Even with the political violence of the early twentieth century a recent 
memory, the prevalence of feud in explaining white intraracial violence determined how 
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Breathitt County was to be interpreted by its own citizens and others from the ―outside 
world.‖           
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CHAPTER VII 
 
―THE FEUDAL WARS OF EASTERN KENTUCKY WILL NO DOUBT BE 
UTILIZED IN COMING YEARS BY WRITERS OF FICTION.‖: READING AND 
WRITING BLOODY BREATHITT 
 
―When the legend becomes fact, print the legend!‖ 
 –Maxwell Scott, character in The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (1962)  
  
 
In an 1898 interview with Reverend James Dickey, former county judge Edward 
Strong declared the early nineteenth century‘s ―Clay Cattle County war,‖ fought by his 
and William Strong‘s grandfather, and Edward Callahan‘s great-grandfather, had not only 
led to the Strong-Amis feud of the early 1870s, but also that ―the effects of the [cattle] 
war have not ceased to this day.‖888  Dickey‘s other interviews among Breathitt County‘s 
older citizens suggested similar views, but none thoroughly explained explicitly the 
continuity between the cattle war and more recent troubles.  Between 1805 and 1861 the 
territory that became Breathitt County did not experience any sort of recorded local strife 
that resulted in multiple deaths or paramilitary factionalism (or, for that matter, familial 
feuds).  The purported lineage between the Clay County Cattle War and the disintegration 
of postwar Union alliances that constituted the Strong-Amis feud was similarly 
questionable.  Even though Strongs and Amises had opposed one another sixty years 
before, their descendants had found a common cause fighting against Confederate 
interests during the war and had not fallen out against each other until 1873.  Even then, 
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it had more to do with conflicts over the spoils of war (livestock, a coincidence that 
further encouraged the drawing of lineages back to the cattle war) and political defection 
than it did loyalties based upon kinship.  If the old judge believed that anything that had 
happened since was the progeny of a conflict from nearly a century earlier, namely his 
first cousin William‘s death the previous year, he did not elaborate.     
Whatever his purposes, Edward Strong preferred to think of the strife that he had 
witnessed in his home county not as events that were contingent upon contemporary 
factors (e.g., war or postwar crises of governmental legitimacy) but rather only a segment 
of a much longer continuity.  If Breathitt County was an inherently violent place, the 
premise required that it have a suitably antediluvian heritage, one that could be 
remembered by the county‘s earliest settlers and interpreted by them as well.  But, if the 
Clay County Cattle War of circa 1805 was to be the creation myth of choice, it was an 
inherency scarcely supported by history.  And yet, events that were still in the future 
when Strong gave his interview would give further credence to the theory of inherency 
and continuity.  Strong had no direct personal reason to dissociate himself from the 
county‘s troubles.  His infamous cousin was now dead and Strong had always managed 
to stand apart from the more violent events he had witnessed in his lifetime.  With a 
surname that he probably knew would always be associated with ―feudalism,‖ but a 
relatively unblemished personal reputation, Edward Strong had good reason to portray 
―Bloody Breathitt‖ as a much longer saga than one with origins in his own adulthood.  
Admittedly, this attribution of ancient continuity may also be an aged mountaineer‘s 
desire for something unchanging in an otherwise rapidly shifting environment.  Dickey 
may have encouraged him to identify a starting point; many of the oral histories that 
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Dickey recorded during his time in Breathitt County were done ―in an effort to determine 
why [people in Breathitt County] were always fighting each other.‖889   
Whatever his reasons, Strong‘s interpretation of his home county‘s history was a 
political act whether he meant it to be or not.  By extending the provenance of Breathitt 
County‘s troubles backward in time to the years long before the Civil War belied the 
war‘s role in generating conflict and encouraging the use of violence.  It also diminished 
the importance of the postwar political divide around the time of Strong‘s own judgeship.  
Furthermore, it indirectly cast William Strong‘s 1897 death as the end result of a 
primordial conflict rather than his own years of agitation against the local powers that be.  
The cattle war was an interpersonal dispute over property with no material significance 
beyond the direct experience of its participants, and no direct effect on Breathitt County‘s 
later combatants other than perhaps memory, a memory they never invoked as just cause 
for their actions.  For someone who wished to depoliticize the county‘s record of death 
and destruction, it could be pointed out as the origins of an inherently violent ―Bloody 
Breathitt.‖  Strong was simply applying the most basic elements of the feud upon his 
home county, a county that had already been named ―the storm centre of the feud troubles 
of the State…‖890   
This chapter describes the discourses of kinship, primitivism, isolation, 
medievalism and racial determinism that comprised feud as a descriptor of violent acts in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and their relationships to the memory of ―Bloody 
Breathitt.‖  Many of these discourses pre-dated national interest in Breathitt County as 
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the center point of feud violence.  The feud, as an actual event or a literary subject, was 
familiar to nineteenth-century Americans before the Civil War because of the novels they 
read or because of their own history.  Familial feuds were said to be widely practiced by 
the planter aristocracy of the lowland South (although the evidence that would suggest 
institutionalized feuds is scanty).  But, as Altina Waller has shown, the locus of feuds was 
moved from there to eastern Kentucky (and, by extension, the southern highlands en toto) 
during the 1880s.
891
  Invariably, they represented something archaic, irrevocably rooted 
in the past and only accidentally thrust upon the present.  As the past three chapters have 
shown, events in Breathitt County between the Civil War and the turn of the century were 
recognized by contemporary observers, both internal and external, were recognized as 
politically motivated acts of brutality based upon a struggle to usurp or maintain local 
power.  But soon after violence in the county had subsided, accounts from within and 
without began to show preference for cultural, geographical and even biological reasons 
for the county‘s violence, reinforcing the county‘s place in the pre-established ―feud belt.‖  
By doing so, the contingencies of modern life could be exonerated from being blamed for 
violence, with an unfortunate inherency accused instead, an inherency that could be either 
eventually overcome by the march of social and economic progress, or dismissed as an 
unfortunate but natural failing of the mountain white.  Discussions of Breathitt County‘s 
feud or feudal history diminished discussions of the crises of legitimacy and struggles for 
power that pervaded the county‘s history.  ―Bloody Breathitt,‖ an enclosure of space and 
time, was a reification of communal violence.  But it was also a memory that could be 
used by both citizens of the county as well as outsiders.    
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 “…a feud among families or factions of the peculiar southern type…” 
In accordance with the thin line between legend and fact that attends the  
events that it describes, feud ―made a comparatively late appearance and [is] of unsolved 
etymology‖ within the English lexicon.892  The Oxford English Dictionary records the 
appearance of the word in relation to enmity and violence (as opposed to the word‘s 
relation to property because of its root relating to feudal) no earlier than the thirteenth 
century.
893
  In the nineteenth century feud motifs were popularized by Sir Walter Scott‘s 
romantic novels about late medieval Scotland, and other literary sources that skirted the 
boundary between romance and political history.
894
  At least by mid-century, the 
Mediterranean island of Corsica became equally well known for revenge-based reciprocal 
violence in the present day.  ―Vendetta,‖ a more recent import to English and one more 
explicitly revenge-based, became almost synonymous with feud.
895
  Via popular fiction, 
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and Americans‘ knowledge of societies that practiced blood feuds in places with weak 
state power, feud violence was understood to take place within the confines of relatively 
strict parameters.  Proper feuds contained abrupt, impetuous acts of brutality, products of 
hot blood and passion, not circuitous schemes devised by politicians and carried out by 
paid henchmen.  As the opening scene of Romeo and Juliet demonstrates, underlings 
could act as violent proxies for their masters but did so for the same purposes of honor- 
defense rather than over issues of state power.  Blood feuds, particularly their tendency 
toward reciprocity for wrongs done to an individual or group, were carried out in the 
conservative interest of maintaining a mutually accommodating status quo.
896
  Neither 
insurrectionary nor counter-insurrectionary, blood feuds were motivated by ―strong 
feelings of justice and moral order‖ that traversed the possibility of chaos presented by a 
weak state.
897
  For that reason, when the idea of feud violence came to be applied within 
the confines of the United States became a clear reality, it was to describe events that 
never fit perfectly within the parameters set by British or European analogs.  The 
interpretation of feud violence among American scholars and lay readers suffered from a 
persistent conflation of history, current events and fiction.  If non-fictional feuds took 
place in America, they did so in a new, strange manner.  Still, somehow the word 
persisted.
898
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 As either a literary subject or a historical event, the blood feud was deemed a 
social mechanism carried out through pathos but motivated by a universally-accepted (at 
least within the society in which it took place) ethos.  The interest in historical blood 
feuds that three late nineteenth century European scholars, Emile Durkheim, Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Max Weber, shared reflects this paradox.  As modernists, Durkheim and 
Weber each recognized the blood feud as a phenomenon exclusive to less-developed 
societies.  But Durkheim did not give violence as much credit for sustaining social order 
as did Weber.  For Weber the need for some societies to employ blood feud represented a 
prototypical state; Durkheim cast the blood feud in a condition of statelessness.
899
  
Nietzsche did not place the same positive value on the modern state (let alone its 
monopolization of legitimate violence as Weber described it), but admired the Corsican 
practice of vendetta as a subversion of mass society‘s suppressive moralization of the 
individual.
900
  Despite their three divergent interpretations of feud, there was a clear 
consensus regarding its relationship to the state: feuding was a specific kind of violence 
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that was performed in retribution for wrongs committed, had no direct relationship to the 
state (except, perhaps, in the case of Weber‘s proto-state) and was only acceptable (if at 
all) in societies that had not achieved the level of social and political development 
reached by most of the occidental world.  But the possibility remained open for violent 
incidents that did indeed involve local state powers for reasons other than revenge (for 
instance, allocation or reallocation of power) to be interpreted as feud or vendetta-based 
if western observers had other reasons to not include the society being observed within 
the realm of western progress (i.e., ―beyond the polis‖).901  Feud was every bit as polemic 
as it was descriptive, and perhaps more so.      
Literary critic Jeffrey Guy Johnson has asserted that the ―feud narrative‖ served as 
an allegory for war and reunion in the years following Appomattox.  A familial feud was 
an ―ideology-free conflict between evenly matched families,‖ a perfect allegory to white 
northerners and southerners bent upon reuniting the nation without dealing with the 
political issues (race and slavery) that had led to the war.
902
  But even before the novels 
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that fixed feud indelibly on the American scene (Mark Twain‘s Huckleberry Finn and 
George Washington Cable‘s The Grandissimes: A Story of Creole Life) were published in 
the 1880s, the language of feud had already entered into the debate over Reconstruction.     
During the war of words between northern and southern newspapers (including the 
aforementioned printed rows over Breathitt County in 1874 and 1878) feud took on an 
unprecedented hyperbolic dimension.  To southerners, particularly conservatives, placing 
local violence within the frame of a feud left it bereft of any racial (therefore political) 
significance.  Feud also denoted endogenous causes for violence, suggesting that the 
North would be appreciated to mind its own business.
903
 The North, on the other hand, 
could use a southern feud to exemplify not only white southerners‘ irredeemable affinity 
for needless violence, but also the region‘s continuing sustenance of a useless, pre-
modern aristocracy fed upon the labor of others and, consequently, self-destructive.
904
  
The word was putty in the hands of either section.  However, while the South and the 
West were popularly identified as feud settings, the idea of a native northern feud was too 
preposterous to ever be conceived of.      
Even though feud violence (or violence referred to as feuds) in the United States 
was supposedly ―virtually non-existent‖ before the Civil War, it would seem that the 
possibility, or the reality, of a domestic feud was familiar enough to postwar Americans, 
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particularly in the South.
905
  Antebellum southerners were ―resigned to [violence‘s] 
necessity‖ because of ―strong doubts about human nature‖ and doubts regarding the 
innate goodness of humanity.
906
  Feuds between individuals or families were not unheard 
of, but were strongly frowned upon in contrast to the also controversial, but far more 
ordered, practice of dueling.
907
  But one of the first uses of feud to describe deadly 
violence in the South, perhaps the first, did not correspond well to the practice‘s 
correlation with ―Anglo-Saxonism‖ that would be popularized years later.  Shortly after 
the removal of the Cherokee nation to west of the Mississippi, the federal government 
became alarmed by what appeared to be the continuation of blood feud among a native 
population thought to be pacified and ―civilized.‖908  Reports of blood feuds among the 
relocated Cherokees provided a precursor to the strange fusion of racial determinism and 
southerness that would be used to explain feuds among the ―pure‖ Anglo-Saxon/Celtic 
mountain whites decades later, and inspired the same debates over ―native‖ populations‘ 
innate depravity versus ability to assimilate.
909
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Antebellum feuds of a Caucasian profile did not attract the same interest from the 
North and existed in a realm somewhere between anecdote and legend.
910
  When reported, 
they were invariably said to originate over difficulties of minimal importance and 
escalate over unanswered grievances and the participation of friends, relatives or 
underlings, although a prolonged dispute between individuals was also sometimes termed 
as a ―feud,‖ especially when it ended in violence.  An 1827 political nomination race 
between two ―feuding‖ candidates for the Alabama state legislature ended in a deadly 
duel but was a strictly personal dispute, since neither candidate had employed allies, and 
neither used anything more than vitriolic stump speeches until one demanded satisfaction 
(with bloody results).
911
   
But feuds, real, imagined or both, were generally defined by the overarching 
significance of family (i.e., a ―family feud‖).  Vengeance, or many other motivations for 
violence, had to be related to the southern family, not so much because of the family‘s 
own overarching importance, but because of a lack of ―strong extra-familial institutions,‖ 
there was nothing else to supplant it.
912
  Events comprising a violent family feud could be 
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interfamilial (between either fictive or biological family groups) or intra-familial (within 
one family; as Bertram Wyatt-Brown mentions, it was popular for the latter sort to be 
portrayed as being between brothers).
913
  An ongoing conflict between an individual and 
a group of male members of one nuclear or extended family could also qualify; William 
C. Falkner, novelist William Faulkner‘s great-grandfather, began a personal vendetta 
against an entire family in 1849 by stabbing a man, and shooting another shortly 
afterward, after Falkner was refused membership in a local temperance society.
914
  But 
most southern feuds were understood to be mutual family affairs and, through fact or 
embellishment, followed the European model of ordered reciprocity between equals.  
Even conflicts that were clearly rooted in provincial southern locations were described 
according to European standards.  It was also important in feud accounts that the original 
subject of conflict be obscure or of miniscule importance and involve no transcendent 
issues of ideology or world view.  In 1863 a Union soldier observed an old ―family 
feud…quite ‗Corsican‘ in its character‖ being fought between neighboring families near 
Chattanooga, Tennessee over a paltry, apolitical matter, while the western theatre‘s 
battles were fought around them.
915
 The ―actual‖ Darnell-Watson feud reported by Mark 
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Twain in his travelogue Life on the Mississippi (and, later, the basis for the feud between 
the Grangerfords and Shepherdons in Huckleberry Finn) was said to have begun at an 
undisclosed time over ―a horse or a cow‖ between to well-fixed families on the 
Kentucky-Tennessee border near the Mississippi River.  Recalling in 1883 his hearing of 
the feud before the war (by which time the media had already established ―feuding‖ in 
eastern Kentucky as an institution) Twain proclaimed that ―no part of the South has the 
vendetta flourished more briskly, or held out longer between warring families‖ than in 
that area.
916
  The end of a twenty-one year ―domestic war‖ on the opposite end of 
Tennessee in Carter County, begun ―about a very trifling affair,‖ was reported in 1867, 
when the last male members of the respective families shot each other to death on the 
streets of the county seat.
917
     
 As long as feuds seemed to be a habit of the white southern gentry, purely 
communal and fought over personal or local trivialities, strictly horizontal (as well as 
inherent to a society given to honor-based violence) and not concentrated in one discreet 
area of the region, hardly any criticism was directed in their direction.  Southern feuds 
were apparently rare enough to be thought of more as quaint than threatening, as 
indicated by the New York Times‘ 1872 prediction of an oncoming ―good old fashioned 
southern feud,‖ even while southern violence was taking on a more sinister guise because 
of Reconstruction.
918
  In 1883, radical Republican newspaper editor Carl Schurz included 
―family feuds‖ among the categories of directionless violence he knew to be rampant 
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after Reconstruction had officially ended.
919
  Schurz was only echoing a book, published 
three years earlier, that firmly established the former Confederacy as a space of inveterate 
violence.  In 1880 Cincinnati journalist Horace V. Redfield published Homicide, North 
and South, a quantitative comparison of violent deaths in the northern and southern states.  
Redfield demonstrated that many of the southern states each numbered the same total of 
killings as up to eight northern states in a year, and asserted that murder was less likely to 
be punished there as well.
920
  This did not mean that conditions in the southern states 
were to blame, Redfield surmised, but rather that something was ingrained within the 
white population, as proven its continued practice by expatriated southerners living in the 
North.  A ―bad condition of affairs‖ in Williamson County, Illinois resulting in ―half a 
dozen homicides in a year‖ was characterized as ―a feud among families or factions of 
the peculiar southern type‖ and was explained as being carried out ―by population from 
the old slave States‖ and ―originat[ing] among the [white] population of Southern 
antecedents, and was carried on in the Southern shot-gun style.‖  The only difference 
between it and a similar feud that might have taken place in the ―old slave States‖ was 
that, it being a northern state, ―the ‗feud‘ was suppressed, murder was punished, and 
Williamson is to-day as quiet and orderly as any county in Illinois.‖921   
Redfield was keenly aware of the difference between political and extrapolitical 
violence and was insistent that the latter defined the white South more than the former.  
He insisted that, while South Carolina‘s Red Shirts and Louisiana‘s White League (as 
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well as the countless Ku Klux Klan blocs across the southern states) blatantly political 
hostilities seemed to have supplanted the older style of communal violence, the latter 
variety still seethed beneath national attention.  ―Although there have been many political 
murders in the Southern States, yet the great majority of homicides, and the class dealt 
with in this book, have no more connection with politics than has petit larceny in New 
York.‖922 In examining South Carolina‘s recent bloody history, he was sure to leave out 
1876 and its ―great political excitement‖ but still charged the state with an egregious (but 
firmly apolitical) record.
923
  One 1872 testimony to a joint congressional committee 
illustrates the clear extrapolitical value of feud and one example of its being used to make 
the political appear communal.  A congressman asked a resident of Cleveland County, 
North Carolina to explain a series of affrays between two planter brothers he had 
witnessed in recent months.  The witness answered that, even though one brother was a 
Republican and one a Democrat and that their enmity began with the close of the war, it 
was impossible to determine whether their rupture was related to the local ―bad feeling‖ 
between the parties or ―merely a family feud‖ (the witness indicated that he preferred the 
latter to be more likely).  It was admitted that the Republican brother had been attacked 
by a body of men in a clear attempt to dispatch a dissident scalawag, but the witness 
repeated his invocation of ―family feud‖ twice more.924  Even if it was an unsuccessful 
rhetorical gambit (and in this case it was not; the witness was unable to convince the 
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committee that white Republicans in Cleveland County were not being persecuted), feud 
could tell a good yarn but it also always served to depoliticize violence.        
 In contrast to the legitimacy of state-sponsored war, even a civil war legitimized 
only in memory, the taking up of arms over personal or familial rifts appeared at best 
archaic and, at worst, degenerate.  Before 1865 a family feud taking place in the United 
States, the South or otherwise, was a tribute to the centuries-long continuity of Anglo-
Saxon/Celtic (or Norman) blood (ergo, by extension in mid-nineteenth-century America, 
whiteness) and, therefore, somehow defensible.
925
  But after the war, even murders that 
were part of an ancient racial tradition were now within the rubric of crime.  The 
existence of a blood feud was no excuse to an observer like Horace Redfield, who saw 
(or, at least, portrayed) only a series of homicides unbestowed with the legitimacy of the 
state.  After a war, provincial armed conflict among whites was no longer excusable.  
And, by the end of Reconstruction, it seemed clear that the feud had found a special 
preserve in Kentucky.                  
 
“Actually, they are all one feud…” 
Since it contained both the quasi-planter society of the Bluegrass and the sparsely 
populated frontier-like mountains of the Cumberland Plateau, the ―two Kentuckys‖ 
concept acted as the feud‘s almost seamless conveyance from one southern setting to 
another, from that of the decadent antebellum planter to that of the primitive mountain 
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white.
926
  But the state‘s two guises were not based only upon geography and white 
southern culture.  It was also a literary device, one that reinforced the Bluegrass‘ image 
as the state‘s ―polis‖ and the mountains as its ―barbarian world.‖ 927  It was established 
not only by the journalists and anthropologists who flocked to the Cumberland Plateau 
beginning in the 1880s, but also by novels that drew a distinct contrast between the ―two 
exact opposites‖ comprised by ―the cultured lowlander of [novelist] James Lane Allen‖ 
and ―the rough-hewn highland feudist of John Fox, Jr.‖928   
The most thorough survey of feud violence‘s historical geography observes that 
the phenomenon became firmly associated with eastern Kentucky in the mid 1880s 
during the New York Times‘ coverage of the Rowan County War.929  Even longer ago 
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there had been a time when a true family feud was something many would have 
associated with the entire state rather than one benighted section.  The beginning of 
Kentucky‘s special reputation for armed interfamilial antagonism can be traced back to 
1854, when a roguish young Mississippi planter‘s son published a florid account of his 
cousin Dr. Hezekiah Evans‘ decades-long feud with his neighbors, the Hill family (one of 
whom was a rival physician) in the Bluegrass‘ Garrard County.  The middling planter 
Evans came into conflict with a neighbor over the former‘s mistreatment of a leased slave 
in 1829.  Years later, the neighbor‘s son, Dr. Oliver Perry Hill, publicly criticized him for 
being a subpar ―steam doctor‖ (as opposed to one with an actual medical degree like 
himself), and a series of confrontations between Evans, Hill‘s yeoman cousins and the 
―rabble‖ economically attached to both families cost nine lives.930  The conflict 
demonstrated simmering class tensions among Bluegrass whites (Oliver Hill supposedly 
turned down Evans‘ challenge to a duel, and Evans considered the other Hills too far 
beneath his ken to invite into the ritual) as well as a conflict over the nineteenth century‘s 
trend of medical professionalization.  Other than the sycophantic author‘s praising Evans 
as ―a genuine son of Erin,‖ the feudists‘ ethnicity was not made an issue.931 Yet the 
manner in which it was originally recorded for a reading public demonstrates familiar 
elements, namely the author‘s self-conscious attempt to frame the story within the 
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auspices of a European past.  The book‘s ostensible purpose was supposed to be Evans‘s 
vindication.  But, in order to demonstrate his knowledge of his favorite language, the 
Mississippian originally wanted to write it as a ―Spanish romance‖ (Evans, whose 
reputation meant more to him than his young cousin‘s linguistic skills, insisted that it be 
written in English).
932
  Even in a nonfiction format that described real, recent events in an 
American/southern setting, the blood feud was still a product of the Old World.   
Once the feud was transferred from the white South at large to eastern Kentucky, 
continuity with a European past had become more regression than romance.
933
 Still, while 
the transference of feud violence‘s attribution from the lowland aristocracy to the 
mountain white may seem somewhat of a historical rupture, the two can also be seen as 
segments in a longer continuity as well.  It was only because of the war‘s ruptures that 
feud took on a new purpose, the depoliticization of violence.  Just as the North 
Carolinian‘s testimony attempted to use it to disguise political violence against 
Republicans in his own state, the violence of ―family feuds‖ in Kentucky were said (by 
one northern missionary) to be ―mistakenly attributed to the Ku Klux,‖ a decidedly 
political organization.
934
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  By the 1880s, comparisons with Corsica, still the feud country du jour by the end 
of the 1870s and for years afterward, were still inspired by American writers.
935
  The 
Corsican analog is telling for reasons that involved culture and race, as well as politics.  
After the Civil War the white South, lowland or highland, was viewed by the North as 
civilization‘s outskirt, just as the island of Corsica was to Europe.  The description of 
violence as feud brought with it natural associations with a European past as well as an 
ever-present connection to kinship.  Comparisons to non-white populations and their 
forms of violence were surprisingly rare, since it would have been generally unacceptable 
to compare white Americans of any region to peoples of non-European extraction.  The 
inhabitants of Corsica were undoubtedly white but given to a ―primitive character‖ that 
had ―survived so many obsolete institutions‖ of government imposed by other nations 
over the centuries.
936
  Furthermore, Corsica had formed a republic in the mid-eighteenth 
century but was then bloodlessly absorbed by France.
937
  This provided a historical 
correlation with eastern Kentucky that was probably not lost on hopeful industrialists: 
mountain feudists were a fiercely democratic people that could be easily integrated into a 
larger economy. But most, if not all, accounts of Corsican or southern feuds failed to 
delve into the material causes of conflict, demonstrating a preference for them to be 
shrouded in obscurity rather than be brought to the light of day.    Still, there was 
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sufficient evidence to show that these feuds did not involve only kinship, a concession 
that observers made very reluctantly.  When the 1878 courthouse riot on the streets of 
Jackson, Kentucky prompted the New York Times to proclaim Kentucky ―the Corsica of 
America,‖ the editorial growled that ―the Kentucky vendetta is worse than that of Corsica, 
since it includes not near relatives merely, but remote kindred and friends of the parties 
involved, and is carried on more openly and defiantly.‖938  The differences between 
Kentucky and Corsica could not make the two different, but instead only make the former 
―worse.‖   
This is partly the urban outsider‘s common ―frontier‖ experience of being unable 
to perceive familiar points of context when observing violence.  When unfamiliar with, or 
only vaguely familiar with, the initial point of departure that leads to political violence, 
visitors to a war zone are likely to ―explain violence as a product of marginality and 
relative deprivation, or even [evoke] simple theories of violence as a phenomenon of the 
frontier.‖939  But the refusal of writers to strive to find the origins of feud violence is also 
a tool for delegitimizing the violence‘s usage, as is the primeval social atmosphere 
suggested by kinship.  Kinship remained the raison d'être once feud was decided to be a 
fixture of the Kentucky mountains rather than the lowland plantation, but with a 
significant change in syntax.  As mentioned before, the old variety of ―family feud‖ could 
be interfamilial (between either fictive or biological family groups) or intra-familial.  In 
contrast, Kentucky mountain feuds were only understood to be ultra-factional with very 
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clear kin-based delineations, taking place between two familial groups who might be 
related by marriage but suffer no identity crisis as to which side they are on.
940
  This 
made kinship an even greater motivational factor for killing.  Presumably, this may also 
have diminished the relationship between violence and personal honor; killing became 
more about eliminating an enemy than about preserving one‘s honor, thereby allowing 
the anonymous ―mountain method of ambush‖ to replace the more decorous and 
publicly-consented use of dueling.  But, most importantly, the alleged predilection with 
kinship placed mountaineers on a lower rung of a ―temporal hierarchy‖ than the mass of 
Anglo-America.
941
  It was this conceptual turn that helped to validate William Frost‘s 
otherwise oxymoronic ―contemporary ancestors‖ title for Kentucky mountaineers.942   
Their differences in appearance notwithstanding, Frost‘s semi-famous quote 
highlights the very important trait the lowland feudist and the mountain feudist did share, 
and the primary quality that justified the continuance of the ―feud‖ label: whiteness.  The 
myth of absolute whiteness among feudists was imperative to the construction of feud as 
a fundamentally horizontal relationship within a racially homogenous population.  With 
the advent of scientific racism and the ―cult of Anglo-Saxonism,‖ elaborations of 
                                                 
 
940
Waller counts among the many misconceptions regarding the Hatfield-McCoy feud the 
assumption that Hatfields and McCoys were only combatants against each other while, as her research has 
demonstrated, men with both surnames (as well as various other surnames) took divergent sides according 
to their economic relationships and personal wishes rather than family loyalties.  But in retrospect, many 
later used familial associations to explain their participation in violence; Waller, Feud, pp.    
 
941―Kinship, on the surface one of the most innocent descriptive terms one could imagine, is 
fraught with temporal connotations.  From the early debates on ‗classificatory‘ kinship systems to current 
studies of its continued importance in western society, kinship connoted ‗primordial‘ ties and origins, hence 
the special strength, persistence, and meaning attributed to this type of social relation.  Views of kinship 
relations can easily serve to measure degrees of advancement or modernization.  By comparing the relative 
importance of kinship bonds in different societies or groups one can construct developmental, i.e., temporal 
scales.‖; Fabian, pp. 75-76.  See also, Patrick Brantlinger.  Dark Vanishings: Discourse on the Extinction of 
Primitive Races.  (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003): pp. 1-16, particularly p. 2.  
 
942
William Frost, p. 311.   
387 
 
whiteness in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries relied upon a combination 
of biology, anthropology and history about which much revisionist ink has been spilled in 
the last four decades.
943
  In a society bent upon white supremacy and pervaded by 
interracial violence against non-white minorities, whiteness made these conflicts appear 
fundamentally horizontal and communal.  The constant paeans to southern mountaineers‘ 
pure bloodlines gave their communal existence a measure of scientific authority.       
But there was not a perfect consensus on mountain Anglo-Saxonism, at least as 
race was understood at the time.  From the 1870s until well into the twentieth century, 
literary discussions of feuding in the Kentucky mountains included constant citation of 
the continuity of Anglo-Saxon bloodlines or culture (the two were scarcely distinguished 
from each other), insistence upon preservation of old behaviors through this continuity 
and frequent medieval analogies.  But the types of behavior that made it possible for the 
greatest of the Nordic races to fill the earth and subdue it could not include violence that 
subverted state authority and its attendant western conceptions of progress.  ―The point of 
honor, as something to fight about, has pretty well disappeared in Anglo-Saxon countries,‖ 
observed a 1919 Harvard Law Review article on international law.
944
  Consequently, 
Anglo-Saxonism could not tell the whole story, and so not all racial explanations of feud 
behavior were the same.  Anthropologist Emma Connelly‘s aforementioned imagining of 
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―a sallow, gypsy-like people…‗far more incorrigible‘ than either the Indian or the negro‖ 
(a population whose existence was very difficult to prove) living next door to the ―purest 
Anglo-Saxon stock in all the United States‖ (which was, in contrast, impossible to 
disprove) was not popular, but it demonstrates Connelly‘s own difficulty reconciling the 
orthodoxy of Anglo-Saxon ascendancy with the mountain whites‘ wartime bushwhacking 
and feuding that followed.
945
  Sometimes semblances of political/contingency 
elucidations of mountain life provided a modest challenge to the 
communal/inherency/racial ones.  Interpretations of feud violence could not be fully 
explained by race, even by an observing literate public that was thoroughly interested in 
race as a transcendent determinant of human affairs.  Shortly before Connelly called the 
purity of the entire mountain population into question, a travel writer suggested that the 
origins of the ―race of American mountaineers occupying the country from western North 
Carolina to eastern Kentucky‖ was ―in doubt‖ and that their ―lawlessness‖ was nothing 
inherent to their make-up but just a ―relic of the disorganization during the war‖ (but 
even if the war started troubles the writer was fairly sure that ―politics has little or 
nothing to do with them now‖).946    
Even if associations between Anglo-Saxon heritage and feud violence were 
inconsistent and troubling, this did not mean an end to racial primordialism.  The 
language of Anglo-Saxonism was supplemented by an association between mountain 
whites and the Celtic ―race‖ or, more specifically, a Scottish past, a discourse more 
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conducive to explaining feuding as a form of communal violence.
947
  Applying ―pure‖ 
Celtic rather than Anglo-Saxon ancestry to the mountain feudist could set the unevolved 
mountain white apart from the mass of the Anglo-Saxon race but without forgetting his 
undeniable whiteness.  Even if Anglo-Saxon Americans of the New England variety had 
given up old forms of violence, nineteenth century feuds had a famous precursor among 
the Scottish highlanders of centuries past (the likelihood that most residents of the 
Kentucky mountains were probably descendants of Scottish lowlanders was a minor 
enough detail to ignore).
948
  Scottish associations were not purely dependent upon race 
but upon history as well.  Feuding, rather than being a peculiar phenomenon brought 
about by racial factors, could also be interpreted as a custom that ―survived to the present 
day‖ rather than appeared recently.949  Language that nineteenth-century Americans 
associated with Sir Walter Scott‘s highlands, such as the aforementioned ‗clan,‘ was 
often accompanied by exaggerations of recent feuds‘ historical lengths and obfuscations 
of their origins, suggesting that the practice continued ―transplanted‖ from Old World to 
New.
950
  The politicians of Rowan and Breathitt County were remembered by Kentucky 
historians as ―chieftains‖ and ―feudal lords,‖ terms that placed them in a past pre-dating 
constitutionally ordained positions as judge and sheriff.
951
  ―The feud is an inheritance,‖ 
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wrote one journalist in 1901.  ―There were feuds before the war and it is not a wild fancy 
that the Kentucky mountain feud takes root in Scotland…‖952  Allusions to medieval 
Scotland were not only a racially specific historical explanation of feuds but also an 
allegorical disciplining of the feud phenomenon.  Without noting that the recent decades‘ 
rash of feud violence was largely contained within one state, a magazine of Scottish 
culture claimed that ―Actually, they are all one feud, and all are products of the old 
Highland clan spirit…‖953  One southern commentator reasoned that, since ―feudal 
troubles…of the Scotch type involved but little loss of life and less of property,‖ they 
were relatively harmless and, most importantly, cast no reflection on statewide, regional 
or national political conditions.
954
  The only time it had been otherwise, in John Fox Jr.‘s 
novelized retelling of the mountain Republicans‘ 1900 occupation of Frankfort, was the 
―invasion from those black hills led by the spirit of the Picts and Scots of old, and aided 
by and abetted by the head, hand, and tongue of the best element of the Blue-grass.‖955  
The primal essence of the race could, in one exception, get involved in such matters as 
long as it had proper guidance from Kentucky‘s polis.      
Collecting all of the reported Kentucky county wars into ―one (racially 
determined) feud‖ took each out of its respective context and generally belied the various 
local cleavages that had motivated men to take up arms.  Though flawed, the theory of 
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Scottish inherency was successful in stripping these conflicts of whatever political import 
they might have otherwise been believed to possess in their respective localities had 
specific facts been publicized.  Even though evidence that ―the family feuds of 
Kentucky…seem[ed] peculiar to families bearing Scottish names‖ was limited, at best, to 
anecdote, it proved believable and an effective means of depoliticizing the feud.
956
  
Ethnicity or race were not only ends but also means to providing a place of detachment 
between eastern Kentucky‘s ―survival of Elizabethan days‖ and Bluegrass Kentuckians, 
or between the former and the mass of Anglo-Americans.
957
 But it was not a perfect 
means, since no anthropologists, especially those who were white Kentuckians and 
southerners, really wanted to be less racially pure than their more rustic neighbors.  For 
that concern, a discourse of frontier and isolation was needed.  ―[L]ess than a hundred 
miles‖ admittedly  ―divide[d] the habitat [original italics] of these wildly different types.  
Their origin was the same, for their forefathers came West over the Wilderness Road,‖ 
wrote one feud chronicler.
958
  ―The slipping of a linch pin in the mountains kept here and 
there a family up among the crags, and they remained there nursing their primitive 
superstitions and hatreds.  Their brothers moved on down to the blue grass, became 
educated and wore broadcloth.‖959  As shown in chapter two, eastern Kentucky was part 
of ―New Appalachia‖ in that it was settled relatively late, particularly after the Bluegrass 
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had become saturated, prompting mountaineers to refer to the Bluegrass as their state‘s 
―old settlements.‖960  But for the feud to be properly distanced historically, this fact had 
to be obscured or ignored.  It took a British historical journal in 1952, distant itself in 
space and time, to finally proclaim that ―the figure of the feuding hillman, crouched in 
the laurels with his long ‗human‘ gun (he called it so to distinguish from his squirrel gun), 
is a phenomenon of modern America rather than of pioneer times.‖  But considering that 
the article was subtitled ―…the scene of family feuds as fierce as any fought, before the 
Union of the Crowns, on the Anglo-Scottish border,‖ the tone of temporal confusion was 
still present as it had been decades before among the American accounts.
961
  And this was 
only briefly after another Briton, Arnold Toynbee, had declared that Kentucky‘s 
―mountain people…acquired civilization and then lost it,‖ a viewpoint that avoided the 
issue of temporal hierarchies altogether while nevertheless echoing the same 
implications.
962
                 
Picts and Scots aside, John Fox, Jr. did not always think of the Kentucky feud 
phenomenon as something wedged in a frozen past, but instead recognized it as a 
relatively new, albeit not especially politically significant, development.  In Bluegrass 
and Rhododendron; Outdoors in Old Kentucky (1901), Fox recorded one firsthand 
testimonial that, in the past, Kentucky mountaineers in one locale would have been ―druv 
outen the country‖ for drawing knives and guns in public, the more public manifestation 
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of what was considered feud-like violence.  By the present however, ―now hit‘s dirk an 
Winchester all the time,‖ a change attributed to the Civil War‘s introduction of easy 
killing.
963
  Years later in The Heart of the Hills (1912), Fox suggested that historical 
change, mainly for the worse, could take place within a feud‘s boundaries of conduct.  
What had once been an honor-based family affair, the Hawn-Honeycutt feud, eventually 
took on the taint of politics after both families began to see better days financially.   
As old Jason Hawn and old Aaron Honeycutt had retired from the leadership, and little Jason and 
little Aaron had been out of the hills, leadership naturally was assumed by these two business 
rivals, who revived the old hostility between the factions, but gave vent to it in a secret, 
underhanded way that disgusted not only old Jason but even old Aaron as well.  For now and then 
a hired Hawn would drop a Honeycutt from the bushes and a hired Honeycutt would drop a Hawn.  
There was, said old Jason with an oath of contempt, no manhood left in the feud.  No principal 
went gunning for a principal- no hired assassin for another of his kind.
964
 
 
The egalitarian ―manhood‖ that had once defined the ritualized feud had been replaced by 
the use of hired underlings, thus the creation of an unprecedented inequality.  As detailed 
in chapter six, the fictional Hawn-Honeycutt feud had been hiatused during their alliance 
against a thinly veiled William Goebel-based character.  Politics, and the violence that it 
involved, supplanted the communal conflict that the two families had kept going in their 
locale until forced to deal with the ―outside world.‖  Now that the feud had resumed, 
however, it had lost its ―manhood‖ by taking on hierarchies (i.e., politics) on each side.  
Not only was the original Hahn-Honeycutt feud apolitical but, in its ―purest‖ form, it was 
antithetical to politics.     
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―Manhood,‖ the primal force that gave the mountain whites their native animus, 
and motivated their supposed need for violence, had been polluted by a less valorous 
form of combat that involved the employment of lesser men rather than family.  Later in 
the novel Fox returned to ―manhood‖ in a soliloquy spoken by Colonel Pendleton, an 
elderly Bluegrass patrón who acts as a mentor to a young member of one of the families 
who attended stately Centre College.  On his deathbed he confesses Kentucky‘s sins 
committed from the 1860s to the 1910s:          
‗The war started us downhill, but we might have done better- I know I might.  The earth was too 
rich- it made life too easy.  The horse, the bottle of whiskey, and the plug of tobacco were all too 
easily the best- and the pistol all too ready.  We‘ve been cartooned for the world with a fearsome, 
half-contemptuous slap on the back.  Our living has been made out of luxuries.  Agriculturally, 
socially, politically, we have gone wrong, and but for the American sense of humor the State 
would be in a just, nation-wide contempt.  The Ku-Klux, the burning of toll-gates, the Goebel 
troubles, and the night-rider are all links in the same chain of lawlessness, and but for the first 
others might not have been.  But we are, in spite of all this, a law-abiding people, and the old 
manhood of the State is still here.  Don‘t forget that- the old manhood is here [Fox‘s italics].‘
965
  
 
Fox temporarily sets the ―two Kentuckys‖ motif aside and suggests that all of the ugly 
incidents and typologies of violence witnessed in the state since before feuding was in 
flower developed from the same decadent source.  But the images conjured were related 
more to the antebellum Bluegrass, and Colonel Pendleton noticeably left feuding off of 
his list, even though his young charge was a member of a feuding family.  This was 
purposeful, because these other forms of violence mentioned were openly insurrectionary 
or (in the case of the Ku Klux Klan) politically-motivated vigilantism.  The feud and its 
―manhood,‖ Fox seemed to imply, was apolitically horizontal and, accordingly, a vestige 
of a Kentucky before it went ―downhill,‖ a vestige that hearkened back to the old 
undivided consensus of white Kentuckians (and perhaps all white southerners).   
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Charles Mutzenburg, a journalist who was probably second only to Fox as an 
influential interpreter of eastern Kentucky feud violence, used the same anecdotes from 
Kentucky‘s recent history to protect the mountaineers from others‘ self-righteous 
condemnation.    
We believe it germane to the matter under discussion to add that not only feuds, but mobs and the 
like, are, and ever have been, the direct outgrowth of a lack of confidence of the people in their 
courts.  The shameful nightrider outrages in the western part of Kentucky a few years ago, in a 
section which had boasted of a civilization superior by far to that of the mountaineers, where 
schools and churches are to be met with at every corner, were the outcome, so it is claimed, of the 
failure of the law to deal sternly with the lawless tobacco trust, the ‗original wrongdoer‘ in the 
noted tobacco war.  If this were true, if this justified the destruction by incendiaries of millions of 
dollars‘ worth of property, brutal whippings, the indiscriminate slaughter of entire families 
without regard to age or sex, the butchery of little children (for aiding the tobacco trust, no doubt) 
then, indeed, is the mountaineer feudist also innocent of wrongdoing; more so, for he, at least, 
never made war upon suckling infants, nor have women suffered harm, except in one or two 
instances.  Nor is the cultured Blue Grass citizen free to censure him, when he calls to mind the 
outrages of the toll-gate raids, or takes into account the numerous lynching bees, proceedings from 
which the mountaineers have always been practically (my italics) free.
966
  
 
All of the violent embarrassments suffered by Kentucky, in Mutzenburg‘s view, 
were from the same source; the ―lack of confidence of the people in their courts‖ 
conveyed a public atmosphere still suffering from the crisis of legitimacy of past years.  
However, violence that was seen as ―feudal‖ did not affect women and children or 
challenge commerce as did those who attacked the Bluegrass toll-gates or the western 
Black Patch nightriders.
967
  Compared to the hateful political violence that eventually 
emerged, communal feudists were relatively benign, since they did not upset the status 
quo beyond their wooded environs.  The fact that the last major event to be named a feud 
in Kentucky involved the assassination of a political figure known throughout the state 
was left unmentioned.  Feud needed to remain unsullied by politics and, consequently, 
two Kentuckys‘ existence went only mildly challenged.       
                                                 
966
Mutzenburg, pp. 26-27.  
 
967
See also, NYT, 13 Feb, 1908; ―Kentucky Tobacco War,‖ Christian Observer, Vol. 96, No. 8 (19 
February, 1908): p. 3.  
 
396 
 
The primary means of forming a disciplined feud phenomenology came from the 
newspapers, in which eastern Kentucky‘s feud was reported to a broader public than the 
readers of anthropology or even novels.  Kentucky papers, especially those circulated in 
smaller markets, were willing to display their party stripes from the Civil War until well 
into the twentieth century, and, as revealed in preceding chapters, their interpretations of 
commotions in the eastern third of the state was guided by their respective loyalties.  But 
strict party devotion among large-circulation newspapers was a dying trend in the days 
when the Kentucky feud was becoming a subject of national interest.  The growth of 
national newspaper conglomerates too big to allow all of their papers to keep their firm 
political stances fostered a journalistic culture that favored human interest and 
sensationalism over the toeing of party lines.  By the middle of the 1890s the scandalous 
and the grotesque had become more worthy currency for widely-read papers and 
magazines and many publications divested themselves of their old party identities.
968
   As 
a result, the party associations that made up most Kentucky feuds were scarcely 
addressed in the nationally-read media.  ―Political rivalry,‖ parochial as it supposedly was, 
could be casually included within a list of trivial causes of quarrels, including ―a horse 
trade, a gate left open and trespassing cattle, the shooting of a dog…or a difficulty over a 
boundary fence,‖ according to Ellen Semple.969  Journalists joined scholars like Semple 
and William G. Frost in favoring explanations of feuds that dealt with race and spatial 
isolation.  When journalists bothered to get personal testimonials from locals, the latter 
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tended to speak of local disharmony in familial terms.
970
  By the beginning of the 
twentieth century the Kentucky feudist was considered a social type invariably formed by 
a combination of geography, breeding and unexplainable medieval qualities, particularly 
the obsession with honor attributed to lowland planters decades earlier. 
…in the mountain counties of [Kentucky‘s] eastern border, where the rugged and untaught minds 
are dominated by a crude and savage idea of the meaning of honor, the deadly vendetta still rages, 
and no one can say when it will cease.  So long as the mountain defiles remain uninvaded by the 
emigrant; so long as their mountain sides intimidate the prospective railroad line; and above all, so 
long as their wild, barbaric blood remains uncrossed by a gentler strain-just so long will their 
internecine wars prevail.  For here men are governed by a medieval idea of right and wrong, and 
each man‘s mind is his own court and judge.  He acknowledges no other, and by it are his actions 
governed.  And when it has led him to wanton slaughter, as it often does, the endless stretches of 
forest-clad mountains afford a refuge which it is impossible to lay bare.  But it is a rare thing that 
the slayer of his kind seeks the shelter of the hills.  When his enemy is done to death, the victor 
goes home and tells his friends, and the clansmen gather on either side, as they did in the days of 
Roderick Dhu.
971
     
 
Though Bluegrass optimists had once expected that the civilizing influence of church, 
dam, bank and steel track would bring peace to Kentucky‘s more restless counties, since 
then ―men had fallen dead by feudists‘ bullets on the doorsteps of the churches‖ and the 
arrival of railroads had not ceased killings.
972
  The mountain whites‘ feudal habits were 
beginning to appear something irredeemably inherent.  In what could have been one of 
the most open admissions that feud violence might have some internal political import, 
activist John C. Campbell wrote that the ―name commonly applied to the feud in 
Kentucky is ‗war,‘ and the principle upon which it was carried out was the principle of 
warfare- to do as much harm to the enemy as possible while incurring the least risk 
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oneself.‖973  This description was a far cry from the ritualistic practice of the classical 
feud.  But instead of crafting a commentary on how feud had been applied to eastern 
Kentucky arbitrarily by exogenous observers, Campbell intended for the war analogy to 
be only an illustration of the mountain feudist‘s ruthlessness as well as his arrogance in 
applying the air of legitimacy attendant to war onto his own personal vendettas.   
 Amid this interpretational atmosphere, the ―Hatfield-McCoy‖ feud began to ―fire 
the public imagination‖ in the 1880s and continued to do so for decades afterward.974  In 
a series of election-day confrontations, ambushes and an arson between 1878 and 1888, 
ten men and two children were killed in the Tug River Valley community straddling the 
Kentucky-West Virginia border.  The feud‘s most widely publicized deaths coincided 
with the French-Eversole feud and the Rowan County War, and might have been lost 
among eastern Kentucky‘s 1880s feud propagation had it not been for a New York 
reporter who chose the Hatfield-McCoy feud as the newly discovered mountain 
phenomenon‘s semi-factual epitome.  In choosing this particular atrocity, T.C. Crawford 
permanently established how Americans defined feud.
975
  Crawford‘s rendering was 
popular as a broad illumination of white intra-racial violence in the United States, as were 
versions of the Hatfield-McCoy Feud that followed in print and, eventually, on film.
976
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The story had charisma that other Kentucky incidents at the time lacked.  Its origins were 
murky enough (originally reported as one white family‘s attempt to enslave another, it 
was eventually reported as beginning after a lawsuit filed over a stolen sow) that it was 
commonly believed that the feud lasted generations rather than a modest twelve years; 
the entirety of the violence took place in one of the most remote areas of the Cumberland 
Plateau; and, in the style of Romeo & Juliet, it ended with a supposedly forbidden 
marriage between the combatants‘ children.977 The events that came to comprise the 
―Hatfield-McCoy feud‖ had far more appeal to American readers than the ―Rowan 
County War‖ or the ―French-Eversole‖ feud, because it combined elements of Old World 
romanticism with elements of the American frontier in an aesthetically satisfying manner.     
But, perhaps most importantly, the Hatfields‘ conflict with the McCoys, in its 
factual and fictional versions, was less offensive than others because of its communal 
appearance.  The homicides that took place were committed either as impulse or in 
revenge, as befitted the Corsican vendetta.  Long after the Progressive era‘s racial 
determinism had faded, it was still believable that the feud had roots in the British isles; 
beneath an article commemorating the centennial of the feud‘s cessation, the county seat 
newspaper in the Hatfields‘ and McCoys‘ old territory (now Mingo County, West 
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Virginia) expressively printed images of both families‘ supposed coats of arms.978  The 
feud was between families and factions of modest means and did not indict men in high 
places (even after an extradition conflict between West Virginia and Kentucky, no 
politicians were unduly embarrassed by the whole thing).
979
  It was unmistakably 
horizontal and devoid of class significance, thus sustaining the popular notion of the 
egalitarian mountain white.  It had no direct connection to intimate hostilities created by 
the war, and therefore did not challenge the promise of a national reunion based upon 
whiteness.  It could easily be written off as the product of a strange aboriginal culture 
rather than an outgrowth of the affairs of state.  The Hatfield-McCoy feud was the 
reported feud least embarrassing to the parties and political elites of its respective states.  
In comparison to the recent Rowan County War, it was almost devoid of party politics, at 
least from an outside viewpoint.  As close as it was in time and space to Bloody Breathitt, 
it was everything that Breathitt was not, thus making it far more popular and almost 
inspiring.  ―Hatfields and McCoys‖ had lasting power as an American idiom, even 
though eastern Kentucky‘s most demoralizing episodes of feud violence, the Clay County 
War and the Hargis-Cockrell feud, were yet to come and would eventually be forgotten 
on a national scale.  In American memory it was the extrapolitical apotheosis of feud.   
This feud‘s fame came almost exclusively from what was said of it by people 
from the ―outside world.‖  The Hatfields, McCoys and the people of other surnames who 
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were directly involved in their conflict hardly got the opportunity to tell their own story 
but were reticent when they did.  The majority of interpretations of Kentucky‘s feud 
violence between the 1870s and 1900s did indeed come from the city-dwelling journalists 
and industrialists who were products of Altina Waller‘s ―dominant culture.‖980  The 
mythological arrangement of the Hatfield-McCoy feud was, fundamentally, a hegemonic 
device to make way for economic exploitation.  By contrast, Breathitt County, the place 
that John Fox, Jr. (himself both a writer AND an industrialist who turned T.C. 
Crawford‘s journalistic subject matter into very popular fiction) considered the alpha and 
omega of this type of feud violence, was not interpreted exclusively by the ―outside 
world.‖981  ―Bloody Breathitt‖ was recorded and created according to a combination of 
the wants and needs of outsiders and those of the county‘s own inhabitants.  But the end 
results were analogous to that of the Hatfield-McCoy feud.  In due course it was decided 
to be in virtually everyone‘s interests for the causality of political divisions to be 
subordinated to the language of feud. 
 
“…a killing in Breathitt always seems to be big news…” 
 
In Jackson the news of peace between the Hatfields and McCoys was received 
almost exactly as it was anywhere else: a wire service half-column printed in the local 
newspaper with references to the middle ages, gross exaggerations of the feud‘s length 
and death toll, and a general oversimplification of the facts.   
The Hatfield-McCoy feud which has lasted nearly twenty years, and caused the death of 100 
persons [in] Logan county W. Va., and Pike county Ky., has at last ended.  Like the ―War of the 
Roses‖ it was terminated by a marriage.  A truce was proclaimed, a Hatfield married a Miss 
McCoy, a peace congress was call [sic] and terms amicable to both parties were agreed upon.  
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Thus ends one of the most bloody feudal wars of modern times not equaled in ferocity and fatality, 
perhaps, by the wars of the Scottish Highlanders.   
 
Jackson Hustler editor J.J. Dickey received the news with a bit of foreboding.  Noting the 
recent heightened national attention on eastern Kentucky as a whole, Dickey dourly 
predicted that fact and fancy would soon become intermingled in regard to his adopted 
section‘s ―feuds.‖   ―The feudal wars of Eastern Kentucky will no doubt be utilized in 
coming years by writers of fiction.  It is in this form, perhaps, they will go down to 
posterity as no historian feels like chronicling the naked facts, and incorporating them 
into local history.  Already two novels have been written to celebrate the deeds of the 
Hatfields and McCoys.‖982   
The missionary editor‘s concern for future fiction reflected a passion for accuracy 
in historical record that shone through in the longhand oral histories that filled hundreds 
of pages in his immense diary.  But it also revealed his apprehension as to how ―Bloody 
Breathitt‖ would be remembered.  Breathitt County was not the home of one iconic 
famous feud but of a series of marginally well-known feuds and general sporadic 
lawlessness dating back to the war, a fact that would make the truthful recording of its 
past complicated and perhaps even impossible.  Dickey had tried to be fair to Breathitt 
County in his own recording of its ―naked facts‖ and he was concerned that other writers 
would not.      
The end of the Hatfield-McCoy feud coincided with the Kentucky Union 
Railroad‘s arrival in Breathitt County.   The railroad‘s eminence in the lives of Jackson‘s 
residents (if not the citizens outside of the county seat‘s boundaries) represented an 
opportunity not afforded to the residents of the more isolated Tug River Valley to the 
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northeast.  It offered Bloody Breathitt‘s opportunity to divest itself of its image that dated 
back to the 1870s, an image that it had imposed upon it from the ―outside world.‖  If 
white intra-racial violence was a product of isolation and ―family feuds,‖ as had been said 
for years, the Kentucky Union was a sure cure.  But just over a decade later, when James 
Marcum‘s death reoriented national attention toward the county again, this assumption 
was disproven.  ―The Breathitt County feuds,‖ wrote the Courier-Journal soon after 
Marcum‘s murder, ―furnish a contradiction to the old adage that wherever newspapers, 
railroads, and colleges penetrate feuds are vanquished.‖983   
The same newspaper had begun the process of defining Bloody Breathitt more 
than twenty-four years before, when the Kentucky militia‘s occupation of Jackson gained 
national press attention.  In 1874, after William Strong‘s capture of the courthouse first 
caught the Louisville paper‘s attention, Watterson‘s column space was spent more on 
terror further to the South (most notably the White League riots in Louisiana) and news 
from Breathitt County was relatively picayune.
984
 But the 1878 street fight that killed 
Judge Burnett and others happened in an otherwise more peaceful time (shortly after 
Reconstruction‘s end), and Breathitt County‘s violence thus appeared more sinister.  In 
its earlier stories in December, 1878, the Courier-Journal took an openly partisan stance, 
defending Breathitt County against northern Republicans‘ hypocritical jabs of ―race 
prejudice‖ and ku kluxing and blaming the county‘s ―Loyal‖ (i.e., formerly Unionist) 
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minority for causing trouble.
985
  ―Neither the state nor the United States have done 
anything for Breathitt,‖ the paper intoned in a statement that defended the county while 
simultaneously dissociating it from the rest of Kentucky, ―and, in turn, Breathitt has 
‗done nothing for nobody.‘‖986  Still, the same correspondent concluded that he would 
―sooner live on the western plains and take the chance of being scalped by Sitting Bull, 
than to live in Breathitt County at the present time.‖987   
As coverage by other newspapers trailed off in early 1879 during the rioters‘ trials, 
the Courier-Journal began to sound less sympathetic toward Breathitt County while 
retaining a portrayal of the community as a country as foreign from the Bluegrass as 
possible.  Rather than rising against the New York Times‘ contention that the Ku Klux 
Klan ―were gentle citizens compared with the desperadoes who infest the ravines and 
hills of Breathitt‖988  The Courier-Journal also began to describe Breathitt County as a 
savage environment with ―meadows that were stripped of all pastoral suggestions‖ and ―a 
land which did not overflow with honey and where civilization was but a puling strangled 
infant.‖989  Shortly before this description was printed, the paper interviewed the ―King 
                                                 
 
985
Cincinnati Commercial, 1 8 December, 1878; CDG, 2 December, 1878; LCJ, 3 5 8 December, 
1878; NYT, 7 December, 1878.   
 
986The same article highlighted the county‘s poverty: ―...the worldly goods of these five or six 
thousand people do not much exceed in value those of so many Indians on a government reservation.  
Under such a state of life society must approximate a primitive condition, and if the Bluegrass counties are 
inclined to turn up their noses at it we beg them to count up their own killings and remember that none of 
us are any better  than we ought to be.  I am informed that a baker‘s dozen will cover the number of men 
killed in  personal difficulties in this county since the war and many a more favored county can discount 
that with a single year‘s crop, and get ahead of Breathitt as much in ‗stiffs‘ as they do in cereals‖;  LCJ, 
December 5, 1878. 
 
987
LCJ, 24 December, 1878. 
 
988
NYT, 26 January, 1879.  
 
989
LCJ, 26 January, 1879.  
405 
 
Bee,‖ William Strong, and exonerated him as having acted in a purely defensive manner 
during the riot.
 990
 But by doing so, the paper belied the political and sectional stance it 
had taken toward the situation just short weeks earlier.  The ―King Bee‖ of Breathitt 
County was no longer a radical Unionist but a quasi-Scots ―chieftain,‖ but with American 
Indian likenesses.   
He came to my room this evening; just before the winter sun sank to rest beyond the western hills, 
sans horns, war paint and other paraphernalia. Instead of looking fierce as the lion in his native 
jungle, or the tiger in defense of her cub, his face was as calm as the surface of a sleeping lake and 
reminded me no more of war than do the innocent flowers of May. I felt considerably relieved 
when I shook hands with him and beheld that springtime smile upon his face, for my memory was 
just then quite vivid with recollection of the adverse criticisms I had indulged in toward the 
mountain Captain, and the smile dispelled the thought that he had come to chaw me up.
991
 
 
Even if Strong was not the monster the correspondent had originally believed him to be 
(no doubt because of local Democrats‘ whispers) his image had gone from the most 
ruthless Union home guard in Kentucky to an exotic.  Although he retained the title of 
―mountain captain,‖ the event that had led to his captain‘s commission in the previous 
decade was beginning to fade.   
But this was long before Bloody Breathitt became familiar to Americans outside 
of Kentucky.  The mountain Kentuckians‘ alleged need for civilizing in the winter of 
1879 established what would become the feud belt‘s essential premise.  When Breathitt 
County once again received widespread media scrutiny, the mold for its interpretation 
had already been set in other eastern Kentucky counties.  Because of the feuds of the 
1880s and the Clay County War of the 1890s, it was arguable that Breathitt‘s experience 
was an example of a greater whole.  But the construction of Bloody Breathitt came about 
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with contributions from a diverse, often conflicting, array of forces, not all of whom 
agreed upon how the strange county should be defined.  To an observer from the ―outside 
world‖ with no prior knowledge of the county‘s history or politics, it was an eastern 
Kentucky county little different than most others, beset by a racial or cultural tendency 
toward communal violence irrespective of county boundaries.  After the Hargis-Cockrell 
feud, the international comparisons used to describe American family feuds of old 
continued to be used.  The latest feud rivaled ―the worst stories that have come out of 
Corsica and Sicily.‖992  The large families of Breathitt presented such a great numerical 
fight against ―race suicide,‖ the Courier-Journal snarked in 1904, that ―President 
Roosevelt‘s [a well-known proponent of Anglo-Saxon monumentalism] heart would be 
gladdened by a sight of Jackson.‖993 ―The feuds of Breathitt County and of the 
mountains,‖ concluded one activist, grew out of the ―code of morals which belong to the 
old Scotch Highlanders.‖994  Sources that acknowledged political impetus used temporal 
exaggerations to make the feud‘s electoral origins seem more distant in time than they 
actually were.  Even when the ―official position and political influence‖ of modern 
politicians was recognized, they were still only considered aggravating factors in ―feud 
wars‖ that had ―raged since the Kentucky mountains were first settled by white men‖ or 
at least were ―older than [the] War.‖995  A children‘s novel published less than six years 
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after James Hargis‘ death (and a year before Sheriff Callahan‘s) recounted the feud 
lasting ―for generations‖ after ―some election for a county judge.‖996  Republican 
Kentucky newspapers, usually less willing to separate Bloody Breathitt from the state‘s 
political present than the Democratic opposition, still could not resist comparing the 
Hargis courthouse‘s corruption to the conditions of the ―the middle ages.‖997      
But at the same time, there was also an impulse to make Breathitt seem strange 
even among its neighbors and within the feud mythos, a viewpoint more likely to be 
espoused by the mountain white‘s self-proclaimed defenders.  Whenever the ―outbreak of 
another feud in ‗bloody Breathitt‘‖ was reported, ―the world infer[ed] that battle, murder, 
and sudden death are commonplaces in Appalachia.‖998  But Bloody Breathitt‘s inherent 
violence did not encourage greater attention to be paid to possible political causes.  The 
conception of ―Bloody Breathitt‖ was very different than the Hatfield-McCoy feud or any 
of the other feuds or ―wars‖ that were reported in other eastern Kentucky counties.  A 
feud was an event, or a series of events, with a beginning (albeit an often obscure or 
unimportant one) and an ending.  To a degree, it was determined by clear contingency.  
But for there to be a series of relatively self-contained feuds within the confines of one 
county, as was the case with Breathitt, violence would have to be a permanent product of 
the terrain rather than of human agency, and therefore inherent in the culture for reasons 
beyond direct comprehension.
999
  This was why the persistence of the Hargis-Cockrell 
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feud was exaggerated and said to continue ―despite the fact that most of its actors have 
been laid low by bullets.‖1000 By suggesting that the late feud lasted past the deaths of 
most of the political actors who acted as instigators or victims, feud was suggested to be a 
localized ontology of violence rather than a historically finite event or series of events.  
Whether part of the feud belt, or singularly perverse, Breathitt County‘s violent history 
was decidedly inherent, irrespective of what went on in the ―outside world.‖     
  After 1903, ‗Breathitt,‘ bloody or unmodified, became a glib metaphor for 
descriptions of violent conditions from the Balkans to the similarly mythologized 
American West.  A Chicago newspaperman compared Serbian King Peter I‘s chances of 
assassination to that of a Breathitt County prosecuting attorney.
1001
  In the nationally-read 
humor magazine Puck, a grizzled westerner named ―Tarantula Tom‖ told a ―commercial 
traveler‖ to fictional ―Crimson Gulch‖ that the rowdy mining camp had been pacified 
after ―a feller come along from Breathitt county, Kentucky, an‘ we felt so much like 
amateurs that the boys all quit tryin‘ to show off.‖1002  Seven years later the same 
magazine expressed hope that ―some beneficient, heedless, rakehelly, irresponsible, light-
hearted cyclone, earthquake, avalanche, conflagration, tidal wave, comet, pestilence, or 
plague would arise and smite, overwhelm, wipe out, submerge, comsume, chew-up-and-
spit-out, devour, emasculate, or destroy‖ Breathitt County and other recent trouble 
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areas.
1003
  In a reverse of the old Mediterranean metaphor, a character in an American 
novel about Sicily exclaimed that the island‘s vendetta habit was ―worse than Breathitt 
County, Kentucky,‖ with no further explication for the reader apparently needed.1004  
When a Virginia courthouse massacre made national news in 1912 one commentator 
branded it ―an echo of the Breathitt County feud‖1005      
  Fictional accounts of mountain feuds in the first decades of the twentieth century 
also exploited the recent memory of the Hargis-Cockrell feud.  A settlement school 
teacher‘s fictional memoir used the town of Jackson and Breathitt County as its model 
and began the storyline briefly after the cessation of a recent prolonged fracas between 
town politicians.
1006
  The surnames ‗Jett‘ (i.e., Curtis Jett) and ‗Valentine‘ (the first name 
of one of the more famous Hatfields) were used as character names in a feud novel set in 
the story-bound town of Leeston.
1007
  Fascinated as much by Breathitt County as he was 
by all of the state‘s other locales, John Fox, Jr. never used it as a setting for one of his 
novels (he tended to avoid using explicitly real places for such) but the county was 
mentioned as a neighboring locale in a novel and two short stories (Fox also used 
‗Marcum‘ as one character‘s name in one novel).1008  Fox‘s primary concern was 
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establishing feud violence as something innate to the experience of the mountain white, 
not just a series of events.  For that reason, the violent streets of Jackson, and the 
bushwhacker-rife woods that surrounded it, made for better subject matter than the finite 
vendettas of other Kentucky counties.  In order to be interesting, feuds had to have 
historical longevity, and even though the longevity of other feuds was exaggerated for 
dramatic effect, Fox‘s interest in authenticity led him to what he considered an inherently 
violent territory rather than simply a place that had played host to a feud.  The inherency 
of violence came to replace the historical facts of feuds in the memory of Bloody 
Breathitt and the rest of eastern Kentucky.  By the 1920s the only nationally-available 
account of the Hargis-Cockrell feud that announced the facts of the conflict and made 
explicit use of full names (particularly Judge Hargis‘s and Sheriff Callahan‘s role in 
organizing the death of James Marcum at the hands of Curtis Jett and Tom White) was a 
folk song of questionable composition.
1009
    
By the high years of the New Deal, it was no longer politically advantageous for 
Breathitt County to be set off from the rest of the United States, but instead it was 
brought into the same efforts at incorporation as the rest of the South.  In the years that 
had passed since Edward Callahan‘s shooting death (often considered the end of the 
―feudal era‖) the county had become a target of reform efforts bent upon hookworm 
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eradication and flood prevention.
1010
  These Progressive efforts often restated eastern 
Kentucky‘s longstanding reputation for isolation and deprivation, but, as the notorious 
Breathitt County came to be seen as one mountain county suffering from the same social 
and infrastructural ills as many others, its individual fame waned.  In the 1930s the 
county was a frequent subject for photographer Marion Post Walcott as she collected 
visual data for the Farm Security Administration.
1011
  Rather than taking pictures of aging 
feudists, Walcott instead focused upon muddy roads and rain-famished cornfields, images 
that made Breathitt County part of a larger regional whole rather than singling it out.  In 
1936 one pair of educators acknowledged the deleterious effects that Breathitt County‘s 
being defined by the ―outside world‖ had on its well-being. ―…the epithets which role 
[sic] so easily off the tongue- a ‗Kentucky feud,‘ a ‗hillbilly song,‘ ‗poor whites,‘ and that 
telltale appellation which so many of the inhabitants would like to live down, ‗Bloody 
Breathitt.‘  It is through these stock phrases that some of us have come to know this part 
of the South.‖1012  Given the need for cooperation between local elites and federal arrivals, 
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politics was not acknowledged as the root cause of the county‘s past horrors.  An 
indictment of the Democratic Party of the past might have seemed like an indictment of 
present Democrats, especially considering that, save for a brief period after the Hargis-
Callahan regime‘s end, they had ruled the county perpetually (and, by the 1930s, 
―controlled everything‖).1013  And, in any case, a society disadvantaged on ―the scale of 
cultural and social values,‖ (a more advanced sociological version of ―contemporary 
ancestors‖) could not be blamed, considering that ―in these days there is hardly any 
people competent to judge another…‖1014  It was now time for the county to reenter the 
rest of the region, even if it meant being part of what President Franklin Roosevelt would 
call ―the Nation‘s number one economic problem.‖1015 
 Feuds were now an event thankfully stuck in the past and absent in a county with 
access to federal aid and centralized planning.  But as the historical home of the ―feud‖ 
country, Breathitt County‘s past of factional violence could not be completely forgotten, 
especially considering that its rate of violent crime was still relatively high as late as 1940.  
―Even though the county may have one or two well-broadcasted murders every year-for a 
killing in Breathitt always seems to be big news- educational facilities, better roads, in 
short, greater contact with modern forces have corroded the feudal spirit,‖ said one 1941 
local history published by the Works Progress Administration.  Feuds were 
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understandable in their day because of environmental factors beyond the control of the 
mountain pioneer.  The ―hilly country where ridges and creeks tended to mark off one 
clan and its supporting faction from another, and where Mother nature was hostile and 
niggardly‖ contributed to the development of ―feudal ties between men.‖  To observers 
from the ―outside world,‖ common criminal violence was even less legitimate than feuds, 
but recent unnamed troubles, readers were reassured, had ―not assumed the proportions of 
a feud.‖1016  Even if Breathitt Countians supposedly retained a customarily nonchalant 
attitude toward murder, ―life was cheap‖ now because ―the hills were stripped, the timber 
business expired, floods washed the topsoil off the farms."
1017
  Violence in Bloody 
Breathitt was no longer a product of the residents‘ temporal dissonance from the 
Bluegrass and the rest of the ―outside world‖ but was now the outcome of very current 
economic problems.  But even though crime had supplanted feud, violence of either sort 
was still useful.  More than ten years later, the county‘s reputation for ―unrestrained 
lawlessness‖ was admissible evidence in a corporation‘s suit against a striking labor 
union.
1018
    
 The construction of Bloody Breathitt was largely the creation of outside observers, 
most of whom were unaware of or unconcerned with the exigencies of life in the county.  
Breathitt County seemed to be one exemplar of the larger eastern Kentucky feud 
phenomenon, but, at the same time, seemed to stand out from the others as well.  In the 
1942 anthology of Cincinnati newspaper editor Harold Coates‘ ―true and accurate 
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descriptions of the various Kentucky Feuds‖ (all of which had been published 
individually in pamphlet form in the 1920s), three of the twelve feud vignettes were 
dedicated to the county‘s history, from William Strong‘s 1874 courthouse capture to the 
death of Edward Callahan in 1912.
1019
  Rather than presenting a protest, most local 
descriptions of Breathitt‘s violent history avoided discussions of conflicts over power but, 
instead, tried to place violence as far into the past as possible, using language not unlike 
the ―outside world‘s‖ accounts.       
 
 
“We know that, from the first, the wilderness was their teacher…” 
 
Judge James Hargis was quite successful in using feud to protect himself from  
 
criminal conviction.  A large part of his success had to do with how ingrained the feud 
narrative had become in explaining violence in eastern Kentucky, so ingrained that even 
his greatest detractor, the Breathitt County News, casually described ―feuds‖ in other 
mountain counties while Hargis was still in office.  The possibility that a recent deadly 
scuffle in Huntington, West Virginia ―may start a feud‖ would have been a comfort to 
any eastern Kentuckian weary of hearing of it only in their section of their own state.
1020
 
Those from Breathitt County who were able to make their voices heard, mainly Jackson‘s 
commercially-interested elite, had never shied from explaining their county‘s own 
violence in language that echoed that of the ―outside world,‖ and the four-letter-word was 
not avoided once it was widely popular.  Language that employed the racial politics of 
the day was just as popular in Breathitt County as it was among the anthropologists and 
local color writers.  As mentioned before, the booster who begged for the Bluegrass‘s 
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investment in 1884 attributed the violence he or she thought was safely in the past to the 
Scots and the Irish, years before it was widely popular to do so in exogenous 
literature.
1021
 Once word of their unadulterated Anglo-Saxon blood was a widely-known 
fact, white Kentuckians in and around the county clung fiercely to the racial badge that 
they probably had never doubted was theirs in the first place, even if it did implicitly 
suggest an innate tendency toward modern savagery.  Upon reading of a lecture that 
suggested that the ―Kentucky mountaineer‖ was the progeny of Indians and ―white slaves‖ 
(the lecturer presumably meant seventeenth-century indentured servants), a Perry county 
resident protested ―There is not one family out of a thousand of the present inhabitants of 
the Cumberlands whose parentage may be traced either to the Indians or to those white 
slaves who had been freed by the Virginia planters.  They are descendants of families 
who had been prominent in the Revolutionary struggles, and those people have known 
almost no intermingling of other blood from the time of their immigration to the present.  
The allegation that these bold, generous, hospitable, strong-minded neighbors about us in 
Breathitt, Perry and Leslie counties are a new class of humanity and descendants of 
Indians and white Virginia slaves is a slander which we repel.‖1022  Nearly twenty years 
later, as the national debate over the teaching of evolution was building steam, the 
Breathitt County News‘ editor fired off a similar salvo.  ―‗The professors at the state 
university [in the Bluegrass] may believe they are descended from apes and baboons, but 
let it be known that the good people of Breathitt are pure Anglo-Saxon.‘‖1023 Racially-
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conscious Breathitt Countians were as aware as other white southerners that whiteness 
dealt as much, and perhaps more, with material and social attainment as it did with skin 
color.  For a place and a people increasingly economically marginalized, and vilified in 
the media as something culturally or even biologically different than the regular white 
southerners they had once been, racial validation was crucial.     
Possibly the most all-inclusive apologia for Bloody Breathitt ever produced was  
journeyman newspaperman Louis Pilcher‘s The Story of Jackson City (1914), the last in a 
series of promotional publications on various eastern Kentucky towns on the make.  
Despite being a Lexingtonian, Pilcher ―something of a literary free lance‖ wrote of 
Jackson as a native and peppered his ―brief biographies of prominent citizens‖ with trivia 
that linked Jackson‘s leading names to the Bluegrass in order to advertise the town‘s 
hopeful connections to the ―outside world.‖1024  For Pilcher, the story of ―Bloody 
Breathitt‖ had already been told in fictional form and, the more fictional it was, the better.  
―If the reader is seeking any light or information on the feuds of Breathitt County this 
book will be a disappointment for I want to go back to the ‗City of Sudden Death,‘ and I 
don‘t like to write about feuds anyway‖ because, after all, ―feuds and pistol toting are so 
vulgar and low flung…‖1025  Pilcher expressed hope that the literary interest in 
Kentucky‘s feuds would soon die down, so that reading about violence would not pollute 
young minds.  ―Just contemplate what a terrible nightmare such a book [collecting all of 
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Kentucky‘s feud stories] would produce on the plastic minds of the youth of Kentucky; a 
veritable chamber of horrors.‖1026 Jackson in 1912 had no more feuds because of solid 
social engineering that kept violence confined within spatial boundaries and class 
designators.  The absence of licensed saloons helped to keep the peace, and the civically-
maintained enclosure of ―Snake Valley,‖ the sin district along the river, kept the town 
quiet enough to require ―only one policeman and but little for him to do except collect 
city taxes and electric light bills.‖ 1027   The ―inspiration of the new Kentucky‖ had 
eradicated feuds through progressive social engineering and brought Breathitt County 
into the present.   
 Even if violence that took the feud form was a thing of the past, Pilcher did not 
attempt to deny eastern Kentucky‘s violent history and, reaffirming many other observers, 
explained the region‘s social problems using racial determinism.  Although he shared 
others‘ belief in Kentucky‘s ―purest Anglo-Saxon stock,‖ Pilcher put a greater emphasis 
on the sociology of race than he did cultural and biological explanations, and did so to 
tout what he considered the less adulterated portion of the ―two Kentuckys.‖1028 ―It is a 
well-known fact in sociology of Kentucky and the South that the Afro-American race has 
for long been the ‗escape valve‘ in morality and immorality-there also being another 
division, unmorality.  In certain sections of Kentucky-notably in the eastern part-the 
absence of Negroes has laid the heavy toll upon the white race, and hence there is more 
white immorality than in communities where Negroes abound, Central Kentucky and 
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many Southern States having a greater number of Negroes than Caucassians [sic].‖1029  
Even with this being the case, the ―purity‖ of a place like Jackson made it far superior to 
most of the United States, especially the racially polluted, and over-urbanized North.  
―We [eastern Kentuckians] will not stand for miscegenation,‖ wrote Pilcher.  ―It is said 
that in Louisville and Indianapolis, Cincinnati and Chicago, that many depraved and 
degenerate white women have Negro husbands.‖1030 But the massive childbirth rates of 
pure eastern Kentuckians guaranteed the survival of whiteness without anyone else‘s 
assistance.  ―When fathers count their progeny from eight to a dozen, race-suicide is out 
of the question and the crusade for eugenics makes the healthy bucks that snuff the 
mountain air, smile in derision when the name is defined.  It belongs to hot-house 
civilization and degenerating, neurotic practices.‖1031 These ―healthy bucks‖ were natural 
―fighting men…big, powerful fellows [and] men of courage and fine marksmen; 
sometimes‘ ignorant, wary and good shots,‘ like the Boers.‖1032 And entrance into politics 
was eastern Kentucky‘s chief means of harnessing this natural energy and aiming it 
toward useful purposes.  ―It is a fact in criminology of the mountains that the ‗tough 
customers‘ are frequently reformed and become good citizens by elevating them to 
offices, and so there is no end of Deputy Sheriffs and Constables and Deputy Constables 
in Breathitt, Perry and Letcher Counties.  It has had a salutary effect in many instances I 
hear and frequently Sheriffs, Jailers, County Attorneys and County Judges are ‗reformed‘ 
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bad men elevated to offices of dignity and power.‖1033 Even with Judge Hargis and 
Sheriff Callahan gone, most of the men who had been peripherally involved in their 
courthouse were still alive, and Pilcher was careful to spin their colorful pasts in as 
flattering a style as possible.  More importantly, however, it was vital that political office 
be the redemption of ―bad men‖ rather than a reason to kill and a platform for giving 
fruition to their evil intentions.  Problems of the recent past were framed as a social 
system worthy of envy. 
 Pilcher‘s interpretation of eastern Kentucky‘s ―fighting spirit,‖ and by insinuation 
the history of feud, fulfilled popular ideas about masculinity and the environmental 
construction of American humanity.  Life in the Kentucky mountains was a Rooseveltian 
―strenuous life‖ all to itself, and combined with its unsullied Anglo-Saxonism, provided a 
cure for the enervating effects of industrial life and ethnic pollution going on in the urban 
North (if there was any irony in the fact that Pilcher was simultaneously trying to bring 
more industry to the mountain towns he touted, in light of this selling point, he did not 
address it).  Feud, now that it was a thing of the past, was a usable past, one with its more 
tragic elements discarded (the widow Marcum, remarried and still living in Jackson, was 
never mentioned, although Callahan and Hargis were; her husband was erroneously 
identified as ―Judge Marcum‖) and its rakish façade remaining.  The actual deaths and 
suffering of the recent past, a ―dead load which by itself time will bury in oblivion,‖ 
could be forgotten and replaced by a mountain ―heritage‖ which toughened its 
descendants without causing any real harm.
1034
 Pilcher‘s employment of feud divorced 
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violence from actual events, making it instead an abstract product of a white mountain 
volksgeist, one that stood as a model for all white Americans.  In this regard, The Story of 
Jackson City was little different than the anthropological and fictional portrayals of 
eastern Kentucky that predated it by decades.  But unlike them, this was a native account, 
told for the benefit of Breathitt County‘s future by someone who ostensibly spoke for the 
community.   
 Men who had actually participated in violence there did not take the same 
communitarian tone as Pilcher, but instead personalized their experiences.  While serving 
time in prison, Curtis Jett, by his own admission ―as vile a sinner as ever came down the 
pike,‖ was famously Born Again and (against Abrelia Tucker née Marcum‘s efforts) was 
able to negotiate an early release with his Christian testimonial, a one-prisoner crusade to 
have pool tables removed from the state penitentiary, and a new life as an evangelist.
1035
  
Now happily a Bluegrass resident (he had spent much of his childhood there after his 
family left Jackson during the troubles of the 1870s), Jett confirmed many of the 
assumptions held regarding the section of his birth; his upbringing was nominally 
Christian but ―weak along spiritual lines,‖ (the portrayal of mountain religion popularized 
by William Guerrant decades before) while his own love of ―strong drink,‖ ―pistol toting,‖ 
and cigarette smoking were learned from his ―typical mountaineer‖ father and a 
―drunkard‖ male neighbor.1036  Jett employed a pat combination of nature and nurture to 
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explain ―Bloody Breathitt‖ and his own role as a ―feudist.‖  During this childhood visits 
to Breathitt County, he discovered that ―every one in that section had an axe to grind‖ 
and, as an impressionable adolescent, ―we boys were ambitious when we became men to 
become leaders of such a click [sic], to take our chance in the mountain battles and some 
day to carry revolvers and Winchesters with notches cut to indicate the number of 
enemies we had outwitted and gotten the drop on.‖1037 In Jett‘s telling, the eastern portion 
of the ―two Kentuckys‖ was a natural training ground for violence to which he had been 
an eager pupil.        
 Jett paid homage to the local political arrangement (one devoid of republican 
norms of governance and therefore more communal than political) that had given birth to 
the feuds of his childhood, particularly the beginnings of sporadic fighting between 
William Strong‘s Red Strings and Edward Callahan‘s Ku Klux, although he referred to it 
as the ―Strong-Callahan feud‖ without any Civil-War-era political designators.  But, by 
the end of his incarceration in 1919, he had absorbed enough written an d spoken feud 
lore involving honor and vendetta to make it part of his description.           
Many of the leaders of the feuds were men of good circumstances and of fine intelligence.  They 
were kind and courteous to their friends, but they came from a race of people beyond the sea who, 
for centuries, had not looked to the courts for protection, but had taken their affairs into their own 
hands.  With them it was perfectly honorable to defend themselves and take the life of any they 
suspected of having ill will toward them. 
The leaders of the mountain feuds were something like the old Scottish Chieftains who gathered 
their class about them and fought their misunderstandings to a finish.
1038
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But his retelling of his own participation in the Hargis-Cockrell feud was circumspectly 
apolitical, dwelling more on remembrances of his own personal failings than on the 
circumstances that brought him to be a deputy under Callahan. 
There was much animosity and ill feeling which culminated in several deaths on both sides of the 
feud.  So far as any part I may have had in these unfortunate affairs is concerned that has been 
thoroughly threshed out in the civil and criminal courts of the State, and I could not add anything 
which would involve anyone who has not already been involved in the courts.  I did not participate 
in these for any price or cause except for the love of my people and the unfortunate spirit of 
revenge in my own heart.  A merciful God has granted my forgiveness which I feel toward all men 
and believe it would be unwise for me to enter into any further discussion of the matters.
1039
 
 
Throughout his book, laden with his poems and his own and others‘ verifications of his 
redemption, he never once mentioned James Hargis or the names of the men he was 
convicted of killing.  He did not endow his official role as deputy sheriff with enough 
legitimacy to allow it a mention.  His ―love of [his] people‖ and ―unfortunate spirit of 
revenge‖ cast a personal and communal basis, and a vendetta-related motivation, for the 
time when he had been a killer and implicitly placed his own actions within a much 
longer narrative of inherent violence.  His conversion could not have happened had he 
not been jailed in a prison where he discovered a love of God, patriotism and personal 
industry (in the capacity of the penitentiary‘s horticulturalist).  But the prison‘s being in 
the Bluegrass rather than the mountains was of special importance to the changes he had 
undergone.  The exodus of (in the penitentiary chaplain‘s words) an ―old wild dog of the 
mountains‘‘ from ―his former mountain days‖ was a metaphorical spiritual journey but a 
geographical journey as well, confirming that Jett‘s former sinfulness and the eastern 
Kentucky were firmly entwined.
1040
  Leaving Bloody Breathitt for the more advanced 
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Bluegrass was an integral part of Jett‘s salvation.  Appropriately, after his release he 
attended the Bluegrass seminary founded by William Guerrant in Wilmore, Kentucky.
1041
   
Another son of ―typical mountaineers‖ who parlayed his connection to ―Bloody 
Breathitt‖ into an evangelical style employed feud in a way that Jett could not.1042  Wolfe 
County native Charles ―Bulldog Charlie‖ Wireman, fifteen years Jett‘s junior, echoed his 
illustration of a rowdy, undisciplined and armed adolescence.  He credited the efforts of 
Bluegrass Kentuckians with bringing a more enlightened Christianity to the mountains 
and his own conversion.  He referenced the ―purest Anglo Saxon blood to be found on 
the American Continent‖ located in his home territory.1043 But Wireman had never taken 
part in a conflict deemed as organized into a feud proper.  Even though he had once 
served as a deputy sheriff, his career had no discernible connection to political struggles.  
Yet ―Bloody Breathitt‖ was still available to him as a foil for his own story of redemption 
although, as of 1950, the Hatfield-McCoy feud was better remembered to Wireman‘s 
potential readers, and he began his book with it rather than with anything that had 
happened to him personally.
1044
            
Feud, as long as it was in a distant enough past, was a useful memory, especially 
in conversion narratives that depend upon a stark division between a wicked past and a 
virtuous present.  Accounts of Bloody Breathitt written outside of the county were not as 
consistent in employing this stark division; it depended upon whether or not the 
storyteller wished to portray a space that was inherently violent or progressively 
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developed (by the passage of time or the contingency of positive exogenous forces) to a 
point where violence no longer took place, at least in an archaic ―medieval‖ form like a 
feud.  In contrast, local accounts like those of Pilcher, Jett and Wireman consistently 
rejected violent inherency reaching to their own present, but for different purposes.  
However, what they shared was a commitment to sustaining the memory of Bloody 
Breathitt as the site of an undeniably horizontal dispute or series of disputes, one defined 
by revenge and lawlessness rather than disputes over public power.  For the last 
generation to have witnessed or taken part in Breathitt County‘s feuds, the specifics of 
the past were best left in the past.  This end was best served by maintaining a measure of 
ambiguity.  The details of an event remembered as a feud, the names of the men who 
were killed and (especially) those of the men who did the killing, were best left unspoken.  
If a conflict was purely horizontal and there were ―deaths on both sides of the feud,‖ as 
Jett concluded, than no one was denied justice by this omission.  The possibility that this 
might not be the case was left roundly unconsidered.   
Maintaining feud as a descriptor of violence served this purpose for others later on.  
Later generations of people from Breathitt County did not speak of violence in their 
county in precisely the same way as these forbears, but the general inclination to separate 
past from present remained consistent.  In the 1930s Breathitt County high school 
students assigned to collect family oral histories displayed an acceptance of their county‘s 
violent past combined with a level of temporal detachment.  Two students‘ grandfathers, 
now happy to freely discuss the Hargis-Cockrell feud (and possibly the 1908 election riot 
that followed the subsequent Republican takeover) openly described the true nature of 
their political struggle, as well as evidence that the famous courthouse assassinations 
425 
 
were only part of a larger effort on Hargis‘ and Callahan‘s part.  ―‘I had six brothers until 
one of my brothers Jim was murdered on the middle fork in the Hargis and Callahan 
battle,‖ one reported to his grandchild.  ―I was lucky to get out alive but me and Fletch 
never was even wounded during the time we were fighting.  The Callahans were trying to 
run the county and who ever tried to get ahead of them they meraly [sic] shot them down 
and that was all.  But they had a job trying to run us out.‘‖1045  Another student whose 
grandfather had died before his or her birth reported that ―‘before [his death] a fuge [sic] 
came up between several parties and it was over politics.‘‖1046  Another elaborated, ―‘It 
begun in 1902, and lasted until 1907, and after this period Breathitt county, was called 
bloody Breathitt.  We people of Breathitt should be thankful for what our forefathers has 
done for us.‘‖1047   
Young people who did not experience the violence of the twentieth century‘s first 
decade had no reason to shy away from admitting political causality, since it bore no 
reflection upon their own lives.  To them, electoral politics of an earlier generation was 
practically as distant as seventeenth-century Scottish chieftains, and there was no need to 
create a temporal façade or to apply a teenager‘s ironic detachment.  The misspelled 
―‘fuge‘‖ suggests a relative unfamiliarity with the word.  However, another student who 
was asked to comment on more recent violent crime felt inclined to comment on what he 
or she considered the county‘s distant past, particularly a communal state that preceded 
politics.  ―We know that, from the first, the wilderness was their teacher and they 
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obtained a kind of education which fitted them for a life in the rough, for it was gained 
through actual experience with their environment.‖1048   
Even though these high school students were presumably natives of Breathitt 
County, and only a generation removed from the county‘s last nationally reported 
account of egregious violence, their descriptions of crime and violence within their home 
territory impose upon it the same language of foreignness used by ―outsiders‖ since the 
1870s.  To say that ―the wilderness was [the students‘ forbears‘] teacher‖ denied the 
historical nearness of violence in Breathitt County, placing it further back in history to a 
pioneer past (a time that was, historically, far more peaceful than that experienced by 
these students‘ parents).  None of the students claimed any direct knowledge or 
experience in violence of any sort, let alone attempted to defend their home county 
against the mockery and criticism that it had long endured.  With access to the 
enlightenment of national incorporation provided by New Deal programs, these students 
were now outside of the experience that had made their home nationally known, and at 
least one refused to lay claim to it without invoking a nostalgic ―wilderness‖ past.   
 
 
“The dirty old Breathitt County courthouse still stands, the place where Cockrell and 
J.B. Marcum were shot down in cold blood…” 
 
In 1978, eighty-one-year-old Breathitt County native Harlan Strong expressed a 
similar resolve to remember Bloody Breathitt as a past enormously different from the 
present, and expressed mild reverence for the lost strenuous life of his childhood.   
‗The horse and buggy days, they‘re past and gone.  Now it‘s automobile and airplane and stuff like 
that.  The Bible said they‘d go weaker and wiser.  People are certainly getting wiser but they‘re 
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weaker.  They‘re weaker in strength and wiser in knowledge.  This day and time a kid 15 years old, 
I‘d say twelve years old knows as much as I did when I was 25.  That‘s the truth.  They see so 
much and know so much.  That‘s right.  A lot of it is worthless, but still they know it.‘
1049
     
 
But the late-nineteenth-century violence that Harlan Strong was aware of, probably from 
popular rather than personal memory, was far away and factually confused.  He knew of 
the factional alignments designated by the ―Red Strings‖ and ―Ku Klux,‖ although he 
offered no elaboration on the larger Civil War-era contexts of these two names, and 
erroneously recollected the 1884 lynching of Henderson Kilburn and Ben Strong as 
having occurred in his lifetime (according to his own disclosure, Harlan Strong would 
have been born in 1896).  He also seemed to recall knowing ―Bill Strong,‖ who 
―belonged to what was called the Rebel and Yankee army,‖ even though the real-life Bill 
Strong he seemed to remember had been killed in 1897.
1050
  When asked to explain the 
origins of Bloody Breathitt, Harlan Strong reaffirmed the primordial foundations of a 
frontier society that many people both in and outside of the county had summoned up in 
the twentieth century, but augmented by allusions to prevailing technological change.           
‗The only difference now than back then is there‘s just more people now.  That‘s why people can 
see so much more because they‘re more people and there‘s more to talk about.  But they did just as 
bad in the early days when I was raised up as they‘re doing right now.  There just weren‘t so many 
people.  Mohegan law back in them days.  An eye for an eye.  A tooth for a tooth.  If you shoot me, 
I‘ll shoot you.  They abide by the law now.  Sure do.‘
1051
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―Mohegan law‖ explicitly ascribed the past with communal qualities that white 
Americans of the 1970s associated with Native Americans who, like feudists, were 
generally tucked safely within a distant earlier period.  The death of Native American 
nations and the feud could both be looked back upon as inevitabilities, since those 
looking back from a modern present could scarcely imagine their being extant.
1052
  A 
metaphor involving a savage Indian-related past, coupled with the Biblical analogy of 
violent reciprocation, confirmed Bloody Breathitt‘s persistence as a place and time of 
communal violence.  But Harlan Strong‘s ―prosthetic memory‖ of a lynching that took 
place before his birth, and others, demonstrates a continuity of a vague memory of 
political conflict as well.
1053
  A memory of the Red Strings and Ku Klux Klan confirmed 
the political foundations for the violence that took place before his childhood.  Even the 
ostensibly nonsensical description of William Strong as belonging to a ―Rebel and 
Yankee army‖ illustrated the political confusion of the era.  Even if this statement 
suggests instead Harlan Strong‘s ignorance of the Civil War, it nevertheless serves as a 
reminder of the strange and tenuous relationship that wartime Breathitt County‘s 
intimately fought ―local cleavage‖ shared with the larger ―master cleavage.‖1054  As a 
member of the Yankee army, William Strong had indeed been a rebel within his own 
home territory.  Long after the events that had created it, Bloody Breathitt was still a 
usable past, and one that did not require the same level of conscious subterfuge and 
omission that Louis Pilcher had employed sixty four years before.       
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 Were it not for one oral history project sponsored by the New York Times (the 
northern newspaper that had often seemed reluctant to attribute feud violence to the 
mountains rather than the state of Kentucky in the nineteenth century), Harlan Strong‘s 
individual memory of Bloody Breathitt would have remained unspoken and unrecorded.  
But in the Bluegrass the county and its place in eastern Kentucky‘s history were still 
referred to often as they became part of the national recognition of Appalachian poverty.  
Just as the existence of the feud was explained by the construction of temporal hierarchies 
decades before, in the late 1950s the same device was used to illustrate the region‘s 
underdevelopment.   
As always, the Bluegrass took the first turn at defining the other of the ―two 
Kentuckys.‖  In his study of pseudonymous ―Beech Creek, Kentucky,‖ University of 
Kentucky sociologist James S. Brown identified ―familialism‖ as the most persistent 
impediment to modernization in mountain society.
1055
 Allusions to Bloody Breathitt also 
remained a useful tool for placing a region, now unquestionably apart from the greater 
South, in the past.   During congressional hearings for the creation of the Area 
Redevelopment Administration (ARA), a Louisville paper‘s 1959 article on Breathitt 
County and its surroundings was used as evidence for the section‘s dire need for federal 
sponsorship.
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This is the land of legends, the mountain country of eastern Kentucky where a century of time is 
thought to have somehow got lost.  Blood feuds, moonshining, child brides, place names like Hell-
for-Sartain, Shoulderblade-the stuff for a thousand tales.  They were not all fictional. 
The dirty old Breathitt County courthouse still stands, the place where Cockrell and J.B. Marcum 
were shot down in cold blood in the incredible Hargis-Cockrell feud that claimed upwards of fifty 
lives before it ran its course a half century ago. 
This courthouse was recently condemned, an act that serves as well as a symbol of the gradual 
passing of the life of the legends.  Society is in transition [in Breathitt County], it is desperately 
trying to catch up with the 20
th
 century.
1057
 
 
The ―stuff for a thousand tales‖ had been the subject of fiction for so long that, by the 
1950s, it was reasonable to assume that the historical existence of eastern Kentucky‘s 
nineteenth century feuds could now be described as ―legendary.‖  Men killing other men 
for now-murky reasons had been replaced by the more recent memory of the Battle of 
Blair Mountain and ―bloody Harlan,‖ conflicts that could be more readily understood, 
regardless of political affiliation, and hardly denied, especially with John Lewis‘ then-
hearty United Mine Workers of America around as a reminder.
1058
  Very little existed to 
prove that the Hatfields and McCoys, the only feudists‘ names that most Americans 
remembered, had fought an internal war somewhere in a mountainous region where 
battles between coal companies and unions had now overshadowed atrocities that had 
taken place before.  Less iconic stories from the mountains were even more shrouded in 
doubt.  Cockrell and Marcum were names of victims remembered only by a dedicated 
student of Kentucky history, but they could still be used to prove a point.  For a structure 
associated with one of these medieval feuds, the symbol of local state authority that had 
been at the center of sporadic killings for years, to still be standing was an affront to 
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progress and proof that Breathitt County and the region needed federal assistance in order 
to ―catch up with the 20th century.‖  The dilapidated courthouse stood for a time of 
partisanship, and had no place in an era of consensus and widespread prosperity.  It was 
the only remainder of a past that had mostly passed on to legendary status, an especially 
ugly reminder in that it connected the feud to an emblem of state power.  For Breathitt 
County to achieve the legitimacy of being truly part of Kentucky and the American 
Republic, the ―symbol of the gradual passing of the life of the legends‖ had to go.                
The offensive old building was eventually torn down and replaced by the structure 
that serves as the court building at this writing (designed, fittingly, by a Lexington 
architectural firm).
1059
  But the source of its infamy was not completely erased.  In the 
twenty-first century a marker near the present Breathitt County courthouse in Jackson 
marks the spot of James Marcum‘s ―feudal‖ death.  But a larger marker nearby celebrates 
a far different distinction celebrated in the county: its contribution of military volunteers 
in time of war.  As early as the beginning of World War I in 1914, Jackson‘s US Army 
recruiting station was said to have ―more enlistments than at any station south of the Ohio 
River.‖1060  With the United States‘ entrance into the war three years later, Breathitt 
County was widely recognized as the only county in the entire country in which the 
number of volunteers for service exceeded the local draft board‘s quota.  As a result, 
Breathitt County was the only county in the United States in which no draft notices were 
issued.
1061
  From one perspective, the tremendous outpouring of volunteers reflected the 
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political identity of an ever-Democratic county rallying around the idealism of Woodrow 
Wilson (although the most funding raised for the war per capita was raised in nearby 
McCreary County, one of the most heavily Republican counties in the old ―Bloody 
Eleventh‖ congressional district).  From another, it was a patriotic motivation rather than 
a political one, and no other single county in America displayed such fervor for defense 
of the American Republic among its young male population.  From yet another, it was 
because of the ―fighting spirit,‖ endemic to Kentucky but pronounced in the mountains, 
that Louis Pilcher had once venerated.  Finally, the remarkable record of volunteers may 
have just as easily revealed a young male population with few local prospects and a 
collective eagerness to leave home, a familiar supposition that has applied to rural 
communities in all American wars.  In any case, the history of internal intraracial white 
violence that had segregated Breathitt County from the American nation-state was now 
balanced by a ―sturdy Americanism‖ that instead incorporated it into the whole, a call to 
duty from an exogenous source to replace a damaged and unusable endogenous 
identity.
1062
  Although this nationalistic distinction was still based in the use of violence, 
it was a violence whose legitimacy was scarcely disputed.   
Because of the supposedly small differences suggested by feud, the practice and 
acceptance of deadly fighting had once demonized Breathitt County.  But when practiced 
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for a larger goal, and attached to the ―defense‖ of a nation-state whose sanctioning of 
killing remains beyond question in the minds of most Americans, deadly violence could 
be a source of redemption as well.   
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